2  **  ,<^^ 


GENERAL  WILLIAM  HULL'S 

MEMOIRS 

THE  CAMPAIGN 

THE  NORTH  WESTERN  ARMY, 
1812. 


MEMOIRS 


OF 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF 
THE  NORTH  WESTERN  ARMY 

OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  A.D.   1812. 

IN  A  SERIES  OF  LETTERS  ADDRESSED   TO  THE  CITIZENS 
OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


WITH  AN  APPENDIX, 

CONTAINING    A    BHIEF    SKETCH   OF   THE   IIEYOLUTIONAHY  SERVICES   OT 

THE  AUTHOR. 


BY  WILLIAM  HULL, 

LATE  GOVERNOUR  OF  THE    TERRITORY    OF    MICHIGAN,    AND     BRIG 
ADIER    GENERAL    IN    THE    SERVICE    OF    THE    UNIT1 D    STATES. 


BOSTON. 

PUBLISHED  BY  TRUE  &  GREENE 


1824. 


•  .'•••' 


H 


.. 


MEMOIRS 

OF    THE    CAMPAIGN    OP    THE 

NORTH  WESTERN  ARMY, 

IN  THE  YEAR  1812. 

Addressed  to  the  People  of  the  United  States. 


No.  I. 

Fellow  Citizens, 

When  my  defence  before  the  Court  Martial  was  publish- 
ed, I  stated  in  a  preface  addressed  to  you,  that  it  was  not  then 
in  my  power  to  present  all  the  documents  and  evidence  which 
related  to  the  subject;  that  the  proceedings  were  deposited  in 
the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  the  department  of  War,  and  by 
law,  I  was  entitled  to  a  copy  of  them ;  and  as  soon  as  they  were 
obtained,  they  should  be  published  in  separate  numbers.  Until 
the  present  time,  I  have  not  been  able  to  obtain  them. 

Immediately  after  the  trial,  during  the  administration  of  Mr. 
Madison,  I  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  Gen. 
Armstrong,  requesting  a  certified  copy.  He  did  not  think  prop- 
er  to  comply  with  my  request,  or  even  return  an  answer  to  my 
application.  Lately,  under  the  administration  of  President 
Monroe,  they  have  been  prepared  and  transmitted  by  Mr.  Cal- 
houn, the  present  Secretary,  with  a  promptitude  and  indepen- 
dence becoming  the  character  of  that  officer. 

Although  it  has  been  a  source  of  severe  regret,  that  I  have  not 
been  able  to  make  this  communication  at  an  earlier  period,  yet 
under  all  circumstances,  perhaps  it  ought  not  to  be  considered 
a  misfortune.    All  who  were  then  actors  on  the  stage,    will  re- 


m  .98761 


Science  is  increasing  with  such  rapid  progress,  that  there  can 
be  no  doubt,  but  our  Country  will  soon  produce  an  American 
Livy  or  Tacitus,  who,  rising  above  the  atmosphere  of  prejudice, 
will  develope  the  true  causes  of  our  misfortunes,  as  well  as  of 
our  glory. 

The  first  war  in  our  country,  after  we  became  a  nation,  and 
the  first  military  operations  in  that  war,  whether  prosperous  or 
disastrous,  will  be  considered  as  interesting  events.  All  the 
evidence,  which  has  any  relation  to  them,  will  become  the  sub- 
ject of  the  research  of  such  an  Historian,  and  viewed  by  him 
with  deep  interest. — His  own  fame,  as  well  as  his  country's 
honour,  will  depend  on  his  strict  adherence  to  truth,  as  his  stand- 
ard, and  no  motives  can  be  presented,  so  powerful,  as  to  induce 
him  to  deviate  from  it. 

To  aid  you,  my  fellow  citizens,  in  forming  a  correct  judgment 
on  this  portion  of  our  history,  and  to  preserve  for  the  use  of 
such  an  Historian,  evidence  which  will  be  useful  to  him,  and  to 
posterity,  are  among  the  objects  of  the  following  memoirs. 
They  will  contain  the  views  of  the  administration  in  preparing 
a  force,  previously  to  the  declaration  of  war  ;  my  motives  in  ac- 
cepting the  command  ;  the  operations  of  the  campaign,  and  the- 
causes  of  its  disasters. 

I  now  have  the  happiness  to  believe,  I  shall  be  able  to  spread 
before  you  such  evidence,  and  principally  from  the  records  of 
the  government,  as  will  satisfy  you,  that  the  misfortunes  of  that 
campaign  ought  not  to  rest  on  me. 

In  recollecting  my  former  relations  to  my  fellow  citizens  of 
the  County  of  Middlesex,  I  cannot  but  hope  a  few  observations 
addressed  particularly  to  them,  will  be  acceptably  received. 

Having  lived  in  the  midst  of  you  nearly  forty  years  ;  having 
by  your  suffrages  been  elected  to  important  public  offices ;  hav- 
ing for  nearly  twentv  years  devoted  my  best  exertions,  and  my 
best  talents  to  the  discipline,  and  fame  of  the  3d  Division  of 
Militia,  and  having  experienced  your  kindness  and  friendship, 
it  is  impossible  for  me  to  feel  indifferent  to  your  opinions. 

If  the  mutual  friendly  intercourse,  which  so  long  subsisted  be- 
tween us,  is  still  remembered  by  you,  and  has  given  me  any 
claim  to  your  regards  ;  if  the  manner  in  which  I  discharged  the 
duties  of  the  public  offices,  which  I  held  by  your  suffrages,  en- 
titled me  to  your  approbation  and  confidence ;  and  if  the  for- 


tunes  I  have  since  experienced,  and  the  representations  which 
have  been  made  to  you,  have  made  any  unfavourable  impressions 
on  your  minds,  I  only  ask  you  to  read  the  statements  I  shall 
make,  and  the  evidence  on  which  they  are  founded,  and  on 
them  form  an  impartial  decision. 

I  presume  I  need  not  make  an  apology,  for  expressing  my 
strong  desire*  that  a  statement  of  the  facts  with  the  evidence, 
contained  in  the  following  numbers,  may  be  examined  with  at- 
tention, by  the  small  remnant  of  the  surviving  officers  of  the 
revolutionary  army. — It  is  impossible  for  me  to  call  to  mind  the 
scenes  and  events  of  that  period,  without  the  most  interesting 
recollections.  A  remembrance,  that  I  was  your  companion  in 
that  glorious  contest ;  that  I  often  fought  by  your  sides,  that 
you  were  witnesses  of  my  conduct,  in  the  battles  on  Long  Isl- 
and, at  the  White  Plains,  at  Trenton,  at  Prince  Town,  at  Sara- 
toga, and  Bhemis's  Heights,  at  Monmouth,  at  Stoney  Point, 
Morrissania,  and  on  many  other  memorable  occasions, — have 
been  a  source  of  happiness  and  support,  through  all  the  vicisi- 
tudes  of  fortune,  which  I  have  since  been  called  to  experience. 

A  recollection  ot  the  motives  which  animated  us  in  that  glori- 
ous contest ;  that  it  was  commenced  by  less  than  three  millions 
of  people;  that  we  have  lived  to  see  more  than  ten  millions,  in 
the  enjoyment  of  privileges  and  blessings,  derived  from  it  ;  that 
we  have  likewise,  lived  to  see  a  great  part  of  the  civilized  world, 
desirous  of  following  the  example,  and  wishing  to  enjoy  the 
same  privileges  and  blessings  ;  and  that  we  were  the  followers 
and  associates  of  the  illustrious  Washington,  and  under  his  ban- 
ners, acted  a  part,  however  small,  in  obtaining  such  privileges 
and  blessings,  for  our  fellow  citizens ;  and  producing  such  an 
example  to  the  civilized  world,  must  now  inspire  us  with  sensa 
turns,  which  no  language  can  describe,  which  will  cheer  the  de- 
cline of  life,  and  console  the  hour  of  death. 


No.  II. 

Before  I  proceed  in  my  narrative,  and  produce  the  docu- 
ments and  evidence  in  its  support,  1  will  exhibit  to  \our  view  a 
general  outline  of  the  facts,  which  it  will  be  my  object  to  prove, 
and  which  will  be  contained  in  the  following  numbers. 


8 

1 

In  the  first  place  I  shall  show,  that  I  accepted  a  military  ape 

pointment,  and  the  command  of  the  forces  in  Ohio,  in  time  of 
peace,  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  inhabitants  of  the  1  er- 
ritorv  of  which  I  was  Governor,  and  those  of  the  North-western 
frontier  against  the  savages  ; — That  I  considered  the  force  en- 
trusted to  my  command,  in  time  of  peace  with  Great  Britain, 
when  we  had   the  free  communication  of  Lake  Erie,  to  obtain 
the  necessary  supplies,  sufficient  for  that  object ; — That  these 
forces  being  ordered  nearly  four  months  before  the  declaration 
of  war,  and  there  being  strong  indications  that  it  would  take 
place,  I  communicated  to  the  government  my  views,  in  an  event 
of  that  kind  ; — That  these  official  communications  were  made 
both  before  and  after  I  accepted  this  command  ; — That  in  the 
event  I  have  mentioned,  I  stated  in  the  most  explicit  manner, 
that  a  naval  force,  sufficient  to  command  Lake  Erie,  would  be 
indispensably  necessary,  and  essential  to  success  ; — That  without 
such  a  force,  an  army  could  not  be  supported  at  Detroit,  and  that 
that  place,  Michillimackinack  and  Chicago,  must  necessarily  fall 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. — And  if  it  were  the  intention  of 
the  Government,  that  hostilities  should  be  commenced  from  that 
quarter  against  Upper  Canada,  it  would  be  indispensably  neces- 
sary, besides  the  co-operation  of  a  naval  force,  to  provide  an 
army  on  the  Niagara  river  to  assist  and  to  co-operate  with  the 
Army  at  Detroit.     That  these  communications,  having  been  re- 
ceived as  official  communications,  I  had  every  reason  to  believe, 
before  a  war  was  declared,  that  such  a  navy,  and  such  an  army, 
would  have  been  provided ; — That  with  these  impressions  I  pro- 
ceeded to  the  state  of  Ohio,  took  the  command  of  the  forces, 
which  consisted  of  1200  militia  and  volunteers,  and  about  three 
hundred  regulars; — That  these  militia  were  badly  armed,  badly 
clothed,  and  entirely  undisciplined  ;  That  my  orders  were  to 
march  to  Detroit,  and  make  the  best  arrangements  in  my  power 
for  the  protection  of  the  inhabitants  against  the  Indians  ;  That 
the  country  from  Urbanna  in  Ohio,  to  Detroit,  was  principally  a 
wilderness,  and  the  distance  about  200  miles  ; — That  I  was  fur- 
nished with  no  field  artillery  ;— That  on  the  2d  day  of  July,  near 
the  foot  of  the  rapids  of  the  Miama,  about  fifty-two  miles  from 
balden,  and  seventy  from  Detroit,  I  first  received  information 
of  war  against  Great  Britain,  fourteen  days  after  it  had  been  de- 
clared ;— That  the  letter  from  the  Ad    inistration  announcing 
this  event,  was  delivered  to  me  by  a  stranger,  who  informed  me 


9 

that  it  was  brought  by  the  mail  to  the  Post  Office  in  Cleaveland, 
state  of  Ohio,  and  the  Post  Master  of  that  place  had  employed 
him  to  deliver  it  to  me,  wherever  he  found  me,  on  my  march  to 
Detroit ; — That  the  rout  it  was  sent  was  very  circuitous,  and  if  it 
had  been  sent  by  an  express,  it  might  have  reached  me  in  four 
or  five  days  at  farthest  ;— That  the  enemy  at  Maiden,  fifty 
miles  more  distant  from  Washington  than  my  army,  received 
the  information  several  days  before  ; — That  by  this  letter  from 
the  administration,  I  was  not  only  informed  that  war  was  de- 
clared against  Great  Britain,  but  was  positively  ordered  to  march 
the  forces  under  my  command  to  Detroit,  eighteen  miles  in  the 
rear  of  the  enemy's  principal  fortress  at  Maiden  ;  and  there  wait 
for  further  orders ; — That  on  the  first  day  of  July,  having  receiv- 
ed no  information  of  the  declaration  of  war,  and  supposing  the 
navigation  of  the  Lake  to  be  safe,  a  vessel  was  employed  by  the 
Quarter-Master,  to  transport  the  sick  of  the  army,  and  the  stores 
and  baggage,  not  necessary  on  the  march,  to  Detroit ; — That 
this  vessel  was  taken  by  the  enemy  on  her  passage,  and  that  this 
first  misfortune  was  occasioned  by  the  neglect  of  the  administra- 
tion, in  not  giving  me  information  of  the  war  eight  days  sooner, 
which  might  easily  have  been  done ; — That  I  have  the  strongest 
possible  ground  to  declare,  that  this  might  have  been  done,  be- 
cause I  shall  show,  that  I  received  a  letter  from  Washington,  on 
the  26th  of  June,  and  dated  also  the  18th,  the  same  date  with 
the  letter  announcing  the  declaration  of  war,  by  express,  which 
gave  no  information  of  the  declaration  of  war. 

I  shall  prove  by  the  records  of  the  government  that  I  stated  in 
the  most  explicit  terms  to  the  administration,  that  Detroit,  or 
some  position  on  the  waters  of  Lake  Erie,  would  be  a  suitable 
position  for  troops,  in  time  of  peace  with  Great  Britain,  design- 
ed for  the  protection  of  the  Michigan  Territory,  and  the  North- 
western frontier  against  the  savages. — But  in  the  event  of  war 
with  that  nation,  it  would  be  impossible  to  support  an  army  in 
that  country,  without  a  naval  force,  sufficient  to  preserve  the 
communication  of  the  Lake,  and  without  a  powerful  army  on  the 
Niagara  strait,  to  take  possession  of  the  enemies  posts,  on  that 
strait,  and  co-operate  with  such  forces  as  should  make  an  inva- 
sion from  Detroit,  and  by  the  co-operation  of  guch  forces,  take 
possession  of  the  Province.  I  shall  show  that  this  order  of  the 
administration  to  march  my  army  to  Detroit,  after  the.  declara* 


10 

tion  of  war,  and  no  navy  being  provided,  to  preserve  the  com- 
munication of  the  Lake,  and  no  army  on  the  Niagara  strait, 
which  ever  co-operated  with  me,  was  contrary  to  what  J  had 
sufficient  grounds  to  believe  was  the  understanding  before  I  left 
Washington  ;  contrary  to  the  most  explicit  opinion  I  had  given 
on  the  subject;  contrary  to  all  military  experience,  and  the 
principles  which  have  been  taught  by  the  best  military  writers  ; 
—That  I  obeyed  this  order  because  it  was  positive,  and  under 
the  full  expectation,  that  a  naval  force,  and  an  army  would  have 
been  provided  to  have  assisted  and  co-operated  with  me,  and 
that  I  had  sufficient  reasons  to  expect  such  assistance  and  co- 
operation in  the  event  of  war,  and  in  the  invasion  of  <  anada;-— 
That  in  compliance  with  these  orders,  I  passed  the  enemy's  post 
at  Maiden,  and  proceeded  to  Detroit,  eighteen  miles  in  the  rear 
of  that  post,  and  both  situated  on  the  3ame  river,  where  I  arriv- 
ed on  the  5th  of  July  ; — That  notwithstanding  my  orders  were 
positive  to  remain  there  until  I  should  receive  further  orders, 
the  militia  and  volunteer  officers  nearly  excited  a  mutiny,  be- 
cause I  did  not  immediately  cross  the  river,  and  commence  of- 
fensive operations  in  violation  of  my  orders  ; — That  on  the  9th 
of  July,  I  received  an  unqualified  authority,  which  from  the 
manner  in  which  it  was  expressed,  could  have  had  no  other  con- 
struction, than  a  positive  order  to  cross  the  river,  and  invade  the 
enemy's  territory ;  and  to  issue  a  proclamation  to  the  inhabi- 
tants, and  to  pledge  the  government  that  they  should  be  protect- 
ed in  their  persons,  property,  and  rights ;  and  in  the  same  let- 
ter I  was  only  authorized  to  attack  the  fortress  at  Maiden,  pro- 
vided, in,  my  opinion,  my  iorces  were  adequate  to  the  enterprise, 
and  it  could  be  done  consistently  with  the  safety  of  my  other 
posts ; — That  I  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  inhabitants,  and  on 
the  morning  of  the  12th  of  July,  crossed  the  river  and  took  pos- 
session of  the  opposite  bank,  in  the  face  of  the  enemy  ; — That  I 
was  induced  to  adopt  these  measures  from  the  orders  I  received 
from  the  government,  from  the  impatience  of  my  army,  from  the 
convenience,  and  even  necessity  of  collecting  supplies  from  the 
enemy's  country,  from  the  expectation  of  co-operation,  and  from 
the  hope  that  a  display  uf  the  American  flag  on  both  sides  the 
river,  would  have  a  favourable  effect  on  the  savages  and  militia 
of  the  province  ; — That  the  authority  I  received  to  attack  the 
enemy's  fortress  at  Maiden,  being  discretionary,  I  wrote  to  the 


II 

Government  the  same  day  I  received  it,  that  my  force  was  not 
adequate  to  the  enterprize,  and  stated  as  a  reason,  that  the  ene- 
my commanded  the  Lake  and  the  savages. 

That  I  remained  in  the  enemy's  country  about  a  month,  un- 
der the  expectation  of  receiving  assistance  and  co-operation  from 
the  army  under  the  command  of  General  Dearborn,  at  Niagara ; 
that  during  this  time  I  received  information  that  Michillimai  ki- 
nack,  on  the  same  navigable  waters  with  Detroit  and  Maiden, 
had  fallen  ;  that  the  forces,  with  the  savages,  of  all  that  region, 
were  descending  the  waters  of  the  northern  lakes  against  me; 
that  I  likewise  had  received  certain  information,  that  General 
Brock,  with  all  the  regulars  and  militia  of  Upper  Canada,  was 
proceeding  to  Maiden  ;  and  that  the  road  I  had  opened  through 
the  wilderness,  from  Ohio,  was  filled  with  hostile  savages, 
and  that  no  supplies  could  be  obtained  for  the  army  through  that 
communication  ; — That,  under  these  circumstances,  I  consider- 
ed that  it  was  my  duty  to  re-cross  the  river,  with  the  principal 
part  of  my  forces,  and  attempt  to  open  the  only  communication 
I  could  now  possibly  have  with  my  country  ; — That  on  the  8th 
of  August,  I  re- crossed  the  river  to  Detroit,  and  on  the  same 
day  made  a  detachment  of  all  the  regulars,  and  part  ot  the  Ohio 
militia,  amounting  to  600,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Miller, 
with  orders  to  proceed  to  the  river  Raisin,  for  the  purpose  of 
opening  that  communication ;  that  on  his  way  to  that  station,  he 
was  attacked,  near  Brownstown,  by  the  regulars,  militia,  and 
savages,  from  Maiden,  and  that,  after  the  loss  of  between  eighty 
and  ninety  men  on  our  part,  the  enemy  was  compelled  to  re- 
treat ;  that,  as  it  was  the  opinion  of  Colonel  Miller,  that  this 
detachment  could  not  proceed  to  the  river  Raisin,  without  a 
reinforcement  of  150  or  200  men,  I  thought  proper  to  order  him 
back  to  Detroit,  especially  as  the  troops  had  been  out  in  a  vio- 
lent storm,  were  greatly  fatigued,  and  it  was  necessary  to  re- 
move, and  provide  for  the  wounded ; — That  on  the  14th  of  August, 
not  having  received  information,  of  the  arrival  of  General  Brock, 
and  the  necessity  of  opening  the  communication,  for  the  purpose 
of  obtaining  supplies,  becoming  more  urgent,  1  made  another 
detachment,  of  the  effective  men  of  Colonels  McArthur  and 
Cass'  regiments,  commanded  by  the  two  Colonels,  for  the  pur- 
pose :  that  as  soon  as  I  received  information  of  the  arrival  of 
General  Brock,  with  the  forces,  from  the  eastern  part  of  the 


12 

province,  I  immediately  sent  expresses,  with  orders  t6  Mc  Arthur4 
and  Cass  to  return  to  Detroit.  That  when  General  Brock, 
landed  at  the  Spring  Wells,  three  miles  below  Detroit,  on  the 
morning  of  the  16th  of  August,  I  had  received  no  information 
from  them,  and  must  have  supposed  they  were  at  the  river 
Raisin,  about  fifty  miles  from  Detroit,  the  route  they  were  or- 
dered to  march.  And  I  pledge  myself,  fellow  citizens,  to  prove 
to  the  satisfaction  of  every  unprejudiced  mind,  that  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  16th,  when  General  Brock  landed,  the  provisions 
were  exhausted,  that  there  was  no  possibility  of  obtaining  a  sup- 
ply from  any  quarter  whatever,  and  that  his  effective  force  was 
much  more  than  twice  my  number.  That  my  communication 
was  entirely  cut  off,  both  by  land  and  water  ;  that  a  part  of  the 
Michigan  militia  deserted,  and  joined  General  Brock's  stand- 
ard, as  soon  as  he  landed  ;  that  the  savages  were  let  loose  on 
the  inhabitants,  whom  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  protect ;  and 
that  even  a  victory  against  his  regulars  and  militia,  that  mor- 
ning, would  have  been  only  a  useless  waste  of  blood — that  I 
could  not  have  conquered  his  savages  in  the  wilderness,  or  his 
navy  on  the  Lake,  and  consequently  could  not  have  opened  my 
communication ;  that,  under  the  circumstances  my  army  was 
placed  by  the  orders  of  the  government,  it  could  no  more  exist, 
than  the  human  arm  can  exist  when  cut  off  from  the  body ;  and 
that  the  measures  I  adopted  were  necessary,  from  my  situation, 
and  dictated  by  the  highest  sense  of  duty  ;  that  I  was  forced  into 
this  situation,  by  the  orders  of  the  government,  and  every  avenue 
to  it  was  closed  by  the  enemy,  in  such  a  manner  that  there  was 
not  a  possibility  of  escaping.  And  here  I  shall  wish  to  be  dis- 
tinctly understood ;  I  have  said,  that  the  order  which  I  received 
from  the  government  to  march  to  Detroit,  after  the  declaration 
of  war,  and  when  Lake  Erie  was  in  possession  of  the  enemy's 
naval  force,  was  contrary  to  all  military  experience,  and  one 
fatal  cause  of  the  disasters  of  the  campaign.  It  was  the  case,  as 
the  result  has  proved.  Had  the  orders  however  of  the  govern- 
ment been  obeyed  by  General  Dearborn,  the  result  probably 
would  have  been  very  different.  I  shall  show,  that  he  was  re- 
peatedly ordered,  by  the  letters  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  by 
the  command  of  the  President,  immediately  after  the  declaration 
of  war,  to  assemble  the  forces  under  his  command  on  the  Nia- 
gara River,  to  attack  the  enemy's  posts  in  that  part  ef  the  prov- 


13 

ince  of  Upper  Canada,  and  co-operate  with  the  forces  under  my 
command  ;  that  during  that  time  he  never  suffered  a  man  to  en- 
ter the  enemy's  country,  that  he  neglected  to  obey  the  positive 
commands  of  his  government ;  and  without  any  orders,  agreed 
to  an  armistice,  or  suspension  of  hostilities,  with  Sir  George 
Provost,  in  which  my  army  was  not  included ;  which  will  be 
shown,  enabled  General  Brock,  with  all  the  forces  of  Upper 
Canada,  and  indeed  a  large  reinforcement  from  Montreal,  to 
proceed  to  Maiden,  and  attack  me  :  that  he  established  a  peace 
on  the  Niagara  frontier,  and  it  became  only  necessary  for  the 
enemy  to  leave  at  their  forts  in  that  quarter  a  few  invalids  to 
guard  their  barracks,  &c.  And  I  shall  further  show,  that  after 
General  Dearborn,  the  commanding  General  of  the  armies,  had 
thus  neglected  to  obey  the  orders  of  the  government,  and  had 
been  the  great  cause  of  the  disasters  of  the  campaign,  he  was 
appointed  the  President  of  the  Court  Martial  for  my  trial ;  and 
that,  although  the  administration  employed,  at  your  expense, 
two  of  the  first  counsellors  in  our  country,  Mr.  Dallas,  and  Mr. 
Van  Buren,  to  assist  the  Judge  Advocate  in  the  posecution,  the 
Court  would  not  suffer  me  to  employ  any  counsel  at  my  own 
expense,  to  open  their  lips  in  the  Court ;  and  the  opinions  of 
officers  were  admitted  to  prove  entire  charges  and  specifications 
against  me.  That  the  officers,  who  were  selected  by  the  admin- 
istration to  give  their  opinions  respecting  my  conduct,  and  to 
testify  against  me,  had  been  promoted,  after  the  capitulation, 
from  Lieutenant  Colonels  in  the  militia,  to  the  rank  of  Generals 
in  the  regular  army,  and  others  of  inferior  rank  on  a  similar 
scale  :  that  the  most,  outrageous  measures  were  adopted  to  ex- 
cite your  prejudices  against  me ;  that  the  officers  who  appeared 
as  witnesses,  were  applauded  in  the  public  Newspapers  for  the 
manner  in  which  they  testified,  and  pamphlets  were  printed  and 
hawked  for  sale,  at  the  very  door  of  the  Capitol  where  I  was 
tried,  filled  with  the  most  scandalous  falsehoods.  That  1  was 
accused  by  the  administration  of  capital  crimes  for  acts,  which 
I  shall  prove  by  the  letters  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  Presi- 
dent had  before  fully  approved  ;  and  that  the  proclamation  I  is- 
sued to  the  Canadians  was  by  order  of  the  President  :  that  as 
soon  as  it  was  issued  it  was  sent  to  him ;  and  after  he  received 
it,  I  shall  produce  letters,  written  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  by 
his  order,  to  showr  that  all  my  conduct,  operations,  and  arrange- 


u 

mcnts,  were  not  only  approved  by  him,  but  viewed  with  the 
highest  satisfaction  :  that  notwithstanding  this  unqualified  ap- 
probation of  the  proclamation  by  the  President,  the  Plenipoten- 
tiaries at  the  treaty  of  Ghent,  without  any  instructions  from  the 
administration  on  that  subject,  declared  to  the  British  Plenipo- 
tentiaries, and  consequently  to  the  British  nation  and  to  the 
world,  that  it  was  unauthorized,  and  disapproved  by  the  Gov- 
ernment :  that  in  an  interview  with  the  Hon.  John  Quincy  Ad- 
ams, one  of  the  Plenipotentiaries,  in  answer  to  my  inquiry,  on 
what  ground  that  declaration  was  made,  he  answered,  that  they 
had  no  particular  instructions  to  make  the  declaration,  that  they 
received  the  information  from  Mr.  Gallatin,  that  he  wrote  the 
paper  which  contained  it,  and  he  being  one  of  the  Plenipotentia- 
ries, the  others  were  induced  to  give  it  their  signatures. 

I  have  given  a  very  general  sketch  of  the  subjects  of  the  fol- 
lowing memoirs.  The  facts  stated  will  be  proved  by  the  best 
evidence  of  which  the  nature  of  the  case  will  admit ;  and  princi- 
pally by  the  records  of  the  government  itself  After  you  are 
possessed  of  the  facts  and  evidence,  I  shall  cheerfully  submit 
the  question  to  your  candid  judgment.  It  is  difficult  always  to 
form  a  correct  opinion,  in  our  own  case.  I  can  however  declare 
with  safety,  that  if  I  have  committed  errours,  they  were  errours 
of  the  head,  and  not  of  the  heart. 


No.  III. 


As  a  desire  for  military  fame  and  motives  of  ambition,  have 
been  imputed  to  me,  I  consider  it  a  duty  which  I  owe  both  to 
myself  and  to  you,  to  explain  the  true  reasons,  which  finally, 
and  very  reluctantly  induced  me  to  accept  an  appointment  in 
the  army,  and  to  satisfy  you  that  the  imputations  are  without 
any  foundation.  It  has  likewise  been  represented,  and  is  be- 
lieved by  many,  that  I  urged  on  the  government  the  expediency 
of  a  declaration  of  war  against  Great  Britain,  at  the  time  of  my 
military  appointment,  and  made  representations  that  the  Can- 
adians were  dissatisfied  with  their  government,  were  desirous 
of  independence,  would  join  the  American  standard,  whenever 
it  was  displayed  in  their  territory,  and  that  the  conquest  of 
those  provinces  might  be  easily  effected  with  a  small  force.     So 


15 

far  from  ever  expressing;  or  entertaining  opinions  of  this  kind, 
I  shall  shew  you,  from  the  records  of  the  government,  the  repre- 
sentations which  I  made,  both  before  and  after  I  accepted  a 
militarv  appointment;  these  communications  must  be  consider- 
ed the  best  evidence  the  nature  of  the  case  will  admit,  of  the 
views  I  entertained.  Before  I  present  them  to  you,  I  will  ask 
your  attention  to  the  particular  reasons  which  induced  me  to 
accept  a  military  appointment  before  the  declaration  of  war,  in 
June  1312. 

Being  at  Washington  in  February  1812,  and  being  at  that 
time  governour  of  the  Territory  of  Michigan,  and  accounts  having 
been  received  from  that  section  of  the  country,  that  the  Indians 
were  becoming  hostile  to  the  defenceless  inhabitants  of  that  ex- 
posed frontier,  it  was  natural  for  me  to  feel  a  solicitude  for  their 
safety.  I  urged  on  the  officers  of  the  administration,  the  expe- 
diency of  providing  a  force  for  their  protection.  At  this  time, 
in  consequence  of  the  differences  which  existed  between  our  gov- 
ernment and  Great  Britain,  Congress  had  thought  it  expedient 
to  augment  the  army,  and  was  taking  measures  for  the  purpose. 
These  measures  were  well  known  to  the  officers  who  adminis- 
tered the  government  in  the  province*  of  the  Canadas,  and  the 
causes  which  produced  them.  In  the  event  of  a  war  with  Eng- 
land, they  were  satisfied  that  the  invasion  of  those  provinces 
would  be  the  first  object.  The  numerous,  and  powerful  tribes 
of  savages,  which  not  only  inhabited  that  country,  but  also  the 
northern  and  western  territory  of  the  United  States,  were  con- 
sidered as  the  allies  and  friends  of  England.  On  them  she  de- 
pended for  assistance,  whenever  her  dominions  were  invaded. 
The  strong  indications  of  war,  which  were  then  apparent,  in- 
duced his  Brittannic  Majesty's  officers  to  adopt  measures  of 
precaution  and  safety  against  the  impending  storm.  Messages 
were  therefore  sent  to  the  different  tribes,  informing  them  of 
the  warlike  preparations  which  were  making  by  the  United 
States,  of  the  events  which  probably  would  soon  take  place,  and 
inviting  them  to  join  their  standard  in  such  a  result.  These 
messages  were  accompanied  with  unusual  quantities  of  presents, 
consisting  of  munitions  of  war,  clothing,  and  ornaments,  gratify- 
ing to  their  pride  and  vanity.  The  British  nation,  ever  since 
her  possession  of  the  Canadas,  has  expended  immense  sums  of 
money  m  presents,  not  only  to  the  Indians,  who  inhabit  her  prov- 


16 

i 

mces,  but  also  to  those  who  reside  within  the  territories  of  the 
United  States.  On  this  occasion  every  effort  was  made  to  pre- 
pare them  for  the  approaching  crisis. 

Of  all  employments,  war  is  the  most  grateful  to  a  savage. 
The  prospect  of  it  did  not  fail  to  produce  the  excitement,  in- 
tended, by  the  means  made  use  of  by  the  British  agents.  It 
became  apparent,  from  the  manner  they  assembled  to  celebrate 
their  war  feasts,  and  from  the  hostile  dispositions  they  manifest- 
ed towards  the  inhabitants  of  the  frontier,  and  particularly  to- 
wards those  of  the  territory  of  Michigan,  which  borders  several 
hundred  miles  on  the  Canadas,  and  is  only  separated  by  an 
imaginary  line,  in  the  middle  of  the  rivers  and  lakes.  The 
hostile  indications,  which  were  frequently  accompanied  with 
acts  of  cruelty  and  murder,  excited  alarm  among  the  inhabitants, 
and  were  represented  both  by  the  civil  authorities  and  command- 
ing officers  of  the  garrisons,  as  foreboding  evils,  against  which  it 
was  necessary  to  guard.  The  exposed  and  dangerous  situation 
of  that  section  of  the  country,  being  thus  made  known  -o  the  ad- 
ministration, measures  were  promptly  adopted  for  its  safety.  The 
governor  of  the  state  of  Ohio,  was  called  on,  by  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  to  detach  1200  militia,  and  prepare  them 
for  actual  service.  These  militia  were  to  be  joined  by  the  4th 
U.  vS.  Regiment,  then  at  Post  St.  Vincennes. 

After  these  arrangements  were  made,  the  Secretary  of  War 
informed  me,  that  it  was  the  desire  of  the  President,  that  I 
should  accept  the  appointment  of  a  brigadier  General,  in  the 
army,  and  take  the  command  of  mese  forces,  and  march  them 
to  Detroit,  the  place  of  their  destination.  I  observed  to  the 
Secretary,  that  I  was  not  desirous  of  any  military  appointment, 
and  declined  it  in  the  most  unqualified  manner.  Another  offi- 
cer was  designated  for  this  command,  and  ordered  to  "Washing- 
ton to  receive  his  instructions.  On  his  arrival,  he  became  dis- 
qualified by  sickness.  The  proposition  was  again  made  to  me, 
and  the  necessity  of  a  force  in  the  country,  for  the  purposes 
before  mentioned,  being  more  urgent,  I  informed  the  Secretary, 
that  I  was  going  to  my  government  at  Detroit.,  and  I  would  ac- 
cept any  military  appointment,  either  the  rank  ot  Lieutenant 
Colonel,  Colonel,  or  Brigadier  General,  which  would  give  me 
the  command  of  those  forces,  and  lead  them  through  the  wilder- 
ness to  their  place    of  destination.     In  consequence  of  this 


17 

consent,  I  was  immediately  nominated  and  appointed  a  Briga* 
dier  General.  I  accepted  the  appointment,  with  great  reluc- 
tance, -and  from  no  other  motive  and  with  no  other  view, 
than  to  afford  my  aid  in  the  protection  of  the  frontier  inhabi- 
tants, and  those  of  the  Territory  of  Michigan  against  the  sava- 
ges. 

As  proof  of  the  principal  facts  here  stated  in  relation  to  my 
appointment  as  a  Brigadier  General  in  the  army,  I  will  state  the 
testimony  of  his  excellency  Governour  Eustis,  who  was  then 
Secretary  of  the  Department  of  War ; — the  whole  of  which  may 
be  seen  in  Lieut.  Col.Forbes's  report  of  my  trial,  pages  3,  4,  and 
S,  of  the  appendix. 

The  part  relating  to  the  facts  referred  to,  is  as  follows  : — 
"The  latter  part  of  February  1812,  information  had  been  re- 
ceived from  Mr.  Atwater,  then  Secretary  of  the  ^Territory  of 
Michigan,  and  acting  as  Govornour,  that  there  were  strong  ap- 
pearances of  hostility  among  the  Indians,  and  that  the  territory 
was  in  danger.  That  Gen.  Hull  urged  on  him,  as  Secretary 
of  War,  the  expediency  and  necessity  of  ordering  a  force  there, 
for  the  protection  of  Detroit,  the  territory,  and  the  northern 
frontier.  That  he  declined  in  the  first  instance  accepting  the 
office  of  Brigadier  General.  That  Col.  Kingsbury  was  then  or- 
dered to  Washington,  for  the  purpose  of  proceeding  to  the  state 
of  Ohio  to  take  the  command  of  this  force,  and  on  account  of 
bodily  indisposition,  was  not  ordered  on  the  command — and  af- 
terwards, when  he  (Gen.  Hull,)  was  appointed,  it  was  not  soli- 
cited by  him — and  that  he  manifested  great  anxiety  for  the  safe- 
ty of  the  northern  frontier,  and  the  Territory  oFMichigan." 

I  have  made  this  statement,  and  produced  this  evidence,  for 
no  other  purpose,  than  to  satisfy  you.  that  I  did  not  accept  this 
appointment  from  the  motives  which  have  been  unjustly  impu- 
ted to  me. 

Having  for  seven  years  been  Governour  of  the  territory,  and 
being  then  the  Governour,  it  was  impossible  forme  to  feel  indif- 
ferent to  the  safety  of  its  inhabitants.  I  consented  therefore 
to  accept  any  military  appointment,  which  the  government 
should  think  proper  to  give  me,  for  this  purpose.  And  it  was 
distinctly  understood,  that  this  appointment  was  not  incompati- 
ble with  my  office  as  Governour,  and  that  office  was.  to  be  re- 
tained by  me*     As  evidence  that  this  was  the  intention  of  the 

.3 


18 

administration,  I  received  orders,  on  my  arrival  in  the  ter- 
ritory, to  perform  my  civil  duties,  in  the  same  manner,  as  if  no 
such  appointment  had  been  made — as  a  further  evidence,  that 
this  was  the  intention,  I  never  asked  for,  or  received  a  military 
commission,  in  consequence  of  the  appointment.  And  further, 
it  was  my  intention,  when  the  object  of  safety  to  the  inhabitants 
was  accomplished,  and  my  military  duties  in  any  degree  interfer- 
ed with  my  duties  as  Governour,  to  have  resigned  the  military 
appointment.  I  have  been  thus  particular,  to  satisfy  you,  my 
fellow  citizens,  what  were  my  motives  in  accepting  a  military 
appointment, — and  to  your  candid  judgment  I  appeal,  whether 
they  were  laudable. 

1  believed  it  to  be  my  duty,  to  make  use  of  every  exertion  in 
my  power,  for  the  protection  of  a  people,  with  whom  I  was  so 
nearly  connected,  against  the  dangers  with  which  they  were 
threatened. 

As  the  differences,  which  existed  between  the  United  States, 
and  Great  Britain  had  not  been  settled  by  negociation,  and  as 
there  appeared  indications  of  war,  in  my  next  number,  I  shall 
state  the  views  I  communicated  to  the  government,  before  I  left 
"Washington,  in  such  an  event. 


No.  IV. 


In  my  former. number,  I  have  explained  what  were  the  objects 
of  the  government,  in  detaching  the  Ohio  militia  in  1812,  before 
war  was  declared,  and  what  were  my  motives  in  taking  the  com- 
mand of  them  ;  viz.  the  protection  of  the  inhabitants  on  the 
frontier  of  our  country  against  the  savages. 

I  shall  now  endeavour  to  demonstrate,  that  it  was  neither  the 
expectation  of  the  Government,  nor  my  expectation,  at  the  time  I 
accepted  the  command,  that  these  forces,  in  the  event  of  war 
with  Great  Britain,  would  have  been  employed  in  the  invasion 
of  Upper  Canada,  without  a  sufficient  naval  force,  to  have  com- 
manded Lake  Erie,  and  to  have  preserved  the  water  communis 
cation  from  the  states  of  New-York,  Pennsylvania,  and  Ohio, 
which  border  on  the  south  and  east  part  of  said  lake;  and  like- 
wise, without  the  co-operation  of  other  forces  to  the  same  object 


19 

As  earl j  as  the  3d  of  April,  1809,  being  then  Governour  of  the 
Territory  of  Michigan,  I  addressed  an  official  letter  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  department  of  war,  in  relation  to  the  security  and  de- 
fence of  the  frontier  settlement  of  our  country  in  which,   among 
other  things,  I  observed,  "I  would   suggest    for  consideration 
the  expediency  of  building  some  armed  vessels  on   Lake  Erie, 
for  the  purpose  of  preserving  the  communication  ;  consider   you 
have  three  military  posts,  to  the  north  and  west  of  these  waters 
and  no  other  communication  with   them."     The   15th   of  June, 
181 1,  about  a  year  before  the  declaration  of  war,  against  Great 
Britain,  I  addressed  another  letter  to  the  government,  through 
the  Secretary,  from  which  the  following  is  extracted ;  "  From 
the    present  state  of  our   foreign   relations,    particularly    with 
England*  I  am  ind;  ced  to  believe,  there  is   little   prospect  of  a 
continuance  of  peace.     In  the  event  of  a  war  with  England, 
this  part  of  the  United  States,   (meaning  the  Michigan   Territo- 
ry) will  be  particularly  situated.     The  British  land  forces   at 
Amherstburg  and  St.   Joseph's,  are  about  equal  to  those  of  the 
Unite;!  States,  at  this  place  and  Michilimackinack.     The  popu- 
lation, of  Upper   Canada  is  more  than  twenty  to  one  compared 
to  this  territory.      That  province  contains  about  one  hundred 
thousand  inhabitants,  while  our  population  does  not  amount  to 
five  thousand.     A  wilderness  of  near  two  hundred  miles  sepa- 
rates this  settlement  from  any  of  the  states.     Besides,   the  In- 
diana Territory  and  states  of  Ohio  and  Kentucky  are  thinly  in- 
habited, Ifave  extensive  frontiers,  and  their  force  will  be  neces- 
sary for  their  own  defence.      With  respect  to  the  Indians,  their 
situation  and  habits   are  such,  that  little  dependence  can   be 
placed  on  them.     At  present  they  appear  friendly,  and  was  I  to 
calculate  on  the  profession  of  their  chiefs,  I  should  be  satisfied 
that  they  would  not  become  hostile.     Their  first  passion,  how- 
ever, is  war.     The  policy  of  the  British  government  is  to  con- 
sider them  their  allies,  and  in  the  event  of  war,   to  invite  them 
to  join  their  standard.    The  policy  of  the  American  government 
has  been  to  advise  them,  in  the  event  of  war,  to  remain  quiet  at 
their  villages,  and  take  no  part  in  quarrels,  in  which  they  have  no 
interest.     Many  of  their  old  Sachems  and  Chiefs  would  advise 
to  his  line  of  conduct.     Their  authority,  however,  over  the  war- 
riors would  not  restrain  them.     They  would  not  listen  to  their 
advice.     An  Indian  is  hardly  considered  as  a  man,  until  he  has 
been  engaged  in  war,  and  can   show  trophies.    This   first,  and 


20 

most  ardent  of  all  their  passions,  will  be  excited  by  presents', 
most  gratifying  to  their  pride  and  \anity.  Unless  strong  meas- 
ures are  taken  to  prevent  it,  we  may  consider  beyond  all  doubt, 
they  will  be  influenced  to  follow  the  advice  of  their  British  Father. 
This  then  appears  to  be  the  plain  state  of  the  case  ;  tm?  British 
have  a  regular  force,  equal  to  ours.  The  province  of  Upper  Can- 
ada has  on  its  rolls,  a  militia  of  twenty  to  one  against  us.  In 
addition  to  this,  there  can  be  little  doubt,  but  a  large  proportion 
of  the  savages  will  join  them  ;  what  then  will  be  the  situation  of 
this  part  oijhe  country  ?  Separated  from  the  states  by  an  exten- 
sive wilderness,  which  will  be  filled  with  savages,  to  prevent 
any  succour,  our  water  communications  entirely  obstructed  by 
the  British  armed  vessels  on  Lake  Erie,  we  shall  have  no  other 
resource  for  defence,  but  the  small  garrisons,  and  feeble  popula- 
tion of  the  territory.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  easy 
to  foresee  what  will  be  the  fate  of  this  country. 

"It  is  a  principle  in  nature,  that  the  lesser   force  must  give 
way  to  the  greater.     Since  my  acquaintance  with  the   situation 
of  this  country,  I  have  been  of  the  opinion  that  the  government 
did  not  sufficiently  estimate  its   value  and  importance.     After 
the  revolution,  and  after  it  was  ceded  to  us  by  treaty,  the  blood 
and  treasure  of  our  country,   were  expended  in  a  savage  war  to 
obtain  it.     The  post  at  this  place,  is  the  key   of  the   northern 
country.     By  holding  it  the  Indians  are  kept  in   check,   and 
peace  has  been  preserved  with  them  to  the  present  time.     If  we 
were  once  deprived  of  it,  the  northern    Indians   would  have  no 
where  to  look,  but  to  the  British  government  in  Upper  Canada. 
They  would  then  be  entirely  influenced  by  their   councils.      It 
would  be    easy  for  them,    aided  by   the  councils  of  the  British 
agents,  to  commit  depredations  on  the  scattered  frontier  settle- 
ments of  Ohio,  Kentucky,  Indiana,  &c.     They  would  be  collect- 
ed  from  the  most  distant  parts  of  their  villages,  where  the  Eng- 
lish factors  have  an  intercourse  with  them,  and   would   become 
numerous.    Under  these  circumstances,  if  there  is  a  prospect  of 
war  with   England,  what  measures  are  most  expedient  ?  In  my 
mind,  there   can  be  no  douht.     Prepare  a  naval  force  on   Lake 
Erie  superiour  to  the  British,  and  sufficient  to  preserve  your  com* 
munication." 

I  have  transcribed  so  much  of  this  letter,  the  original  of  which 
may  be  found  on  the  files  of  the  war  office,  principally  to  show, 


±1 

that  t  considered  a  naval  force  on  Lake  Erie,  superiour  to  the 
British,  and  sufficient  to  preserve  the  communication,  in  the 
event  of  war,,  essential,  even  for  the  preservation  of  the  country; 
and  likewise  to  show  how  strongly  I  urged  it  on  the  government* 
a  year  before  war  was  declared. 


No.  V. 

On  the  sixth  of  March,  1812,  about  a  month  before  I  was  ap- 
pointed a  General  in  the  army,  I  addressed  another  letter  to  the 
government,  through  the  Secretary  of  the  department  of  war,  in 
which  I  stated  the  situation  of  the  inhabitants  on  our  frontier 
settlements,  and  particularly  those  in  the  Territory  of  Michi- 
gan, in  which  I  pointed  out  the  expediency  of  ordering  a  force 
for  their  protection,  and  building  a  navy  on  Lake  Erie  sufficient 
to  preserve  the  communication.  The  following  is  an  extract 
from  this  letter. 

"  If  we  cannot  command  the  ocean,  we  can  command  the  in- 
land lakes  of  our  country.  I  have  always  been  of  the  opinion, 
that  we  ought  to  have  built  as  many  armed  vessels  on  the  lakes, 
as  would  have  commanded  them  ;  we  have  more  interest  in  them, 
than  the  British  nation,  and  can  build  vessels  with  more  con- 
venience." 

The  whole  of  this  letter  is  recited  in  my  defence,  which  has 
been  published,  and  it  is  certified  to  be  correct  by  the  depart- 
ment of  war. 

After  my  appointment  as  a  Brigadier  General  in  the  army, 
and  before  I  left  Washington  to  take  the  command  of  the  north 
western  army,  I  presented  to  the  administration  a  letter  contain- 
ing distinctly  my  views,  with  respect  to  the  destination,  and  op- 
erations of  the  forces  placed  under  my  orders,  both  in  time  of 
peace  with  Great  Britain,  and  likewise  in  the  event  of  war  with 
that  nation 

The  circumstances  of  this  communication,  with  the  documents 
in  proof  of  them,  are  fully  related  in  my  defence  before  the 
Court  Martial,  from  page  33,  to  page  38,  inclusive.  In  this  let- 
ter I  repeated  the  opinions,  I  had  before  given,  that  the  force 
entrusted  to  my  command,  in  time  of  peace  with  England,  was 
sufficient  for  the  protection  of  the  northern  frontier  against  the 


22 

savages;  and  likewise,  that  Detroit,  or  a  position  on  that  river, 
or  the  west  end  of  Lake  Erie,  was  a  suitable  station  for  that  ob- 
ject,;  and  for  this  obvious  reason,  that  all  the  necessary  sup- 
plies could  be  easily  furnished  through  the  communication  of 
the  lake.  But  in  the  event  of  war,  1  stated  in  the  most  expli- 
cit and  strongest  terms  the  necessity  of  having  a  naval  force, 
superiour  to  the  enemy  on  the  lakes; — and  that  without  it,  and 
unless  the  army  I  was  to  command,  was  strengthened  by  addi- 
tions to  its  numbers ;  and  unless  it  was  followed  by  detachments, 
to  keep  open  the  communication,  and  insure  it  supplies  from 
Ohio ;  and  unless  it  was  supported  by  co-operations  from  other 
quarters,  it  could  not  be  able  to  maintain  itself  at  Detroit,  much 
less  cany  on  offensive  operations  in  the  enemy's  country. 

That  I  wished  it  farther  clearly  to  be  understood  by  the  govern- 
ment, that  in  the  event  of  war  with  England,  I  did  not  consider  this 
force  in  any  degree  adequate,    either  to  the  invasion  of  Upper 
Canada,  or  for  the  defence  of  our  own  territories.    That  it  was 
formed  almost  entirely   of  militia,   undisciplined,  and   who  had 
never    seen    anv  service,      I    then   described   the  situation    of 
the    country,   and  observed,  that  it  would  be  difficult,  if  not  im- 
possible, to  send  a  force,  which  would   be  sufficient,  either  for 
invasion   or   even    defence,   in    the   event   of  war  without   the 
privilege  of  a  communication  through  Lake  Erie.     That  as  soon 
as  a  declaration  of  war    should  be  made,    that  communication 
would  be  entirely  obstructed.     That  in  accepting  the  command, 
and  leading  an  army  through  that  wilderness,-it  was  under  the  full 
expectation   that    war  would   not  be  declared,  until  such  a  na- 
val force  was  provided,  as  would  preserve  that    communication. 
It  was  farther  stated  that  from  the    conversation  I  had  with  the 
President  of  the  U.  S.   and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  from  the 
circumstance  of  a  navy   agent  having  been  appointed   on  Lake 
Eri'3,  and  Capt.    Stewart,  of  the  navy,  having  been  ordered  to 
Washington,  for   the    express  purpose    of  giving  him  the  com- 
mand on  the  lakes,  I  had  the  fullest  confidence,   that  before  a 
declaration  of  war  was  made,  measures  would  be  taken  for  the 
security  of  that   communication.     That   under    these    circum- 
stances, I  believed  the  government  would  consider  it  a  measure, 
dictated  by  true  policy,  and  indeed  indispensably  necessary — as 
it  was  not  at  that  time  accomplished,  and  as    every  thing  is  un- 
certain, until  it  is  carried  into  effect,  and  as  I  knew  I  was  to  bo 


23 

placed  in  a  most  critical  situation,  I  observed,  if  the  govern- 
ment should  adopt  a  different  policy,  and  declare  war,  leaving 
to  the  British  the  command  of  the  lakes,  it  would  become  in- 
dispensably necessary,  as  the  next  best  measure,  immediately 
on  its  declaration  to  make  an  invasion  of  Upper  Canada,  by  cross- 
ing the  Niagra  River,  with  a  large  army,  sufficient  to  take  pos- 
session of  the  whole  province,  and  likewise  with  large  detach- 
ments, to  reinforce  the  army  I  commanded,  in  such  a  manner,  as 
to  preserve  the  communication  by  land  to  the  state  of  Ohio. 
By  this  means  the  army  at  Detroit,  might  co-operate  with  the 
main  army,  which  crossed  the  Niagara  River,  and  the  whole 
province  be  subdued.  In  such  an  event,  the  British  naval 
force  on  Lake  Erie,  would  fall  into  our  possession,  as  it  would 
have  no  harbours,  and  no  means  of  being  furnished  with  necessa- 
ry supplies. 

That,  if  in  the  event  of  war,  a  naval  force  should  not  be  provid- 
ed, or  an  invasion  of  Canada  should  not  be  made,  in  the  manner 
I  have  stated,  by  an  army  from  Niagara,  the  army  I  commanded 
would  be  led  into  a  situation,  from  which  there  would  be  no  es- 
cape, and  that  whole  country,  with  all  our  military  posts,  would 
fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  That  his  regular  force,  mili- 
tia, and  savages,  with  the  facilities  of  the  water  communication, 
for  rapid  movements,  and  the  transportation  of  necessary  sup- 
plies, would  be  fully  equal  to  effect  this  object. 


No.  VI. 

In  my  former  number  I  have  mentioned,  that  from  a  conver- 
sation I  had  with  the  President  of  the  United  States,  and  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  ;  from  the  circumstance  of  a  Navy  Agent 
having  been  appointed  on  Lake  Erie,  and  Commodore  Stewart 
of  the  Navy,  having  been  ordered  to  Washington,  for  the  ex- 
press purpose  of  giving  him  the  command  on  the  lakes,  I  had 
the  fullest  reason  to  believe,  that  before  a  declaration  of  War, 
was  made,  measures  would  have  been  taken  for  the  security  of 
that  communication. 

That  there  may  be  no  question  with  respect  to  these  facts,  I 
will  now  state  the  evidence  on  which  they  are  founded.  Com- 
modore Stewart,  in  his  testimony,  on  my  trial  before  the  Court 


24 

Martial,  declared,  that  he  received  an  order  from  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  to  repair  to  Washington,  as  it  was  contemplated  by 
the  Government,  to  trust  him  with  an  important  command  ;  that 
in  compliance  with  the  order,  he  arrived  in  Washington  in  the 
beginning  of  April,  and  at  his  first  interview  with  the  Secretary, 
he  was  informed  that  it  was  contemplated  to  give  him  the  com- 
mand on  the  lakes  ;  that  the  Secretary  observed,  that  a  naval 
force  superiour  to  the  British,  on  the  lakes,  had  been  strongly 
ur^ed  by  General  Hull,  as  essential,  and  as  a  certain  means  of 
ensuring  success  to  the  army.  He  then  goes  on  to  state  why  he 
declined  the  command,  &o. 

General  Peter  B.  Porter,  in  his  testimony  on  my  trial,  said, 
about  the  last  of  March,  or  beginning  of  April,  1812,  he  was  at 
the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  with  General  Hull,  after  he 
had  been  appointed  a  Brigadier  General,  and  about  the  time  he 
was  to  march  to  Detroit;  that  he  was  frequently  with  the  Heads 
ef  Departments,  and  had  conversations,  as  to  the  operations  of 
the  army,  in  case  war  should  be  declared,  as  was  in  contempla- 
tion. He  said  he  recollected  that  General  Hull,  recommended 
that  a  navy  should  be  formed  on  the  lakes,  to  have  a  superiority 
over  the  British  in  case  of  war.  General  Porter  further  states, 
that  a  Navy  Agent  was  appointed  for  lake  Erie,  and  he  was 
twice  at  the  President's,  with  the  General,  when  the  subject 
was  talked  over. 

From  the  evidence  contained  in  this  and  the  foregoing  letters, 
I  feel  a  confidence  that  every  candid  reader  will  be  satisBed, 
that  when  I  accepted  the  command  of  the  Ohio  militia,  and  the 
4th  regiment,  the  motive  by  which  I  was  influenced  was  for  the 
protection  of  the  northern  frontiers,  and  particularly  the  Territo- 
ry of  Michigan,  of  which  1  was  Governour,  against  the  savages; 
and  that  I  had  not  the  most  distant  idea,  in  the  event  of  war, 
with  that  force,  of  making  an  invasion  of  Upper  Canada,  while 
the  enemy  commanded  the  lakes,  and  while  no  army  was  pro- 
vided, with  which  I  might  co-operate.  Before  I  proceed  to  a 
relation  of  the  march  through  the  wilderness,  and  of  the  opera- 
tions of  the  army  after  I  took  the  command,  I  shall  present  and 
consider  one  other  document,  which  appears  to  me  singular  in 
its  nature,  and  very  important,  on  account  of  the  high  authority 
from  whence  it  is  derived. 


25 

No.  VII. 

The  singular,  and  important  document,  to  which  I  alluded  in 
my  former  letter,  is  the  Message  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  to  Cougress,  after  the  termination  of  the  campaign,  of 
which  in  my  future  letters,  it  is  my  intention  to  give  you  the 
history.  Although  this  is  not  in  the  order  of  time,  with  the  sub- 
jects, which  have  been  considered,  yet  as  it  gives  informatiui  of 
the  motives  of  the  government,  with  respect  to  the  objects  of  my 
command,  and  has  a  strong  bearing  on  the  considerations,  which 
I  have  already  presented,  it  appears  to  be  the  proper  place  for 
its  introduction. 

In  this  Message,  it  is  stated,  "  That  the  force  sent  to  Detroit, 
was  with  a  general  view  to  the  security  of  the  Michigan  Terri- 
tory ;  and  in  the  event  of  war,  to  such  operations  in  the  upper- 
most Canada,  as  would  intercept  the  hostile  influence  of  Great 
Britain  over  the  savages ;  obtain  the  command  of  the  lakes  on 
which  that  part  of  Canada  borders ;  and  maintain  co-operating 
relations  with  such  forces  as  might  be  most  conveniently  em- 
ployed against  other  parts.  Our  expectation  of  gaining  the  com- 
mand of  the  lake,  by  the  invasion  of  Canada,  from  Detroit,  hav- 
ing been  disappointed,  measures  were  instantly  taken  to  provide 
on  them  a  naval  force  superiour  to  that  of  the  enemy." 

From  this  message,  it  appears,  there  were  four  objects  for 
which  the  forces  were  sent  to  Detroit  under  my  command. 

1.  With  a  general  view  to  the  security  of  the  Michigan  Terri- 
tory. 

2.  In  the  event  of  war,  to  make  such  operations  in  uppermost 
Canada,  as  would  intercept  the  hostile  influence  of  Great  Britain 
over  the  savages. 

3.  To  obtain  the  command  of  the  lake,  on  which  that  part  of 
Canada  borders. 

4.  To  co-operate  with  other  forces  in  that  quarter. 

The  first  object  declared  by  the  President,  is  what  I  have 
stated,  the  security  of  the  Michigan  Territory  against  the  In- 
dians, as  we  then  had  no  other  enemy. 

Being  at  that  time  the  Governour  of  the  territory,  it  is  natural 
to  suppose,  under  the  circumstances  which  existed  with  respect 
to  the  savages,  that  I  felt  a  strong  solicitude  for  its  safety.  It 
was  indeed  that  motive  alone,  which  induced  me  to  accept  the 
command.  The  troops  being  composed  principally  of  undisci- 
4 


26 

plined  militia,  and  without  artillery,  is  conclusive  evidence, 
that,  it  was  not  an  aimy  designed  for  invasion  and  conquest. 

Indeed,  it  was  a  time  of  peace,  and  there  was  no  danger  from 
any  other  quarter  than  from  the  lawless  savages.  No  power 
but  Congress  had  an  authority  to  declare  war,  and  the  President 
had  no  power  to  order  a  militia  force  for  any  other  purpose  than 
the  safety  of  the  country,  in  the  manner  which  has  been  men- 
tioned. That  I  had  no  reason  to  expect  there  was  any  other  ob- 
ject than  the  security  of  the  territory,  is  evident,  from  every 
communication  I  made  to  the  government,  both  previously  to, 
and  after  accepting  the  command.  In  the  event  of  war,  it  was 
perfectly  understood  to  be  my  opinion,  that  the  command  of  the 
lakes  was  not  only  essential  for  a  successful  invasion  of  the  ene- 
mv's  country  but  for  the  very  existence  of  the  army  I  com- 
manded. 

In  the  next  place,  the  President  informed  Congress,  that  in 
ihe  event  of  war  it  was  expected  the  forces  under  my  command 
would  make  such  operations  in  uppermost  Canada,  as  would  in- 
tercept the  hostile  influence  of  Great  Britain  over  the  savages. 
It  was  perfectly  understood,  in  the  event  of  war,  that  the  sava- 
ges who  resided  in  our  territory  were  not  to  be  employed.  In 
that  event  I  was  directed  to  advise  them  to  remain  quiet  at  their 
villages,  and  take  no  part  in  a  contest  in  which  they  had  no  in- 
terest, and  to  assure  them  of  protection  and  safety.  This  was 
humane,  and,  had  it  been  practicable,  would  have  been  wise 
policy.  For  a  number  of  years,  I  had  not  only  been  Governour 
of  the  territory  of  Michigan,  but  superintendant  of  Indian  af- 
fairs. The  duties  of  this  office  rendered  a  constant  intercourse 
with  them  necessary.  I  had  become  acquainted  with  their  hab- 
its, and  their  ruling  passions.  From  the  knowledge  wt  ich  my 
situation  had  thus  enabled  me  to  acquire  of  their  characters,  I 
well  knew  that  as  soon  as  the  trumpet  of  war  was  sounded,  they 
would  not  follow  this  pacific  advice,  and  remain  indifferent 
spectators.  By  the  documents  which  I  have  presented,  and  to 
which  I  have  referred  in  these  numbers,  it  will  be  manifest,  that 
I  repeatedly,  and  in  the  most  explicit  terms,  gave  this  opinion 
to  the  government.  Notwithstanding  this  opinion,  I  did  every 
thing  in  my  power,  in  conformity  to  my  instructions,  to  induce 
them  to  remain  neutral.  Before  and  after  the  declaration  of 
war,  I  sent  messages,  with  interpreters  to  the  different  villages, 


27 

explaining  the  views  of  the  government,  and  enforcing  them 
with  all  the  reasons,  I  was  capable  of  suggesting.  I  11*  ewise 
collected  the  chiefs  in  council,  repeated  the  views  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  urged  them  to  restrain  their  warriours,  and  induce 
them  to  follow  the  advice  of  their  great  Father,  the  President  of 
the  United  States.    This  was  all  I  was  authorized  to  do. 

Many  who  joined  the  British  standard  would  have  joined  ours 
if  the  government  would  have  accepted  their  services. 

There  was  no  probabilitv  of  preventing  an  intercourse  between 
them  and  the  British  agents. — Upper  Canada  is  separated  from 
the  United  States  only  by  an  imaginary  line,  running  through 
the  lakes  and  rivers,  several  hundred  miles,  and  the  principal 
part  of  the  distance  on  the  shores  a  wilderness.  It  was  well 
known  to  the  government  that  the  British  had  a  constant  inter- 
course with  those  who  resided  in  our  territory,  ever  since  it  be- 
came a  part  of  the  United  States;  that  at  an  immense  expense, 
they  furnished  them  with  presents,  consisting  of  arms,  ammuni- 
tion, and  clothing,  and  considered  them  as  their  allies  and 
friends. 

To  have  guarded  this  immense  wilderness,  and  prevented  the 
hostile  influence  of  the  British,  was  impossible  with  the  army  I 
commanded. 

In  my  next  number  I  shall  consider  the  other  objects  for  which 
the  President  informed  Congress,  the  forces  were  sent  to  De- 
troit, under  my  command. 


No.  VIII. 

The  next  object  of  my  command,  as  stated  by  the  President- 
was,  "  To  obtain  the  command  of  the  lake  on  which  that  part 
of  Canada  borders . " 

By  this  description  the  President  must  have  meant  lake  Erie. 
There  are  two  important  facts  so  well  known,  that  it  is  unneces- 
sary to  produce  any  evidence  to  prove  them.  One  is,  that  in  the 
year  1812,  when  war  was  declared,  Great  Britain  had  four  or 
five  vessels  of  war  on  this  lake,  some  of  them  carrying  twenty 
cannon,  besides  a  number  of  gun-boats,  all  completely  armed  and 
manned.  The  other  is,  that  the  United  States  had  not  a  single 
armed  vessel,    not  even  a  gun-boat  or  canoe.     It  was  not  even 


28 

intimated  to  me,  in  any  instruction  that  I  received  from  the 
government,  that  this  was  one  of  the  objects  of  my  command. 
The  first  knowledge  I  ever  had  of  it,  was  contained  in  this  mes- 
sage to  Congress. 

I  cannot  to  the  present  moment  conceive,  notwithstanding  the 
high  authority,  and  the  solemn  manner  in  which  it  was  commu- 
nicated, on  what  grounds  such  an  expectation  was  founded.  It 
certainly  must  have  been  impossible  to  have  obtained  the  com- 
mand of  the  lake,  without  in  some  way  destroying  the  British 
naval  force,  which  was  established  on  it.  In  what  possible  way 
could  the  Ohio  militia  have  effected  this  object  ? 

Before  I  left  Washington,  it  will  be  seen  how  repeatedly  and 
earnestly  I  recommended  the  necessity  of  constructing  a  navy 
on  this  lake,  superiour  to  that  of  the  enemy,  in  the  event  of  war. 
If  that  object  should  be  abandoned,  and  the  government  should 
not  think  proper  to  listen  to  this  advice,  I  then  suggested,  as  the 
next  most  expedient  measure,  immediately  on  the  declaration  of 
war,  to  invade  Upper  Canada,  with  a  powerful  army,  by  cros- 
sing the  Niagara  river,  with  which  the  troops  I  commanded 
might  co  operate,  and  by  this  means  fake  possession  of  the  whole 
province.  t 

Thus  being  in  the  possession  of  all  the  harbours  on  the  lake, 
the  navy  would  be  obliged  to  surrender  for  the  want  of  necessary 
supplies.  This  measure  not  being  adopted,  and  not  even  an 
armed  boat  of  any  description  being  provided  on  the  lake,  I  re- 
peat the  question,  on  what  grounds  could  this  expectation  have 
been  formed  ?  That  the  President  was  serious  in  making  this 
communication,  and  at  length  was  satisfied  thai  the  opinion  I 
had  so  often  given  was  correct,  clearly  appears  ;  for  in  the  next 
paragraph  of  the  message  he  says,  "Our  expectation  ot  gaining 
the  command  of  the  lake,  by  the  invasion  of  Canada  from  De- 
troit, having  been  disappointed,  measures  were  instantly  taken 
to  provide  a  naval  force  superiour  to  that  of  the  enemy  !" 

I  do  think  this  subject  is  so  plain,  that  no  further  commenta- 
ries on  it  are  necessary;  and  that  no  blame  can  attach  to  me  for 
not  fulfilling  what  Mr.  Madison,  then  President,  says  was  the 
expectation  of  the  government,  viz.  taking  possession  of  lake 
Erie,  with  no  other  force  than  a  few  Ohio  militia,  when  that  lake 
was  commanded  by  a  naval  armament,  such  as  I  have  described. 


29 
No.  IX. 

Iv  addition  to  all  the  other  evidence,  that  it  was  neither  the 
expectation  of  the  government  nor  my  expectation,  that  the  forces 
sent  to  Detroit  under  my  command  were  sufficient  for  the  inva- 
sion of  Canada,  I  here  present  the  declaration  of  the  President, 
in  his  message  to  Congress,  to  which  I  have  referred ;  that  t> '  ey 
were  tent,  in  the  event  of  war,  to  co-operate  with  other  forces  in 
that  quarter. 

This  appears  to  be  conclusive  evidence,  that  in  the  event  of 
war,  the  government  did  not  consider  the  forces  under  my  com- 
mand sufficient  for  this  object. 

The  President,  in  this  message,  did  not  describe  the  nature  of 
the  forces  nor  the  manner  they  were  to  be  employed.  The  rea- 
son undoubtedly  was,  that  none  of  any  description  were  em- 
ployed. From  the  urgency  of  such  provision,  however,  and  the 
arrangements  which  have  since  been  made,  for  the  construction 
of  a  navy  on  Lake  Erie,  and  for  the  organization  of  an  army  it 
must  be  evident,  that  he  referred  to  a  naval  force  on  that  lake 
and  a  powerful  army  on  the  eastern  border  of  Upper  Canada, 
which  he  has  since  become  convinced,  it  was  indispensable  to 
provide,  to  co-operate  with  the  army  at  Detroit,  #s  the  only 
means  to  a  successful  invasion  of  Canada. 

Had  such  a  navy  been  prepared,  and  such  an  army  been  em- 
ployed in  the  manner  I  have  stated,  there  is  no  question  but  the 
conquest  of  that  province  would  have  easily  been  effected  during 
that  campaign.  Had,  indeed,  either  of  these  measures  been  car- 
ried into  effect,  the  results  of  our  military  operations  would  in 
all  probability,  have  been  successful  and  prosperous. 

Before  T  left  Washington,  to  take  command  of  the  forces,  as 
I  have  before  observed,  a  navy  agent  had  been  appointed  on  the 
lake,  and  a  distinguished  naval  officer  had  been  ordered  to  re- 
pair to  the  government,  to  receive  his  instructions,  with  respect 
to  what  was  considered  an  important  command  on  the  lakes. 
Every  member  of  the  administration  appeared  to  be  impressed 
with  the  necessity  of  securing  that  communication,  in  the  event 
of  war  ;  General  Dearborn,  the  senior  officer  of  the  army,  was 
at  Washington,  assisting  in  organizing  a  large  army,  to  be  ready 
for  service,  should  a  declaration  of  war  become  necessary.  Be- 
sides the  assurances  I  received  from  the  administration  it  result- 
ed from  our  relative  situation,  and  the  nature  of  things,  that  in 


30 

the  event  of  war,  the  invasion  of  Canada  would  be  the  first  ob- 
ject. For  what  other  purpose  could  so  large  an  army  have  been 
provided?  There  was  no  other  British  territory  within  our 
reach,  and  no  other  British  forces  in  a  situation  that  we  could 
approach.  Besides,  by  the  conquest  of  Upper  Canada,  we 
should  have  had  the  controul  of  the  Indians,  and  perfect  security 
would  have  been  given  to  our  extensive  and  exposed  frontiers, 
and  have  prevented  the  miseries  of  savage  barbarity.  As  these 
mem  *irs  are  written,  merely  for  the  purpose  that  the  truth  may 
be  known,  I  shall  make  no  apology,  either  for  prolixity  or  repe- 
tition. I  shall  not,  therefore,  hesitate  to  repeat,  that  from  the 
documents  and  circumstances  which  have  been  produced,  the 
following  facts  have  been  fully  substantiated  : — 

That  in  April,  1812,  when  I  accepted  the  command  of  the 
forces  destined  for  Detroit,  it  was  understood,  both  by  the  gov- 
ernment and  myself,  that,  it  being  a  time  of  peace,  these  forces 
were  designed  to  protect  the  northern  frontier  against  the 
depredations  of  the  savages,  and  particularly  the  territory  of  Mi- 
chigan, of  which  I  was  Governour ;  and  in  the  event  of  war,  to 
have  co-operated  with  both  naval  and  land  forces  in  the  invasion 
of  Upper  Canada. 

In  the  future  numbers,  I  shall  give  an  account  of  the  opera- 
tions of  the  army,  after  I  took  the  command  ;  how  I  was  disap- 
pointed in  my  expectations ;  and  how  cruelly,  both  the  army 
and  myself  have  been  sacrificed  by  the  government,  and  Gener- 
eral  Dearborn,  the  commanding  General. 


No.  X. 

In  leaving  Washington,  in  April,  1812,  to  take  the  command 
of  the  forces,  assembled  in  the  state  of  Ohio,  I  felt  a  very  deep 
interest  in  the  object  of  my  mission.  The  consideration  that  I 
was  clothed  with  the  authority,  and  furnished  with  the  means  of 
affording  safety  and  security  to  the  frontier  inhabitants  of  the 
country  ;  and  particularly  to  those  of  the  territory  of  Michigan, 
of  which  I  was  governour,  was  soothing  to  my  feelings,  and  ani- 
mating to  my  exertions.  Although  about  thirty  years  had  then 
elapsed,  since  my  sword  had  laid  useless  in  its  scabbard,  and 
time  had  necessarily  enfeebled  my  strength  and  constitution,  yet 


31 

it  was  impossible  for  me  to  see  a  country,  in  which,  from  my 
situation,  I  was  so  particularly  interested,  exposed  to  the  fury 
of  the  savages,  without  raising  an  arm  for  its  safety.  Convinced 
that  the  forces  entrusted  to  my  command  were  sufficient  for  the 
protection  of  the  frontier  settlements,  and  the  security  of  the 
territory  while  we  were  at  peace  with  Great  Britain  ;  and 
knowing  that  I  had  communicated  what  measures  in  my  opin- 
ion, would  be  indispensably  necessary  in  the  event  of  war, 
which  communications  had  been  received  as  official  documents, 
and  approved  by  the  government,  and  feeling  a  generous  confi- 
dence in  the  justice  and  honour  Of  the  administration,  I  had  lit- 
tle anxiety  with  respect  to  any  consequences  which  might  have 
attended  my  command^ 

If  it  were  to  be  my  fortune  to  protect  the  defenceless  inhab- 
itants of  our  country,  against  the  cruelty  of  savages,  and  pros- 
perity was  to  attend  the  exertions  of  the  army,  the  satisfaction 
of  having  promoted  the  cause  of  humanity,  would  have  been  an 
ample  reward.  But  if,  after  honestly  discharging  my  duty,  in  the 
best  manner  I  was  capable,  misfortune  was  to  be  my  lot,  I  be- 
lieved that  a  generous  government,  and  a  generous  people  would 
at  least  have  shielded  me  from  censure  and  reproach.  At  that 
time,  indeed,  I  considered  there  was  little  or  no  hazard.  It 
was  a  time  of  peace,  with  England,  and  while  that  remained, 
there  was  no  danger  excepting  from  the  savages.  Some  excite- 
ment then  existed,  through  the  influence  of  the  British  Agents, 
in  preparing  them  for  events  which  they  anticipated  might  take 
place. 

In  the  event  of  war  I  considered  that  such  arrangements 
would  have  been  made,  as  would  have  enabled  the  army  I  com- 
manded to  have  operated  with  success  against  the  enemy.  As 
the  government  continued  me  in  the  command  of  the  north  wes- 
tern army,  after  the  declaration  of  war,  1  hail  a  right  to  believe, 
that  such  measures  would  have  been  adopted,  as  1  had  stated, 
were  deemed  by  me,  essential  to  success.  The  measures  to 
which  I  alluded  in  the  event  of  war,  I  have  mentioned  were  a 
navy  on  lake  Erie,  sufficient  to  preserve  that  communication, 
and  an  army  of  sufficient  strength,  in  co-operation  with  the  one 
I  commanded,  to  make  a  conquest  of  Upper  Canada.  In  all  these 
communications,  I  gave  it  as  my  opinion,  that  unless  we  had 
the  benefit  of  this  co-operation,  the  posts  of  Detroit,  Michil- 


32 

limackinack,  and  Chicago,  would  inevitably  fall  into  the  hands 
of  the  enemy. 

How  I  was  disappointed  in  my  expectations  ;  how  I  was  de- 
ceived by  the  government;  how,-  after  the  declaration  of  war,  I 
was  ordered  into  a  situation,  which  it  was  impossible  for  me  to 
sustain,  and  from  which  there  was  no  retreat;  how  the  officers 
of  the  administration  shamefully  neglected  to  redeem  the  pledge 
they  had  given  me;  and  how  General  Dearborn  the  senior  offi- 
cer of  the  army,  and  afterwards  the  President  of  the  Court  Par- 
tial, neglected  e\ery  duty,  incident  to  his  command,  and  adopt- 
ed measures,  which  proved  the  inevitable  destruction  of  the  army 
I  commanded,  will  be  the  subjects  of  my  future  numbers. 

Before,  however,  I  close  this,  I  will  make  one  further  obser- 
vation. If,  after  the  declaration  of  war,  the  President  and  other 
officers  of  the  administration,  who  directed  the  military  opera- 
tions, had  changed  their  opinions,  and  believed  that  twelve  hun- 
dred Ohio  militia,  and  three  hundred  regular  troops,  were  suffi- 
cient without  any  naval  force,  to  have  taken  possession  of  lake 
Erie,  and  without  any  reinforcements,  and  without  any  other 
army,  with  which  they  might  have  co-operated,  to  have  invaded 
and  conquered  the  province  of  Upper  Carrada,  they  ought  to  have 
appointed  an  officer  to  that  command,  of  the  same  opinions,  and 
not  to  hive  made  one  responsible,  who  had  repeatedly,  decided- 
ly, and  in  an  official  manner,  declared,  that  in  the  event  of  war, 
without  the  command  of  the  lake,  and  without  a  powerful  army 
for  co-operation,  the  most  disastrous  consequences  would  inev- 
ably  follow. 

That  these  consequences  did  follow,  in  the  manner  I  had 
predicted,  is  well  known,  and  that  under  the  circumstances,  it 
was  not  possible  for  me  to  have  prevented  them  ;  and  that  they 
were  occasioned  by  the  neglect  of  the  government,  and  the  mis- 
conduct of  General  Dearborn  will  appear  manifest,  from  the  fu- 
ture statements  I  shall  make,  and  the  documents  and, other  evi- 
dence I  shall  produce. 

By  the  documents  and  evidence  which  have  already  been 
shown,  the  objects  of  the  government  in  detaching  the  forces 
entrusted  to  my  command,  must  be  distinctly  understood.  I 
have  produced  my  communications  to  the  government  explanato- 
ry of  my  own  views:  and  I  likewise  have  exhibited  the  Mes- 
sage of  the  President  ,who  was  at  the  head  of  the  administration, 
to  prove  the  views  of  the  government.     In  my  communications, 


33 

both  before  and  after  I  was  appointed,  and  accepted'  the  com 
mand  of  these  forces,  I  stated  distinctly  my  views,  that  in  time 
of  peace  with  Great  Britain,  the  forces  were  competent  to  the 
protection  of  the  frontiers  of  our  country  against  the  savages; 
but  in  the  event  of  war  without  the  co-operation  of  a  naval  force 
on  Lake  Erie,  and  without  the  co-operation  of  an  army  from 
Niagara,  they  were  not  competent  to  the  invasion  of  Canada 
and  not  adequate  to  the  protection  of  that  part  of  our  territory. 
And  it  further  appears,  by  the  President's  Message,  that  the 
forces  were  sent  to  Detroit  with  a  view  to  the  security  of  the 
Michigan  territory  against  the  Indians  in  time  of  peace,  and  in 
the  event  of  war  to  intercept  the  hostile  influence  of  the  British 
over  the  savages  ;  to  obtain  the  command  of  the  lake  on  which 
that  part  of  Canada  borders  ;  and  to  co-operate  with  other  forces 
in  that  quarter. 

Upper  Canada  borders  on  lake  Erie  and  the  navigable  lakes 
and  rivers  more  than  four  hundred  miles,  and,  on  what  grounds 
the  expectation  of  the  administration  were  founded,  that  with 
the  forces  I  commanded  I  should  be  able  to  take  the  command 
of  the  lake,  when  commanded  by  a  strong  naval  force  of  the  en- 
emy ;  and  without  any  co-operation  of  any  other  forces,  from 
any  quarter,  are  questions  which  will  be  hereafter  considered. 
This  subject  I  wish  distinctly  to  be  understood,  and  I  must  be 
excused  if  I  make  use  of  repetition,  in  the  explanation  of  it. 

I  have  offered  these  documents  to  shew  the  grounds  I  had  to 
expect  the  co-operation  of  other  forces ;  and.,  that  the  adminis- 
tration became  convinced  that  a  naval  force  was  necessary,  and 
one  was  immediately  ordered,  as  soon  as  it  was  found  that  the 
possession  of  the  lake  could  not  be  obtained  by  the  militia  under 
my  command. 

By  lessons  of  experience,  since  that  period,  we  have  been 
taught  how  important  the  command  of  those  waters  are  to  suc- 
cessful operations  against  the  country. 

General  Harrison,  with  a  force  vastly  superiour  to  the  one  I 
commanded,  was  not  able,  after  more  than  a  year,  to  approach 
within  fifty  miles  of  Maiden,  with  the  assistance  of  a  large  force 
at  Niagara  to  co-operate  with  him;  and  was  not  able  to  make 
any  impression  on  the  country,  until  after  the  command  of  the 
lake  was  obtained,  by  Commodore  Perry's  glorious  naval  vic- 
tory. As  soon  as  that  was  obtained,  the  enemy  immediately 
5 


34 

abandoned  Maiden,  and  (he  army  took  possession  of  the  coun- 
try. The  territory  situated  on  these  navigable  waters  is  so  in- 
sulated, that,  the  power  which  commands  them  will  necessarily 
command  the  country.* 


No.  XI. 

On  the  10th  of  May,  I  arrived  at  Cincinnati,  in  the  state  of 
Ohio.  Here  I  met  Governour  Meigs,  who  had  made  great  ex- 
ertions in  collecting  the  1200  militia,  which  had  been  ordered 
by  the  President — Their  place  of  rendezvous  was  Dayton.  Al- 
though the  officers  and  soldiers  appeared  to  be  animated  with 
zeal,  yet  in  reviewing  them,  and  inspecting  their  equipments, 
they  were  found  without  discipline,  and  destitute  of  arms  and 
clothing,  necessary  for  military  operations  Their  arms  were 
totally  unfit  for  use,  the  leather  whii  covered  their  cartouch 
boxes  was  rotten  and  no  better  security  to  the  cartridges  than 
brown  paper ;  ma?iy  of  the  men  were  destitute  of  blankets,  and 
other  necessary  clothing ;  no  armourers  were  provided  to  repair 
the  arms;  no  means  had  been  adopted  to  furnish  clothing;  no 
public  stores  to  resort  to,  either  for  good  arms,  or  suitable  cloth- 
ing ;  and  no  powder  in  any  of  the  magazines,  fit  for  use — and 
what  is  more  extraordinary,  no  contract,  or  any  measures  adop- 
ted, to  supply  these  troops  with  the  necessary  article  of  provi- 
sions, during  their  march  through  a  wilderness  of  more  than  two 
hundred  miles,  until  they  arrived  at  Detroit,  the  place  of  their 
destination.  On  my  own  responsibility,  I  sent  to  powder  mills 
in  Kentucky,  and  purchased  powder,  collected  a  few  blankets? 
and  other  necessary  articles  of  clothing  from  the  inhabitants  of 
Ohio,  and  employed  private  armourers,  at  Cincinnati,  and  Day- 
ton, to  repair  the  arms,  &c. 

These  facts  have  been  stated,  to  shew  the  neglect  of  the  gov- 
ernment in  equiping  and  providing  for  these  troops,  which  in 
their  situation  could  not  be  considered  as  a  force  adequate  to  of- 
fensive operations,  and  to  the  conquest  of  Canada. 

After  the  junction  of  the  4th  United  States  regiment,  which 
consisted  of  300  effect ve  men,  with  the  1200  militia  at  Urbarna, 
I  commenced  the  march,  early  in  June  from  that  place,  a  fron- 


35 

tier  town  in  the  state  of  Ohio,  for  Detroit,  the  distance  of  more 
than  two  hundred  miles. 

^fter  the  disposition  was  made  for  the  march,  I  was  informed 
that  a  part  of  the  militia,  refused  to  obey  the  order. 

In  the  first  place,  I  directed  their  own  officers,  to  give  them 
positive  orders  to  march,  and  inform  them,  if  they  did  not  obey, 
the  4th  United  States  regiment  would  be  sent  to  compel  them- 
They  still  refused,  and  a  part  of  the  4th  regiment  was  marched 
to  their  station,  and  they  obeyed.  This  fact  is  proved  by  the 
testimony  of  Col.  Miller  of  that  regiment,  and  I  have  stated  it, 
to  shew,  when  I  first  took  the  command  of  these  troops,  the 
want  of  discipline,  and  the  mutinous  spirit  which  prevailed, — 
and  that  the  authority  of  their  officers,  was  not  sufficient  to  com- 
mand their  obedience,  and  that  nothing  but  the  bayonets  of  the 
4th  regiment  could  have  the  effect. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  describe  the  labours  and  fatigues,  of  the 
army  in  the  march.  It  is  sufficient  to  know,  that  the  country 
was  a  wilderness,  and  the  difficulties  in  marching  an  army 
through  it  will  be  apparent  It  is,  however,  a  justice  due  to  the 
officers  and  soldiers  to  say,  that  all  the  labours  of  opening  a  road, 
building  bridges  and  causeways,  and  indeed  all  the  fatigues,  in- 
cident to  such  a  march,  were  borne  with  patience,  and  every 
possible  exertion  was  made  to  effect  the  object  of  the  march. 
On  the  rout  the  army  built  four  blockhouses,  which  were  gairi 
soned  by  the  invalids,  who  were  unable  to  accompany  the  army. 
The  object  in  building  these  blockhouses,  was  the  convenience 
of  reenforcements,  and  the  security  of  convoys. 

On  the  2d  day  of  July,  I  -,  'ceived  a  letter  from  the  secretary 
of  war,  dated  the  1 8th  of  June,  informing  me  of  tie  declaration  of 
war.  It  was  in  these  words — "  Sir,  war  is  declared  against 
Great  Britain.  You  will  be  on  your  guard,  proceed  to  your 
post  with  all  possible  expedition,  make  such  arrangements  for 
th  defence  of  the  country,  as  in  your  judgment  may  be  neces- 
sary, and  wait  for  further  orders." 

The  day  before  this  letter  was  received,  the  quarter-master, 
had  been  directed  to  hire  a  small  vessel,  at  the  foot  of  the  Rapids 
of  tin  Miami,  to  transport  the  invalids,  and  the  baggage,  &c.  not 
wanted  on  the  march  to  Detroit.  The  horses  being  worn  down 
on  the  march,  rendered  this  measure,  in  my  opinion,  expedient. 
At  this  time  I  had  received  no  information  of  the  declaration  of  ( 


36 

war,  and  did  not  consider,  there  was  any  hazard  in  the  measure. 
On  the  24th  of  June,  I  received  a  letter  from  the  war  depart- 
ment, dated  in  the  morning  of  the  18th  June,  directing  me  to 
march  to  Detroit,  with  all  possible  expedition.  In  that  letter, 
not  one  word  was  said  respecting  a  declaration  of  war.  The 
British  garrison,  at  Maiden  having  a  number  of  days  before  re- 
ceived the  information,  this  vessel  was  taken  in  passing  that  for- 
tress. The  court  martial  could  not  find  any  ground  to  censure  me 
for  employing  that  vessel,  as  I  had  no  information  of  the  declar- 
ation of  war,  and  was  obliged  to  acquit,  me  of  the  charge  growing 
out  of  that  event.  The  circumstances  of  this  transaction,  are 
particularly  related  in  my  defence. 

Thus  it  appears,  that  I  did  not  receive  information  of  the  war, 
until  fourteen  days  after  it  was  declared,  that  the  British  garri- 
son had  official  knowledge  of  it  four  or  five  days  sooner,  that  it 
is  proved  to  a  demonstration,  that  I  might  have  received  it  eight 
days  earlier,  as  I  actually  did  receive  a  letter  from  the  secretary 
of  war,  on  the  24th  ot  June,  dated  on  the  same  da\  (viz.)  the 
18th  pjf  June,  in  the  morning,  which  gave  no  information  of  the 
declaration  of  war. 

The  person  who  brought  me  this  letter  announcing  the  war, 
informed  me  he  was  employed  by  the  post  master  of  Cleveland, 
in  the  state  of  Ohio,  and  that  it  was  brought  in  the  mail,  to  that 
post  office.,  In  time  of  peace  with  England,  there  could  have 
been  but  one  opinion,  with  respect  to  engaging  this  vessel,  in 
the  manner  it  was  employed.  Having  no  information  of  the 
declaration  of  war,  I  must  necessarily  have  believed,  it  was  a 
time  of  peace,  and  consequently  no  blame  could  be  attached  to 
me.     This  was  the  opinion  of  the  court  martial. 

If,  after  a  knowledge  of  the  war,  I  had  sent  this  unarmed  vessel 
to  Detroit,  with  the  sick  of  the  army,  the  medical  stores,  intrench- 
ing tools,  &c.  knowing  sh-  must  pass  the  British  fortress  at  Am- 
herstburg,  it  would  have  been  treason,  for  which  I  ought  to  have 
been  punished.  The  following  is  the  opinion  of  the  court  mar- 
tial on  this  subject — "The  evidence  on  the  subject  having  been 
publicly  given,  the  court  deem  it  proper,  in  justice  to  the  accus- 
ed, to  say,  that  thev  do  not  believe,  from  any  thing  which  lias 
appeared  before  them,  that  Brigadier  General  "William  Hull  has 
committed  treason  against  the  United  States." 


37 

It  appears  then  by  the  opinion  of  the  court,  founded  on  the 
testimony  of  the  witnesses,  in  behalf  of  the  prosecution,  that  in 
this  respect,  there  was  no  fault  on  my  part.  But  here  was  a 
serious  public  disaster,  the  first  which  had  happened  to  the  army 
I  commanded,  and  occasioned  by  the  fault  or  neglect  of  some 
officer  of  the  government,  whose  duty  it  was  to  give  me  the  ear- 
liest possible  information  of  the  war.  It  was  well  known  to  the 
government,  that  I  was  in  a  wilderness,  filled  with  hostile  sava- 
ges, and  approaching  a  British  garrison,  that  a  previous  knowledge 
of  the  war,  would  have  given  the  enemy  the  greatest  possible 
advantage,  in  the  situation  I  was  placed.  It  is  impossible  that 
stronger  reasons  could  have  existed,  to  render  it  necessary,  that 
I  should  have  received  the  earliest  information  of  the  war.  What 
measures  were  taken  to  give  me  this  information  ?  A  letter  was 
put  into  the  post-office,  and  sent  a  circuitous  rout  to  Cleveland 
in  the  state  of  Ohio,  and  the  post -master  at  that  place  was  re- 
quested to  send  it  through  a  wilderness  of  about  an  hundred 
miles,  to  me.  This  letter,  announcing  this  important  event,  was 
travelling  fourteen  days  before  it  reached  me,  when  I  had  re- 
ceived one  in  six  days  from  Washington,  dated  on  the  same  day. 
Who  then,  I  seriously  ask,  was  in  fault  ?  If  I  had  received  infor- 
mation of  the  war,  as  early  as  the  government  might  have  com- 
municated it  to  me,  this  vessel  would  not  have  been  employed, 
and  this  misfortune  would  not  have  happened.  Every  effort  was 
attempted  to  make  me  the  guilty  cause  in  the  prosecution,  but 
without  success.  Could  treason  have  been  proved  by  the  opin- 
ions of  witnesses,  the  case  wruld  undoubtedly  have  been  differ- 
ent ;  but  that  would  have  been  too  great  an  outrage  on  establish- 
ed principles.  Opinions,  however,  were  reserved  for  another 
charge  against  me,  which  will  be  considered  in  the  course  of 
these  memoirs. 

On  this  subject,  I  am  sure  you  will  acquit  me  of  all  censure, 
and  place  the  fault  at  the  door  of  the  administration  by  whose 
neglect,  the  disaster  was  occasioned. 

I  ask  you,  fellow  citizens,  what  must  have  been  my  feelings, 
as  the  commanding  officer  of  that  army,  when  I  found  that  the 
enemy  had  received  information  of  the  declaration  of  war,  a 
number  of  days  before  it  had  been  communicated  to  me.  Espe- 
cially, as  Maiden  was  toou?  sixty  miles  farther  from  Washing- 
ton, than  my  situation  at  the  time  it  was  received.     Had  I  not 


38 

as  much  cause  to  declare,  there  was  treason  at  "Washington,  as 
the  administration  had  to  declare  there  was  treason  in  my  camp  ? 
There  was  no  act  which  I  committed,  and  no  duty  which  I 
omitted,  which  could  create  the  least  foundation  for  the  charge. 
The  administration  had  omitted  giving  me  the  earliest  informa- 
tion of  the  declaration  of  war,  which  had  been  attended  with  the 
most  serious  consequences  to  the  army.  1  have  been  the  more 
particular  on  this  suhject,  on  account  of  the  injustice  and  cruelty 
of  the  government,  in  charging  me  with  treason,  for  an  unfortir 
nate  event,  which  was  caused  by  its  own  neglect. 


No.  XII. 

It  will  be  perceived,  that  the  letter  which  I  received  from  the 
Secretary  of  the  department  of  war,  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of 
July  1812,  which  is  transcribed  in  the  former  number,  contain- 
ed a  positive  order  to  march  the  army  to  Detroit,  and  there 
wait  for  further  orders.  This  order  being  positive,  no  other 
alternative  remained,  but  obedience.  In  reflecting  on  the  sub- 
ject, the  following  considerations  forced  themselves  on  my  mind* 
I  had  given  it  as  my  opinion,  that  while  we  were  at  peace  with 
Great  Britain,  Detroit  would  be  a  suitable  situation  for  forces, 
designed  to  protect  that  territory,  and  the  northern  frontier  against 
the  savages,  and  for  this  obvious  reason,  that  they  could  re- 
ceive all  necessary  supplies  by  the  communication  of  the  lake. 
But  in  the  event  of  war  with  Great  Britain,  I  had  officially  stat- 
ed, that  without  a  navy  on  Lake  Erie,  that  communication 
would  be  entirely  closed  against  us.  I  had  likewise  stated  in 
that  event,  the  difficulty,  if  not  the  impossibility  of  obtaining 
the  necessary  supplies  in  any  other  way. 

Indeed  it  must  be  apparent  to  all  who  have  any  knowledge  of 
the  geography  of  the  country,  that  there  would  be  no  other 
mode  of  obtaining  supplies,  but  from  the  settled  parts  of  the 
state  of  Ohio,  through  the  wilderness  which  I  had  passed,  and 
was  passing,  of  more  than  two  hundred  miles,  and  filled  with 
hostile  savages.  When  the  important  event  of  the  declaration 
of  war  against  Great  Britain  was  announced,  I  received  no  as- 
surances from  the  Government,  that  any  preparation  was   made 


39 

to  preserve  the  communication  of  the  lake.  I  received  no  as- 
surances that  any  reenforcements  were  in  readiness,  to  make 
such  establishments  on  the  road  I  had  opened  through  the  wil- 
derness, as  would  give  security  to  convoys,  from  the  state  of 
Ohio.  I  received  no  assurances,  that  any  army  was  prepared 
to  co-operate  with  the  forces  I  commanded,  in  making  offensive 
operations.  At  that  moment,  I  anticipated  what  must  be  the 
fate  of  my  army,  unless  the  measures  I  have'  stated,  were 
adopted. 

Notwithstanding  these  reflections,  I  knew  the  first  duty  of  a 
soldier  was  to  obey  orders  ;  and  in  obedience  to  them,  I  march- 
ed the  army  to  Detroit  with  all  possible  expedition. 

In  passing  a  large  Indian   village,  the  residence  of  the   Wy- 
ondots,  nearly  opposite  the   British  fort  at   Maiden,    and   only 
separated  from  my  rout   by  the  Detroit  river,   it  was   the  inten- 
tion of  the  British  commanding  officer,  to  have  crossed    the  riv- 
er and  attacked  the  army  on  its  march  through  a  hideous  swamp, 
which  we  entered  after  passing  this   Indian  village.    At  this 
time,  having  been  informed  of  the  war,   a  large  body  of  the  mi- 
litia of  Upper  Canada,  had  reenforced  the  British  garrison,  and 
all  the  surrounding  tribes  of  Indians  had  been  invited  to  join  its 
standard.     Every  preparation  was  made  for  it,  on  the  morning 
of  the  5th  of  July.     It  was  only  prevented  by  a   communication 
the  night  before,    which  I  caused  to  be   made,  by  a  confidential 
inhabitant  of  Maiden,  then  in  my  camp,  to   a  friend  of  his  who 
resided  in  Maiden,  and  was  in  the  confidence  of  the  command- 
ing officer.     The  information   communicated   was,  that  it  was 
not  the  intention  of  the  army  to  march  to  Detroit,    that  all   the 
boats  had  been  collected  on  the  west  side  of  the  river,  that  can- 
non had  been  sent  for,  from  Detroit,  and  that  my  intention  was 
to  cross  the  river,  and  attack  the   fort.     This   information   was 
immediately  communicated  to  the   commanding  officer,    which 
induced  him  to  abandoned  the  enterprize,  and   concentrate   all 
his  forces  for  the  defence  of  the  fort.     This  manoeuvre  I   deem- 
ed necessary,  as   the  forces  I  commanded   had   been   about  a 
month  in  the  wilderness,  on  the  hardest  fatigue,    opening  a  road 
and  not  in  a  situation  for  discipline,  or  preparation   for  action. 
Besides  the  ground  was  well  calculated  for  Indian  warfare,  and 
we  had  no  field  artillery  to   oppose  to  that  of  the  enemy,  which 


40 

might  easily  have  been  transported  across   the  river.     By   this 
stratagem  the  troops  passed  this  fortress  without  annoyance,  and 
that  evening  arrived  at    Detroit.     After  a   march    of  so   much 
hardship  and  fatigue,  I  thought  it  was  my  duty   to   permit  both 
officers  and  soldiers  to  rest  from  their   labours  for  a  few  days. 
The   time  was  however   employed    in    washing   their   clothes, 
cleaning  and  repairing  their  arms.     All  the   armourers  at    De- 
troit, were  engaged,  assisting  in  this  necessary  work.     The  ene- 
my were  directly  opposite  at  this  time,  erecting  fortifications  on 
tht  bank  of  the  river.     An  impatience  was  excited,  and  a  strong 
wish  manifested  among  both  officers  and  men,  to   cross   the  riv- 
er and  commence  offensive  operations.     In  consequence  of  this, 
I  called  a  council  of  war,  consisting  of  the  field   officers,  and 
communicated  to  them  the  instructions  I  had  received   from  the 
government,    "that  I  was  to  march  with  all  possible  expedition 
to  Detroit  and  there  wait  for  further  or  ers."     I  informed  them 
that  I  did  not  consider  myself  authorized  by  those  instructions 
to  invade  the  enemy's  territory,  ami  I  wished  them  to  give  such 
explanations,  as  would  allay  the  impatience  which  had  been  ex- 
cited.    Notwithstanding  this  communication,  the   officers   gave 
it  as  their  opinion,  that  it  was  expedient  immediately   to   cross 
and  take  possession   of  the   opposite  bank.     I   then    informed 
them,  as  long  as  I  commanded  that  army,  I  should  obey  the  or- 
ders of  the  Government.     The   circumstances  of  this   Council, 
are  proved  by  the  testimony  of  Colonel    Cass,  who  was  a  mem 
ber  of  it,  and  are  only  stated,  to  shew  the  temper  and   inexperi- 
ence of  my  officers,  and  the  difficulty   of  my   command.     This 
was  but  four  days  after  the  arrival  of  the  army  at   Detroit.     On 
the  evening  of  the  9th,  after  the  council  was  dismissed,  I  receiv- 
ed a  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  the  department  of  war,  author- 
izing me  to  commence  offensive  operations.     This  letter  is  of  so 
much  importance  that  1  shall  here  recite  the  part  of  it,   which 
relates  to  offensive  operations. 

War  Department,  June  24th,  1812. 
Sir, 
By  my  letter  of  the  18th  inst.  you  were  informed  that  war 
was  declared  against  Great  Britain.  Herewith  enclosed,  you 
will  receive  a  copy  of  the  act,  and  of  the  President's  proclama- 
tion, and  you  are  authorized  to  commence  offensive  operation! 
accordingly. 


41 

Should  the  force  under  your  command  be  equal  to  the  enter* 
prise,  consistent  with  the  safety  of  your  own  posts,  you  will 
take  possession  of  Maiden,  and  extend  your  conquests  as  cir- 
cumstances may  justify. 

(Signed)  WILLIAM  EUSTIS. 

On  the  same  evening  this  letter  was  received,  the  following 
answer  was  given. 

Detroit,  9th  July,  1812. 
Sir, 
I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  24th  of  June.  The  army 
under  my  command  arrived  here  on  the  5th  of  July  inst.  Every 
effort  has  been  and  is  still  making,  by  the  British  to  collect  the 
Indians  under  their  standard.  They  have  a  large  number.  I  am 
preparing  boats,  and  shall  pass  the  river  in  a  few  days  The 
British  have  established  a  post,  directly  opposite  this  place  — I 
have  confidence  in  dislodging  him,  and  being  in  possession  of 
the  opposite  bank.  I  have  little  time  to  write  :  every  thing  will 
be  done  that  is  possible  to  do. 

The  British  command  the  water  and  the  savage's. 

I  do  not  think  the  force  here  equal  to  the  reduction  of  Am- 
herstburg  (meaning  the  fort  at  Maiden ;)  you  therefore  must  not 
be  too  sanguine. 

(Signed)  .    WILLIAM  HULL. 

Hon.  Wm.  Eustis. 

By  the  letter  which  has  just  been  recited  from  the  Secretary 
of  War,  of  the  24th  of  June,  and  received  by  me  at  Detroit,  the 
9th  of  July,  I  was  authorized, 

1st.  To  commence  offensive  operations. 

2d.  Should  the  force  under  my  command  be  equal  to  the  en- 
terprise, consistent  with  the  safety  of  our  own  posts,  I  was  to 
take  possession  of  Maiden,  and  extend  my  conquests,  as  cir- 
cumstances might  justify. 

As  soon  as  I  received  this  letter  I  determined  to  cross  the 
river,  and  take  possession  of  the  bank  opposite  Detroit.  For 
this  purpose,  all  the  boats  and  canoes  belonging  to  the  inhabi- 
tants were  collected  and  repaired.  There  were  none  belonging 
to  the  public.  On  the  1 1th  of  July  a  sufficient  number  had  been 
collected  to  carry  over  about  four  hundred  men.  As  the  enemy 
was  in  considerable  force  on  the  opposite  bank,  and  as  I  could 

not  carry  over  more  than  four  hundred  men  at  once,  I  thought 
6 


4* 

it  expedient  to  draw  off  his  attention,  as  much  as  possible,  from 
the  m  int  where  it  was  my  intention  to  cross.  This  point  was 
at  Bloody  Bridge,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  above  Detroit.  For 
this  purpose  I  ordered  all  the  boats  on  the  Uth,  towards  even- 
ing, to  pass  down  the  river,  in  sight  of  the  enemy,  and  to  con- 
tinue 'ow  the  town  until  dark,  and  then  silently  to  return  to 
the  station  at  Bloody  Bridge.  This  movement  had  the  desired 
effect.  The  enemy  retreated  in  the  night  below  Sandwich,  and 
at  daylight  in  the  morning  of  the  12th,  the  army  passed  the 
river,  and  landed  without  any  opposition. 


No.  XTII. 

As  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  the  department  of  war  of  the 
24th  of  June,  authorized  me  to  commence  offensive  operations, 
ami  gives  assurances,  in  behalf  of  the  government,  to  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Canada,  of  protection,  in  their  persons,  property,  and 
rights  ;  1  shall  now  state  the  reasons,  which  induced  me  to  make 
the  invasion,  and  issue  the  proclamation,  when  the  army  landed 
on  the  Canada  shore. 

The  authority  given  to  commence  offensive  operations,  was 
absolute.  There  was  no  qualifications. — Nothing  was  left  to 
my  discretion.  The  intention  of  this  order  is  very  clearly  ex- 
plained, by  another  order  contained  in  the  same  letter. 

"Should  the  force  under  my  command  be  equal  to  the  enter- 
prise, consistent  with  the  safety  of  our  other  posts,  I  was  order- 
ed to  take  possession  of  Maiden.  &c  n  In  this  case,  the  authori- 
ty was  not  absolute,  but  the  measure  was  left  to  my  discretion. 
If,  therefore,  I  had  not  commenced  offensive  operations,  the  ex- 
pectations of  the  government  would  have  been  disappointed. 

Situated,  however,  as  this  army  was,  there  were  other  very 
strong  reasons  for  the  measure.  The  enemy  were  erecting  for- 
tifications on  the  opposite  bank,  directly  opposite  to  the  town  of 
Detroit.  This  bank  is  a  little  more  elevated,  than  the  one  on 
the  American  side  of  the  river.  Had  the  enemy,  therefore, 
been  permitted  to  have  finished  the  fortifications,  and  armed 
them  with  cannon,  the  town  of  Detroit  would  have  been  greatly 
annoyed,  and  the  situation  of  the  army  made  uncomfortable. 
To  dislodge  the  enemy  from  this  position,  1  thought  both  ex- 


43 

pedient  and  necessary.  The  possession  of  both  banks,  would 
give  us  the  command  of  the  river,  and  prevent  the  enemy  from 
sending  supplies  to  the  garrisons  on  Lake  Huron. 

There  were  other  objects,  under  the  circumstances  I  was 
placed,  which  rendered  the  measure  expedient.  The  delay  of 
only  one  or  two  days,  in  collecting  and  repairing  the  boats,  and 
in  making  the  necessary  preparations  increased  the  impatience, 
which  had  been  before  manifested  and  it  arose  almost  to  mutiny. 
This  spirit  was  fostered,  and  inflamed  generally  by  the  officers 
of  the  militia ;  what  the  motives  were,  whether  they  were  an 
expectation  of  plunder,  I  will  not  pretend  to  say.  With  many 
of  them,  however,  they  proved  to  be  an  unsteady,  wayward 
spirit ;  as  about  two  hundred  of  them  refused  to  accompany  the 
army,  alledging  as  a  reason,  that  by  law,  and  by  their  engage- 
ments, they  were  not  obliged  to  march  out  of  the  U.  States. 

Another  object,  which  I  considered  of  great  importance,  was, 
to  preserve  the  neutrality  of  the  inhabitants  of  Upper  Canada, 
and  the  savages,  and  to  prevent  them  from  joining  the  British 
standard. 

I  confidently  hoped,  when  the  inhabitants  beheld  the  Ameri- 
can forces  in  the  possession  of  their  country,  and  in  a  situation 
to  afford  them  protection,  it  would  be  a  strong  inducement  to 
them  to  remain  quietly  at  their  homes,  and  take  no  part  in  the 
war. 

I  believed,  when  the  Indians  discovered  the  American  stand- 
ard erected  on  both  sides  of  the  river,  it  would  have  a  favoura- 
ble effect,  and  induce  them  to  return  to  their  villages,  and  take 
no  part  in  a  war,  in  which  they  had  no  interest.  At  this  time 
there  was  no  information  that  Michillimackinack  had  fallen,  and 
there  were  some  grounds,  that  these  expectations  would  be 
realized. 

There  was  another  reason,  which  most  powerfully  urged  me  to 
take  possession  of  the  enemy's  country.  It  was  to  draw  from 
it  provisions  and  forage  for  the  support  of  my  army,  and  to  in- 
tercept, as  far  as  possible,  the  supplies  from  the  river  Le 
Trench,  to  the  British  garrison  at  Maiden.  In  the  course  of 
these  memoirs,  I  shall  exhibit  the  small  quantities  of  provisions, 
which  were  at  Detroit,  the  5th  of  July,  on  my  arrival,  that  none 
arrived  afterwards,  that  in  the  Territory  of  Michigan,  there  was 
aot  a  sufficiency  for  the  inhabitants,  and  that  the  whole  stock 


44 

,would  have  been  exhausted,  long  before  the  capitulation,  had 
not  an  additional  supply  been  obtained  from  the  inhabitants  of 
Canada.  The  supply  indeed  was  small,  but  it  had  a  double 
operation;  as  it  increased  our  stock  and  diminished  that  of  the 
enemy,  fr  was  taken  principally  from  mills  on  the  river  Le 
Trench,  where  it  had  been  prepared  for  the  garrison  at  Maiden. 
I  hav-  stated  these  reasons,  for  the  invasion  of  Canada,  not  that 
the  government  made  it  one  of  the  articles  of  charges  against 
me.  This  indeed,  could  not  have  been  done,  because  it  was 
bv  its  own  order;  but  I  have  done  it  to  satisfy  some  of  my  fel- 
low citizens  of  its  expediency,  who  have  attached  blame  to  me 
for  the  measure,  under  the  circumstances,  in  which  I  was  placed. 
Had  it  not  been  done  by  the  orders  of  the  government,  there  is 
no  doubt  it  would  have  been  one  of  the  first  charges  against  me, 
for  which  I  should  have  been  condemned. 

These  are  the  reasons,  which  induced  me  to  commerce  offen- 
sive operations,  and  not  with  a  view  to  storm  the  British  fort 
at  Maiden,  with  undisciplined  and  mutinous  militia.  My  let- 
ter to  the  Secretary  of  War,  which  has  been  recited,  is  conclu- 
sive evidence  on  this  subject,  I  repeat  the  words.  "The  Bri- 
tish command  the  water  and  the  savages ;  I  do  not  think  the 
force  here  equal  to  the  reduction  of  Amherstburg,  (the  fort  at 
Maiden,)  you  therefore  must  not  be  too  sanguine." 


No.  XIV. 


On  the  subject  of  the  number  which  I  shall  now  present  to 
you,  I  feel  more  interest  than  on  any  other  which  has  been  or 
will  be  discussed.  It  is  the  proclamation  which  I  issued  to  the 
inhabitants  of  Canada.  This  was  not  made  an  article  of  charge 
against  me,  because  it  would  have  re-acted  on  the  administra- 
tion. By  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  of  the  24th  June, 
and  which  was  received  before  the  proclamation  was  issued,  I 
was  authorized,  when  I  commenced  offensive  operations,  to 
give  assurances  of  protection  to  the  inhabitants,  in  their  per- 
sons, property,  and  rights.  This  was  the  foundation  of  the  pro- 
clamation, and  the  substance  of  it  was  authorized  in  this  letter, 
and  the  other  parts  of  it  contained  reasons  to  induce  the  inhabi- 
tants not  to  take  any  part  in  the  contest.    I  shall  endeavour  to 


45 

give  it  a  fair  and  candid  explanation,  and  sfate  the  motives 
which  induced  me  to  issue  it  in  the  form  it  appeared.  What- 
ever opinion  you  may  form  of  it — whether  it  meets  with  your 
approbation  or  disapprobation — T  pledge  myself  to  produce  au- 
thentic testimony,  that  as  soon  as  it  was  published,  it  was  sent 
to  the  government,  approved  by  the  government,  and  conse- 
quently became  the  act  of  the  government ;  and  that,  in  publish- 
ing it,  I  was  influenced  by  pure  and  honourable  motives. 

I  feel  the  more  solicitude  on  this  subject,  because,  many  hon- 
ourable men,  who  have  approved  of  my  conduct  generally,  cur- 
ing that  campaign,  have  not  been  satisfied  with  every  part  of 
the  proclamation.  As  many  of  you,  perhaps,  have  not  had  an 
opportunity  of  seeing  it,  I  shall  here  transcribe  the  whole  of  it ; 
after  which,  I  shall  give  such  explanations  as  in  my  opinion  the 
text  will  justify. 

By  William  Hull,  Governour  of  the  Territory  of  Michigan, 
and  Commanding  the  North  Western  Army, 

A  PROCLAMATION. 

Inhabitants  of  Canada, 

After  thirty  years  of  peace  and  prosperity,  the  United  States 
have  been  driven  to  arms.  The  injuries  and  aggressions,  the 
insults  and  indignities  of  Great  Britain  have  once  more  left 
them  no  alternative  but  manly  resistance  or  unconditional  sub- 
mission. The  army  under  my  ccmmand  has  invaded  your 
country  ;  the  standard  of  the  Union  now  waves  over  the  territo- 
ry of  Canada.  To  the  peaceable,  unoffending  inhabitants,  it 
brings  neither  danger  nor  dilficulty.  1  come  to  find  enemies, 
not  to  make  them.     I  come  to  protect,  not  to  injure  you. 

Separated  by  an  immense  ocean  and  an  extensive  wilderness 
from  Great  Britain,  you  have  no  participation  in  her  councils, 
no  interest  in  her  conduct.  You  have  felt  her  tyranny,  you  have 
seen  her  injustice.  But  I  do  not  ask  you  to  avenge  the  one  or 
redress  the  other.  The  United  States  are  sufficiently  powerful 
to  afford  every  security  consistent  with  their  rights  and  your  ex- 
pectations. I  tender  to  you  the  invaluable  blessings  of  civil, 
political,  and  religious  liberty,  and  their  necessary  result ;  in- 
dividual and  general  prosperity  :  that  liberty  which  gave  deci- 
sion to  our  councils  and  energy  to  our  conduct,  in  a  struggle  for 
independence,  which  conducted  us  safely  and  triumphantly 
through  the  stormy  period  of  the  revolution — that  liberty  whick 


46 

raised  us  to  an  elevated  rank  among  the  nations  of  the  world; 
and  which  afforded  ■  greater  measure  of  peace  amd  security,  of 
wealth  and  improvement,  than  ever  fell  to  the  lot  of  any 
people. 

In  the  name  of  my  country,  and  the  authority  of  government, 
I  promise  you  protection,  to  your  persons,  property,  and  rights. 
Remain  at  your  homes,  pursue  your  peaceful  and  customary 
avocations  ;  raise  not  your  hands  against  your  brethren.     Many 
of  your  fathers  fought  for  the  freedom  and  independence  we  now 
enjoy.     Being  children,  therefore,  of  the  same  family  with  us, 
and  heirs  to  the  same  heritage,  the  arrival  of  an  army  of  friends 
must  be  hailed  by  you,  with  a  cordial  welcome.      You  will  be 
emancipated  from  tyranny  and  oppression,  and  restored  to  the 
dignified  station  of  freemen.     Had  I  any  doubt  of  eventual  suc- 
cess, I  might  ask  your  assistance,  but  I  do  not,  I  come  prepar- 
ed for  every  contingency.     I  have  a  force  which  will  break 
down  all   opposition,  and  that  force  is  but  the  vanguard  of  a 
much  greater.     If  contrary  to  your  own  interest,  and  the  just 
expectations  of  my  country,  you  should  take  a  part  in  the  ap- 
proaching contest,  you  will  be  considered  as  enemies,  and  the 
horrours  and  calamities  of  war  will  stalk  before  you.  If  the  bar- 
barous and  savage  policy  of  Great  Britain  be  pursued,  and  the 
savages  be  let  loose  to  murder  our  citizens  and  butcher  our  wo- 
men and  children,  this  war  will  be  a  war  of  extermination.    The 
first  stroke  of  the  tomahawk,  the  first  attempt  with  the  scalping 
knife,  will  be  the  signal  of  one  indiscriminate  scene  of  desola- 
tion.    No  white  man  found  fighting  by  the  side  of  an  Indian 
will  be  taken  prisoner — instant  death  will  be  his  lot.     If  the 
dictates  of  reason,  duty,  justice,  and  humanity,  cannot  prevent 
the  employment  of  a  force  which  respects  no  rights,  and  knows 
no  wrong,  it  will  be  prevented  by  a  severe  and  relentless  sys- 
tem of  retaliation.    I  doubt  not  your  courage  and  firmness,  I 
will  not  doubt  your  attachment  to  liberty.     If  you  tender  your 
services  voluntarily,  they  will  be  accepted  readily.    The  Unit- 
ed States  offer  you  peace,  liberty,  and  security.     Your  choice 
lies  between  these  and  war,   slavery  or  destruction.    Choose 
then;  choose  wisely,  and  may  He  who  knows  the  justice  of  our 
cause,  and  who  holds  in  his  hand  the  fate  of  nations,  guide  you 
to  the  result  the  most  compatible  with  your  rights  and  interest, 
your  peace  and  happiness.  WILLIAM  HULI/. 


47 

Before  I  proceed  to  any  particular  explanations,  I  ask  you  to 
fcear  in  mind  the  situation  in  which  I  was  placed  by  the  orders 
of  the  government.  I  was  in  an  enemy's  country,  with  the  com- 
mand of  a  small  body  of  militia,  and  a  few  regulars,  (the  num- 
bers will  hereafter  be  described)  nearly  three  hundred  miles 
distant  from  any  magazines  of  provisions,  munitions  of  war,  or 
re-enforcements.  The  enemy  with  which  I  had  to  contend,  was 
all  the  British  troops  in  Upper  Canada,  all  the  militia  of  that 
province,  and  all  the  northern  and  western  Indians,  both,  in  the 
territory  of  Canada  and  the  United  States,  together  with  all  the 
strength  and  resources  of  the  wealthy  and  powerful  North-west 
Company. 

Placed  in  this  insulated  situation,  by  the  orders  of  the  gov- 
ernment ;  and  surrounded  by  all  the  veteran  British  troops  in 
Upper  Canada,  a  powerful  militia,  subject  to  the  command 
of  the  British  governour  of  the  province,  who  was  the  general  of 
the  army ;  with  but  a  small  stock  of  provisions  on  hand  and  no 
possibility  of  obtaining  a  further  supply,  as  the  lake  was  com<- 
manded  by  a  British  naval  squadron,  and  the  only  communica- 
tion by  land,  a  wilderness  of  more  than  two  hundred  miles, 
filled  with  hostile  savages ;  I  saw  no  possibility  of  even  sustain 
ing  my  situation,  unless  the  militia  could  be  prevented  from 
taking  a  part  in  the  war,  and  joining  the  British  standard. 

A  large  portion  of  the  population  of  that  province  had  emi- 
grated from  the  United  States.  They  had  been  educated  with 
the  principles  of  freedom  and  independence;  and  some  of  them, 
and  many  of  their  fathers,  had  fought  and  bled  in  our  revo- 
lutionary contest.  They  were  situated  more  than  three  thous- 
and miles  from  the  country  to  which  they  were  subjected,  and 
had  no  participation  or  interest  in  the  measures  it  adopted. 
Having  for  a  number  of  years  lived  in  their  neighbourhood,  I 
had  often  heard  them  express  the  injustice  and  oppression  they 
suffered,  and  their  nutural  right,  and  strong  wishes,  to  partici- 
pate in  the  same  freedom  and  independence  which  their  breth- 
ren of  the  United  States  enjoyed,  and  under  which  they  were 
so  prosperous  and  happy.  They  were  informed  that  the  force 
I  had  was  but  the  vanguard  of  a  much  greater.  I  considered 
that  I  had  solid  grounds  to  make  this  declaration. 

In  the  first  place,  it  will  be  seen  that  I  was  authorized  to 
pledge  the  faith  of  the  government,  that  they  should  be  protect- 


48 

ed  in  their  persons,  property,  and  rights.  Could  I  have  believ- 
ed that  the  government  would  have  authorized  me  to  have  made 
this  pledge,  without  furnishing  the  means  of  redeeming  it  ?  I 
be<:  you,  my  fellow  citizens,  to  look  back,  and  consider  what 
took  place,  before  I  left  Washington,  on  this  subject.  In  my 
official  communications  to  the  government,  I  stated,  that  in  the 
event  of  war  with  Great  Britain,  it  would  be  necessary  to  com- 
mand the  waters  of  Lake  Krie,  by  a  naval  force  superiour  to  that 
of  the  enemy ;  to  provide  re-enforcements,  to  secure  the  com- 
munication through  the  wilderness  I  was  to  penetrate — and  a 
powerful  army,  to  co-operate  from  the  Slates  of  New  York  and 
Pennsylvania,  which  border  on  the  east  part  of  the  lake  :  that, 
without  these  measures,  it  would  be  impossible  for  me  to  sustain 
my  situation  ;  and  the  ports  of  Detroit,  Michiliimackanack,  and 
Chicago,  would  fall  into  the  possession  of  the  enemy.  I  hope, 
and  indeed  believe,  you  will  be  satisfied,  there  were  sufficient 
grounds  on  my  part  for  making  this  declaration. 

I  now  come  to  that  part  of  the  proclamation  which  regards  the 
Indians,  and  the  employment  of  them  in  the  war  by  the  British 
government.  It  is  well  known,  that  the  mode  of  Indian  war- 
fare is  to  give  no  quarter.  After  torturing  their  prisoners  in 
the  most  inhuman  manner,  they  put  them  to  death,  unless  they 
believe  they  will  be  useful  to  them  as  slaves,  or  they  can  obtain 
an  high  ransom  for  them.  In  their  warfare,  they  have  no  respect 
to  age,  to  women,  or  children;  wherever  their  power  extends,  it 
becomes  an  indiscriminate  scene  of  desolation ;  and,  on  their 
part,  a  war  of  extermination. 

In  the  former  wars,  it  is  well  known,  that  many  of  the  Cana- 
dians have  joined  their  bands,  and  in  every  respect  assumed 
their  dress,  and  so  assimilated  themselves  to  them,  that  it  was 
impossible  to  make  any  distinction.  If  it  is  the  Indian  mode  of 
warfare  to  give  no  quarter,  it  is  certainly  proper  for  those 
aganist  whom  they  fight  to  observe  the  same  rule.  If  white  men 
paint  and  disfigure  themselves,  and  assume  the  dress  of  Indians, 
and  fight  by  their  sides  in  war,  in  such  a  manner  that  they  can- 
not be  distinguished,  I  ask  whether  it  is  not  proper  to  treat  them 
in  the  sa»ne  manner  as  Indians.  By  a  reference  to  General 
Brock's  proclamation,  in  answer  to  mine,  it  will  be  seen  that  he 
justified  this  mode  of  warfare  of  his  savage  allies. 


49 

It  is  observed,  if  the  barbarous  and  savage  policy  ofGrreajt 
Britain  be  pursued,  and  the  savages  are  let  loose  to  murder 
our  citizens,  and  butcher  our  women  and  children,  this  war 
will  be  a  war  of  extermination.  It  then  states,  that  if  the  dic- 
tates of  reason,  duty,  justice,  and  humanity  cannot  prevent  the 
employment  of  a  force,  which  respects  no  rights,  and  knows  no 
wrongs,  it  will  be  prevented  by  a  severe  and  relentless  system 
of  retaliation. 

It  will  be  perceived,  that  all  these  declarations  are  grounded 
on  *he  principle  of  retaliation ;  this  principle,  I  have  ever  been 
taught  by  the  high  authority  of  the  laws  of  nations,  is  well 
founded  and  just.  The  whole  proclamation  has  been  recited  > 
and  I  beg  it  may  be  particularly  observed,  that  the  threatening 
declarations  are  hypothetical ;  that,  if  the  enemy  pursue  this 
barbarous  policy    we  must  retaliate  in  our  own  defence. 

On  the  13th  of  July,  the  day  after  it  was  published,  a  copy  of 
it  was  sent  to  the  government.  The  paragraph  of  the  letter  is 
in  these  words  : — "  Enclosed  is  a  copy  of  a  proclamation  to  the 
inhabitants,  which  I  hope  will  be  approved  by  the  government. 
Two  hundred  copies  have  been  printed  and  are  in  circulation.'* 
See  HuWs  Trial*  page  10  of  the  Index.  Here  follow  several 
extracts  of  letters  received  from  the  war  department,  in  reply 
to  my  letters  about  that  date. 

**  War  Department  Aug,  1,  1812. 

"  Sir:  Your  letters  of  the  13th  and  14th,  together  with  your 
proclamation,  have  been  received.  Your  operations  are  ap- 
proved by  the  President. n 

In  another  letter,  dated  on  the  same  day  the  proclamation 
was  received,  the  Secretary  of  war  says  :  u  The  progress  you 
have  made,  and  the  success  which  has  attended  it,  are  highly 
satisfactory  to  the  President." 

In  another  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  the  8th 
of  August,  eight  days  after  the  receipt  of  the  proclamation,  he 
says  :  "  Your  letters  of  the  21st  and  22d  of  July  have  been  re- 
ceived and  your  arrangements  are  approved  by  the   President." 

These  letters  have  lately  been  obtained  from  the  war  office, 
and  are  certified  to  be  true  copies. 

Thus  it  appears,  from  the  records  of  the  war  office,  that  my 
letter  of  the  13th  of  July,  enclosing  the  proclamation,  was  re- 
ceived on  the  1st  of  August;  that  on  the  same  dav,  the  Secreta- 


£0 

tj  wrote  me  a  letter,  acknowledging  the  receipt  of  it,  and  say- 
ing that  my  operations  were  approved  by  the  President. 

On  the  same  day,  the  Secretary  wrote  me  another  letter,  re- 
ferring likewise  to  the  one  enclosing  my  proclamation  ;  in  which 
he  said,  "  that  the  progress  I  had  made,  and  the  success  which 
had  attended  it  was  highly  satisfactory  to  the  President ;"  and 
in  another  letter,  written  eight  days  after  the  receipt  of  the  proc- 
lamation, he  says,  referring  to  the  same  subject,  "your  ar» 
rangements  are  approved  by  the  President." 

After  this  explanation  and  state  of  facts,  which  has  been 
proved  by  the  records  of  the  goverment,  I  confidently  submit  the 
subject  to  your  candid  decision. 

I  have  been  the  more  particular  on  this  subject  for  two  reasons 
which  have  not  been  mentioned.  One  is,  although  this  procla- 
mation was  not  an  aricle  of  charge  against  me,  as  I  before  ob- 
served, yet  it  was  copied  from  the  records  of  the  government, 
and  sent  to  the  court  martial  as  evidence  against  me  on  my 
trial,  and  published  with  the  other  evidence,  by  Lieut,  Col. 
Forbes,  in  his  report  of  my  trial.  There  could  have  been 
no  other  motive,  but  to  have  created  unfavourable  impres- 
sions against  me.  It  is  with  reluctance,  that  I  state  the  other 
rftason,  because  it  may  in  some  measure,  affect  characters,  for 
whom  I  have  the  highest  respect,  and  on  whom  the  future  hopes 
of  our  country  are  placed. 

By  the  journal  of  the  proceedings  of  the  commissioners,  at 
the  treaty  of  Ghent,  it  appears,  that  the  commissioners  on  the 
part  of  Great  Britain,  stated  some  improper  aggressions,  which 
our  government  had  committed  against  the  inhabitants  of  Cana- 
da. Not  having  the  journal  before  me,  I  cannot  state  precisely, 
and  it  is  not  necessary,  what  they  were.  The  American  com- 
missioners asked  them  for  the  evidence.  The  proclamation, 
which  has  been  referred  to,  was  offered  as  evidence.  The 
American  commissioners  declared  that  it  was  unauthorized  and 
disapproved  by  the  government. 

On  this  subject,  my  fellow  citizens,  you  have  before  you  the 
documents  and  evidence,  giving  me  an  authority  to  issue  this 
proclamation,  of  its  being  sent  to  the  government,  and  the  Pres- 
ident's approbation  of  it,  in  three  letters,  after  it  had  been  re- 
ceived,— my  enquiries  of  the  Hon.  John  Quincy   Adams,  on 


51 

what  grounds  that  declaration  waa  made,  and  his  answer,  ar*, 
contained  in  my  second  number. 

Thus,  it  appears,  that  every  wheel,  and  indeed  the  whole 
machinery  of  the  administration,  was  put  in  motion,  however 
distant  from  the  centre  of  operation,  to  exonerate  itself,  and 
place  on  my  shoulders,  all  the  misfortunes  which  took  place  at 
the  commencement  of  the  war ;  a  war,  however  just  were  the 
causes  of  it,  was  declared  without  any  preparation  ;  and  I  can 
safely  appeal  to  the  public  records,  to  prove,  contrary  to  every 
opinion  1  had  given  on  the  subject. 

In  not  less  than  three  official  communications  made  to  the 
administration,  I  stated  that  if  war  was  declared,  without 
the  command  of  the  lake,  Detroit,  Michillimackanack  and 
Chicago,  must  in  the  nature  of  things,  fall  into  the  hands  of  ih». 
enemy. 


No.  XV. 

Having  in  the  former  numbers  explained  the  motives  which 
rendered  it  expedient,  to  cross  the  Detroit  river,  and  take  a  posi- 
tion with  the  principal  part  of  the  forces  on  the  opposite  bank,  I 
shall  now  endeavour  to  satisfy  you  of  the  propriety  of  the  delay 
in  this  situation,  and  offer  the  reasons  why  an  attack  on  the 
British  fort  at  Maiden  was  not  made.  In  the  same  letter,  from 
the  Secretary  of  War,  which  authorized  me  to  commence  offen- 
sive operations,  an  attempt  to  take  possession  of  the  British  fort 
at  Maiden,  was  left  to  my  discretion.  This  letter  was  received 
the  9th  of  July,  in  the  evening.  On  the  same  evening  this  let- 
ter was  received,  I  wrote  to  the  Secretary,  in  answer  to  it,  in 
these  words  : — "  The  British  command  the  water  and  the  sav- 
ages.— I  do  not  think  the  force  here,  equal  to  the  reduction  of 
Amherstburg.     You  therefore,  must  not  be  too  sanguine." 

As  the  Secretary's  letter  only  authorized  me  to  make  the  at- 
tack on  the  British  fort  at  Maiden,  provided,  I  considered  my 
force  adequate  to  the  enterprise,  and  consistent  with  the  safety 
of  my  other  posts  ;  and  as  in  my  answer,  I  gave  it  as  my  opinion 
that  my  force  was  not  equal  to  the  enterprise,  and  gave  my 
reasons  for  the  opinion,  (viz.)  that  the  enemy   commanded  the 


^2 

Water  and  the  savages.  I  could  not  have  believed  it  possible, 
after  the  government  had  confided  this  measure  to  my  discretion, 
and  had  fully  approved  of  my  conduct,  that  it  could  have  been 
made  a  charge  of  capital  offence  against  me.  But  so  it  was,  and 
I  therefore,  must  ask  the  indulgence  of  your  patience,  in  stating 
the  reasons,  which  governed  my  conduct. 

After  having  received  these  discretionary  orders,  and  after 
having  given  this  answer  and  opinion,  if  I  had  made  the  attempt, 
and  it  had  been  unsuccessful,  what  would  the  officers  of  tlie  ad- 
ministration have  said  ?  They  would   have  said,  and  with  pro- 
priety, that  I  was  only  authorized  to  adopt  this  measure,  provi- 
ded my  force  was  competent  to  it ;  that  I  had  communicated  to 
them  my  opinion   that  it  was  not  competent  to  it,  and  therefore 
it  had  been  attempted,  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  orders  1  had 
received,  and  would  then  have  been  a  sufficient  ground  for  an 
article  of  charge.      In  explaining  the  reasons  of  my  conduct  on 
this  occasion,  nothing  shall  be  disguised,  nothing  shall  be  kept 
back,  nothing  shall  be  said,  but  what  is  founded  in  truth,  whe- 
ther  it  operates  for  or  against  me.       Under  these  impressions, 
I  wish  you  to  understand,  that  on  the  9th  of  July,  when  I  wrote 
to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  informed  him  that  my  force  was 
not  equal  to  the  reduction  of  Maiden,  it  was  uncertain,  what 
part  the  inhabitants  of  Upper  Canada  would  take  in  the  war. 
They  were  subjects  of  the  British  nation,  and  liable  to  the  or- 
ders of  its  government.     Unless  in  some  way  they  could  be  pre- 
vented from  taking;  a  part  i:i  the  war,  they  alone  were  sufficient 
to  overwhelm  the  whole  of  my  army.      They  were  militia,  com- 
posed of  the  same  materials,  as  the  principal  part  of  my  army 
and  more  than  five  times  its  number.     With  respect  to  the  sav- 
ages, many  of  them  at  that  time  had  joined  the  British  stand- 
ard, and  no  certain  calculations  could  be  made,  that  I  should 
be  able  to  induce  them  to  return  and   remain  quiet  at  their  vil- 
lages.   It  was  well  known  that  a  great  portion  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  Province,  felt  no  very  strong  attachment  to  the  govern- 
ment under  which  they  lived.      Many  of  them,  as  I  have  before 
observed,  were  born  and  educated  in  the  United  States,  had  en- 
joyed the  blessings  of  a  free  government,  and  were  united  to 
us  by  ties  of  friendship  and  of  blood. 

They  remembered   the  time  when  the  United   States,   were 
provinces  of  Great  Britain,  the  history  of  our  revolution,  and 


53 

were  not  ignorant  of  the  blessing  we  enjoyed  as  an  independent 
nation.  I  could  not  but  indulge  the  expectation,  that  from  their 
situation  and  feelings,  they  would  not  have  been  disposed  to 
have  joined  in  the  war  against  us.  For  some  time  every  ap- 
pearance justified  this  expectation.  Large  numbers,  who  had 
been  called  into  Maiden  for  its  defence,, came  to  our  camp,  and 
received  the  protection  of  our  government.  Numbers  came  from, 
every  part  of  the  province,  and  gave  assurances  of  their  friend- 
ship, and  their  determination,  not  to  take  arms  against  us.  Un- 
der these  circumstances,  I  considered  delay  favourable  to  mj 
operations,  as  the  force  of  the  enemy  was  every  day  diminish- 
ed. Strong  detachments  were  made  to  the  river  Trench,  to 
collect  provisions,  and  to  Maiden,  to  reconnoitre  the  situation 
of  the  enemy.  All  the  artificers  of  the  army  were  employed  in 
making  carriages  for  twenty-lour  pounders,  for  the  attack  on  the 
fort  at  Maiden,  and  floating  batteries  were  commenced  to  tran- 
sport them  down  the  river,  if  possible,  to  operate  against  the 
«nemy?s  naval  force. 

These  preparations  for  an  attack  on  the  fort  at  Maiden,  were 
made  under  the  expectation,  or  at  least  the  hope,  that  the  de- 
sertion of  the  militia  would  continue,  and  other  events  would 
take  place,  which  would  render  that  measure  expedient. 

During  this  delay,  a  clamour  was  excited  in  the  camp,  by  the 
officers  of  the  militia  because  the  army  was  not  immediately 
marched  to  the  attack  of  Maiden.  In  consequence  of  this  im- 
patience, two  days  after  the  invasion  of  the  enemy's  territory, 
I  called  a  council  of  war,  and  proposed  the  question,  whether 
it  were  expedient  to  attempt,  with  the  bayonet,  to  storm  the  fort 
at  Maiden.  The  council  determined  that  no  attempt  ought  to 
be  made  on  Maiden,  until  the  heavy  artillery  was  prepared. 

Although,  from  the  time  of  the  first  council,  to  the  5th  of  Au- 
gust, many  circumstances  had  taken  place,  which  will  hereafter 
be  related,  to  render  an  attack  on  Maiden  still  more  inexped- 
ient, and  the  heavy  artillery  had  not  been  completed,  yet  on  ac- 
count of  the  great  impatience  of  the  officers,  I  called  another 
council  of  war,  on  the  5th  of  August. 

In  this  council,  I  stated  that  the  heavy  artillery  was  not  in 
readiness,  but  would  be  in  two  or  three  days.  The  question 
was  then  submitted  to  the  council,  whether  it  were  expedient  to 
wait  for  the  heavy  artillery,  in   order  to   make  a  breach  in  the 


54 

works,  or  immediately  to  make  the  attempt  with  the  bayonet 
alone  ? 

Before  the  question  was  taken,  I  observed  to  them,  that  if  it 
should  be  their  opinion  that  it  was  expedient  to  make  the  at- 
tack immediately,  and  they  would  answer  for  their  men,  I  would 
th     lead  them  to  the  enterprise.     Colonel  Miller,  (who  commanded 
the  regulars.)  answered,  he  would  be  answerable  for  the  men 
h      he  commanded.      Colonels  Mc Arthur,  Cass,  and  Finley,  (who 
a      commanded  the  militia,)  said  they  would  not  be  answerable, but 
j       hoped  they  would  behave  well.      The  council  then  determined 
that  it  was  expedient  to  wait  two  days  longer  for  the  heavy  ar- 
tillery. 

Thus  it  appears,  that  notwithstanding  the  impatience  and  de- 
sire which  was  manifested  to  attack  the  fort  with  the  bayonet, 
yet  when  it  came  to  the  test,  and  I  declared  to  them  that  I 
would  lead  them,  if  in  their  opinion  in  council,  they  thought  it 
expedient,  their  impatience  and  desire  subsided,  and  they 
thought  it  best  to  be  aided  in  the  enterprise  by  the  heavy  artil- 
lery. These  facts  are  proved  by  the  testimony  of  Colonel  Mil- 
ler, and  others,  and  a  more  particular  detail,  will  be  found  in 
my  defence  before  the  court  martial. 


No.  xvi. 


As  the  measures  alluded  to  in  my  last  number  of  not  attack- 
ing Maiden,  and  of  recrossing  the  Detroit  river,  were  made  ar- 
ticles of  capital  charge  against  me,  by  the  administration,  I 
must  ask  your  particular  attention  to  these  subjects.  However 
contrary  they  were  to  my  feelings  and  wishes,  yet  under  the 
unexpected  circumstances,  which  had  taken  place,  they  were  in 
my  opinion  dictated  by  a  sense  of  imperious  duty — had  I  been 
influenced  only  by  a  desire  of  popular  fame,  and  not  been  gov- 
erned by  the  dictates  of  duty,  I  should  have  been  unworthy  of 
the  confidence  which  had  been  placed  in  me. — There  existed, 
however,  powerful  inducements  to  a  departure  from  the  line  of 
conduct  which  I  pursued.  I  well  knew  the  interest  which  the 
progress  of  the  army  I  commanded  had  excited,  and  the  expec- 
tations which  were  cherished.     I  well  knew  the  feelings  of  the 


55 

officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Ohio  militia,  who  in  a  patriotic  man- 
ner had  volunteered  their  services  ;  and  the  effect  that  a  retro- 
grade movement  would  have  on  them.  I  well  knew  their 
anxious  desire,  when  they  returned  to  their  homes,  after  the 
fatigues  and  dangers  of  the  campaign  had  passed,  to  be  adorn- 
ed with  laurels,  and  to  be  hailed  by  their  friends  and  neighbours 
as  the  conquerors  of  Maiden.  As  to  myself  had  I  been  influ- 
enced by  motives  of  ambition  alone,  I  was  no  stranger  to  the 
road  which  would  have  conducted  me  to  popular  favour,  or  of 
the  rewards  and  honours,  which  an  achievement  so  anxiously  ex- 
pected, would  have  bestowed. 

In  adopting  the  measures,  which  I  did  on  this  occasion,  I 
hope  to  convince  you,  that  I  was  influenced  by  the  purest  mo- 
tives, that  the  measures  were  strictly  conformable  to  establish- 
ed military  principles,  and  that  not  even  errours  of  judgment, 
much  less  crimes,  ought  to  have  been  imputed  to  me. 

The  number  of  effective  men,  of  which  my  army  consisted, 
has  been  greatly  exaggerated,  both  at  this  time,  and  at  the  time 
of  the  capitulation. — In  the  course  of  these  memoirs,  1  shall 
present  a  more  particular  detail.  At  present,  I  shall  make 
such  statements  and  present  such  documents,  as  will  enable 
you  to  form  a  satisfactory  estimate  of  my  forces  in  the  enemy's 
country,  at  the  time  I  recrossed  Detroit  river. 

By  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  war,  of  the  9th  of  April, 
1812,  which  gave  me  the  command  of  these  forces,  their  num- 
bers were  stated,  and  the  objects  for  which  they  were  called 
into  service.  The  numbers  were  1200  militia  from  the  state  of 
Ohio,  and  the  4th  United  States'  Regiment,  which  consisted  of 
about  300.  I  never  received  any  instructions  from  the  Govern- 
ment to  march  with  a  larger  force.  A  few  straggling  volun- 
teers, from  the  novelty  of  the  scene,  curiosity,  or  a  desire  to 
see  the  country,  followed  the  army,  and  were  included  in  the 
return. 

On  the  road  which  was  opened  through  the  wilderness  three 
block  houses  were  built,  and  garrisoned  for  the  purpose  of  aid- 
ing in  the  security  of  the  communication,  and  the  protection  of 
convoys  of  provisions,  against  the  savages.  It  appears  from 
Lieut.  Furbush's  testimony,  and  other  evidence  on  my  trial 
(Page  146  of  Lieut.  Gol.  Forbes'  report  of  the  trial,)  all  the 
sick  of  the  army,  with  a  suitable  number  to  take  care  of  them, 


56 

were  made  prisoners  in  the  vessel,  which  sailed  from  the  Mi- 
ami, on  the  |S1  of  July,  for  Detroit,  in  passing  the  Fort  at  Mai- 
den, before  I  had  received  information  of  the  declaration  of 
war. — This  number  must  have  been  as  many  as  sixty,  as  the 
Lieut,  who  was  himself  on  board  the  vessel,  says,  it  was  as 
many  as  she  could  carry.  A  number  of  the  sick  of  the  army, 
on  its  march,  were  left  at  the  river  Raisin,  and  never  again 
joined  it.  One  hundred  and  eighty  of  the  Ohio  militia  refused 
to  pass  the  river  when  I  commenced  offensive  operations,  al- 
ledging  as  a  reason,  that  they  were  not  obliged  to  serve  out  of 
the  United  States.  The  aggregate  of  these  numbers,  will 
amount  to  more  than  three  hundred.  In  addition  to  this  num- 
ber, a  subaltern  officer  and  thirty  men,  were  left  at  the  Miami, 
to  build  a  stockade  fort,  by  orders  from  the  Secretary  of  war. 
Besides  this,  it  was  necessary  to  leave  a  portion  of  the  troops, 
for  the  security  of  the  fort  of  Detroit,  and  the  other  posts  in  its 
vicinity. 

In  addition  to  the  Ohio  militia,  and  the  4th  regiment,  there 
was  a  company  in  the  fort  of  Detroit.  Being  governour  of  the 
territory,  its  militia  were  under  my  command.  The  population 
of  that  territory  did  not  much  exceed  four  thousand,  and  scat- 
tered from  lake  Superior  to  .the  Miami  of  lake  Erie,  a  distance 
of  about  five  hundred  miles.  Little  or  no  advantage  could  be 
derived  from  this  militia.  The  unfortunate  loss  of  my  papers 
during  the  campaign,  the  circumstances  of  which  will  be  parti- 
cularly related  in  a  future  number,  prevents  me  from  giving, 
at  present,  a  more  particular  detail.  But  here  we  have  the 
highest  authority  for  the  numbers  ordered  by  the  government, 
and  in  my  trial,  will  be  found  conclusive  evidence,  with  respect 
to  those  taken  in  the  vessel,  those  left  in  the  block  houses,  and 
those  who  refused  to  pass  the  river. — It  was  now  the  6th  or  7th 
of  August ;  the  troops  had  endured  great  fatigue  in  opening  the 
road  on  their  march,  and  the  principal  part  of  them  had  not 
been  inured  to  a  camp  life.  They  were  in  a  country  liable  to 
the  ague  and  fever,  and  a  large  number  were  sick  and  de- 
bilitated. 

At  my  trial  rav  prosecutors  endeavoured  to  make  the  numbers 
as  large  as  possibl* — A  return  was  presented  to  the  Court 
Martial  made  at  fort  Finlay  at  the  commencement  of  the 
inarch,  and  before  any  detachments  were  made,  and  the  total 


57 

number  amounted  to  a  few  more,  than  were  ordered  by  the 
government  This  return  included  all  the  volunteers,  and  fol- 
lowers of  the  army,  not  legally  subject  to  my  command,  was^- 
onners,  packhorse-men,  &c.  &c.  &c.  On  the  data  here  given 
the  effective  force  at  Sandwich,  could  not  have  been  one  thou- 
sand, which  will  appear  evident  by  mathematical  calculation. 

In  a  future  number,  in  which  I  shall  state  the  reasons  why 
the  capitulation  was  necessary,  I  shall"  explain  the  manner  in 
which  Gen.  Brock  made  the  numbers  so  much  larger.  I  will 
now  only  state  a  tew  facts  on  that  subject.  In  the  first  place, 
the  troops  made  prisoners  at  Michillimackanack,  were  at  De- 
troit on  their  parole,  and  were  included  in  the  number.  Like- 
wise the  Michigan  militia  were  included,  which  joined  the  ene- 
my on  their  first  landing  at  the  Spring  Wells.  Major  Jessop, 
who  was  one  of  my  most  violent  prosecutors,  and  who  mani- 
fested a  desire  to  augment  my  force  as  much  as  possible,  in  his 
testimony  before  the  Court  Martial,  says  we  crossed  the  river 
with  sixteen  or  eighteen  hundred  men.  This  however  was  a 
mere  matter  of  opinion,  because  he  did  not  state,  or  produce 
any  document  or  evidence  on  which  it  was  grounded  By  his 
own  expressions  he  was  uncertain,  and  had  no  correct  data,  on 
which  even  to  found  an  opinion.  His  testimony  therefore, 
leaves  it  as  uncertain,  as  if  he  had  said,  between  a  thousand 
and  eighteen  hundred.  By  the  official  documents  and  evidence, 
which  I  have  here  given,  it  is  impossible  in  the  nature  of  things, 
that  his  opinion  could  have  been  correct.  Notwithstanding  this 
testimony,  1  think  you  must  be  satisfied  that  at  this  time,  I  had 
not  on  the  Canada  shore,  a  thousand  effective  men. 

Without  giving  any  weight  to  my  opinion,  from  the  evidence 
here  exhibited,  and  an  accurate  calculation,  you  will  be  able  to 
form  an  estimate  for  yourselves.  I  shall  now  proceed  to  state 
the  situation  in  which  I  was  placed,  and  offer  my  reasons,  for 
not  making  an  attack  on  the  fortress  at  Maiden.  Obedience  to 
orde-s,  is  the  first  duty  of  a  military  officer.  I  will  therefore 
again  state,  the  only  order  I  had  received  on  the  subject.  In 
the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  war,  of  the  24th  of  June,  I  was 
only  authorized  to  make  the  attempt,  provided  I  thought  my 
force  was  adequate  to  the  enterprize,  and  it  could  be  done  con- 
sistent with  the  safety  of  my  other  posts.  Here  it  was  left  to 
my  discretion,  and  if  I  did  not  believe  it  could  be  done  with 
8 


58 

safety,  in  the  manner  stated  in  the  order,  neither  its  letter  nor 
spirit  authorized  the  enterprise. 

The  following  reasons  induced  me  to  believe  that  it  was  not 
expedient. 

The  few  undisciplined  forces  I  commanded,  were  in  an  ene- 
my's country,  and  surrounded  by  foes  of  every  description. 
The  waters  and  the  wilderness  were  enemies,  which  in  the  na- 
ture of  things,  could  not  be  controuled  by  any  means  in  my 
power.  I  had  no  communication  with  my  country,  excepting 
through  one  or  the  other  of  them.  The  first  was  obstructed  by 
the  enemy's  navy,  the  other  by  his  savage  allies.  Thus  it  ap- 
pears, my  communication  was  entirely  cut  off,  and  distant 
about  three  hundred  miles  from  any  part  of  the  country  on 
which  I  could  depend  for  re-enforce ments,  or  necessary  sup- 
plies. 

Information  had  now  bsen  received,  that  the  fortress  at  Mich- 
illimackanack,  situated  on  the  navigable  waters  above  me,  and 
which  the  enemy  commanded,  had  fallen  into  the  possession  of 
the  British  and  savage  forces,  which  surrounded  it. 

The  news  of  this  event  was  accompanied  with  information 
which  cast  a  shade  over  my  prospects,  and  greatly  encouraged 
and  strengthened  the  force  of  the  enemy  opposed  to  me. 

Immediately  after  the  fall  of  Michillimackanack,  messages 
were  sent  by  the  Indian  Chiefs,  who  attended  the  British  troops 
in  the  reduction  of  that  place,  and  who  inhabited  the  adjacent 
country,  to  all  the  villages  south,  as  far  as  Miami,  informing 
them  that  they  had  joined  the  British  standard,  that  Michilli- 
mackanack had  fallen  into  their  hands,  that  Chichago  was  in- 
vested, and  that  they  were  all  preparing  to  proceed  to  Maiden  ; 
that  they  expected  there  to  meet  all  their  warriours,  and  assist  in 
the  reduction  of  Detroit.  That  an  express  had  likewise  been 
sent  to  General  Brock,  informing  him  of  the  event,  and  that  the 
Canadians  and  savages  were  coming  to  join  the  army  at  Mai- 
den. About  the  same  time,  viz.  the  4th  of  August,  I  received 
information,  that  Major  Chambers,  of  the  British  army,  with  a 
detachment  of  regular  soldiers  and  brass  field  pieces,  had  land- 
ed on  the  west  part  of  Lake  Ontario,  had  penetrated  as  far  as 
the  river  Le  Trench,  and  was  collecting  all  the  Canadian  mili- 
tia and  savages  of  (>at  part  of  Canada,  to  lead  them  against  my 
army.      At  this  time  I  likewise  received  information,  that  Colo- 


59 

nel  Proctor,  of  the  British  army,  had  arrived  from  fort  Erie,  by 
water,  with  re-enforcements  at  Maiden.  As  their  re-enforce- 
ments were  guarded  by  an  armed  vessel,  I  had  nothing  to  op- 
pose to  them,  to  prevent  their  junction  at  Maiden.  Indeed  the 
advantage  to  the  enemy  of  commanding  the  lake  became  every 
day  more  apparent.  Both  re-enforcements,  and  supplies,  could 
be  transported  with  facility  from  one  post  to  another,  whenever 
it  became  necessary. 

At  this  time,  I  had  intercepted  a  letter  from  a  Mr.  McKenzie, 
a  member  of  v>e  Noi-th-west  Company,  at  fort  William,  to  a 
Mr.  Mcintosh  A  Sandwich,  the  principal  agent  of  that  com- 
pany, in  Upper  Canada,  dated  the  19th  of  July,  1812.  The 
genuineness  of  this  letter  was  proved  on  my  trial,  and  admitted 
in  evidence.  It  affords  such  clear  evidence  of  the  force  on  the 
borders  of  the  lakes  above  me,  and  that  it  was  to  be  directed 
against  me,  that  I  shall  here  recite  the  following  extracts 
from  it. 

"  The  declaration  of  war  reached  us  on  the  16th  inst.  [viz. 
"  16th  July]  but  we  are  neither  astonished  nor  alarmed.  Our 
"agents  ordered  a  general  muster,  which  amounted  to  twelve 
"hundred,  exclusive  of  several  hundreds  of  the  natives.  We 
u  are  equal  in  ail  to  sixteen  or  seventeen  hundred  strong.  One 
"of  our  gentlemen  started  on  the  17th  with  several  light  canoes 
"  for  the  interiour  country,  to  rouse  the  natives  to  activity,  which 
"  is  not  hard  to  do  on  the  present  occasion.  We  likewise  dis- 
"  patched  messengers  in  all  directions  with  the  news.  I  have  not 
"the  least  doubt  but  our  force  in  ten  days  hence,  will  amount  to 
"five  thousand  effective  men.  Our  young  gentlemen  and  en- 
"gagees,  offered  most  handsomely,  to  march  immediately  for 
"Michillimackanack.  Our  Chief,  Mr.  Shaw,  expressed  his 
"gratitude,  and  drafted  one  hundred.  They  are  to  proceed 
"  this  evening  for  St.  Joseph's.  He  takes  about  as  many  In- 
"  dians.  Could  tiie  vessel  contain  them,  he  might  have  had 
"four  thousand  more.  It  now  depends  on  what  accounts  we 
"receive  from  St.  Joseph's  whether  these  numerous  tribe3, from 
"  the  interiour  will  proceed  to  St.  Joseph's  or  not." 

At  the  time  I  intercepted  this  letter,  its  contents  were  con- 
firmed by  the  information  I  received  from  Lieutenant  Hanks, 
Doctor  Day,  and  Mr.  Stone,  who  had  arrived  at  Detroit  from 
Michillimackanack,  prisoners  on  parole.    They  stated,  that  be- 


60 

fore  they  left  Michillimackanack,  a  number  of  boats  and  ca- 
noes had  arrived,  in  which  several  gentlemen  came  passengers, 
who,  they  were  informed,  were  agents  of  the  North-w<  st  Com- 
pany, and  had  come  from  fort  William,  on  lake  Superiour  af- 
ter the  news  of  the  declaration  of  war  had  been  received  there  ; 
and  that  they  gave  the  same  account  of  the  Canadian  and  sav- 
age force,  and  its  destination,  as  is  contained  in  Mr.  McKen- 
zie's  letter.  They  further  stated  to  me,  that  a  large  body  of 
savages  were  collected  at  the  outlet  of  lake  Superiour  and  that 
two  thousand  savages,  according  to  the  best  estimate  they  could 
make,  were  at  Michillimackanack,  prepared  to  proceed  and 
join  the  British  force  at  Maiden.  Lieutenant  Hanks  was  killed 
in  the  fort  at  Detroit,  which  deprived  me  of  his  testimony. 
Doctor  Day  and  Mr.  Stone,  who  were  both  at  Michillimacka- 
nack, and  present,  when  Lieutenant  Hank  made  the  communi- 
cation to  me,  in  their  testimony  on  my  trial,  fully  confirmed  the 
statement  here  made. 

In  addition  to  all  this  combination  of  force,  which  was  pro- 
ceeding against  me,  symptoms  appeared  in  the  interiour  of  my 
camp,  not  less  alarming.  The  spirit  of  mutiny,  which  before 
hid  manifested  itself  in  whispers,  increased,  and  became  more 
open.  It  was  evident  it  was  now  fostered  and  encouraged  by  the 
principal  officers  of  the  militia,  and  was  fast  rising  into  an 
avowed  conspiracy.  I,  however,  never  believed  the  extent,  en- 
ormity and  malignity  of  it,  until  it  was  confessed  in  Colonel 
Cass'  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  (which  is  published  in  my 
trial,  page  25  of  the  appendix)  which,  in  the  course  of  these 
memoirs,  will  be  more  particularly  noticed. 

Notwithstanding  the  fortress  of  Maiden  had  been  strengthen- 
ed by  British  re-enforcements,  notwithstanding  many  of  the 
militia  of  Upper  Canada  had  returned  to  their  duty,  under  a 
proclamation  of  pardon  from  the  commanding  officer,  notwith- 
standing, after  the  fall  of  Michillimackanack,  the  Wyondots,  and 
other  tribes  of  Indians  connected  with  them,  had  joined  the 
standard  of  the  enemy,  yet,  under  all  the  circumstances,  I  was 
determined  to  make  the  attempt  on  the  fort  on  the  8th  of  Au- 
gust, and  made  my  arrangements  accordingly. 

And  I  now  repeat  what  I  stated  in  my  defence,  that  there  is 
no  part  of  my  conduct,  since  I  have  been  a  soldier,  that  I  reflect 
upon  with  so  much  self  conviction  of  errour,  as  I  do  upon  this. 


61 

I  look  back  with  regret  upon  the  moment  when  I  yielded  to  the 
councils  of  the  inexperienced  officers  I  commanded,  and  deter- 
mined to  make  an  attempt,  which  my  own  judgment  did  not  ap- 
prove, which  was  contrary  to  all  military  knowledge,  aad  which 
even  success  might  not  justify,  I  thought,  however,  it  was  pos- 
sible, that  if  I  were  successful,  and  should  possess  myself  of  the 
enemy's  fortress,  I  might  possibly  maintain  myself  there,  for 
some  short  time  ;  and  in  that  time,  I  hoped  I  might  have  some 
succour  and  security,  from  my  own  country,  and  her  armies^ 
that  I  had  been  led  to  expect  would  be  operating  below  me. 


No.  XVII. 

I  shall  now  ask  your  attention  to  the  reasons  which  finally  in- 
duced me  not  to  make  the  movement  and  attack  on  the  fortress 
at  Maiden,  according  to  the  arrangement  I  had  made,  but  to  re- 
cross  the  river  with  the  principal  part  of  the  army,  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  7th  of  August.  That  afternoon  I  received  two  letters 
from  General  Hall,  who  commanded  the  American  troops  on 
the  Niagara  Straits,  and  one  from  General  Porter,  from  Black 
Rock.  By  these  letters  T  was  informed  that  a  large  number  of 
boats,  filled  with  British  troops,  had  passed  over  Lake  Ontario, 
to  the  west  part  of  it,  and  were  directing  their  course  to  Mai- 
den, and  likewise,  that  the  British  forces,  with  the  Canadian 
militia,  and  savages,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Niagara  river, 
were  moving  by  water,  to  the  same  point;  and  what  was 
more  decisive  still  on  my  operations,  by  the  same  letters  I  was 
informed  that  nothing  would  be  done  there  to  check  these  move- 
ments, and  that  no  assistance  or  co-operation  would  be  afforded 
from  thdt  quarter,  to  the  army  I  commanded.  It  is  impossible 
for  me  to  express  the  disappointment  which  this  information  oc- 
casioned—what possible  events  could  have  taken  place,  which 
would  have  authorized  General  Brock  to  have  withdrawn  the 
troops  from  fort  George,  fort  Erie,  and  the  other  posts  on  the 
Niagara  river,  I  could  not  conceive ;— especially,  as  I  had 
grounds  to  believe  that  the  whole  strength  of  the  American 
forces  were  posted  on  the  opposite  bank— and  as  the  Secretary 
of  War  had  informed  General  Dearborn  of  my  situation,  and 


62 

had  ordered  him  lo  make  diversions  in  the  enemy's  country,  at 
those  very  stations,  from  which  I  was  informed  they  were  with- 
drawn, and  were  bearing  on  me.  The  real  and  true  eauses 
which  enabled  the  enemy  to  withdraw  his  forces  from  those  sta- 
tions on  Ihe  Niagara  river,  and  concentrate  them,  and  his  other 
troops,  against  the  army  I  commanded,  were  then  unknown  to 
me.  The  mystery  has  since  been  unfolded,  and  the  causes  are 
as  apparent  as  the  sun  at  noon -day  without  a  cloud.  It  was  the 
armistice,  or  cessation  of  hostilities,  which  General  Dearborn, 
the  senior  officer  of  the  army,  agreed  to  the  beginning  of  Au- 
gust, and  which  he  communicated  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  on 
the  8th  of  the  same  month,  as  appears  by  his  letter  of  that 
date,  in  which  the  army  I  commanded  was  not  included,  but 
which  extended  to  all  the  other  forces  on  the  northern  borders. 
This  convention,  or  agreement  entered  into  by  General  Dear- 
born, and  its  consequences  on  my  situation,  will  be  fully  con- 
sidered in  my  future  numbers. 

It  now  appeared  that  the  whole  war  against  Canada,  was  to 
be  carried  on  with  the  1200  Ohio  militia,  and  three  hundred 
regulars,  which  were  placed  under  my  command.  It  will  be  re- 
membered before  I  crossed  the  river,  and  took  a  position  in 
the  enemy's  country,  I  stated  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  my 
letter  of  the  9th  of  July,  which  has  been  before  referred  to,  that 
I  did  not  consider  my  force  adequate  to  the  enterprize,  and  in 
a  former  number,  have  stated  the  reasons,  which  induced  me 
to  cross  the  river  and  take  possession  of  Sandwich. 

When  I  received  these  letters  from  General  Hall  and  Gener- 
al Porter,  the  expectations  which  I  had  before  entertained  of 
my  communication  by  the  lake  being  opened  by  a  naval  force, 
and  of  assistance  and  co-operation,  from  our  armies  on  the  Nia- 
gara river,  were  at  an  end.  These  letters  from  Generals  Hall 
and  Porter,  were  admitted  in  evidence  On  my  trial,  and  the  time 
and  circumstances  of  receiving  them  proved,  by  the  testimony 
of  Colonel  Miller,  to  whom  I  communicated  the  contents.  (See 
Col.  Miller's  testimony,  page  1 17,  Lieut.  Col.  Forbes'  report  of 
my  trial.) 

After  this  information,  and  thus  situated,  I  determined  to  re- 
cross  the  river  with  the  principal  part  of  the  army,  not  with  an 
intention  of  relinquishing  the  object  of  the  reduction  of  Maiden, 
and  offensive  operations  against  Canada,  but  of  waiting  until 


63 

more  favourable  circumstances  should  present  themselves,  and 
in  the  meantime  of  attempting  to  open  my  communication 
through  the  wilderness. 

I  had  now,  no  communication  with  my  country,  and  it  was 
not  possible  to  obtain  any  through  any  other  channel.  On  the 
security  of  this  communication  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  sup- 
plies, I  considered  the  very  existence  of  my  army  depended. 

If  I  had  believed  that  an  attack  on  Maiden,  with  a  probability 
of  success,  would  have  effected  the  object  of  opening  this  com- 
munication, or  of  even  giving  facility  to  it,  I  should  cheerfully 
have  undertaken  it. 

As  I  have  before  observed,  my  own  fame,  and  the  gratification 
of  my  officers,  were  powerful  inducements  to  the  measure. 
Situated,  however,  as  I  was,  it  was  my  opinion  that  it  would 
have  been  a  useless  waste  of  blood,  and  success  would  have,  been 
attended  with  no  advantage. 

The  reduction  of  Maiden  could  have  had  no  effect  on  the  na- 
val force  of  the  enemy,  unless  all  the  harbours  on  the  Canada 
shore,  and  among  the  islands,  had  been  m  our  possession.  It 
would  have  been  utterly  impossible  to  have  maintained  the  for- 
tress. It  must  have  fallen  for  the  want  of  supplies.  The  wa- 
ters of  the  lakes  would  have  remained  shut  against  us.  If, 
therefore,  the  road  through  the  wilderness  to  the  settlements  of 
Ohio  could  have  been  opened,  still  no  supplies  could  have  pas- 
sed into  the  fort  without  crossing  the  water,  and  that  would 
have  been  prevented  by  the  enemy's  naval  force. 

As  Michillimackanack  had  fallen,  if  we  had  possessed  Mai- 
den, in  a  very  short  time  it  would  have  been  assailed  by  all  the 
Canadians  attached  to  the  North-western  Company,  with  the 
numerous  and  powerful  hosts  of  savages  of  that  region,  and  by 
the  British  force,  which  had  landed  on  the  western  part  of  Lake 
Ontario,  with  the  militia  and  savages  of  that  part  of  the  coun- 
try. The  naval  armament  would  have  co-operated  with  these 
forces,  the  supplies  would  have  been  intercepted,  and  no  relief 
or  assistance  could  possibly  have  been  afforded. 

If,  with  the  knowledge  I  had  of  the  forces  which  were  march- 
ing against  me,  I  had  made  an  attack  on  Maiden,  it  would 
have  been  as  great  a  crime  as  any  of  which  I  was  accused  by 
the  administration,  and  I  certainly  should  have  wanted  the  con- 
sciousness of  having  acted  from  the  purest  motives,  and  accord- 


64 

ing  to  my  best  judgment,  which  has  been  my  consolation  in  all 
I  have  suffered. 

Thus  it  appears,  that  the  little  army  I  commanded  was  en- 
tirely cut  off  from  the  country,  and  could  receive  no  more  sus- 
tenance from  it  than  the  arm  can  receive  sustenance  when  cut 
off  and  separated  from  the  human  body  ;  and  remaining  in  this 
situation,  it  must  as  inevitably  have  perished  as  the  arm  would 
perish  without  receiving  sustenance  from  the  source  on  which  it 
depended  for  life.  As  I  considered  the  existence  of  my  army 
depended  on  opening  the  communication  through  the  road  to 
Ohio,  and  as  no  other  possible  mode  presented  of  effecting  it  but 
by  recrossing  the  river  with  the  principal  part  of  the  army,  it 
was  adopted  on  the  evening  of  the  7th  of  August. 

These,  fellow   citizens,  as  I  observed  in  my  defence,  were 
the  grounds  on  which  I  made  a  retrogade  movement  with  a  part 
of  the  army  to  Detroit.      It  was  from  thence  I  could   open  the 
only  channel,  through  which  it  could  derive   the  means   of  its 
existence.     If  my  judgment  then  misled  me,  it  continues  yet  to 
mislead  me ;  for  every  day  that  I  have  lived  I  have  become  more 
confident  that  I  did  right  to  leave  the  enemy's  country.     Had  I 
followed  the  dictates  of  my  own  judgment  I  should  have  made 
my  retreat  to  the  Miami,  and  there  waited  for  co-operation  and 
assistance.     The   distance   from   thence  to  the  settlements  in 
Ohio  would  have  been  comparatively  short ;   I  should  have  had 
no  enemy  in  my  rear  but  savages,  and  it  might  have  been  possi- 
ble to  have  preserved  my  con  munication,  and  obtained  supplies. 
The  day  after  I  recrossed  the  river,  (the  9th  of  August,)  I  pro- 
posed this  measure  to  some  of  the  principal  officers.    I  will  here 
give  the  answer  of  Colonel  Cass.      It  was,  that  if  I  did,  under 
the  existing  circumstances,  every  man  of  the  Ohio  volunteers 
and  militia  would  leave  me.      His  language  was,  as  he  states 
it  himself,  that  the  militia  would  retreat  with  me  if  they  thought 
a  retreat  necessary.     But  as  they  undertook  to  judge  that  it  was 
not  then  necessary,  they  would  leave  me,  and  not  a  man  would 
retreat  under  my  command.      Colonel  Cass's  testimony  on  thi6 
subject  is  in  the  following  words.     "I  recollect  a  conversation, 
after  the  retreat  from  Canada,  and  before  we  went  to  the  river 
Raisin,  in  which  General  Hull  suggested,  that  as  he  heard  of  no 
co-operation  from  below,  it  might  be  necessary  to  take  post  at 
the  Miami.    I  think  I  told  General  Hull  that,  if  under  existing 


65 

circumstances,  he  took  such  a  step,  the  Ohio  militia  would  de- 
sert him  to  a  man.  Whethe  I  told  General  Hull  so  or  not,  I 
am  confident  it  would  have  been  the  case."  This,  among  many 
other  things  which  might  be  mentioned,  is  evidence  of  the  insub- 
ordination which  was  among  the  troops.  That  this  spirit  wag 
encouraged  by  the  principal  officers  is  evident,  from  the  confes- 
sions of  some  of  them  on  my  trial.  The  officers  were  indebted 
to  the  soldiers  for  their  stations ;  they  were  their  neighbours, 
and  were  elected  by  them.  They  lived  together,  in  camp  on 
habits  of  perfect  equality,  and  before  this  campaign,  neither 
officers  nor  soldiers  had  ever  seen  any  actual  service,  and  had 
never  been  accustomed  to  any  military  discipline  excepting 
company  trainings  about  their  doors.  It  is  unnecessary  for  me 
to  describe  the  difficulty  of  commanding  troops  of  such  a  char- 
acter;  or  of  performing  any  military  operations  where  obedience 
to  orders  is  essential  to  success.  No  better  exemplification  can 
possibly  be  given  than  the  conduct  which  both  officers  and  men 
exhibited  on  this  occasion. 

It  may  probably  be  asked,  why  did  you  not  arrest  the  princi- 
pal officers  who  had  been  guilty  of  this  conspiracy,  and  who  had 
excited  this  insubordination  ?  I  answer,  by  asking  another  ques- 
tion. Whether  you  believe  these  volunteers  from  the  militia, 
who  composed  more  than  two  thirds  of  the  army,  would  have 
suffered  the  leaders  they  had  chosen,  to  be  deprived  of  their 
command  ?  "Whether  an  attempt  of  the  kind  would  not  have 
produced  a  civil  war  in  the  camp  ?  This  same  spirit  had  been 
manifested  from  the  commencement  to  the  end  of  the  campaign. 
It  was  manifested  at  Urbanna,  by  a  part  of  the  militia  refusing 
to  march  when  ordered.  It  was  manifested  at  Detroit,  by  one 
hundred  and  eighty  refusing  to  cross  the  river  when  order- 
ed; it  was  manifested  on  the  march,  by  conduct  towards  some 
of  their  own  officers,  too  ridiculous  and  too  disgraceful  to  be  re- 
peated. And  it  finally  appeared  that  a  Cataline  was  in  our 
camp,  who  had  formed  a  conspiracy  to  deprive  me  of  the  com- 
mand, with  which  I  had  been  entrusted  by  the  government. 
This  fact  appears  by  the  letter  of  Colonel  Cass  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  which  is  published  in  my  trial. 

Under  the  events  which   had   taken    place,  and   which   had 
come  to  my  knowledge,  I  should  have  been  wanting  in  the  du- 
ties which  I  owed  to  my  station,  had  I  not  retreated  from 
9 


66 

Canada.  I  retreated  for  the  purpose  of  taking  the  most  effective 
measures  in  my  power  for  opening  my  communication.  Its  im- 
portance I  have  endeavoured  to  explain.  Indeed  it  was  so  ob- 
vious that  the  administration  was  sensible  of  it,  and  one  of  the 
articles  of  charges  against  me  was,  for  not  keeping  it  open,  and 
another  for  withdrawing  the  army  from  Canada,  the  only  meas- 
ure by  which  it  possibly  could  have  been  effected.  In  my  let- 
ters to  the  Secretary  of  War,  immediately  after  the  retreat,  I 
stated  the  same  reasons  which  I  have  here  given.  Likewise  in 
my  letters  to  Governour  Meigs,  of  Ohio,  Governour  Scott,  of 
Kentucky,  &c.  These  letters  bear  date  the  8th,  9th,  and  11th 
of  August,  and  were  in  evidence  on  my  trial.  All  these  letters, 
written  at  the  time,  shew  that  I  retreated  from  Canada  because 
I  had  ascertained  that  I  should  soon  be  surrounded  by  an  over- 
whelming force ;  because  there  was  no  possibility  of  opening  my 
communication  from  that  station,  and  because  I  found  the  few 
regulars  and  militia  under  my  command,  were  to  be  left  to  car- 
ry on,  without  any  assistance  or  co-operation,  the  offensive  war, 
which  the  United  States  had  declared  against  one  of  the  most 
powerful  nations  on  earth.  By  a  referrence  to  my  trial,  it  will 
appear,  that  Colonel  Cass  and  others  of  my  officers,  were  sensi- 
ble at  this  time  of  the  difficulties  of  my  situation.  In  a  letter 
to  Mr.  Silliman,  of  Ohio,  the  brother-in-law  of  the  Colonel,  he 
says,  "that  provisions  would  become  necessary  for  the  exist- 
ence of  the  troops. "  In  a  letter  to  the  same,  after  the  fall  of 
Michillimackanack,  he  says,  "that  the  impression  made  by  that 
event  could  scarcely  be  conceived."  According  to  Mr.  Silli- 
man's  testimony  in  his  letters  to  him,  Colonel  Cass  pressed  him 
to  use  his  influence  to  procure  re-enforcements  for  the  army, 
and  expressed  his  surprize  that  we  were  left  without  co-opera- 
tion, by  putting  to  his  correspondent  the  following  interrogation, 
"  Is  their  nothing  to  be  done  in  the  lower  end  of  the  lakes  to 
make  a  diversion  in  our  favour  ?"  In  a  letter  to  the  same  gentle- 
man on  the  12th  of  August,  Colonel  Cass  says,  "think  our  sit- 
uation as  bad  as  you  may,  it  is  still  worse." 


67 


No.  XVIII. 

Before  I  proceed  to  give  an  account  of  the  measures  I  adopt- 
ed, to  open  the  communication,  to  Ohio,  I  will  state  some  gen- 
eral principles,  and  will  endeavour  to  show  the  propriety  of  ob- 
serving them  in  all  military  movements,  and  will  applv  them 
to  the  situation  in  which  1  was  placed  by  the  orders  of  the  gov- 
ernment.    And  here  in  the  first  place,  I  will   ask  your  atten- 
tion, to  the  same  principles,  which  I  stated  in  my  defence — that 
in  modern  warfare,  the  first  great  object  of  each  contending 
party,  is  the   resources   of  his   enemy. — The  fate  of  armies  is 
found  to  depend  upon  the  abundance  of  their  resources,  on  their 
security,  and  the  facility  of  keeping  up  a  communication  with 
them.    It  has  become  a  principle  to  manoeuvre  in  such  a  man- 
ner, as  to  cover  the  places  from  whence  supplies  may  be  drawn-, 
not  to  go  far  from  them,  but  with  great  caution,  and  never  to 
cease   preserving  with   them   those   connections,  in  which  the 
strength  of  an  army  consists,  and  on  which  its  success  depends. 
These    principles    are    to  be  found    in  the  best  military  au- 
thors of  modern  times,  and  the  soundness  of  them  have  been 
confirmed  by  numerous   examples .      The  enemy  with  which  I 
had  to  contend,  had  strictly  observed  them.     His  principal  post 
was  at  Maiden,  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Detroit  river,  where  it 
empties  into  lake  Erie.      His  magazines,  which  contained  all 
necessary  supplies,  were  at  fort  Erie,  and  at  other  places,  be- 
tween Maiden  and  fort  Erie,  on  the  borders  of  the  lake,  which 
his  navy  commanded.     Having  no  armed  vessels,  or  boats,  it 
was  impossible  for  me,  in  the  least  degree  to  interrupt  this  line 
of  communication.      The  enemy's  station,  therefore,  could  be 
furnished  with  all  necessary  supplies,  with  the  greatest  facility, 
and  with  the  most  perfect  safety.     I  now  ask  you,  my  fellow 
citizens,  to  cast  your  eyes  on  the  map  of  the  country,  where  I 
was  placed,  not  by  my  own  judgment  and  discretion,  after  the 
declaration  of  war,  but  by  the  positive  orders  of  the  government, 
and  consider  on  what  grounds,  such  orders  could  have  been 
justified.     As  these  fatal  orders  were,  in  my  opinion,  one  great 
cause  of  the  misfortune,  which  attended  the  army  I  commanded, 
I  shall  ask  your  particular  attention  to  them.     On  th©  1 8th  of 


68 

June,  after  war  was  declared  against  Great  Britain,  the  Secreta- 
ry of  War,  wrote  me  a  letter,  in  which,  he  informed  me  of  the 
event,  and  ordered  me  to  march  the  army  I  commanded,  to  De- 
troit, with  all  possible  expedition.  At  the  time,  this  order  was 
given,  the  President  of  the  United  States,  by  whose  command 
it  was  given,  well  knew,  that  no  preparation  v/as  made  to  build 
a  navy  on  lake  Erie,  and  that  the  enemy  commanded  it,  with  a 
number  of  armed  vessels  and  ^un-boats. 

When,  therefore,  these  fatal  orders  were  given,  those,  by 
whose  authority  they  were  given,  well  knew  that  the  communi- 
cation through  the  lake  would  be  closed  against  us,  and  that  n» 
re-enforcements,  or  supplies  of  any  kind,  could  be  obtained  for 
the  army,  through  that  channel.  Those,  who  gave  these  fatal  or- 
ders, well  knew,  that  after  the  declaration  of  war,  the  army  I 
commanded,  and  the  posts  of  Detroit,  Michillimackanack,  and 
Chicago,  which  had  before,  in  time  of  peace,  been  supplied 
through  the  communication  of  the  lakes,  could  only  receive  their 
supplies  by  land  They  well  knew,  that  the  State  of  Ohio,  was  the 
nearest  part  of  our  country,  from  which  the  necessary  supplies 
could  be  furnished.  They  well  knew,  that  the  distance  from 
any  magazines,  where  these  supplies  could  be  obtained,  to  the 
point  where  they  ordered  the  armv*  was  more  than  two  hun- 
dred miles,  and  to  the  other  posts  they  had  established,  was 
more  than  five  hundred  miles. 

They  well  knew,  that  this  distance,  was  almost  entirely  a 
wilderness,  filled  with  savages,  who  in  the  event  of  war,  would 
probably  become  hostile.  They  well  knew,  that  the  necessary 
supplies,  could  only  be  carried  through  this  wilderness,  on  pack- 
horses.  They  well  knew,  that  the  only  line  of  communication, 
through  which  these  pack-horses,  with  supplies,  could  pass,  was 
for  about  seventy  miles  on  the  margin  of  lake  Erie,  and  the  De- 
troit river,  both  of  which  were  commanded  by  the  enemy's  gun- 
boats and  vessels  of  war.  They  likewise  well  knew,  that  these 
supplies  must  pass  by  the  enemy's  principal  post  at  Maiden, 
only  separated  by  the  Detroit  river.  Under  the  orders  the  ad- 
ministration had  given,  they  well  knew  the  impossibility  of  sup- 
plying the  army,  and  the  posts  I  have  mentioned,  witji  the 
means  of  subsistence.  They  well  knew,  the  facility  and  ease, 
with  which  the  enemy  could  assail  the  convoys,  both  by  his  land 
and  naval  forces,  on  this  long  and  vulnerable  line  of  communi- 


69 

Nation,  and  the  impossibility  of  stretching  the  army  back,  from 
the  point  they  had  ordered  as  my  station,  for  the  safety  and  pro- 
tection of  such  convoys. 

The  administration,  likewise  well  knew,  when  these  fatal  or- 
ders were  given,  that  in  three  separate  statements,  which  I  had 
made  to  the  President  through  the  medium  of  the  Secretary  of 
the  department  of  war,  I  had  observed  that  in  the  event  of  a  war 
against  Great  Britain,  a  navy  on  lake  Erie,  superiour  to  the  Bri- 
tish was  essential  to  success;  and,  that  without  preserving  *he 
water  communication,  an  army  could  not  be  supported  at  De- 
troit, and  that  Detroit,  Michillimackanack,  and  Chicago,  would 
inevitably  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

These  statements  had  been  received  as  official  documents, 
and  no  objections  had  ever  been  urged  apainst  them.  The  ad- 
ministration, therefore,  knew  my  opinions  on  the  subject,  and 
certainly  ought  not  to  have  continued  me  in  command,  when  a 
course  was  to  be  pursued  directly  contrary  to  the  opinion,  I  had 
repeatedly  and  officially  given. 

On  a  map  of  the  country,  which  was  the  scene  of  my  opera- 
tions, you  will  be  able  more  distinctly  to  perceive  the  natural 
obstacles,  with  which  I  had  to  contend.  Besides  seeing  the 
positions  of  the  British  and  Canadian  forces,  and  the  stations  of 
the  different  nations  of  savages,  you  can  see  the  manner  in 
which  the  waters  and  the  wilderness,  were  arrayed  against  me. 
At  present,  I  can  only  ask  your  attention  to  the  general  maps  of 
our  country,  which  will  afford  some  assistance,  in  obtaining  a 
knowledge  of  my  situation. 

The  necessity  and  importance  of  preserving  my  communica- 
tion with  magazines,  for  supplying  the  army,  I  had  learned  from 
reading  the  best  military  authors,  and  from  my  observations  and 
experience,  during  the  war  of  the  revolution. 

From  books,  I  had  been  taught,  that  when  an  army  moved 
towards  an  enemy,  its  line  or  lines  of  operation  must  be  from  its 
base,  on  which  are  its  magazines  of  necessary  supplies.  That 
a  connection  should  always  be  preserved  between  the  line  or 
lines  of  operation,  and  the  base,  or  magazines.  That  an  army 
never  ought  to  advance  so  far  from  the  magazines,  as  to  enable 
the  enemy,  to  attack  and  destroy  the  convoys  of  supplies  from 
the  magazines  to  the  army,  W  hen  the  army  marched  from  Ur- 
ijanna  in  Ohio,  this  rule   did  not  apply,   because  we  were  at 


1 


70 

peace  with  Great  Britain,  and  in  the  country  through  which  I 
marched,  there  was  no  other  enemy  but,  savages.  The  armyr 
therefore,  carried  on  pack-horses,  sufficient  supplies,  for  its  sup- 
port, until  it  arrived  at  the  lake.  On  the  communication 
through  the  lake  on  our  arrival  there,  we  depended  for  supplies, 
as  it  was  open  to  us,  until  after  the  declaration  of  war. 

Near  the  Miami  of  the  lake,  I  received  the  fatal  order,  which 
has  so  often  been  referred  to,  informing  me  of  the  declaration  of 
war,  and  ordering  me,  positively,  to  march  to  Detroit. 

Had  I  not  received  this  order,  and  the  operations  had  been 
left  to  my  discretion,  I  should  not  have  marched  to  Detroit, 
eighteen  miles  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  but  made  my  move- 
ments against  the  enemy,  from  a  different  quarter. 

I  had  served  under  the  banners  of  General  Washington,  from 
the  commencement  to  the  end  of  the  revolutionary  war. 

I  had  observed,  how  cautious  he  was  in  all  his  movements,  to 
preserve  a  communication  with  his  magazines.  He  retreated 
from  Long  Island  to  New  York,  because  he  knew  the  enemy 
would  prevent  his  communication  with  a  naval  force  in  the  East 
river.  He  retreated  from  New  York  to  the  White  Plains,  be- 
cause the  British  navy  commanded  both  the  East  and  North  riv- 
ers, and  the  army  was  marching  to  take  possession  of  the  high 
grounds,  beyond  King's  Bridge,  to  intercept  his  communication 
from  the  country,  whence  he  received  his  supplies.  He  retreat- 
ed through  New  Jersey  and  passed  the  Delaware,  to  take  a  pos- 
ition, where  he  could  receive  his  supplies.  In  1777,  when  Gen- 
eral St.  Clair  commanded  at  Ticonderoga,  and  found  that  the 
enemy  commanded  lake  Champlain,  and  was  making  move- 
ments to  surround  the  garrison  on  all  sides,  and  cut  off  his  com- 
munication, and  supplies,  he  retreated,  and  abandoned  a  post, 
which  was  considered  the  key  of  the  country. 

When  General  Burgoyne,  became  sensible  that  he  was  to  re- 
ceive no  co-operation,  from  New  York,  and  his  communication 
was  cut  off  from  his  magazines  in  Canada,  he  surrendered  un- 
der a  capitulation. 

When  General  Lincoln,  was  beseiged  at  Charleston,  by  a 
British  fleet  and  army,  and  his  communication  with  his  maga- 
zines was  cut  off,  he  surrendered. 

When  the  army  commanded  by  Lord  Cornwallis  at  York- 


71 

town,  was  attacked  by  a  naval  and  land  force,  and  he  had  no 
communication  with  his  magazines,  he  surrendered. 

At  an  earlier  period,  during  the  war  between  France  and 
England,  in  1753,  when  General  Washington,  (then  Major 
Washington)  and  commandant  of  a  colonial  regiment,  from  Vir- 
ginia, was  surrounded  and  attacked  in  a  Stockade  fort,  at  a 
place  called  the  Little  Meadows,  by  a  body  of  Frenchmen  and 
savages,  by  which  means,  his  communication  was  cut  off  from 
any  supplies,  he  made  a  capitulation  with  the  enemy. 

Bonaparte,  in  his  Russian  campaign,  departed  from  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  most  celebrated  military  authors.  Moscow,  the 
object  of  his  attack,  was  so  distant  from  his  magazines,  that  it 
was  impossible  to  preserve  any  connection  with  them,  so  as  to 
receive  the  necessary  supplies.  For  the  support  of  his  army,  he 
had  nothing  to  depend  on,  but  supplies  from  the  enemy's  coun- 
try. The  conflagration  of  Moscow,  and  the  Russians  rising  in 
mass  against  him,  rendered  it  impossible  to  obtain  supplies,  and 
consequently  to  sustain  his  situation,  at  so  remote  a  post 

In  this  situation,  had  he  proposed  a  capitulation,^  he  probably 
might  have  saved  the  lives  of  more  than  four  hundred  thousand 
men,  for  the  future  services  of  his  empire.  His  haughty  spirit, 
and  former  triumphs  forbid  any  proposition  of  the  kind.  In  his 
attempt  to  retreat,  his  army  was  destroyed  by  the  force  of  the 
elements,  and  the  Russian  bayonet.  It  may,  at  least  be  made 
a  question,  whether,  under  the  circumstances  he  was  placed,  he 
would  not  have  exhibited  more  magnanimity,  by  an  attempt  to 
save  the  lives  of  his  army,  by  negotiation,  than  by  the  course 
he  pursued. 

I  have  cited  the  examples  of  these  celebrated  commanders, 
for  no  other  purpose,  than  to  illustrate  the  principle,  that,  when 
an  army  is  deprived  of  its  communication  with  its  magazines, 
on  which  it  depends  for  its  necessary  supplies,  and  cannot  open 
that  communication,  so  as  to  obtain  them,  its  fate  is  inevitable, 
and  it  becomes  the  duty  of  its  commander,  to  accept  the  best 
terms  from  the  enemy,  which  can  be  obtained. 


72 


No.  XIX. 

Before  T  left  the  enemy's  country,  having  received  informa- 
tion that  some  beef  cattle  had  arrived  at  or  near  the  river  Hai- 
sin,  escorted  by  a  company  of  militia  from  the  State  of  Ohio,  I 
made  a  detachment  of  two  hundred  men,  under  the  command  of 
Major  Van -horn,  with  orders  to  proceed  to  the  river  Raisin,  and 
guard  these  cattle  safely  to  camp. 

At  Brownstown,  this  detachment  was  attacked  by  a  body  of 
savages,  and  entirely  defeated.  According  to  Major  Van-horn's 
report,  eighteen  men  were  killed,  twelve  wounded,  and  about 
seventy  missing.  His  opinion  was,  that  three  hundred  Indians 
crossed  from  Maiden,  and  that  from  one  hundred  and  fifty  to 
two  hundred  were  actually  engaged.  This  report  was  received 
on  the  5th  of  August,  two  days  before  the  retreat  from  Sand- 
•wich.  This  unpropitious  event  increased  the  difficulty  of  my 
situation,  and  more  strongly  convinced  me  how  impossible  it 
was  to  continue  offensive  operations,  and  furnish  at  the  same 
time  a  sufficient  force  to  give  security  to  so  extensive  a  com-* 
munication.  The  war  had  now  become  both  offensive  and  de- 
fensive, and  the  little  army  I  commanded  was  alone  left  to  car- 
ry it  on  in  both  characters.  This  was  among  the  reasons  which 
induced  me  to  recross  the  river,  that  I  might  be  able  to  detach 
a  more  powerful  force  to  open  the  communication. 

For  this  purpose,  therefore,  on  the  very  day  the  army  retreat- 
ed to  Detroit,  I  ordered  a  detachment  of  six  hundred  men',  un- 
der the  command  of  Colonel  Miller,  of  the  4th  United  States' 
regiment.  This  command  consisted  of  all  the  effective  men  of 
that  regiment,  and  a  selection  of  the  most  effective  of  the  mili- 
tia. It  was  likewise  accompanied  by  a  field  piece  and  howit- 
zer, from  the  fort  at  Detroit  Colonel  Miller  met  a  body  of  the 
enemy,  consisting  of  British  troops,  Canadian  militia,  and  sav- 
ages ;  which,  having  received  information  of  his  approach,  was 
formed  in  the  woods  in  regular  order  of  battle.  A  disposition 
was  immediately  made  on  his  part  for  an  attack,  and  after  a 
severe  contest,  honourable  to  the  American  arms,  the  enemy 
was  compelled  to  retreat.  After  pressing  on  his  rear  about  two 
miles,  Colonel  Miller  thought  proper  to  discontinue  the  pursuit, 


73 

and  the  enemy  embarked,  under  cover  of  his  armed  vessels,  and 
recrossed  to  Maiden.  The  loss,  in  killed  and  wounded,  iu  'ha 
battle,  on  our  part,  was  about  eighty.  As  soon  as  I  received  an 
account  of  the  action,  a  re-enforcement  of  one  hundred  men, 
with  a  supply  of  provisions,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Mc- 
Arthur,  was  ordered  to  join  Colonel  Miller's  detachment  at 
Maguago.  As  soon  as  the  detachment  had  recruited  from  its 
fatigue,  ray  intentions  was,  that  it  should  have  proceeded  on  the 
expedition  to  the  river  Raisin.  A  severe  storm  of  rain  inter- 
vened, and  the  troops  were  exposed  to  it  without  any  covering. 
I  therefore  thought  it  expedient,  on  account  of  their  great  fa- 
tigue, to  order  them  back  to  Detroit,  and  make  an  arrangement 
by  another  rout  to  open  the  communication. 

The  road  to  the  river  Raisin,  which  passed  through  the  In- 
dian village  of  Brownstown,  being  principally  on  the  margin  of 
the  Detroit  river,  both  troops  and  convoys  could  easily  be  an- 
noyed by  the  gun  boats  and  armed  vessels  of  the  enemy  Be- 
sides, in  its  course,  there  was  only  the  river  which  separated  it 
from  the  enemy's  principal  post  at  Maiden.  Being  thus  situat- 
ed, it  was  almost  impossible  to  secure  it  in  such  a  manner  as 
that  convoys  could  pass  with  any  kind  of  safety.  After  Colonel 
Miller's  return  to  Detroit,  therefore,  seeing  the  indispensable 
necessity  of  obtaining  the  supplies  which  had  arrived  at  the 
river, Raisin,  and  being  informed  of  a  circuitous  rout,  distant 
from  the  river,  I  thought  it  expedient  to  make  the  attempt  in 
that  direction.  I  communicated  my  intentions  to  Colonels  Mc- 
Arthur  and  Cass,  and  they  not  only  fully  approved  of  the  meas- 
ure, but  offered  their  services,  as  volunteers,  on  the  expedition. 
I  likewise  communicated  to  them  a  letter  from  Captain  Brush, 
who  commanded  the  escort  of  provisions,  informing  me  that  he 
should  take  the  back  road,  and  should  have  occasion  for  sup- 
port. I  authorized  Colonels  Mc Arthur  and  Cass  to  select  the 
most  healthy  and  effective  men  of  their  regiments,  and  directed 
the  Quarter  Master  to  furnish  pack-horses  to  carry  provisions 
for  them  during  their  march.  On  the  14th  of  August,  they 
commenced  their  march,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  McAr- 
thur,  attended  by  Colonel  Cass.  The  progress  they  made,  and 
the  circumstances  which  attended  the  expedition,  will  hereafter 
be  related. 

Thus  will  be  seen  the  measures  which  were  adopted,  and  the 
10 


74 

efforts  which  were  made  to  open  the  communication.  I  have 
been  the  more  particular  on  this  subject,  because  it  was  made 
an  article  of  charge  against  me.  What  more  could  have  been 
done,  in  my  situation,  and  with  the  force  at  my  disposal,  I  know 
not,  unless  I  had  retreated  with  my  whole  force  to  the  Miami. 
The  reasons  why  I  did  not,  have  been  stated  in  these  memoirs. 

By  the  statement  here  made,  the  truth  of  which  will  be  man- 
ifest by  the  evidence  and  documents  in  my  trial,  it  appears 
that  T  made  three  attempts  to  open  my  communication — one  by 
a  detachment  of  two  hundred  men,  under  the  command  of  Ma- 
jor Van-horn  ;  another  by  a  detachment  of  six  hundred  of  the 
best  and  most  effective  part  of  the  army,  under  the  command  of 
Colonel  Miller ;  and  the  third,  by  all  the  healthy  and  effective 
men  of  McArthur's  and  Cass'  regiments,  which  the  two  Colo- 
nels were  authorized  to  select  and  command  themselves. 

I  now  ask  the  candid  reader,  in  imagination,  to  fix  himself  at 
Detroit,  and  view  my  situation  :  I  ask  him  to  read  the  orders  of 
the  government,  which  positively  placed  me  in  this  situation, 
eighteen  miles  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  principal  post  in  the 
province  of  Upper  Canada ;  to  look  over  the  waters  of  the  lake, 
and  behold  the  hostile  naval  armament  which  commanded  them ; 
to  view  not  only  the  enemy's  principal  post,  situated  on  these 
waters,  but  all  his  magazines  established  on  them,  protected  by 
this  naval  armament,  and  capable  of  being  transported,  with  the 
greatest  safety  and  facility,  to  any  point  where  they  might  be 
necessary.  After  viewing  the  situation  of  the  enemy,  and  his 
resources,  I  ask  you  more  particularly  to  look  at  mine.  You 
must  look  through  a  dreary  wilderness  of  more  than  two  hun- 
dred miles,  filled  with  hostile  savages,  before  you  can  find  a 
base  on  which  any  magazines  were  established,  by  which  my 
little  army  could  be  supplied  with  the  means  of  subsistence. 
Through  this  wilderness  you  will  see  no  possible  communica- 
tion, excepting  by  a  single  road,  opened  by  the  labour  and  fa- 
tigue of  this  little  army,  in  penetrating  to  the  position  to  which 
it  was  ordered.  This  only  and  single  line  of  operation,  was 
liable  to  be  obstructed  by  the  savage  force,  to  which  the  na- 
ture of  the  country  was  peculiarly  suited ;  by  the  whole  force  of 
the  enemy's  troops,  both  British  and  Canadian;  and  between 
the  Miami  and  Detroit,  seventy  miles,  by  the  gun  boats  and 
armed  vessels  on  the  lake.     To  give  security  to  this  communi- 


15 

cation,  you  will  see  nothing  but  two  or  three  solitary  block- 
houses, built  by  the  troops  when  the  road  was  opened,  and 
guarded  only  by  a  few  invalid  militia,  left  in  them  on  the 
march. 

By  the  foregoing  memoirs,  and  by  the  evidence  on  my  trial, 
you  will  perceive  there  was  no  adequate  force,  on  this  long  line 
of  operation,  furnished  by  the  government,  to  give  security  to 
it,  for  the  protection  of  convoys.  And  when  you  consider  the 
attempts  I  had  made  and  their  consequences,  I  think  you  will 
be  satisfied,  that  with  my  whole  force  I  could  not  have  stretch-  ( 
ed  back  so  great  a  distance  as  to  have  preserved  the  communi- 
cation. To  illustrate  a  subject  of  this  kind  the  best  writers  on 
military  movements  compare  an  army's  lines  of  operation  to  the 
muscles  of  the  human  body,  on  which  the  life  and  motions  of  the 
members  depend.  When  the  whole  moving  spring  of  a  mem- 
ber is  confined  to  a  single  muscle,  the  loss  of  which  would  ren- 
der it  useless,  it  is  the  more  important  to  defend  it  from  every 
hurt.  So  a  single  offensive  line  is,  to  an  army  marching  to- 
wards an  object,  a  part  singularly  sensible,  and  cannot  be  too 
carefully  guarded  from  contact  with  the  enemy. 

From  the  nature  of  the  country  from  Miami  to  Detroit,  it  was 
impossible  to  have  more  than  one  line  of  operation,  and  it  has 
been  shown  how  singularly  it  was  exposed  to  be  intercepted  and 
rendered  useless. 

Thus  I  think,  from  the  exposition  given  of  my  situation,  eve- 
ry unprejudiced  reader  will  be  convinced  that,  there  was  no 
posibility  of  obtaining  any  supplies,  from  any  magazines  from 
my  country.  I  shall  n'ow  offer  for  your  consideration,  the  best 
evidence  and  the  best  documents  the  nature  of  the  case  will  ad- 
mit of,  to  satisfy  you  of  the  state  of  the  magazines  at  Detroit, 
and  the  supplies  which  could  have  been  obtained  from  the  coun- 
try around  it. 

As  a  true  knowledge  of  this  subject  is  very  important  in  form- 
ing an  opinion  of  the  measures  I  adopted,  and  as  the  grossest 
misrepresentations  have  been  made  by  my  enemies,  I  shall  make 
it  a  separate  article  in  my  next  number. 


76 


No.  XX 

That  you  may  clearly  understand  the  situation  in  which  I  was 
placed,  with  respect  to  provision,  for  the  army,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary, that  you  should  be  acquainted   with  the  country,  and  its 
resources.     At  this  time  the  population  of  the  Michigan   terri- 
tory, of  which  Detroit  was  the  capital,  was  between  four  and 
five  thousand  souls  —-Their    settlements  were  on  the   Miami 
of  lake  Erie,   the  river  Raisin,  Ecoss,  Rouge,  and  the  Detroit 
river,  lake  St.  Clair,  the   river  Huron,  which  empties  into  lake 
St.  Clair,  the  river  St.  Clair,  and  the  island  of  Mlchillimack- 
anack — at  that  time  much    the  greatest  part,   indeed    almost 
the  whole,  who  cultivated   the  land,  were  Canadians. — They 
were  miserable  farmers,  paid  little  attention  to  agriculture,  and 
depended  principally  on  hunting,  fishing,  and  trading  with  the 
Indians  for  support. — The  produce  of  the  territory,  in  the  sub- 
stantial articles  of  living,  was   by  no  means   sufficient  for  the 
subsistence  of  the  inhabitants.— -They  were  supplied,  with  pork, 
beef,  flour,  and  corn  from  the  State  of  Ohio,  and  the  parts  of 
New  York  and  Pennsylvania,  which  border  on  lake  Erie— not- 
withstanding these  facts  are  well  known,  I  will  refer  to  some 
testimony,  to  satisfy  those,  who  are  unacquainted  with  the  ter- 
ritory. * 

Captain  Thomson  Maxwell,  in  his  evidence  on  my  trial,  tes- 
tified, "that  he  had  lived  thirteen  years  in  Ohio,  and  had  been 
engaged  every  year,  in  driving  cattle  and  hogs,  from  thence  to 
Detroit  market;  from  a  thousand  to  fifteen  hundred  hogs  an- 
nually, from  one  hundred  and  fifty,  to  two  hundred  pounds 
each — and  from  an  hundred  and  fifty,  to  two  hundred  head  of 
cattle. — They  were  generally  driven  through  the  woods,  without 
any  road."— -Colonel  Kingsbury,  of  the  1st  United  States'  regi- 
ment, testified,  "that  he  commanded  at  Detroit  about  two  years, 
and  left  it  in  1811,  and  that  during  the  time  he  commanded 
there,  there  were  large  droves  of  hogs,  and  fat  beef  cattle,  driv- 
en from  Ohio,  to  that  market". 

A  great  variety  of  other  evidence  might  be  adduced  to  prove 
his  fact,  but  I  deem  it  unnecessary. 

It  is  only  necessary  to  know  the  character  of  the  inhabitants 
and  the  situation  oi  the  country,  to  be  satisfied  of  the  fact — uni- 


77 

Versal  experience  proves,  that  nothing  but  necessity  will  induce 
men  to  toil  and  hard  labour.  They  are  much  better  pleased 
with  the  chase,  fishing,  &c.  Without  making  any  further  ob- 
servations on  this  subject,  I  believe  you  will  be  convinced,  af- 
ter considering  how  long  the  army  had  been  among  these  peo- 
ple* and  how  much  had  been  taken  from  them  that  there  were 
no  grounds,  to  calculate  on  any  further  supplies  from  their  scan- 
ty stores. 

I  shall  now  endeavour  to  demonstrate,  from  the  best  evidence 
which  the  nature  of  the  case  will  admit,  the  state  of  provisions 
at  Detroit,  at  the  time  of  the  capitulation. 

Augustus  Porter,  Esq.  of  the  State  of  New  York,  was  the  con- 
tractor for  furnishing  this  army. — David  Beard,  Esq.  was  his 
agent,  and  was  present  at  Detroit. 

Before  my  trial,  and  pending  my  trial,  I  repeatedly  request- 
ed that  David  Beard  who  then  resided  in  the  State  of  New  York, 
might  be  summoned  as  a  witness  to  prove  the  quantity  of  pro- 
visions at  Detroit  before,  and  at  the  time  of  the  capitulation. 
The  Judge  advocate  assured  me,  he  should  be  summoned.  Near 
the  close  of  the  trial,  as  he  did  not  appear,  I  wrote  him  a  letter, 
informing  him  how  important  his  testimony  was,  and  requested 
his  attendance  He  arrived  in  Albany  the  day  the  evidence  was 
closed,  and  his  certificate  of  the  quantity  of  provisions,  was  ad- 
mitted in  evidence.  It  wll  appear  by  the  minutes  of  the  trial 
that  his  testimony,  was  the  last  before  I  made  my  defence. 
This  being  the  best  evidence  which  the  nature  of  the  case  will 
admit  of.  I  presume  ought  to  controul  all  other  evidence.  Mr. 
Beard,  was  not  only  the  agent,  who  did  all  the  business  at  De- 
troit, but  I  understood  from  him,  had  some  share  in  the  profits  of 
the  contract.  He  could  have  no  motive,  to  have  diminished  the 
quantity,  because  the  United  States  must  have  paid  for  all 
that  was  on  hand  at  the  time  of  the  capitulation. 

By  the  contractor's  agent's  certificate,  it  will  appear  that  on 
the  ninth  of  July,  1812,  tkere  was  at  Detroit  125,000  rations  of 
flour,  and  70,666  rations  of  meat;  and  that  on  the  28th  of  July, 
there  was  70,000  rations  of  flour,  and  21,000  of  meat.  Mr. 
Beard  has  certified  that  this  statement  was  handed  to  me,  con- 
taining the  provisions  in  the  contractor's  store,  and  signed  by 
him  as  will  appear  by  the  proceedings  of  the  Court  Martial,  on 
my  trial. 


78 

By  this  return,  it  will  appear,  what  quantity  was  consumed,, 
from  the  ninth,  to  the  28th  of  July,  what  quantity  remained  on 
hand,  the  28th  of  July,  and  by  observing  the  same  rule  of  con- 
sumption, it  will  appear,   what  quantity,  would  have  been  in 
store,  on  the  16th  of  August,  the  day  of  the  capitulation. 

By  the  data  here  given  it  will  appear  that,  if  a  ration  of  meat 
had  been  issued,  the  meat  would  have  been  exhausted  on  the  6th 
of  August,  ten  days  before  the  capitulation.  And  if  during 
those  ten  days,  after  the  meat  was  exhausted,  an  additional 
quantity  of  flour  had  been  issued,  to  make  up  the  ration,  as  was 
the  case,  the  whole  of  the  flour  would  have  been  exhausted  on 
the  16th  of  August,  the  day  of  the  capitulation.  It  appears  by 
the  return  of  the  contractor,  that  from  the  9th  to  the  28th  of  July, 
that  5,334  rations  of  flour,  more  than  of  meat,  were  issued,  and 
that  practice  was  continued,  in  about  the  same  proportion,  un- 
til the  16th  of  August.  There  is  another  reason  why  so  much 
more  flour  was  issued  than  meat. — In  a  former  part  of  these 
memoirs,  I  stated,  that  the  old  Indian  Chiefs  and  Sachems  con- 
tinued friendly  to  the  United  States,  and  advised  the  warriours 
not  to  join  the  British  standard,  or  to  take  any  part  in  the  con- 
test. These  friendly  Chiefs  and  Sachems,  with  the  women  and 
children,  daily  came  to  Detroit  from  the  villages,  in  a  starving 
condition.  It  had  long  been  the  custom,  and  I  was  ordered  by 
the  Government,  as  superintendant  of  Indian  affairs,  on  their 
visit  to  this  post,  to  furnish  them  with  provisions.  At  this  time, 
I  directed,  on  account  of  the  deficiency  of  meat,  that  flour  alone 
should  be  issued,  which  they  preferred.  Every  effort  was  made 
to  prevent  these  visits,  and  no  more  provisions  were  issued  to 
them,  than  was  necessary  to  preserve  life. 

Perhaps  it  may  be  asked  by  those  unacquainted  with  my  situ- 
ation, and  the  practice  of  armies,  why  so  many  more  rations 
were  daily  issued,  than  the  number  of  effective  men,  which 
composed  the  army  ?  I  will  give  the  true  answer  to  an  enquiry 
of  this  kind. 

It  will  appear  by  the  foregoing  memoirs,  that  the  officers  and 
soldiers  from  Michillamackinack  had  arrived  at  Detroit,  prison- 
ers on  parole,  and  they  had  no  other  means  of  subsistence,  but 
to  receive  rations. 

It  likewise  appears,  that  a  large  number  of  old  Indian  Chiefs 
and  Sachems,  daily  visited  our  camp,  and  were  fed  from  the  pub- 
lic stores  by  order  of  the  Government,  as  I  before  stated. 


79 

It  was  now  the  middle  of  August,  and  a  large  number  of  sick 
were  to  be  provided  for,  and  there  being  no  medical  stores  it  was 
necessary  to  issue  meat  and  flour,  for  their  subsistence. 

A  number  of  women,  are  attached  to  all  armies,  and  it  is  a 
general  custom  to  furnish  them  with  provisions.  All  the  officers 
are  entitled  to  extra  rations,  from  twelve  to  two.  All  the  quar- 
ter-masters' department,  such  as  waggoners,  pack-horsemen, 
boatmen,  &c.are  entitled  to  rations.  I  think  this  statement  will 
satisfy  any  enquiries  on  this  subject. 

Although  every  possible  effort  was  made  by  the  administration 
to  prove,  that  the  state  of  the  provisions,  was  no  reason  for  the 
capitulation;  yet,  on  a  careful  examination  of  all  the  evidence 
on  my  trial,  I  can  find  nothing  which  ought  to  have  any  weight 
in  any  degree  to  controul,  or  vary  the  statement,  here  made. 
It  has  been  said  by  Cols.  M'Arthur  and  Cass,  and  other  wit- 
nesses, that  they  never  heard  any  complaints  of  the  want  of  pro- 
vision. Brevet-Major  Whistler  is  the  only  witness,  who  has 
given  any  testimony  on  this  subject  worthy  of  notice. 

His  testimony  is  in  the  words  following  :  "  I  went,  some  days 
before  the  army  re-crossed,  with  a  Mr.  Beard,  the  deputy  con- 
tractor, to  a  store  which  held  the  provisions  of  the  army,  and 
saw,  and  helped  to  count  between  2  and  300  barrels  of  flour,  48 
barrels  of  pork,  and  16  or  17  barrels  of  salt  beef."  From  this 
testimony  of  the  Brevet  Major,  it  is  impossible  to  determine,  the 
quantity,  if  any,  which  was  in  the  store  on  the  16th  of  August. 
And  for  this  conclusive  reason,  that  he  does  not  ascertain  the 
day,  that  he  was  in  the  store,  and  it  is  impossible  to  ascertain  it, 
from  any  thing  he  said.  He  said,  "  some  days  before  the  army 
re- crossed  the  river."  It  might  have  been  three  or  four  days  be- 
fore, or  it  might  have  been  fifteen  or  twenty.  It  is  unfortunate 
for  me,  that  he  did  not  recollect  the  day,  because  had  it  been 
only  three  or  four  days  before  the  army  re-crossed  the  river,  the 
quantity,  by  his  testimony,  would  not  have  been  so  great,  as  it 
appears  to  be  by  the  returns  of  the  deputy  contractor.  This 
can  easily  be  ascertained  and  reduced  to  mathematical  demon- 
stration, from  the  data  here  given. 

I  feel  confident,  that  I  am  not  blinded  by  prejudice,  in  be- 
lieving, that  every  person,  who  will  read  this  statement,  and  the 
evidence,  by  which  it  is  proved  to  be  true,  will  be  satisfied,  that 
the  state  of  the  Provisions  in  the  store,  and  the  impossibility  of 


80 

ebtaining  a  supply,  from  any  other  quarter,  presented  very  pow- 
erful reasons,  for  the  measures,  which  I  adopted  on  the  16th  of 
August. 

In  my  next  number,  I  shall  present  to  you,  my  fellow  citizens, 
documents,  from  the  records  of  the  government,  to  prove  the 
assistance,  and  co-operation,  which  the  administration  instruct- 
ed General  Dearborn,  the  senior  officer  of  the  army,  to  afford 
me,  and  to  convince  you,  by  the  most  conclusive  testimony,  that 
in  violation  of  his  orders,  instead  of  affording  any  assistance  and 
co-operation,  he  adopted  measures  which  were  among  the  fatal 
causes  of  the  disasters,  which  the  army  under  my  command 
suffered. 


No.  XXL 


In  redeeming  the  pledge,  which  I  gave  in  my  last  number,  I 
shall  endeavour  to  suppress  the  feelings,  which  a  recollection  of 
the  injustice  I  have  experienced,  naturally  excites.  In  vindica- 
tion of  my  honour,  I  have  no  disposition  to  criminate  others. 
Age  is  entitled  to  respect ;  the  feelings  of  near  connections  have 
a  claim  to  our  regard,  and  should  never  wantonly  be  violated; 
and  every  day,  my  fellow  citizens,  we  witness  your  veneration 
and  gratitude  for  revolutionary  services.  No  considerations 
ought,  however,  to  prevent  the  publication  of  truth,  whatever  its 
operations  may  be  on  any  individual  character. 

It  is  well  known,  that  General  Dearborn  was  the  senior  officer 
of  our  armies  in  the  year  1812,  it  is  well  known  that  he  was  the 
President  of  the  Court  Martial,  before  which  I  was  tried  ;  and 
it  will,  and  it  must  appear,  that  the  defence  of  his  own  charac- 
ter and  fame,  depended  on  the  event  of  that  trial.  The  unfor- 
tunate loss  of  all  my  public  papers  will  be  particularly  stated, 
and  it  will  appear  that  on  my  trial,  I  had  no  other  documentary 
evidence,  excepting  what  the  administration,  who  were  my  pro- 
secutors, thought  proper  to  furnish.  Whoever  will  examine  the 
proceedings  of  that  Court  Martial  will  find  that  none  of  the 
letters  from  the  administration  to  General  Dearborn,  none  of  the 
instructions  which  he  received,  and  indeed  not  a  single  docu- 


81 

merit,  to  prove  the  manner  in  which  he  was  ordered  to  co-ope- 
rate with  my  army  were  produced ;  although  I  requested  copies 
of  all  the  papers  from  the  war  office,  which  had  any  relation  to 
the  charges  the  administration  had  exhibited  against  me.  If  is 
too  well  known, how  deeply  interested  the  officers  of  that  admin- 
istration were  in  my  condemnation,  to  require  any  evidence  on 
the„subject.  The  important  crisis  of  the  Presidential  election 
soon  followed  the  disasters  of  the  campaign,  and  the  fate  of 
every  officer  who  directed  the  councils  of  the  cabinet,  and  the 
operations  of  the  field,-  depended  on  that  event  A  general 
opinion  prevailed  that  the  war  had  been  declared  without  suit- 
able preparation,  and  that  its  misfortunes  had  been  occasioned 
by  the  ill  judged  measures  of  the  administration,  and  n  storm 
seemed  to  be  gathering  over  the  heads  of  its  officers.  Its  fury 
was  increasing  with  so  much  violence,  and  its  direction  was  be- 
coming so  pointed,  as  to  create  the  most  alarming  fears.  To 
divert  its  force,  and  to  shield  themselves  from  its  violence,  a 
shelter  of  some  kind  became  necessary  for  their  safety  :  and  as 
/had  been  the  unsuccessful  General,  it  was  thought  more  easy 
to  divert  it  from  themselves,  by  directing  its  force  against  me, 
than  in  any  other  manner.  To  effect  this,  every  means  in  their 
power  were  brought  into  exercise,  and  General  Dearborn  was 
selected  as  the  principal  instrument  to  execute  their  plans 

I  have  made  these  observations  to  show  the  efforts  of  the  ad- 
ministration, in  the  measures  which  were  adopted,  for  my  de- 
struction. In  proof  of  the  statements  which  I  shall  make,  the 
highest  evidence  of  which  the  nature  of  the  case  will  admit,  cer- 
tified documents  from  the  records  of  the  government,  will  be 
produced.  The  facts  which  I  shall  exhibit  to  your  view,  are  so 
necessary  to  be  known,  to  enable  you  to  form  a  just  estimate  of 
both  his  public  conduct  and  mine,  and  are  so  connected  with  the 
history  of  our  country  and  its  military  operations,  that  no  con- 
siderations ought  to  prevent  the  publication  of  them. 

Satisfactory  reasons,  I  presume,  have  been  given  for  the  long 
-delay.  We  are  both  fast  descending  the  downhill  of  life,  and 
rapidly  approaching  the  end  of  our  journey.  The  truth  can  bet- 
ter be  made  known  while  we  are  living,  than  after  our  death. 

I  have  deeply  regretted  his  absence  from  the  country  at  this 
time,  lest  it  should  be  thought  that  I  have  taken  advantage  of 
that  absence  to  make  communications  which  would  not  bear  the 
11 


82 

test  of  his  examination.  I  rejoice,  however,  to  learn  by  the 
public  prints  that  he  will  soon  return,  and  have  an  opportunity 
of  repelling  any  charges,  which  he  may  believe  unwarranted  by 
the  evidence  in  my  possession.  No  one  of  you  can  be  more 
ready  than  myself  to  receive,  and  give  due  weight  to  any  expla- 
nations which  he  may  wish  to  make.  But,  fellow  citizens,  should 
he  avoid  such  explanations  on  the  ground  that  the  decision  of  the 
Court  Martial  of  which  he  was  President,  is  conclusive,  1  shall, 
with  the  utmost  confidence  appeal  to  my  countrymen  for  a  re- 
vision of  the  sentence  of  that  tribunal;  knowing  that  in  you  I 
shall  have  candid,  just,  intelligent,  and  disinterested  judges,  in 
whose  hands  the  honour  of  the  innocent  and  the  injured  must 
always  be  safe. 

I  shall  now  proceed  to  produce  documents  to  show,  the  man- 
ner in  which  he  discharged  the  duties  of  his  high  office  in  rela- 
tion to  the  detachment  of  the  army  entrusted  to  my  command. 
In  the  first  place,  I  will  observe,  that  during  the  whole  cam- 
paign, I  never  received  a  single  letter  from  him. 

In  the  next  place  I  shall  prove,  that  early  in  the  campaign,  he 
was  ordered  by  the  government,  to  place  the  troops  under  his 
immediate  command,  in  stations  suitable  for  the  invasion  of  Up- 
per Canada;  and  that  when  I  commenced  offensive  operations 
against  that  province,  he  was  likewise  commanded  to  co-operate 
with  me  in  those  operations. 

In.  the  next  place  I  shall  prove,  that  in  violation  of  the  orders 
of  the  government,  he  never  made  any  co-operations,  at  the  time 
here  referred  to,  although  he  had  at  his  disposal,  a  sufficient 
force  for  the  purpose. 

I  shall  then  show,  that  without  any  instructions  from  the  gov- 
ernment, and  without  any  justifiable  cause  for  the  measure,  he 
agreed  with  Sir  George  Prevost,  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
armies  in  Canada,  to  an  armistice,  or  suspension  of  hostilities, 
in  which  the  auny  I  commanded  was  not  included  ;  and  by  that 
means,  left  it  in  the  poweivof  the  enemy  to  march  his  whole 
force  with  the  mos>  perfect  safety  to  his  other  posts,  to  the  point, 
where  I  had  commenced  offensive  operations.  1  shall  further 
show,  thathe  was  constantly  informed  of  my  situation,  and  must 
have  known,  if  he  had  any  knowledge  of  his  duty,  that  the  meas- 
ures he  adopted,  in  the  nature  of  things,  must  have  occasioned 
the  destruction  of  my  army.     And  I  shall  further  show,  that  in 


83 

consequence  of  this  armistice,  or  cessation  of  hostilities,  that 
General  Brock,  the  acting  Governour  and  commander-in-chief  of 
Upper  Canada,  marched  with  all  the  forces  of  his  province,  and 
re-enforcements  from  Montreal  to  the  station  at  Maiden. 

As  early  as  the  26th  of  June,  1812,  ten  days  before  the  army 
I  commanded  arrived  at  Detroit,  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  a 
letter  to  General  Dearborn  says,  M  It  is  altogether  uncertain 
what  time  General  Hull  may  deem  it  expedient  to  commence 
offensive  operations.  The  preparations,  (meaning  General 
Dearborn's  preparations)  it  is  presumed,  will  be  made,  to  move 
in  a  direction  for  Niagara,  Kingston  and  Montreal."  [Record- 
ed Vol.  5th,  p.  458.]  This  shows,  that  a  few  days  after  the 
declaration  of  war,  and  while  I  was  on  my  march,  through  the 
wilderness,  that  it  was  not  only  the  intention  of  the  government, 
that  I  should  commence  offensive  operations  from  Detroit  against 
UpperCanada,  but  likewise,  that  General  Dearborn  should  make 
preparations  to  co-operate  with  me,  as  the  troops  were  to  move 
in  a  direction  for  Niagara,  &c.  In  the  Secretary's  letter  to  the 
same,  dated  the  9th  of  July,  he  says,  "  You  will  order  all  the 
recruits  not  otherwise  disposed  of,  to  Albany,  or  some  other  sta- 
tions on  Lake  Champlain,  to  be  organized  for  the  invasion  of 
Canada."  [Vol.  6th,  p  15,  16.  Records  of  the  War  Office.] 
This  shows  as  early  as  the  9th  of  July,  the  object  of  the  admin- 
istration, was  the  invasion  of  Canada. 

On  the  20th  of  July,  the  Secretary  wrote  to  General  Dear- 
born as  follows  :  "  I  have  been  in  daily  expectation  of  hearing 
from  General  Hull,  who  probably  arrived  at  Detroit  on  the  8th 
inst.  The  first  intelligence  received  from  him  will  be  commu- 
nicated to  you ;  enclosed  is  a  copy  of  his  last  orders ;  you  will 
make  such  arrangments  with  Governour  Thompkins,  as  will 
place  the  militia  detached  by  him  for  Niagara,  and  the  other 
posts  on  the  Lakes  under  your  controul  :  and  there  should  be  a 
communication,  and,  if  practicable,  a  co  operation,  throughout 
the  whole  frontier."  [Vol.  6,  p.  35.]  By  this  letter,  the  mili- 
tia of  New  York  were  placed  under  General  Dearborn's  con- 
troul, and  he  was  directed  to  communicate,  and  co-operate  with 
the  other  forces'on  the  frontier.  General  Dearborn  could  not 
have  misunderstood  this  order,  because  there  were  at  that  time 
no  other  forces  on  the  frontier  but  those  under  my  command, 
and  the  orders  which  are  alluded  to,  in  the  letter  enclosed  to 


84 

him,  were  the  orders  to  me  to  commence  offensive  operations 
against  Canada. 

On  the  1st  of  August,  the  Secretary  wrote  to  General  Dear- 
born the  following  letter.  "  Enclosed  herewith,  you  will  receive 
a  copy  of  a  letter,  from  Brigadier  General  Hull,  of  July  19,  by 
express.  You  will  make  a  diversion  in  his  favour  at  Niagara, 
and  at  Kingston,  as  soon  as  may  be  practicable,  and  by  such  op- 
perations  as  may  be  within  your  controul  r?  [Vol.  6,  p.  199] 
Here  he  was  positively  ordered  to  make  a  diversion  at  Niagara, 
and  Kingston,  as  soon  as  was  practicable ;  and  by  such  opera- 
tions, as  were  within  his  controul.  It  may  here  be  observed, 
that  he  was  the  senior  officer  of  the  army,  and  all  the  troops 
raised  for  the  invasion  of  Canada  were  subject  to  his  immediate 
controul,  excepting  the  few  Ohio  militia,  and  the  4th  United 
States  regiment  under  my  command,  and  by  his  rank,  he  would 
have  commanded  them,  if  he  had  obeyed  his  orders,  in  making 
diversions  in  the  enemy's  country,  and  co-operating  with  them. 

In  a  number  of  other  letters  to  General  Dearborn  from  the 
Secretary,  he  was  instructed  to  make  diversions,  and  co-operate 
with  my  army  :  to  prevent  being  tedious,  I  will  extract  the  sub- 
stance of  them,  with  a  reference  to  the  record  of  them  in  the 
War  Office.  In  one,  the  Secretary  informs  General  Dearborn 
that  the  last  letter  from  General  Hull  was  dated  the  £9th  of 
July,  and  that  reports  had  been  received  that  the  militia  order- 
ed by  Governour  Meigs  of  Ohio,  to  secure  the  road  for  conveying 
provisions  to  Detroit,  had  halted  at  the  Miami  of  the  lake,  in 
consequence  of  a  collection  of  Indians  in  their  front.  He  fur- 
ther informed  him,  that  every  thing  indicated  the  necessity  of 
early  and  effective  co-operation  at  Niagara,  and  the  posts  below. 
[Vol.  6,  p.  89.] 

Indeed  all  my  letters  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  giving  an  ac- 
count of  my  situation,  and  the  necessity  of  co-operation,  were 
enclosed  by  him  to  General  Dearborn,  for  his  information.  [See 
Vol.  G,  p.  68.]  The  others  I  will  not  notice ;  they  may  be  found 
on  record. 

In  order  to  make  it  still  more  apparent,  that  General  Dear- 
born knew  perfectly  my  situation,  and  was  ordered  to  adopt 
measures  for  my  support  and  assistance,  I  will  give  extracts  of 
letters  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to  me,  on  that  subject.  In 
his  letter  of  the  26th  of  July,  he  says,  "  General  Dearborn  will 


85 

be  apprized  of  your  situation,  and  directed  to  keep  up  a  corres- 
pondence with  you,  and  to  take  measures  to  afford  the  necessary 
support."  [Vol.  6,  p.  126.]  In  another  letter  to  me  of  the  1st 
of  August,  he  says,  "On  the  26th  of  July,  your  letters  of  the 
7th  and  lOih  were  enclosed  to  General  Dearborn,  with  a  copy 
cf  mine  of  the  26th,  accompanied  with  a  request,  that  he  would 
make  a  diversion  in  your  favour.  By  the  mail  of  this  evening, 
youi  s  of  the  29th  is  enclosed  to  him,  with  an  instruction  to  make 
a  diversion  at  Niagara  and  Kingston,  as  soon  as  practicable." 
[Vol.  6,  p.  127,  8.] 

Thus  it  appears,  by  a  number  of  official  letters  from  the  Sec- 
retary s>f  the  department  of  war,  to  General  Dearborn,  from  the 
26th  of  June,  1812,  to  the  1st  of  August,  and  from  official  let- 
ters from  the  Secretary  to  me,  that  during  that  time,  he  was 
constantly  apprized  of  my  situation,  and  ordered  by  the  govern- 
m<  t,  not  only  to  make  diversions  against  the  enemy,  but  to  co- 
operate with  me  in  the  invasion  of  Canada.  And  it  will  like- 
wise appear  by  a  letter  to  me  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  which 
I  shall  hereafter  have  occasion  to  mention  more  particularly  on 
another  subject,  that  the  force  at  Niagara  was  twenty-four  hun- 
dred. It  is  in  these  words,  "Orders  have  been  given  to  Gen- 
eral Dearborn,  to  attack  the  enemy's  posts  at  Niagara  and 
Kingston,  as  soon  as  may  be  practicable.  Our  force  at  Niagara, 
according  to  General  Dearborn's  account,  will  amount  to  twen- 
ty -four  hundred;  and  he  will  notify  you  of  such  movements  and 
operations  as  he  may  order.  It  is  indispensably  necessary  that 
a  communication  should  be  kept  up  between  you  and  the  com- 
mandant, at  Niagara."— [Vol.  6,  p.  128,  129.] 

Notwithstanding  the  forces  which  were  collected  on  the  Nia- 
gara river,  notwithstanding  the  militia  of  the  State  of  New 
York,  and  all  the  recruits  of  the  army,  in  the  northern  section 
of  the  country,  were  at  his  disposal,  and  notwithstanding  the  in- 
structions, he  had  received  from  the  government,  not  a  single 
man,  crossed  the  Niagara  river,  from  the  time  he  received  those 
instructions,  from  the  latter  part  of  June,  to  the  8th  of  August, 
when  he  agreed  to  an  armistice,  or  suspension  of  hostilities,  in 
which  the  army  I  commanded  was  not  included.  This  measure 
and  the  effect  it  had  on  my  situation,  will  be  the  subject  of  my 
next  number. 


86 


No.  XXII. 

It  is  a  subject  of  regret  to  me,  that  in  this  memoir,  I  cannot 
present  to  you  a  certified  copy  from  the  records  of  the  war  of- 
fice, of  the  original  armistice  or  agreement  between  Sir  George 
Prevost  and  General  Dearborn,  for  a  suspension  of  hostilities  on 
the  Niagara  frontier ;  I  am  happy  at  the  same  time  that  I  have 
it  in  my  power,  to  furnish  a  satisfactory  reason,  why  it  is  not 
presented,  and  to  offer  other  documents,  to  prove  its  existence 
and  contents.  The  following  is  a  copy  of  a  letter,  from  the 
Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Calhoun. 

War  Department,  25th  Jlug.  1823. 
SIR  — Conformably  to  your  request,  I  have  had  copies  made 
of  all  the  correspondence,  between  this  department,  and  your- 
self; likewise  the  correspondence  with  General  Dearborn,  Gov- 
ernour  Meigs,  and  Governour  Scott,  as  far  as  the  same  can  be 
had  from  the  records  and  files  of  this  office,  and  now  transmit 
them  to  you.  The  copy  of  the  armistice  to  which  you  refer, 
cannot  be  found  on  file,  in  this  department. 

I  am,  &c 
(Signed.)  J.  C.  CALHOUN. 

Gen.  Wm.  Hull,  Newton,  Mass. 

After  receiving  this  letter,  I  applied  to  Governour  Eustis,  who 
was  at  that  time  Secretary  of  the  War  Department,  -and  he  in- 
formed me,  that  it  was  received  at  the  war  office,  and  placed  on 
the  files  of  the  Department.  How  a  p-  blic  document  of  so  much 
consequence  could  be  lost,  appears  in  some  degree  mysterious. 
I  shall  however  make  no  other  comment  on  it,  than  to  observe, 
that  the  high  standing  and  character  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  and  his 
prompt  and  honourable  conduct,  in  furnishing  me,  with  the 
other  testimony,  which  I  requested,  and  which  his  predecessor 
General  Armstrong,  had  neglected  to  furnish,  or  even  notice 
any  application,  forbids  the  most  distant  suspicion,  of  any  un- 
fair, or  improper  management  on  his  part.  General  Armstrong 
was  the  immediate  successor  of  Governour  Eustis,  who  declares 
it  was  left  on  file  in  the  office,  and  had  the  custody  of  the  pub- 


87 

lie  papers  of  the  department.  The  following  is  a  copy  of  the 
letter  to  General  Armstrong,  which  was  put  into  the  Post  Office 
in  Boston. 

Newton,  (Mass.)  May  \0th,  18l4. 

SIR, — Having  been  officially  informed,  by  the  Adjutant  Gen- 
eral, of  the  result  of  the  Court  Martial  by  which  I  have  been 
tried,  and  feeling  it  a  duty,  which  I  owe  to  my  country,  my 
family,  and  myself,  to  publish  the  proceedings  of  my  trial,  I  re- 
quest as  soon  as  possible,  a  copy  of  the  same  from  the  War  De- 
partment; which  request  is  warranted  by  the  90th  article  of  the 
rules  and  articles  of  war. 

I  am,  &c. 
(Signed)  WILLIAM  HULL. 

Hon.  John  Armstrong,  Secretary  of  War,  > 
Washington  City.         V 

This  armistice  had  so  fatal  a  bearing  on  my  situation,  that  I 
must  be  excused,  for  disclosing  every  circumstance  which  had 
any  relation  to  it. 

To  prove  that  this  agreement  was  made  between  Sir  George 
Prevost  and  General  Dearborn,  I  will  in  the  first  place  present 
a  copy  of  a  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General  Dear- 
born, copied  from  the  records  of  the  war  office. — [Vol.  6th, 
page  200.] 

War  Department,  August  \5th,  1812. 

SIR, — Your  letter  of  the  8th,  with  that  of  the  9th  inst.  enclos- 
ing a  letter  from  Sir  George  Prevost,  addressed  to  you,  has  been 
received.  A  letter  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  cover- 
ing a  dispatch  for  Mr.  Baker,  late  Secretary  of  legation  of  His 
Brittanic  Majesty,  from  Sir  George  Prevost,  has  also  been  re- 
ceived, and  the  dispatch  has  been  delivered  to  Mr.  Baker. 

No  communication  having  been  made  to  this  government,  by 
Mr.  Baker,  I  am  commanded  by  the  President  to  inform  you,  that 
there  does  not  appear  to  him  any  justifiable  cause  to  vary  or 
desist  from  the  arrangements,  which  are  in  operation ;  and  I  am 
further  commanded  to  instruct  you,  that  from  and  after  the  re- 
ceipt of  this  letter,  and  allowing  a  reasonable  time,  in  which 
you  will  inform  Sir  George  Prevost  thereof,  you  will  proceed 
with  the  utmost  vigour  in  your  operations^  How  far  the  plan, 
originally  suggested  by  you  of   attacking  Niagara,  Kingston, 


88 

and  Montreal,  at  the  same  time  can  be  rendered  practicable, 
you  can  best  judge.  Presuming  that  not  more  than  a  feint,  (if 
that  should  be  deemed  expedient)  with  the  troops  on  lake  (  ham- 
plain,  aided  by  volunteers  and  militia,  can  be  immediately  ef- 
fected, against  Montreal,  and  considering  the  urgency  of  a  di- 
version in  favour  of  General  Hull,  under  the  circumstances  at- 
tending his  situation,  the  President  thinks  it  proper,  that  not  a 
moment  should  be  lost  in  gaining  possession  of  the  British  posts 
at  Niagara  and  Kingston,  or  at  least  the  former,  and  proceeding 
in  co-operation  with  General  Hull  in  securing  Upper  Canada. 
It  is  expected,  that  the  force  assembled  at  those  places,  particu- 
larly at  Niagara,  will  be  such  as  to  justify  your  immediate  or- 
ders for  an  attack,  or  if  this  should  not  be  the  case,  that  the 
measures  you  have  taken  for  rendering  it  such,  will  prevent  any 
material  delay.  You  will  of  course  communicate  your  views  to 
General  Hull,  and  direct  the  commanding  officer  at  Niagara,  to 
be  particular  in  giving  him  every  information  which  can  be  use- 
ful." 

Before  I  proceed  to  make  any  comments  on  this  letter,  I  wdl 
transcribe  another  addressed  to  me  by  the  Secretary  of  War, 
giving  me  the  information. 

War  Department,  August  20th,  1812. 
"  SIR, — General  Dearborn  has  communicated  to  this  depart- 
ment, an  arrangement  by  which  it  was  agreed  between  him  and 
Sir  George  Prevost,  that  offensive  operations  should  be  suspend- 
ed until  the  determination  of  the  government  should  be  made 
known  to  him,  on  certain  information  presumed  by  General 
Dearborn  to  be  contained  in  a  dispatch,  transmitted  by  Sir 
George  Prevost  to  Mr.  Baker,  late  Secretary  of  legation  to  His 
Brittanic  Majesty  in  this  city.  It  further  appears  by  General 
Dearborn's  letter,  that  he  made  known,  and  proposed  to  your 
concurrence,  in  said  agreement,  so  far  as  your  orders,  and  as 
circumstances  might  permit. 

I  am  now  instructed  by  the  President  to  inform  you  that  no 
communication,  such  as  was  supposed  by  General  Dearborn 
might  have  been  transmitted,  has  been  made  to  this  government, 
by  Mr.  Baker,  or  by  any  authorized  agent  of  the  British  govern  - 
ment,  which  will  justify  a  delay,  or  suspension  of  any  military 
operations,  of  which  General  Dearborn  has  been  duly  informed. 
In  case  therefore,  you  shall  have  entered  into  any  stipulation 


89 

respecting  a  suspension  of  offensive  operations,  with  the  officer 
commanding  the  forces  of  His  Brittanic  Majesty  in  your  vicini- 
ty, you  will  conceive  it  to  be  made  known  to  him,  that  such 
stipulation,  is,  after  due  notice,  to  cease  and  determine,  and 
you  will  proceed  in  the  same  manner  as  if  no  such  agreement 
had  been  entered  into." — See  vol.  6,  p.  128,  129. 

In  the  close  of  the  letter,  I  am  informed  that  General  Dear- 
born was  ordered  to  attack  the  enemy's  posts  at  Niagara  and 
Kingston,  that  2400  men  were  at  Niagara,  that  he  was  ordered 
to  notify  me  of  his  movements,  &c.  which  has  been  cited  in  a 
former  memoir. 

As  I  before  observed,  I  never  received  a  letter  front  General 
Dearborn  during  the  campaign  ;  and  it  appears  by  the  letter 
here  recited,  that  it  was  twelve  days  after  the  armistice  was 
agreed  to,  before  the  administration  wrote  to  me  from  Washing- 
ton, giving  me  information  of  it. 

This  letter  I  never  received,  and  the  copy  I  have  here  pre- 
sented has  been  obtained  from  the  records  of  the  War  Office. 
Indeed,  the  first  information  I  received,  that  General  Dearborn 
had  established  a  peace  on  the  Niagara  frontier  was  from  Gen- 
eral Brock,  immediately  after  the  capitulation  was  signed. 
Neither  the  administration  nor  General  Dearborn  ever  gave  me 
any  information  of  it,  which  was  received.  Thus  it  appears, 
that  by  the  neglect  of  the  General,  and  the  delay  of  the  admin- 
istration, I  was  kept  in  ignorance  of  a  measure  which  so  mater- 
ially effected  my  situation  and  had  no  knowledge  of  it  until 
General  Brock  had  time  sufficient  to  collect  and  march  all  the 
forces  of  the  province  against  me. 

Before  I  close  this  number,  I  will  observe,  that  from  docu- 
ments here  produced.  I  do  presume  you  will  be  as  well  satis- 
fied of  the  following  facts  as  if  a  copy  of  the  agreement  had  been 
produced ;  viz.  that  it  was  entered  into  as  early  as  the  8th  of 
August,  and  that  it  provided  for  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  on 
the  frontiers  of  Canada,  in  which  the  army  I  commanded  was 
not  included. 

Having  thus  proved,  what  were  the  orders  of  the  government  to 
General  Dearborn,  and  the  measures  he  adopted ;  in   my  next 
number,  after  making  some  general  observations,  I  shall  consid- 
er the  effect  they  had  on  my  situation. 
12 


90 


No.  XXTII. 

By  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General  Dearborn, 
referred  to  in  the  last  number,  it  appears,  that  the  agreement 
he  had  made  with  Sir  George  Prevost,  for  a  suspension  of  hos- 
tilities, was  entirely  disapproved  by  the  President,  and  he  was 
commanded  to  cause  it  to  cease,  after  due  notice.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  account  for  the  motives  which  induced  him  to  adopt  the 
measure.  All  my  letters,  stating  my  situation  in  the  enemy's 
country,  had  been  sent  to  him  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  He 
knew  that  the  lake  was  shut  against  me;  and,  by  the  Secretary's 
letter,  he  was  infcrmed,  that  a  body  of  Indians  had  assembled 
on  the  road  I  had  opened  through  the  wilderness,  and  had  stop- 
ped a  company  of  Ohio  militia,  at  the  Miami,  which  was  escort- 
ing provisions  to  Detroit,  for  the  support  of  my  army.  He  knew 
by  the  same  letters,  sent  to  him  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  that 
Michillimackanack  had  fallen;  that  the  savages  had  joined  the 
"British  standard,  and  all  the  northern  and  western  tribes  were 
marching  in  hostile  array  against  me.  Under  these  circumstan- 
ces, if  his  own  military  experience,  and  knowledge  did  not 
teach  him  his  duty,  viz.  the  necessity  of  co  operation  with  the 
forces  under  my  command,  he  had  before  him  the  positive  or- 
ders of  the  government.  After  making  this  agreement,  it  be- 
came impossible  for  him,  during  its  continuance,  to  have  obeyed 
the  orders  of  his  government,  in  making  diversions  and  co-oper- 
ations, without  a  violation  of  the  faith  he  had  pledged.  Had  he 
the  power,  by  his  commission,  to  make  an  agreement  which 
would  render  him  incapable  of  obeying  the  orders  of  those  from 
whom  he  received  his  authority  ?  I  ask,  then,  by  what  authority 
did  he  make  this  armistice  ?  It  was  not  by  the  authority  of  the 
government,  because,  in  my  former  numbers,  I  have  cited  the 
letter  of  the  government,  by  which  the  measure  was  disapprov- 
ed, in  the  most  pointed  language.  But  suppose,  by  his  com- 
mission as  the  senior  Major  General  in  the  army,  a  discretiona- 
ry power  was  vested  in  him  to  make  an  armistice ;  did  he  in. 
this  instance,  exercise  that  power  properly,  by  agreeing  to  a 
measure,  vUiich  tot  .ily  disqualified  him  from  carrying  into  effect 
the  orders  of  his  government  ?  I  ask  you,  then,  my  fellow  citi- 


91 

fceris,  on  what  grounds  this  measure  can  be  justified  ?  If  it  can- 
not be  justified  on  military  principles,  permit  me  again  to  ask 
you,  what  motives  could  have  induced  him  to  have  adopted  it  ? 
I  will  not  even  ask  the  question,  whether  it  was  to  shield  him- 
self from  personal  danger,  in  attacking  the  enemy's  posts,  and 
co-operating  with  the  forces  under  my  command.  I  have  too 
often  witnessed  his  bravery,  during  the  war  of  the  revolution,  to 
make  a  suggestion  of  the  kind. 

Was  it  the  fear  that  the  forces  under  my  command,  having 
first  made  the  invasion  of  Upper  Canada,  would  have  shared 
some  part  of  the  glory,  in  the  event  of  conquest  ? 

When  he  was  commanded  by  the  administration  to  concentrate 
his  forces  at  Niagara,  and  co-operate  with  me,  and  only  make 
a  feint  againt  Montreal,  why  did  he  direct  the  principal  part  of 
them  to  Plattsburg  and  Burlington,  on  lake  Champlain  ?  He 
must  have  foreseen,  that  by  agreeing  to  the  suspension  of  hos- 
tilities, in  the  manner  he  did,  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy 
would  be  removed  for  the  defence  of  that  part  of  the  province 
which  was  invaded.  Thi*  he  must  have  perceived,  unless  he 
had  become  giddy  by  his  elevation,  and  could  not  discern  his 
duty.  It  is  possible,  that  it  was  not  his  expectation  that  the 
government  would  approve  of  the  measure,  and  would  have  or- 
dered it  to  have  ceased,  aftt  r  giving  due  notice  ;  and  in  such  an 
event,  before  the  enemy's  force  could  have  returned  to  Mon- 
treal, he  might  have  advanced  his  forces  from  Plattsburg  and 
Burlington,  and  taken  possession  of  that  capital.  In  such  a 
case  he  undoubtedly  supposed  all  the  glory  would  be  his  own, 
and  that  such  an  achievement  would  have  more  than  compensat- 
ed for  the  sacrifice  of  my  army. 

If  he  were  not  influenced  by  any  of  the  motives  which  have 
been  here  suggested,  let  me  ask  you,  whether  they  were  not  the 
same,  which  induced  him,  in  publishing  a  narrative  of  the  battle 
of  Bunker  Hill,  to  open  the  tomb,  and  violate  the  ashes  of  the 
brave  General  Putnam,  more  than  twenty  years  after  he  had 
rested  from  his  patriotic  labours  ? — a  chief  whose  name  alone 
was  a  host  at  the  commencement  of  our  revolution,  and  whose 
gallant  deeds,  are  identified  with  the  glory  of  our  country. 
Putnam  was  then  a  general  and  Dearborn  was  a  capttin. 

If  he  were  capable  of  making  representations  intended  to 
blast  the  laurels,  which  had  so  long  flourished  around  the  tomb, 


92 

of  this  brave  commander,  does  it  not  in  some  measure  account 
for  his  motives,  in  attempting  to  rob  me  of  the  little  fame,  I  had 
acquired  in  following  the  standard  of  the  illustrious  Washing- 
ton, during  the  war  of  our  revolution.  Every  man  engaged  in 
that  memorable  battle  is  entitled  to  glory ;  and  had  General 
Dearborn  been  contented  with  the  share  to  which  his  rank  and 
conduct  entitled  him,  no  one  would  have  been  so  ungenerous 
twenty  years  after  his  death,  as  to  have  opened  his  tomb,  violat- 
ed his  ashes,  or  attempted  to  blast  even  the  twig  of  a  laurel, 
which  might  have  been  found,  growing  around  it. 

He  must  have  known  when  he  agreed  to  the  armistice,  that  a 
very  considerable  time  must  elapse,  even,  if  the  government  dis- 
approved of  it,  before  its  operation  would  have  ceased.      The 
despatches    must  have    travelled  from    his    Head  Quarters,  to 
Washington,  and  from  Washington  back  to  Albany ;  he  then  must 
have  given  notice  to  Sir  George  Prevost  at  Quebec  or  Montreal, 
and  have  waited  a  reasonable  time  for  this  notice  to  have  arriv- 
ed.     As  the  division  of  the  army  I  commanded  had  no  partici- 
pation in  the  measure,  he  well  knew  the  advantages  he  thereby 
gave   the  enemy  in   concentrating  his   whole  force  to  the  scene 
of  my  operations — he  knew  that  during  this  period,  it  would  not 
be  necessary  for  the  enemy  to  retain  a  single  effective  man  at 
any  of  the  stations,  on  the  Niagara  river,  Kingston,  Montreal, 
or  any  of  the  posts,  in  the  eastern  part  of  the  province. — He 
well  knew,  that  the  whole  force  of  the  British  army,  in  that  sec- 
tion of  territory,  the  militia  of  the  Canadas,  and  the  savages  of 
the  wilderness  might  be  employed  in  opposing  the  offensive  oper- 
ations, I  had  commenced,  and  at  that  moment  was  engaged  in 
prosecuting.     He  was  perfectly  acquainted  both  with  my  situa- 
tion, and  the  situation  of  the  enemy;  that  I  was  surrounded  on 
all  sides,  and  had  no  communication  with  my  country;  that  by 
the  command  of  lake  Erie,  and  being  in  the  possession  of  armed 
ships,  transports,  and  boats,  all  the  troops  from  fort  Erie,  fort 
George,  with  all  the  militia  of  that  part  of  the  province,  might 
with  the  greatest  facility,  have  been  moved  to  any  point,  where 
their  services  were  most  necessary. — That  two  or  three  days? 
would  only  have  been   required,    to  have  transported  them  to 
Maiden,  or  any  part  of  the  Detroit  river — that  by  the  command 
of  lake  Ontario  the  forces  from  Kingston,  York,  and  that  part  of 
the  province,  with   the  same  facility  and  despatch,  might  have 


93 

been  removed  to  the  west  part  of  the  lake,  and  marched  to  the 
same  point — all  these  advantages,  General  Dearborn  must  have 
well  known,  would  be  given  to  the  enemy,  when  he  signed  this 
agreement,  for  the  suspension  of  hostilities. 

In  the  course  of  these  memoirs,  I  shall  show,  that  all  these 
advantages  were  made  use  of;  and  in  consequence  of  this  mea- 
sure, which  was  unauthorized  and  disapproved  by  the  govern - 
went,  the  plan  of  the  British  commander  succeeded  according  to 
the  expectation,  which  was  anticipated. 

The  measure  I  am  now  considering,  my  fellow  citizens,  had 
such  an  effect  on  my  situation,  that  no  apology,  I  presume  ii  ill 
be  necessary.,  for  asking  your  very  particular  attention  to  all  the 
circumstances,  attending  it — It  will  be  recollected  from  the 
copy  of  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  war,  that  he  had  received 
General  Dearborn's  of  the  8th  and  9th  of  August,  communicat- 
ing information  of  the  suspension  of  hostilities,  and  the  cause  of 
it.  Colonel  Uaynes,  the  adjutant-general  of  the  army  com 
manded  by  Sir  George  Prevost,  was  the  officer  appointed  and 
authorized  on  his  part  to  make  this  negotiation. — He  must  have 
arrived  at  the  head -quarters  of  General  Dearborn  as  early  as  the 
6th  or  7th  of  August ; — consequently  he  must  have  left  Montreal, 
as  early  as  the  first  of  August,  the  distance  being  about  two 
hundred  and  forty  miles — Sir  George  Prevost,  calculating  on  the 
success  of  this  measure,  no  doubt  gave  General  Brock  immediate 
information  respecting  it,  as  soon,  as  Colonel  Baynes  commenc- 
ed his  journey,  with  directions  to  proceed  with  all  the  forces,  to 
Maiden — In  addition  to  this,  Major  General  Sheafe,  marched 
with  the  forces  from  Montreal  to  Kingston,  where  a  great  part 
of  them  embarked,  passed  to  the  west  part  of  Lake  Ontario, 
there  landed,  marched  to  the  relief  of  Maiden,  collecting  the 
militia  and  savages  on  their  march. 

Thus  it  appears,  that  eight  or  nine  days  before  the  agreement 
was  actually  signed,  all  the  British  forces  were  put  in  motion, 
and  concentrating  to  the  only  point  where  the  invasion  of  the 
Upper  Province  had  been  made,  and  these  arrangements  must 
have  been  made  on  the  presumption  that  Colonel  Baynes  would 
obtain  a  suspension  of  hostilities. 

The  inquiry  now  becomes  important.  What  information  had 
General  Dearborn  received  by  the  Adjutant-General,  which 
could  have  afforded  even  a  shadow  of  colour  for  the  measures  he 


94 

adopted  ?  This  information  was  communicated  by  him,  to  ike 
Secretary  of  War,  and  in  the  Secretary's  letter  to  me,  has  been 
recited  in  the  former  number  ;  and  it  is  so  important  it  should 
be  perfectly  understood,  that  I  will  here  again  repeat  the  sub- 
stance of  it — He  says,  that  General  Deai  born  has  communicated 
an  arrangement,  by  which  it  was  agreed  between  him  and  Sir 
George  Prevost,  that  offensive  operations  should  be  suspended, 
until  the  determination  of  the  government  should  be  made  known 
to  him,  on  certain  information,  presumed  by  General  Dearborn, 
to  be  contained  in  a  dispatch  transmitted  by  Sir  George  Prevost, 
to  Mr.  Baker  late  Secretary  of  Legation  to  his  Brittanic  Ma- 
jesty in  this  city. 

The  Secretary,  further  says  that  he  was  further  instructed  by 
the  President  to  inform  me,  that  no  communication*  such  as  was 
supposed  by  General  Dearborn*  might  have  been  transmitted*  has 
been  made  to  this  government.  This  letter,  which  was  presumed 
to  contain  the  information,  was  not  addressed  to  General  Dear- 
born, but  to  Mr.  Baker,  at  Washington,  and  he  had  no  other 
grounds  for  consenting  to  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  than  a  bare 
presumption,  that  it  might  contain  something  which  might  ren- 
der such  a  measure  proper.  The  grounds  even  of  this  presump- 
tion could  have  been  nothing  more,  than  his  conversation  with 
the  Adjutant-General,  and  the  sight  of  this  sealed  despatch  to 
Mr-  Baker,  which  he  was  requested  to  send  to  the  Secretary  of 
State,  to  be  delivered  according  to  his  discretion.  I  now  ask 
you  to  imagine  a  reason,  why  he  did  not  wait  for  the  orders  of 
the  government,  before  he  made  an  agreement,  which  was  so 
important  in  its  consequences  ? 

In  my  next  number  I  shall  consider  the  effect,  which  it  had 
on  my  situation. 


No.  XXIV. 


The  motives  of  Sir  George  Prevost,  in  sending  his  Adjutant- 
General  to  the  head-quarters  of  General  Dearborn,  at  this  time, 
I  think,  must  be  evident  from  the  statement  of  facts  in  the  pre- 


95 

ceding  numbers,  and  from  considerations,  which  I  shall  now  of- 
fer. At  this  time,  no  part  of  the  enemy's  country  was  invaded, 
excepting  by  the  forces  from  Detroit,  under  my  command.  To 
repel  this  invasion,  must  have  been  a  desirable  object  of  the 
commander-in-chief  of  fhe  British  army.  He  could  not  with- 
draw his  forces  from  the  east  part  of  Upper  Canada,  consistently 
with  the  safety  of  his  posts,  at  Fort  Erie,  Fort  George,  Kingston 
and  Montreal,  because  he  well  knew  General  Dearborn  had  col- 
lected, and  was  collecting  troops,  opposite  to  those  stations. 
He  therefore  found  it  necessary  to  devise  some  plan,  by  which 
his  troops,  on  those  stations  might  be  withdrawn,  and  employed 
under  the  command  of  General  Brock,  for  the  support  of  Mai- 
den, and  the  protection  of  the  part  of  the  provii  ce  invaded,  and 
in  a  manner  consistently  with  the  safety  of  the  posts  which  have 
been  mentioned.  The  stratagem,  which  has  here  been  describ- 
ed, was  formed  by  the  enemy,  and  assented  to  by  General  Dear- 
born, and  its  success  was  complete.  He  was  induced  to  enter 
into  an  agreement  that  his  troops  should  only  act  on  the  defen- 
sive, at  those  stations,  from  which  General  Brock  wished  to 
withdraw  his  troops,  and  indeed  which  extended  to  the  whole 
frontier,  excepting  where  the  invasion  was  made. 

In  pursuance  of  this  plan,  all  the  forces  were  withdrawn  from 
the  stations  I  have  mentioned,  excepting  a  few  invalid  soldiers 
to  take  care  of  the  fortifications,  cannon,  &c>  These  forces, 
with  the  militia  of  the  province,  anil  all  the  savages  which  could 
be  collected,  were  immediately  transported  by  water,  over  the 
lakes  to  Maiden  and  Sandwich,  under  the  command  of  General 
Brock,  as  re-enforcements  to  the  enemy's  army  at  those  stations. 
General  Brock  arrived  at  Maiden  on  the  14th  of  August,  during 
the  suspension  of  hostilities  below,  and  on  the  15th  marched  to 
Sandwich  opposite  to  Detroit,  from  which  place  I  had  retreated, 
for  the  reasons  stated  in  the  former  numbers  of  these  memoirs. 
About  12  o'clock  on  the  15th,  I  received  a  letter  from  General 
Brock,  by  Lieut.  Colonel  McDonnell,  and  Major  Gregg,  of  the 
British  army,  who  came  under  the  sanction  of  a  flag  of  truce. 

"  Head  Quarters,  Sandwich,  August  15,  1812. 
Sir— The  force  at  my  disposal  authorizes  me  to  require  of 
you  the  immediate  surrender  of  Fort  Detroit;  it  is  far  from  my 
inclination  to  join  in  a  war  of  extermination;  but  you  must  be 


96 

aware  that  the  numerous  body  of  Indians,  who  have  attached 
themselves  to  my  troops,  will  be  beyond  my  controul  the  moment 
tlie  contest  commences;  you  will  find  me  disposed  to  enter  into 
such  conditions  as  w;.ll  satisfy  the  most  scrupulous  sense  of 
honour.  Lieut-Colonel  McDonnell  and  Major  Gregg,  are  fully 
authorized  to  conclude  any  arrangement  that  may  prevent  the 
unnecessary  effusion  of  blood.  I  have  the  honour  to  be  your 
obedient  servant. 

[His  Excellency,  Brigadier  General  Hutt,  commanding  at 
Fort  Detroit. 

Signed  ISAAC  BROCK,  Major  General, 

commanding  his  Brittanic  Majesty's  forces,  Upper  Canada." 

To  this  letter,  I  immediately  returned  the  following  answer. 

"Head  Quarters,  Detroit,  August  15,  1812. 
Sir — I  have  no  other  reply  to  make,  than  to  inform  you  that 
I  am  prepared  to  meet  any  force  which  maybe  at  your  disposal, 
and  any  consequences  which  may  result  from  an  exertion  of  it, 
you  may  think  proper  to  make.     I  am,  &c. 

His  Excellency,  Major  General  Brock,  commanding  his  Brit- 
tanic Majesty's  forces,  Sandwich,  Upper  Canada. 

Signed  WILLIAM  HULL,  Brig.  General, 

commanding  the  North  Western  army  of  the  United  States." 

This  letter  was  the  first  information  that  I  received  of  the  ar- 
rival of  General  Brock,  with  the  forces  from  Fort  Erie,  Fort 
George,  and  the  other  stations  on  the  east  part  of  Upper  Cana- 
da. Indeed  it  was  hardly  possible  for  me  to  have  received  the 
information,  as  he  came  by  water  with  his  re-enforcements,  and 
had  the  exclusive  command  of  the  lake. 

By  my  former  numbers,  it  appears,  that  before  I  recrossed  the 
river,  I  had  received  letters  from  Generals  Hall  and  Porter, 
who  commanded  the  American  forces  on  the  Niagara  river,  that 
the  British  forces  had  moved  from  their  stations  on  that  river, 
and  the  east  part  of  the  province,  and  were  passing  over  lakes 
Erie  and  Ontario,  towards  Maiden.  In  those  numbers,  I  like- 
wise stated  how  mysterious  this  information  was.  The  arrival 
of  General  Brock,  with  the  forces,  still  added  to  the  mystery. 
It  will  be  remembered,  that  I  had  received  no  information  from 


97 

General  Dearborn,  or  from  any  other  quarter  of  the  suspension 
of  hostilities ;  and  I  knew  that  a  large  American  force  had  as- 
sembled, and  was  assembling  on  the  Niagara  river,  directly  op- 
posite to  the  British  posts.  It  was  likewise  well  known  to  me, 
that  that  part  of  the  province  was  of  much  more  importance  to 
the  British  interest  than  Maiden,  and  the  territory  on  the  De- 
troit river  and  its  vicinity.  It  appeared  to  me  certain,  that  the 
British  forces  could  not  have  been  withdrawn  from  those  stations, 
without  exposing  them  to  an  invasion,  and  to  be  taken  posses- 
sion of  by  General  Dearborn's  forces  on  the  Niagara  river,  di- 
rectly opposite  to  them,  and  only  separated  by  the  river.  I  ask 
you,  my  fellow  citizens,  to  reflect  on  my  situation,  and  con- 
sider for  a  moment,  the  embarrassments  at  this  time  occasioned 
to  my  army. 

General  Brock  was  not  only  the  Major  General  of  the  army, 
but  the  Acting  Governour  of  the  province.  Could  I  have  be- 
lieved that  the  Governour  of  the  province  would  have  left  the 
most  important  part  of  it,  without  the  means  of  defence,  expos- 
ed in  the  manner  I  have  stated,  and  liable  to  be  invaded,  and 
possessed  by  the  American  forces  ?  Such  an  event  would  have 
been  the  most  disastrous  of  any  which  could  have  happened  to 
him.  By  possessing  both  sides  of  the  Niagara  river,^we  should 
have  commanded  the  water  communication  to  Maiden,  and  the 
whole  country  above,  which  was  the  only  communication  on 
which  that  post,  St.  Joseph's  on  lake  Huron,  and  indeed  the 
whole  North  West  Company  depended  for  supplies.  Had  we 
therefore  taken  possession  of  Fort  Erie,  Fort  George,  and  the 
other  posts  on  the  Niagara  river,  their  communication  would 
have  been  obstructed,  and  they  must  have  perished  for  the  want 
of  the  means  of  subsistence.  I  again  ask,  on  what  grounds  I 
could  have  possibly  conceived,  that  General  Brock  had  left  that 
vital  part  of  his  province,  and  drawn  his  troops  from  situations 
on  whose  protection  their  very  existence  depended.  Had  it 
been  possible  for  me  to  have  imagined  the  case,  which  actually 
existed,  that  General  Dearborn  had  agreed  to  a  suspension  of 
hostilities,  I  should  have  believed  it  certain,  that  he  would  have 
stipulated,  that  all  the  troops,  which  were  parties  to  it,  should 
remain  in  the  same  situation,  they  were,  at  the  time  it  was  made, 
and  expressly,  that  none  bound  by  the  armistice  should  be  em- 
ployed, against  those  which  were  not  included  in  it.  If  he  had 
13 


98 

possessed  any  knowledge  of  his  duty,  he  would  have  known 
this  to  have  been  the  invariable  practice  in  similar  cases.  But 
in  fact,  1  did  not  even  imagine,  that  it  was  possible  a  measure 
so  fraught  with  the  certain  destruction  of  my  army  could  have 
been  adopted  by  him. 

But  so  it  was,  and  almost  all  the  enemy's  most  important 
posts  were  perfectly  safe,  when  only  guarded  by  a  few  invalids, 
to  take  care  of  the  barracks,  &c.  The  Secretary  of  War,  it 
will  be  seen  by  his  letter  referred  to  in  a  former  memoir,  stated, 
that  by  General  Dearborn's  letter  to  him,  the  General  had  in- 
formed me  of  the  measure,  and  had  proposed  a  similar  one  to 
my  concurrence.  If  it  were  sent,  it  only  reached  me  before  the 
capitulation  from  the  mouths  of  General  Brock's  cannon  ;  after 
that  event,  he,  (General  Brock)  informed  me  that  it  had  taken 
place  at  Niagara,  and  all  the  other  posts  below  were  embraced 
in  it.  Perhaps  it  may  be  asked,  when  I  perceived  the  forces  of 
the  enemy,  of  all  descriptions  concentrating  and  bearing  upon 
me  from  every  quarter,  why  I  did  not  retreat  from  Detroit,  and 
save  my  army  from  capture  ?  as  I  wish  to  answer  every  inquiry, 
and,  if  possible,  remove  everv  doubt,  with  respect  to  the  pro- 
priety of  my  conduct,  I  will  here  state  the  reasons.  To  those 
who  are  unacquainted  with  the  situation  of  the  country,  this 
would  probably  be  a  natural  inquiry.  In  the  manner  in  which, 
these  memoirs  are  published,  I  cannot  present  a  map  of  the  coun- 
try which  was  the  scene  of  my  operations.  I  fear  it  will  be  diffi- 
cult to  describe  it  in  such  a  way  that  it  will  be  perfectly  under- 
stood. I  must  ask  you  in  this  case  to  examine  some  general 
maps  of  the  country,  from  Detroit  to  the  foot  of  the  rapids  of 
the  Miami  of  lake  Erie.  The  distance  is  about  seventy  miles. 
The  only  road  through  which  I  could  have  retreated,  runs  from 
Detroit  as  far  as  Brownstown,  on  the  banks  of  the  Detroit  river, 
about  twenty  miles  ;  and  from  Brownstown  to  the  foot  of  the 
rapids,  about  fifty  miles ;  in  some  places  on,  and  in  others  near 
the  borders  of  lake  Erie.  This  road  was  very  difficult  to  pass, 
a  great  part  of  it  being  through  a  wilderness,  and  had  only  been 
opened  by  my  army,  when  advancing  to  Detroit.  Its  course, 
for  seventy  miles  being  on  the  margin  of  a  navigable  river,  and 
the  lake  and  General  Biock  with  his  army  being  opposite  to 
Detroit,  with  a  number  of  armed  vessels,  gun-boats,  and  a  suf- 
ficient number  of  flats  to  move  his  troops  on  the  water,  would 


99 

have  had  such  an  advantage  in  attacking  a  retreating  army,  es- 
pecially when  aided  by  his  numerous  tribes  of  savages,  that  I 
then  thought  and  I  now  think,  that  an  attempt  of  the  kind  would 
have  resulted  in  the  total  destruction  of  the  army.  With  his 
boats,  protected  by  his  armed  vessels  and  gun -boats,  his  troops 
might  have  been  moved  on  those  smooth  waters  with  the  greatest 
celerity,  and  landed  in  the  front,  rear,  or  on  the  flank,  and  har- 
rassed  my  march  in  such  a  manner  that  it  would  have  been  im- 
possible to  have  effected  it ;  besides  we  must  have  encountered 
the  difficulty  of  passing  a  numb  ^r  of  rivers  without  boats,  and 
over  which  there  were  no  bridges.  The  only  places  where  some 
of  these  rivers  could  have  been  crossed,  were  near  the  naviga- 
ble waters  commanded  by  the  enemy's  naval  armament,  and  no 
boats  could  have  been  provided  for  the  purpose.  There  would 
have  been  no  other  mode  of  effecting  the  passage,  but  by  swim- 
ming or  constructing  rafts,  in  the  face  of  the  enemy.  Situated 
as  I  was,  after  the  arrival  of  General  Brock  with  the  re-enforce- 
ments, I  think  you  must  be  satisfied,  that  nothing  could  have 
justified  an  attempt  of  this  kind,  especially  when  the  nature  of 
the  country,  and  the  character  of  the  enemy,  which  would  have 
assailed  my  arm v  during  this  long  march,  is  considered.  The 
reasons  which  prevented  me  from  retreating  and  taking  a  posi- 
tion at  the  Miami,  immediately  after  recrossing  the  Detroit  river? 
have  been  stated  in  a  former  number  of  these  memoirs.  I  pre- 
sume this  will  be  considered  as  a  satisfactory  answer  to  the  in- 
quiry. 

In  my  next  number,  I  shall  proceed  to  a  consideration  of  my 
situation. at  Detroit  on  the  15th  of  August,  when  I  received 
General  Brock's  letter,  and  the  position,  and  numbers  of  the 
enemy ;  after  which  I  shall  state  the  reasons  which  induced  me 
to  agree  to  the  capitulation  on  the  16th.  Before,  however,  I 
close  this  number,  I  must  ask  your  indulgence,  my  fellow  citi- 
zens, in  making  such  observations  and  reflections  as  will  natu- 
rally arise  from  the  facts  and  documents  which  have  been  pre- 
sented in  the  last  numbers  of  these  memoirs  in  relation  to  the 
conduct  of  General  Dearborn. 

After  considering  the  facts  and  evidence  which  has  been  ad- 
duced to  prove  them,  I  ask  who  has  been  guilty  of  the  vile  and 
base  charges  which  have  been  imputed  to  me  ?  Who  has  been 
guilty    of  unofficer-like  conduct  ?    If  /  had  been  in  General 


100 

Dearborn's  situation,  and  he  had  been  in  mine,  and  /  had  re- 
ceived the  same  orders  from  the  government  which  it  has  been 
proved  he  received,  respecting  the  invasion  of  Canada,  would 
you  not  have  had  a  right  to  have  said  that  /  had  been  guilty  of 
unofficer-like  conduct  ?  If  thus  situated,  /  had  received  the 
same  orders  he  repeatedly  received,  to  make  diversions  in  the 
enemy's  country,  to  attack  their  posts  and  to  co-operate  with 
him,  I  had  not  only  neglected  to  obey  these  orders,  but  had 
agreed  to  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  from  which  his  army  was 
excluded,  1  ask  you  whether  1  could  have  complained  of  the 
vile  charge  of  cowardice  being  imputed  to  me  ?  If  further,  /had 
agreed  to  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  in  the  manner  and  under 
the  circumstances  General  Dearborn  did,  whether  it  would  not 
have  afforded  some  colour  to  have  supposed  it  was  with  treason- 
able views  ?  I  wish  it  to  be  distinctly  understood,  that  I  im- 
pute nothing;  criminal  to  him,  and  have  made  these  reflections 
with  no  other  view  but  to  exhibit  in  a  strong  light,  that  there 
was  not  the  least  foundation  for  criminal  charges  against  me. 

For  the  present,  I  shall  take  a  farewell  of  him,  and  if  the 
facts  and  documents  which  have  been  presented  shall  cause  any 
unpleasant  sensations  in  his  mind,  I  regret  that  I  can  offer  no 
balm  to  cure  the  stings  and  wounds  which  his  own  reflections 
must  inflict. 

Before  these  memoirs  are  eaded,  he  will  again  be  introduced, 
as  President  of  the  Court  Martial  before  which  I  was  tried,  and 
his  conduct  in  that  character  will  be  particularly  examined. 

As  you,  my  fellow  citizens,  are  the  legitimate  and  final  tri- 
bunal, if  you  are  satisfied  that  the  facts  which  have  been  here 
stated,  are  proved  by  the  evidence  which  has  been  offered,  and 
that  the  measures  he  adopted  were  the  cause  of  the  misfortunes 
of  the  campaign,  and  the  disasters  which  attended  the  army  I 
commanded,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  on  account  of  his  age,  his  respect- 
able connections,  and  his  revolutionary  services,  your  clemency 
will  be  exercised,  and  the  punishment  which  would  be  justly 
due  to  such  conduct  will  be  remitted. 

For  the  same  reasons  here  expressed  recommending  him  to 
your  mercy,  in  a  former  number,  I  stated,  that  it  would  have 
been  a  happy  consideration,  had  it  been  in  my  power  to  have 
exhibited  the  truth  in  vindication  of  my  own  honour,  without 
any  impeachment  of  his  character. 


101 


No.  XXV. 

A  knowledge  of  the  number,  and  character  of  the  enemy's 
forces,  at  the  time  of  the  capitulation,  and  likewise  of  those  un- 
der my  command,  is  so  important  in  forming  a  correct  opinion 
that  I  shall  ask  your  very  particular  attention  to  an  examination 
of  both  these  subjects. 

Before  I  proceed  to  offer  you  the  evidence  of  them,  it  is  a  du- 
ty which  I  owe  to  you,  and  to  myself,  to  state  particularly  the 
reasons  why  this  evidence  was  not  presented  to  the  Court  Mar- 
tiai,  and  why  it  has  not  before  been  presented  to  you  ;  and  like- 
wise, why  it  will  not  be  in  my  power,  even  at  this  time,  to 
spread  before  you,  the  whole  which  existed  in  the  case. 

The  same  causes  have  prevented  me  from  giving  a  more  min- 
ute detail  of  the  transactions  and  events  of  the  campaign.  The 
reasons  are  the  unfortunate  loss  of  my  papers,  both  of  a  public 
and  private  nature.  A  part  of  them  were  taken  in  the  Cayahoga 
packet,  the  particular  circumstances  of  which  have  been  related 
in  my  trial. 

After  the  capitulation,  I  left  Detroit,  a  prisoner,  not  knowing 
my  place  of  destination.  One  of  my  daughters  was  with  me, 
and  expected  in  a  few  days  to  return  to  my  residence  in  Massa- 
chusetts. As  I  should  have  no  occasion  for  these  papers  while 
a  prisoner,  I  thought  it  advisable,  to  pack  them  in  trunks  and 
commit  them  to  her  care,  to  be  carried  to  my  home,  at  the  place 
where  I  now  reside. 

A  short  time  after,  my  daughter  passed  lake  Erie  in  a  British 
vessel,  and  arriving  near  Buffalo  in  the  evening,  she  was  put  on 
shore  at  that  place,  with  an  assurance  from  the  captain  of  the 
vessel,  that  her  trunks,  &c.  should  be  sent  to  her  the  next  morn- 
ing. In  the  course  of  that  night,  the  vessel  was  attacked  by  a 
party  of  our  sailors,  under  the  command  of  Captain  Elliot,  and 
in  the  contest  was  burnt.  By  this  event,  all  these  papers  were 
destroyed. 

The  most  material  of  these  documents,  were  copies  of  all  the 
orders  I  had  issued  to  the  army,  from  the  day  I  took  command 
of  it,  to  the  time  of  the  capitulation.  All  the  returns  and  daily 
reports,  which  were  made  to  me.    The  letters  which  I  had  re- 


ceived  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  the  Governours  of  Ohio 
and  Kentucky.  Copies  of  all  the  communications  which  1  had 
made  to  these  officers  and  many  others  ;  likewise  a  daily  journal 
of  (he  operations  of  the  army,  and  the  events  which  took  place 
during  the  period  above  mentioned ;  likewise  the  information  I 
had  received  of  the  numbers  and  movements  of  the  enemy  dur- 
ing the  campaign. 

At  my  trial  before  the  Court  Martial,  I  had  no  other  docu- 
mentary evidence,  excepting  what  the  administration  was  will- 
ing to  furnish  from  the  records  of  the  government.  Some  pa- 
pers which  were  necessary  to  exhibit  a  true  state  of  facts,  could 
not  be  found  on  the  files  and  records  of  the  public  offices.  After 
my  trial,  as  I  have  before  remarked,  I  applied  for  a  cepy  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  Court  Martial,  and  all  the  documents  relat- 
ing to  the  compaign,  and  could  not  obtain  them.  Lately,  Mr. 
Calhoun,  as  I  have  before  stated,  has  furnished  me  with  c<.j:ies 
of  all  the  documents  which  can  be  found  in  the  War  Office. 
Many  very  important  papers  now,  which  ought  to  be  on  the  files 
and  records  of  the  government,  cannot  be  found  ;  even  one  of 
so  important  a  nature  as  the  armistice,  entered  into  by  General 
Dearborn,  cannot  be  obtained.  This  fact  is  certified  by  the 
present  Secretary  of  War,  in  his  letter  to  me,  which  has  been 
published  in  a  former  number.  My  orders  to  the  army,  daily 
journal,  reports,  and  letters,  giving  me  accounts  of  the  numbers 
and  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  many  other  important  docu- 
ments are  irreparable  losses. 

The  destruction  of  this  vessel  is  a  subject  of  public  notority, 
and  were  it  necessary,  the  testimony  of  my  daughter,  and  others 
who  assisted  in  packing  the  papers,  and  who  well  knew  the  con- 
tents of  them,  might  be  here  added.  I  will  not  encumber  these 
numbers,  at  present,  with  this  evidence.  If  the  truth  of  these 
facts  shall  be  doubted  by  any  reader,  the  evidence  shall  be  pub- 
lished.       • 

Some  of  the  Adjutants  preserved  their  orderly  books,  and  I  re- 
quested the  Judge  Advocate  to  direct  them,  when  they  were 
summoned  as  witnesses,  to  produce  them.  They  however, 
either  forgot  them,  or  did  not  incline  to  present  them  to  the 
Court. 

I  will  here  recite  the  circumstances  of  another  important  doc- 
ument which  I  could  not  obtain,  at  the  time  of  my  trial,  which 


103 

has  been  referred  to  in  a  former  number,  and  I  will  copy  from 
my  defence,  the  statement  and  evidence  which  I  offered  to  the 
court  martial,  respecting  it. 

"A  few  days  after  I  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the 
North  Western  Army,  I  presented  another  memorial  to  the 
President,  through  the  war  department,  in  vhich  I  was  explicit 
as  to  what  might  be  expected  from  such  a  force  as  I  was  to  lead  ; 
as  to  the  necessity  of  re  enforcements ;  of  our  commanding  the 
lake ;  and,  of  a  co-operation  in  other  quarters. 

"My  draft  of  this  memorial  I  have  lost,  in  the  way  I  shall 
hereafter  explain.  The  existence  of  the  original  and  its  gener- 
al purport,  is  proved  by  Mr.  Eustis,  who  in  his  answer  to  the 
6th  and  7th  interrogations  addressed  to  him,  says,  4 1  have  a 
perfect  recollection  of  your  having  presented  the  memorial  re- 
ferred to  in  the  interrogatory.'  'I  recollect,'  he  adds,  'your 
attendance  by  appointment,  at  the  War  Office.  The  memorial 
or  that  part  of  it  which  related  to  the  naval  defence  of  lake  Erie, 
was  referred  or  communicated,  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
who  was  present.  The  brig  Adams,  which  had  been  employed 
as  a  transport,  under  direction  of  the  war  department,  became, 
the  subject  of  conversation.  Whether  she  was  (being  then  on 
the  stocks  repairing)  actually  transferred  to  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment, I  do  not  distinctly  recollect.  If  that  was  the  case,  the 
evidence  is  on  record.'  Yet  this  memorial,  or  a  copy  of  it,  I 
have  never  been  able  to  obtain. 

"I  have  applied  for  it  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  he  referred 
me  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  ;  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to 
Mr  Dallas,  [who  was  then  employed  by  the  administration  in 
the  prosecution  against  me  ;]  to  him  I  applied,  and  he  referred 
me  to  the  present  Judge  Advocate,  who  knows  nothing  of  it. 
And  finally  when  my  trial  commenced,  I  addressed  a  letter  to 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  requesting  him  to  interfere 
his  authority  to  procure  me  a  document,  which  I  considered  so 
important  in  my  defence.  It  was,  sir,  too  much  for  me  to  have 
expected  an  answer  from  the  President  himself,  though  the  time 
has  been,  when  such  an  answer  would  not  have  been  considered 
as  conferring  too  great  an  honour.  The  President  referred  my 
letter  to  the  gentlemen  at  the  head  of  the  War  and  Navy  De- 
partments. They  also  would  not  condescend  to  answer  my 
letter,  but  handed  it  over  to  their  clerks.     I  ask,  would  it  not 


104 

have  comported  with  the  importance  of  the  occasion,  the  deco- 
rum due  an  old  man  and  a  veteran  soldier,  not  jet  convicted  of 
any  crime,  for  the  Secretaries  themselves  to  have  addressed 
me  ?  But  in  answer  to  my  letter,  I  received  a  letter  from  the 
chief  clerk  in  the  War  Office,  dated  the  12th  of  February,  1814; 
with  a  certificate  from  the  chief  clerk  in  the  Navy  Department. 
The  letter  from  the  War  Office,  is  in  the  following  words  : 

"  War  Office,  February  12th,  1814. 
SIR, — Your  letter  of  the  1st  inst.  addressed  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  has  been  referred  to  me.  In  answer 
to  which  I  have  the  honour  to  state,  that  all  your  communica- 
tions to  the  War  Department,  after  you  were  appointed  Briga- 
dier General  in  the  army,  have  been  transmitted  to  P.  S.  Par- 
ker, Esq.  Judge  Advocate  of  the  Court  Martial,  now  sitting  at 
Albany,  together  with  such  others  as  you  had  required,  as  far 
as  they  could  be  found  on  the  files  of  this  office.  The  public 
records  of  papers  of  the  War  Department  have  been  constantly 
within  my  observation  and  charge  for  several  vears  past,  and  I 
assure  you,  Sir,  I  have  never  seen  or  heard  of  a  memoir  pointing 
out  the  necessity  of  a  navy  on  lake  Erie.  Since  the  receipt  of 
your  letter,  I  have  carefully  examined  the  files,  and  enquired  of 
every  gentleman  attached  to  the  department  without  being  able 
to  give  any  information  on  the  subject. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 

Sir,  very  respectfully, 

Your  O'bt.  servant, 

DANIEL  PARKER,  C.  C. 
Brig.  Gen.  Wm.  Hull,  Albany. 

"  It  is  unaccountable,  that  a  public  document  of  this  nature 
should  be  lost.  That  it  did  exist,  and  was  on  the  files  of  the 
war  office,  is  proved  beyond  controversy,  by  the  deposition  of 
the  late  Secretary  of  War,  who  declares  that  he  has  &  perfect  re- 
collection of  it.  But  a  most  extraordinary  part  of  this  letter 
from  the  War  Department,  is  that  which  states,  that  the  writer 
has  had  the  public  records,  and  papers  of  the  Wrar  Department 
constantly  under  his  charge  and  observation  for  several  years 
past;  yet,  that  he  never  knew  or  heard  of  a  memorial,  pointing 
out  the  necessity  of  a  navy  on  lake  Erie.      It  is  a  fact  hardly  to 


105 

be  creditted,  that  a  copy  of  the  memorial  of  the  6th  of  Marchj 
1812,  from  which  I  made  that  copy  which  I  have  just  read  to 
the  court,  is  certified  as  a  true  copy  from  the  files  of  the  War 
Office,  by  the  very  gentleman,  who  writes  me  the  letter  of  the 
12th  of  February.  Let  me  quote  from  the  memorial  of  the  6th 
of  March,  or  rather  from  the  copy  certified  as  I  have  mentioned 
above,  a  passage  which  is  in  the  following  words : 

'If,  sir,  we  cannot  command  the  ocean,  we  can  command  the 
inland  lakes  of  our  country.  I  have  always  been  of  opinion  that 
we  ought  to  have  built  as  raany  armed  vessels  on  the  lakes  as 
would  have  commanded  them.  We  have  more  interest  in  them 
than  th  British  nation,  and  can  build  vessels  with  more  con- 
venience.' 

"When  the  writer  of  the  letter  had  certified  a  copy  of  this 
memorial  but  a  few  days  before,  how  could  he  say,  that  he  nev- 
er knew  or  heard  of  a  memorial,  (from  me  to  the  government) 
pointing  out  the  necessity  of  a  navy  on  lake  Erie  ?" 

I  shall  more  particularly  feel  the  loss  of  the  documents  which 
were  destroyed  in  the  vessel,  in  a  future  paper,  in  which  I  shall 
state  the  number  of  the  effective  force,  under  my  controul,  at 
the  time  of  the  capitulation.  Perhaps  you  may  think  it  an  in- 
trusion, and  I  certainly  feel  a  degree  of  humiliation,  in  asking 
your  attention,  one  moment  to  my  private  losses,  and  my  pri- 
vate misfortunes,  as  respects,  property.  This  I  should  not  do, 
had  it  not  been  rumoured,  and  probably  believed  by  some,  that 
I  had  been  influenced  by  the  base  and  grovelling  motives  of 
self-interest,  in  the  measures  I  agreed  to,  as  the  commanding 
General  of  my  country's  forces.  The  bare  mention  of  the  sub- 
ject excites  the  most  indignant  feelings,  and  I  believe  no  just 
and  honourable  man,  wao  ever  knew  me,  for  a  moment  enter- 
tained an  opinion  of  the  kind.  In  the  year  1805  when  I  accept- 
ed the  office  of  Governour  of  the  territory  of  Michigan,  I  dis- 
posed of  all  my  property  in  Massachusetts,  excepting  the  farm 
on  which  I  now  live,  which  I  hold  in  right  of  my  wife.  Af- 
ter paying  my  debts,  a  considerable  sum  remained  This  was 
transferred  to  the  Michigan  territory.  Before  my  arrival,  the 
town  of  Detroit  was  burnt,  with  all  the  public  buildings,  in  one  of 
which  I  was  to  have  resided.  For  my  accommodation  I  was  oblig- 
ed to  build  a  house,  and  engage  mechanics  in  this  part  of  the 
country.  Under  the  circumstances  of  the  territory,  comfortable 
14 


106 

accommodations  were  provided  at  very  great  expense.  All  the 
property  which  I  possessed,  ex:epting  the  farm  I  have  mention- 
ed, was  vested  in  that  country.  All  this  property  I  have  since 
sold,  and  the  proceeds  of  it,  have  not  been  one  third  part  as 
much  as  I  carried  to  the  country. 

During  my  command  of  the  North  Western  army,  no  military 
chest  was  furnished,  and  I  never  received  one  dollar  from  the 
government  to  defray  the  necessary  contingent  expenses  of  the 
army.  The  Secretary  of  War,  placed  in  the  bank  of  Pittsburg, 
ten  thousand  dollars  to  my  credit,  for  defraying  these  expenses, 
and  gave  me  notice  accordingly.  At  that  time  there  was  little 
or  no  communication  between  Pittsburg  and  Detroit,  and  I  could 
not  obtain  money  for  bills  on  that  Bank.  I  made  use  of  my 
own  money  and  credit  to  defray  those  necessary  expenses  to  the 
amount  of  sixteen  hundred  dollars,  on  the  credit  of  the  ten  thou- 
sand, which  was  thus  deposited.  For  this  sixteen  hundred  dol- 
lars, I  took  regular  vouchers,  which  were  with  my  other  papers, 
and  were  lost  in  the  vessel,  as  before  stated.  As  soon  as  the 
administration,  received  information  of  the  capitulation,  the 
whole  of^his  ten  thousand  dollars  was  withdrawn  from  the 
bank,  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  I  never  have  received  the 
sixteen  hundred  dollars  or  any  part  of  it,  which  I  disbursed  for 
the  public,  to  defray  these  necessary  expenses.  I  have  present- 
ed my  account,  and  evidence  to  show,  the  once  existence  of  the 
vouchers,  and  the  manner  in  which  they  were  lost.  The  ob- 
jection to  an  allowance  of  the  claim,  by  the  auditor  is,  that  as  I 
am  not  a  public  defaulter,  and  owe  the  government  nothing,  he 
is  not  authorized  to  hear  the  evidence,  with  respect  to  the  los* 
of  the  vouchers,  as  the  government  will  have  money  to  pay,  pro- 
vided the  account  were  allowed.  But  if  on  the  other  hand  I 
had  been  a  public  defaulter,  the  auditor  in  that  case  would  be 
authorized  to  cancel  the  demand  of  the  government,  on  being 
satisfied  with  the  loss  of  my  vouchers. 

I  do  not  now  possess  more  property  than  is  sufficient  to  pay 
my  just  debts,  excepting  the  farm  on  which  I  live,  which  as  I 
before  observed,  I  hold  in  the  right  of  my  wife.  And  I  can  say 
with  truth,  had  I  not  been  so  fortunate  as  to  have  lived  among 
friends,  ami  experienced  their  generosity,  it  would  have  been 
impossible  l*r  me,  on  my  form,  at  my  age,  for  twelve  years  past* 
to  have  supported  my  tamily,  with  common  decency. 


107 

1  have  made  this  statement  to  satisfy  you  how  much  I  have 
been  injured,  and  to  repel  the  base  and  wicked  insinuations, 
which  have  been  more  than  rumoured  against  me.  It  will  be 
easy  for  me  to  produce  evidence  of  all  these  facts,  if  any  one 
desires  it. 

It  is  only  necessary  to  look  at  the  newspapers  of  that  day,  to 
prove  the  pains  which  were  taken  to  excite  your  prejudices 
against  me. 

Every  skipper  of  a  boat,  every  unprincipled  adventurer,  and 
follower  of  the  army,  who  was  at  Detroit,  and  every  drunken 
soldier  who  was  returning  home,  were  placed  in  requisition,  and 
taken  before  magistrates,  and  oaths  were  prepared  for  them, 
with  respect  to  the  number  of  my  army,  and  the  number  of  the 
enemy,  and  the  boxes  of  gold,  which  were  carried  to  my  house, 
as  the  consideration  for  the  capitulation.  After  keeping  me 
nearly  two  years  in  arrest,  and  during  that  time,  searching  for 
evidence  to  prove  the  charge  of  treason  against  me,  the  Court 
Martial  was  obliged,  as  not  the  faintest  colour  of  evidence  ap- 
peared, to  acquit  me  of  that  charge,  and  all  the  specifications 
under  it.  1  must  be  excused,  my  fellow  citizens,  for  this  di- 
gression, and  defer  the  evidence,  with  respect  to  General 
Brock's  force  to  my  next  number. 


No.  XXVI. 


Before  I  relate  the  events  of  the  16th  of  August,  1812,  and 
assign  the  reasons,  which  induced  me  to  agree  to  the  capitula- 
tion, I  will  ask  your  attention, — 

1st.  To  the  position  which  General  Brock  had  taken,  on  the 
15th,  with  his  army. 

2d.  To  the  number  and  character  of  the  forces,  which  were 
under  his  authority  and  controul,  which  were  in  suitable  situa- 
tions, and  might  have  immediately  been  ordered  to  re-enforce 
his  army,  with  the  most  perfect  safety  to  his  other  posts,  before 
it  would  have  been  possible  for  me  to  have  received  any  as- 
sistance. 

3d.  To  the  number  and  character  of  the  forces,  with  which 


108 

he  actually  invaded  our  territory  on  the  morning  of  the  16th  of 
August. 

With  respect  to  the  position  he  had  taken,  it  was  at  Sand- 
wich, on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river,  more  elevated  than  the 
fort  of  Detroit,  and  from  which,  with  his  cannon  and  mortars, 
he  could  throw  shot  and  shells  into  the  town  and  fort. 

With  respect  to  the  number  and  character  of  the  forces, 
which  were  under  his  authority  and  controul,  which  were  in 
suitable  situations,  immediately  to  re-enforce  his  army  before  I 
could  have  received  any  aid,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  he  was 
not  only  the  General  of  the  army,  but  the  acting  Governour  of 
Upper  Canada,  and  had  the  superintendence  and  direction  not 
only  of  the  numerous  tribes  of  Indians,  who  resided  in  the  Bri- 
tish dominions,  but  likewise  those  who  inhabited  our  territories, 
had  joined  his  standard.  Consequently  all  the  British  troops, 
in  the  different  stations,  at  fort  George,  York,  Kingston,  fort 
Erie,  and  Chippewa,  with  all  the  militia  of  the  province,  and  all 
the  Indian  warriours,  in  the  northern  and  western  region,  were 
subject  to  his  controul  and  authority. 

Jn  addition  to  these  sources  of  strength,  the  numerous  retain- 
ers of  the  wealthy  and  powerful  Northwest  Company,  were  call- 
ed from  their  stations,  and  hunting  grounds,  and  offered  their 
services,  after  the  fall  of  Michillimackanack,  in  the  reduction 
of  Detroit.  It  is  well  known,  there  are  more  than  three  thous- 
and men  employed  by  this  company,  and  that  their  supplies  are 
carried  over  lake  Erie,  and  pass  up  Detroit  river,  and  that  their 
existence  depended  on  keeping  open  that  communication.  And 
it  appears  by  Mr.  McKenzie's  letter,  one  of  the  principal 
agents  of  that  company,  which  has  been  recited,  that  they  were 
prepared,  with  numerous  hosts  of  savages,  to  proceed  against 
Detroit,  whenever  their  services  should  become  necessary.  It 
further  appears,  by  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  Gener- 
al Dearborn,  which  lias  been  recited,  that  the  savages  had  as- 
sembled on  the  road,  which  I  had  opened  from  Ohio,  and  had 
stopped  the  militia  which  were  escorting  provisions  to  Detroit. 
T  will  here  recite  an  extract  of  a  letter,  which  I  received  from 
Colonel  Anderson,  who  commanded  at  the  river  Raisin,  dated 
the  4th  of  August,  which  was  in  evidence  on  my  trial,  and  is  to 
be  found  in  the  20th  page  of  the  appendix. 

"I  am  doubtful  if  the  mail  is  not  taken,  but  I  hope  not.     I  do 


109 

ail  in  my  power  to  keep  up  the  spirits  of  the  inhabitants?,  which 
is  all  but  exhausted.  There  is  forty  men  on  guard  and  patrole 
at  this  place,  and  ten  at  the  other  Creek,  and  will  continue  the 
same  until  further  orders.  We  are  short  of  ammunition,  if  at- 
tacked, please  to  keep  a  little  for  us,  if  possible.  I  understand 
by  good  authority,  that  numbers  of  Indians,  are  passing  on  the 
heads  of  this  river  (meaning  the  river  Raisin)  and  river  Huron, 
on  their  way  to  Maiden ;  and  T  think  if  some  plan  is  not  taken 
soon,  that  they  will  be  in  thousands  at  that  place  before  long, 

&c.  &c. 

(Signed)  JOHN  ANDERSON. 

P.  S.  In  behalf  of  the  inhabitants,  I  request  you  will  not  or- 
der away  any  of  the  people  from  this  place ;  for  we  are  too  few 
for  its  defence.  If  it  was  possible  to  be  succoured,  would  be 
best.  (Signed)  J.  A. 

This  letter  was  received  after  the  reduction  of  Chicago,  and 
it  appeared  that  the  Indians,  who  had  taken  that  fort,  with 
those  from  the  western  region,  were  marching  to  join  those  at 
Maiden. 

With  respect  to  the  British  troops,  militia,  and  savages  of  the 
province,  they  were  unnecessary  at  any  other  stations,  because 
the  armistice  entered  into  by  General  Dearborn  was  then,  and 
had  been  for  eight  days  in  operation.  General  Rrock  left  the 
vital  part  of  the  province,  where  General  Dearborn  had  estab- 
lished a  peace,  and  commanded  in  person  the  expedition  against 
Detroit.  He  was  a  Major  General  in  the  British  army,  and  had 
a  high  reputation  as  a  military  officer.  On  the  success  of  this 
enterprize,  not  only  his  military  fame,  but  the  protection  and 
safety  of  his  province  depended.  Having  these  sources,  and 
the  means  of  augmenting  his  army,  under  his  contrbul  and  au- 
thority, I  ask  you  whether  it  is  possible  for  you  to  believe,  that 
he  did  not  make  use  of  them,  and  assemble  and  order  under  his 
immediate  command,  before  he  made  the  invasion  of  our  terri- 
tory, a  force  competent  to  the  object?  At  this  time,  I  had  re- 
ceived no  information  of  the  armistice  ;  yet  I  had  received  in- 
formation from  Generals  Hall  and  Porter,  who  were  in  command 
on  the  Niagara  river,  that  all  the  forces  of  every  description 
from  the  east  part  of  the  province,  were  proceeding  to  Maiden. 

When,  therefore,  General  Brock  had  the  means  of  augment- 
ing his  army,  with  perfect  safety  to  the  other  parts  of  his  pro- 


110 

vince,  to  at  least  ten  times  the  number  of  those  under  my  com- 
mand, and  when  on  the  15th  he  appeared  on  the  bank  of  the 
river  at  Sandwich,  opposite  to  Detroit,  and  summoned  me  to 
surrender  the  Fort  of  Detroit,  and  not  only  declared  in  his  sum- 
mons, that  his  force  justified  him  in  making  the  demand,  but 
that  the  tribes  of  savages,  which  had  joined  his  standa>d,  were 
so  numerous,  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to  restrain 
them,  the  moment  the  contest  commenced.  1  ask  you,  fellow 
citizens,  whether  the  facts  here  stated,  did  not  afford  strmg 
reasons  for  me  to  believe,  that  his  forces  were  much  superiour 
to  mine,  and  competent  to  the  object,  which  he  had  in  view  ? 

To  this  summons,  I  however  gave  a  decided  answer,  that  I 
should  defend  the  fort ;  hoping  to  be  able,  before  he  m  de  the 
invasion,  to  collect  at  Detroit,  the  detachment  under  the  com- 
mand of  M'Arthur  and  Cass,  which  had  marched  to  the  river 
Raisin,  and  other  detachments,  which  were  absent  on  other  du- 
ties. And  I  now  again  ask  you,  whether  his  landing  with  his 
army  the  next  morning,  did  not  afford  additional  evidence  of 
the  competency  of  his  farce  ? 

The  moment  I  received  information  of  the  arrival  of  General 
Brock,  I  sent  orders  to  M'Arthur  and  Cass,  immediately  to  re- 
turn to  Detroit,  and  stated  the  reasons.  On  the  morning  of  the 
16th,  when  the  invasion  was  made,  I  had  received  no  informa- 
tion from  them.  The  route  they  marched,  as  1  have  before  ob- 
served, was  about  fifty  miles  through  a  wilderness.  1  hey  were 
sent  to  procure  the  mjans  of  subsistence,  for  my  army.  *To 
satisfy,  how  easy  he  might  have  increased  his  numbers,  I  refer 
you  to  the  testimony  of  Captain  Eastman,  of  the  4th  regiment, 
who  was  a  witness  in  behalf  of  the  administration;  "that  he  was 
at  Detroit,  and  says  that  fourteen  hundred  Indian  warriours,  ar- 
rived as  re -enforcements,  a  few  days  after  the  capitulation,  from 
two  stations  only,  viz.  Saganau  and  Michillimackanack."  The 
facts  and  circumstances  here  stated,  furnish  you  with  solid  ma- 
terials, to  form  a  general  estimate  of  the  force,  and  strength 
which  General  Brock,  at  this  time,  had  it  in  his  power  to  havo 
brought  against  me ;  and  I  believe  you  will  be  satisfied  that  he 
availed  himself  of  the  advantages  of  collecting  as  large  a  force, 
as  he  deemed  necessary  for  the  object. 

*  See  page  100  of  my  trial. 


Ill 

In  making  your  estimate  on  this  subject,  you  will  recollect, 
the  orders  General  Dearborn  had  received,  immediately  after 
the  declaration  of  war,  to  order  the  troops  under  his  command 
to  the  Niagara  river,  and  other  suitable  situations  for  the  inva- 
sion of  Upper  Canada,  and  he  was  likewise  ordered  only  to 
make  a  feint  against  Montreal,  and  not  even  a  feint  against 
Quebec.  Fort  George,  and  all  the  other  British  posts,  on  the 
east  part  of  Upper  Canada,  being  thus  threatened  with  invasion, 
and  Quebec  and  Montreal,  &c.  not  even  being  threatened,  it  re- 
quires no  evidence  to  prove,  that  the  principal  part  of  the  Brit- 
ish forces  were  drawn  from  those  lower  stations,  to  re-enforce 
and  support  those  which  were  irraanger. 

From  these  facts,  it  may  very  fairly  be  presumed,  that  the 
principal  part  of  the  British  forces  were  at  these  stations  on  the 
Niagara  river,  directly  opposite  to  General  Dearborn's  army 
and  only  separated  by  the  river.  Let  me  then  in  the  first  place 
ask  you,  after  peace  was  established  with  General  Dearborn,  ta 
make  your  estimate  of  the  British  force,  which  General  Brock 
might  with  the  most  perfect  safety,  have  carried  with  him  to 
Maiden? 

In  the  next  place,  the  population  of  Upper  Canada  at  that 
time,  was  about  one  hundred  thousand  inhabitants.  If  only 
every  tenth  inhabitant  was  on  the  militia,  the  number  would 
have  amounted  to  ten  thousand.  I  ask  you  to  consider,  under 
the  quiet  and  peaceable  circumstances  of  the  east  part  of  the 
province,  what  number  of  militia,  the  British  General  and  Gov- 
ernour,  might  have  taken  with  him  in  his  expedition  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  only  part  of  his  province  which  was  invaded? 

Being  the  superintendant  of  Indian  affairs,  within  the  British 
territcries,  and  the  numerous  tribes  of  savages  within  our  own 
country,  having  joined  the  British  standard,  I  ask  you  to  calcul- 
ate what  number  of  this  description  of  force,  it  was  in  his  power 
to  have  assembled,  for  his  assistance?  From  knowledge  of  the 
wealth  and  ihfluence  of  the  Northwest  Company,  and  the  nu- 
merous Engagees  in  their  service,  and  the  deep  interest  they 
had  in  opening  the  communication  through  the  Detroit  river, 
through  which  channel,  they  received  their  supplies,  you  will 
be  able  to  judge  what  aid,  he  might  have  received  from  that  im- 
portant establishment. 

After  the  tall  of  Michillimackanack  and  Chicago,  the  forces 


112 

which  reduced  those  places,  could  have  had  no  other  object,  ex- 
cepting the  reduction  of  Detroit,  and  those  from  Michillimack- 
anack  were  descending  the  upper  lakes,  for  the  purpose,  as  ap- 
pears by  Mr.  McKenzie's  letter,  and  other  testimony,  and  those 
from  Chicago,  and  the  western  wilderness  were  marching  to  the 
same  place,  as  appears  by  the  letter  of  Colonel  Anderson,  who 
commanded  at  the  river  Raisin,  which  has  been  recited.  The 
river  Raisin,  it  will  be  seen  by  looking  on  the  map,  is  in  the  di- 
rect course  from  Chicago  to  Maiden. 

I  have  taken  this  view  of  the  subject,  fellow  citizens,  to  fur- 
nish you  with  facts  and  materia^,  to  assist  you  in  forming  a  cor- 
rect judgment  of  the  forces,  wfiich  the  British  General,  had  it 
in  his  power,  to  have  assembled,  for  the  invasion  of  our  territo- 
ry, before  I  could  have  received  any  assistance,  from  any  quar- 
ter whatever.  Perhaps  I  may  be  censured  by  critics,  for  repe- 
tition and  digression.  I  have  no  other  object  in  writing,  but  to 
communicate  the  truth,  and  have  it  distinctly  understood  by  all 
classes  of  my  fellow  citizens,  even  by  the  youngest  children 
who  attend  our  schools  and  to  correct  the  erroneous  statements 
which  have  been  published.  It  is  a  fact  which  will  appear  evi- 
dent from  the  testimony,  which  has  been,  and  will  be  present- 
ed, in  the  course  of  these  memoirs,  that  many  of  the  school 
books  which  are  made  use  of  for  the  education  of  the  rising  gen- 
eration, contain  the  grossest  falsehoods  on  this  subject.  It  is  a 
misfortune,  which  every  good  man  will  lament,  that  such  books 
should  be  admitted  into  these  most  valuable  of  all  our  institu- 
tions, and  that  any  of  the  rising  generation  should  be  taught 
errour  and  indeed  falsehood,  instead  of  justice  and  truth,  with 
respect  to  the  history  of  our  happy  and  prosperous  republic. 

I  s  all  now  ask  your  attention,  to  a  consideration  of  the  evi- 
dence, which  I  shall  offer,  to  satisfy  you  of  the  number  of  the 
forces,  with  which  General  Brock  actually  crossed  the  Detroit 
river,  and  invaded  our  territory  on  the  morning  of  the  16th  of 
August. 

In  addition  to  the  re- enforcements,  which  attended  him,  from 
the  east  part  of  the  province;  he  had  all  the  forces  which  were 
at  Maiden,  when  he  arrived  ;  to  ascertain  that  number,  I  will 
here  offer  to  you  the  same  evidence,  which  my  prosecutors  made 
use  of  at  my  trial,  (viz:)  the  testimony  of  Lieutenant  Forbush. 
Lieutenant  Forbush  was  made  a  prisoner,  in  the  Cayahoga  pack- 


113 

et,  the  1st  day  of  July,  and  remained  at  Maiden  until  the  16th 
of  August;  he  was  then  a  Serjeant,  and  was  promoted  by  the 
administration,  to  the  rank  of  Lieutenant,  two  grades,  before  he 
gave  his  testimony.  He  was  selected  and  examined  by  the 
Judge  advocate,  to  prove  the  numbers,  which  were  at  Maiden, 
at  the  time  mentioned,  and  which  had  been  there,  from  the  1st 
of  July.  I  only  examined  him  to  prove  the  circumstances  of 
the  vessel  being  taken,  and  to  ascertain  the  number  of  Indians, 
he  counted  at  Maiden,  on  the  15th  of  August.  His  testimony 
was  as  here  follows. 

"I  was  then  Sergeant  in  the  4th  regiment  of  Infantry,  and 
had  charge  of  the  sick  and  of  the  hospital  stores.  The  enemy 
permitted  me  to  go  about  the  wrorks  at  Maiden,  and  I  was  little 
restrained.  I  took  every  opportunity  1  could  of  counting  them. 
The  regulars,  when  I  arrived,  were  from  eighty  to  an  hundred. 
From  two  hundred  and  fifty  to  three  hundred  militia.  Perhaps 
three  hundred  to  three  hundred  and  fifty  Indians."  This  force 
amounting  to  seven  hundred  and  fifty,  was  at  M  .lden,  on  the 
1st  day  of  July,  when  my  army  was  opening  a  road  in  the  wil- 
derness, seventy  miles  from  Detroit,  and  before  I  had  received 
any  information  of  the  declaration  of  war. 

Lieutenant  Forbush  then,  being  asked  by  the  Judge  Advocate 
what  number  of  troops  arrived  at  Maiden  afterwards,  answered, 
44 There  were  in  the  Hunter  thirty  regulars,  and  in  the  Lady 
Prevost  from  thirty  to  forty  regulars.  This  was  about  the  20th 
of  July  ;  and  after  the  battle  of  Brownstown,  there  were  three 
hundred  arrived  in  red  coats."  These  regulars,  or  red  coats, 
amount  to  three  hundred  and  seventy,  which  added  to  the  seven 
hundred  and  fifty  which  he  testifies  were  at  Maiden  the  1st  of 
July,  makes  the  number  eleven  hundred  and  twenty.  He  then 
says,  "he  counted  in  one  body,  on  the  15ti>  or  August,  s<x  hun- 
dred Indian  warriours,  passing  up,  (that  is  from  Maiden  to 
Sandwich)  some  on  horse-back,  and  some  on  foot."  He  further 
says,  that  from  the  20th  to  the  30th  of  July,  many  of  the  militia 
went  to  their  farms  and  returned,  making  as  many  as  before ; 
he  then  says,  nine  hundred  was  the  whole  force  at  Maiden,  ex- 
clusive of  the  red  coats.  By  his  former  testimony,  given  in  de- 
tail, the  red  coats  amounted  to  four  hundred  and  seventy — add 
this  to  the  nine  hundred,  makes  thirteen  hundred  and  seventy 
— add  to  this  number  th«  six  hundred  Indian  warriours,  which 
15 


114 

he  counted  at  one  time,  and  at  one  place,  at  Maiden,  on  tfie 
15th,  and  it  makes  the  whole  number  nineteen  hundred  and 
seventy. 

I  wish  this  subject,  viz.  the  numbers  at  Maiden,  exclusive 
of  the  re-enforcements  which  arrived  with  General  Brock,  to  be 
distinctly  understood.  General  Brock,  the  latter  part  of  the 
night  of  the  14th  of  August,  marched  from  Maiden  toSandwich, 
with  the  British  troops  and  militia,  and  arrived  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  15th;  and  hundreds  of  witnesses  might  be  pro- 
duced ro  prove,  that  a  large  body  of  Indians  attended  his  army, 
and  arrived  at  Sandwich  at  the  same  time.  They  were  seen, 
indeed  by  my  whole  army  on  the  opposite  bank.  I  have  stated 
this  fact,  because  it  may  be  possibly  said,  that  the  six  hundred 
Indian  warriours  which  Lieutenant  Forbush  counted  at  Maiden 
on  the  15th,  and  which  on  that  day  marched  to  Sandwich,  was 
the  whole  of  the  Indian  force.  Those  which  he  counted  on  the 
15th  at  Maiden,  could  have  been  no  part  of  those  which  march- 
ing with  General  Brock,  and  were  at  Sandwich  early  in  the  morn- 
ing of  the  same  day,  the  distance  being  eighteen  miles.  I  have 
made  this  statement,  because  three  hundred  and  fifty  Indians, 
by  Lieutenant  Forbush's  testimony,  were  at  Maiden  on  the  1st  of 
July,  and  were  included  in  the  whole  number  of  nineteen  hun- 
dred and  seventy,  which  is  made  by  a  calculation  on  the  details 
of  his  evidence.  On  the  facts  here  stated,  the  judicious  reader 
will  be  able  to  form  a  satisfactory  estimate. 

With  respect  to  the  militia  at  Maiden,  there  is  no  fact  which 
can  be  more  indisputable  as  to  their  number.  Between  the  20th 
and  30th  of  July,  many  of  them  deserted  and  came  to  my  camp. 
Their  uniform  testimony  was  that  when  the  approach  of  our 
army  was  known,  one  thousand  was  ordered  by  the  government 
to  be  detached,  and  re-enforce  the  station  at  Maiden,  and  that 
nine  hundred  out  of  the  thousand  ordered,  actually  arrived.  It 
is  a  vvell  known  fact,  that  about  the  30th  of  July,  a  proclamation 
of  pardon  was  issued ;  and  bv  the  testimony  of  Lieutenant  For- 
bush, it  appears  they  all  returned.  Many  copies  of  this  proc- 
lamation were  seen  in  our  camp ;  and  besides  the  evidence  I 
have  here  stated,  complete  proof  of  the  number  of  militia  de- 
tached for  the  defence  of  Maiden,  may  be  found  on  the  records 
of  Upper  Canada.  Thus  it  appears,  by  the  the  testimony  of  Lieu- 
tenant Forbush,  when  examined  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  the  whole 


115 

immber  at  Maiden  was  nineteen  hundred  and  seventy,  before  the 
arrival  of  Genera'  Brock,  with  the  re-enforcements  which  attend- 
ed him  from  the  east  part  of  the  province.      As  I  have  no  evi- 
dence to  determine  precisely  what  those  numbers  were,  1  must 
leave  the  estimate  to  your  judgment  under  the  circumstances 
which  have  been  stated,  as  it  was  peace  in  that  quarter,  and 
there  was  no  occasion  for  any  force  whatever  for  t,he  defence  of 
that  part  of  the  province.     In  addition  to  the  forces  at   Maiden, 
and  those  which  he  brought  with  him,  he  had  all  the  sailors  and 
marines  which    belonged  to  his  navy,  which,  on  the  15th  of  Au- 
gust,  was  anchored   in  the  Detroit    river,   between  Sandwich 
and  the   Spring  Wells.     Having  stated  the  number  of  vessels, 
with  the  number  of  cannon  mounted  on   them,  and   likewise  a 
number  of  armed  joats,  suitable  for  those   waters,  and  we  hav- 
ing not  a  single  armed  boat  to  annoy  them,  and  as  consequent- 
ly, the  whole  of  their  crews  might  have  been,  an    actually  were, 
employed  in    the  land   service,  I  leave  it  to  your  judgment  to 
determine  their  numbers.      The   detachment  of  British  troops . 
which  marched  across  the  country,  under  the  command  of  Ma- 
jor Chambers,  with  artillery,  collecting  the  militia  and  Indians 
on  his  rout,  joined  General    Brock  at  Sandwich.      This  number- 
must  have   been  several   hundreds.      On  the    river  Le  Trench 
was  a  large  settlement  conveniently  situated  to  join  his  forces 
and  the  militia  of  that  settlement  were  seen   with  the  invading 
army  at  the  time  of  the  capitulation.     From  the  facts  here  offer- 
ed,  and  the  evidence  produced,  you   will   have   the  means  of 
forming  for  yourselves  an  opinion,  with  respect  to  his  numbers 
at  Sandwich,  on  the  15th  of  August. 

I  will  now  state  the  testimony  of  Colonel  Snelling,  who  was 
only  a  captain  in  my  army,  who  had  been  promoted  by  my  pro- 
secutors, who  was  depended  on  as  a  leading  and  principal  wit- 
ness in  behalf  of  the  prosecution,  and  had  become  my  most  ma- 
lignant enemy.  His  testimony  of  the  numbers  of  General 
Brock's  army,  on  the  l-6th  of  August,  the  day  of  the  capitula- 
tion, is  as  follows.  I  shall  transcribe  it,  verbatim  et  literatim, 
and  it  is  to  be  found  in  the  40th  page  of  my  trial.  He  says, 
"that  he  stood  at  the  corner  of  the  slip  leading  to  the  gate  of 
the  fort,  and  attempted  to  count  the  British  troops  on  entering 
the  fort ;  that  the  troops  in  advance  were  the  41st  regiment,  in 
platoons  of  fourteen  files  as  well  as  the  York  volunteers,  twen- 


116 

ty-nine  platoons,  two  deep  in  red  coats ;  that  the  militia  pla- 
toons, which  were  in  the  rear,  consisted  of  no  more  than  seven 
or  eight  files,  and  composed  one  third  part  of  the  whole  force, 
probably  seven  hundred  and  fifty  whites  ;  of  which  the  remain- 
ing two  thirds  were  regulars  and  ununiformed  militia." 

Here  Colonel  Snelling  swears,  there  were  three  descriptions 
of  troops,  viz..  the  British  41st  regiment,  the  York  volunteers  in 
uniform,  and  the  militia,  not  in  uniform.  He  says  the  41st  regi- 
ment and  the  York  volunteers  formed  twenty-nine  platoons 
of  fourteen  files  in  each  platoon,  two  deep,  and  in  red 
Coats.  He  then  says,  that  the  militia  platoons,  which  followed 
in  the  rear,  consisted  of  only  seven  or  eight  files.  He  does  not 
say  how  many  platoons  the  militia  consisted  of,  but  only  men- 
tions the  number  of  files  in  each;  and  then  states  their  whole 
number  to  be  seven  hundred  and  fifty,  which  was  one  third  part 
of  their  whole  force.  He  then  says,  in  these  identical  words, 
that  the  remaining  two  thirds  were  regulars,  and  uniformed 
York  volunteers. 

By  this  evidence,  it  appears,  that  the  regulars  and  York  vol- 
unteers, in  uniform  amounted  to  only  fifteen  hundred  ;  to  which 
add  seven  hundred  and  fiftv,  which  was  the  number  of  the 
ununiformed  militia,  and  was  one  third  part  of  the  whole 
white  force,  makes  the  whole  force  of  regulars,  uniformed  York 
volunteers,  and  militia,  two  thousand  two  hundred  and  fifty. 

In  this  number  the  In  lians  are  not  included;  for,  in  his  fur- 
ther testimony,  he  says,  he  supposed  the  Indian  force  was  more 
than  one  hundred  and  fifty,  although  he  only  saw  that  number, 
drawn  up  to  fire  a  salute,  as  he  understood.  As  he  says  that  he 
saw  only  one  hundred  and  fifty  drawn  up  in  a  body,  to  fire  a  sa- 
lute, and  supposed  there  were  more,  no  correct  estimate  can  be 
formed  of  the  Indian  force  from  his  testimony. 

As  Lieutenant  Forbush  counted,  at  one  time,  and  at  one 
place,  in  a  body,  six  hundred  Indian  warriours,  on  the  lath  at 
Maiden ;  and  as  it  is  well  known  there  was  a  large  body  at 
Sandwich,  at  the  same  time,  with  General  Brock,  the  testimony 
is  positive  that  there  were  six  hundred ;  for  when  they  were 
counted,  they  were  marching  to  join  the  General  at  Sandwich. 
What  number  were  before  with  the  General,  I  cannot  give  an 
•xact  account 

Only  by  adding  the  six  hundred,  and  leaving  those  wh«> 


117 

marched  up  with  General  Brock  out  of  the  estimate,  would 
make  his  whole  number,  on  the  morning  of  the  16th.  iwo  thou- 
sand eight  hundred  and  twenty-five.  These  were  the  troops 
which  marched  into  the  fort,  excepting  the  Indians.  It  is  well 
known  a  number  were  left  in  the  forts  on  the  opposite  bank,  as 
there  was  an  incessant  fire  from  those  forts,  until  the  capitula- 
tion took  place,  and  they  were  distinctly  seen.  I  have  no  doc- 
m<  nt  to  show  the  exact  number  left  on  the  opposite  bank.  It 
is  likewise  well  known,  that  as  soon  as  the  capitulation  took 
place,  and  before  the  troops  marched  into  the  fort,  guards  were 
placed  around  the  town  and  fort,  to  prevent  the  Indians  from 
taking  the  horses  into  the  woods,  and  likewise  to  protect  the 
inhabitants  from  them.  This  is  the  positive  testimony  of  the 
witnesses  in  behalf  of  my  prosecutors,  stated  in  detail,  and  the 
calculation  is  made  on  the  facts  to  which  they  testified.  From 
examining  the  whole  of  the  testimony  which  they  gave  on  the 
other  charges,  it  will  be  seen  that  they  were  no  friends  to  me, 
and  that  they  wished  to  make  General  Brock's  force  as  small 
as  possible. 

Major  Jessup  and  the  other  witnesses,  who  were  examined 
on  this  subject,  said  they  did  not  count  the  enemy's  forces,  and 
did  not  know  their  numbers,  and  could  only  state  their  general 
impressions.  Whatever  those  impressions  were,  ought  not  to 
have  weight  against  the  positive  testimony  of  those  who  counted 
them.  Even  any  opinions  which  may  have  been  expressed  by 
those  who  counted  them,  ought  not  to  have  influence,  if  they 
vary  from  the  detailed  facts  to  which  they  testified.  It  on- 
ly shows  they  were  not  correct  mathematicians.  I  have  suf- 
fered so  much  by  the  opinions  of  interested  witnesses,  thai  I 
hope  correct  calculations  will  now  be  made  on  facts,  and  on 
them  a  judgment  will  be  formed.  It  was  my  intention,  in  this 
number,  to  have  stated  and  given  you  evidence  of  my  force  at 
this  time,  but  I  find  it  cannot  be  contained  in  one  paper.  I 
must  therefore  defer  it  to  the  next,  with  the  hope  that  this  will 
particularly  be  kept  in  mind  when  the  next  is  presented . 


118 


No.  XXVII. 

1  shall  exhibit  to  you  from  the  best  evidence  which  can  be  ob- 
tained, the  number  and  quality  of  the  forces  under  my  com- 
mand, and  at  my  disposal,  on  the  morning  of  the  16th  of  August, 
when  General  Brock  invaded  our  territory  with  the  forces  which 
have  been  described  in  the  former  number. — To  avoid  repeti- 
tion, I  must  ask  you  to  examine  number   16,  where  will  be 
found  a  general  statement  of  my  force  before  the  army  retreat- 
ed from  the  Canada  shore.     It  will  appear  that  the  original  num- 
ber ordered  by  the  President,  and  placed  under  my  command 
when   I  commenced  my  march  from   Dayton,   in  the  state  of 
Ohio,  was  twelve  hundred  militia,  and  the  4th  United  States'' 
Regiment,  consisting  of  about  three  hundred,  according  to  Colo- 
nel Miller's  testimony,  who  commanded  the  regiment.     In  ad- 
dition to  these  forces  there  was  a  small  number  of  volunteers 
unauthorized  by  the  President's  order  to  Governor  Meigs  :  they 
were  the  associates  and  neighbours  of  Colonel  McArthur  and 
Cass,  and  I  took  the  responsibility  of  including  them   in  the 
return,  that  they  might  draw  provisions,  as  they  had  no  other 
mode  of  obtaining  them  in  marching  through  the  wilderness. 
I  did  not  consider  them  subject  to  my  authority,  and   they  re- 
fused obedience  to  orders,  when  offensive  operations  were  com- 
menced, as  appears  by  evidence  on  my  trial.      Being  Governour 
of  the  territory  of  Michigan,  its  n  ilitia  was  subject  to  my  au- 
thority.    The  number  of  white  inhabitants  of  all  descriptions 
from  which  a  militia  could  have  been  drawn,  was  between  four 
and   five  thousand,  as  appeared  on  my  trial,  by  the  officer  who 
took  the  census,  and  these  were  settled  on  the  borders  of  the 
lakes  and   rivers,  an  extent  of  five  hundred   miles   from  the 
Miama  to  the  sault  of  St.  Mary,  the  outlet  of  Lake  Superiour. 
The  few  regular  troops,   which  in  time  of  peace  consisted  of 
about  fifty,  in  the  garrison  at  Detroit,  were  likewise  subject  to 
my  command  ;  I  had  no  authority  to  employ  the  Indians  in  our 
serviCe— Here  is  exhibited  all  the  forces  of  which  my  army  con- 
sisted, when  I  commenced  the  march  from  Ohio,   and   all  the 
sources  from   which  any  additions  could  have  been  drawn.     It 
was  in  evidence  on  my  trial,  that  three  block  houses  were  built 


119 

by  the  army  in  its  march  through  the  wilderness,  and  garrisoned 
by  the  troops  ;  their  situations  may  be  seen  on  some  of  the  maps 
of  the  country  recently  made ;  that  a  stockade  fort  was  likewise 
built  on  the  bank  of  the  Miami,  and  a  subaltern  officer  and  thir- 
ty men  were  left  for  its  defence,  by  order  of  the  Secretary  of 
War. 

That  about  sixty  were  made  prisoners  in  the  vessel,  on  her 
passage  from  Miami  to  Detroit,  under  the  command  of  Lieuten- 
ant Forbush  :  as  he  says  there  were  as  many  as  the  vessel  could 
carry,  which  must  have  been  at  least  that  number.  [See  Lieu- 
tenant Forbush's  Testimony,  page  145  of  my  trial.] 

A  number  were  left  sick  at  the  river  Raisin;  having  lost  my 
papers  as  before  mentioned,  which  contained  the  daily  reports 
of  the  sick,  and  the  state  of  the  troops,  I  cannot  ascertain  the 
exact  number  ;  according  to  my  best  recollection  it  was  not  less 
than  twenty -five,  and  they  never  afterwards  joined  the  army. 
In  several  rencounters  near  Maiden,  a  number  were  killed  and 
wounded — the  exact  number  I  cannot  ascertain  for  the  reason 
above  stated. 

On  the  4th  of  August,  according  to  the  testimony  of  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Vanhorn,  a  detachment  under  his  command  was 
attacked  by  the  Indians  near  Brownstown,  and  eighteen  were 
killed,  twelve  wounded,  and  above  seventy  missing,  a  part  of 
which  number  afterwards  returned  to  the  camp.  [See  report  of 
my  trial,  page  70.] 

On  the  8th  of  August,  in  the  action  on  the  bank  of  the  De- 
troit river,  between  Maguago  and  Brownstown,  where  Colonel 
Miller  commanded,  the  killed  and  wounded  on  our  side  was 
eighty-one,  according  to  Colonel  Miller's  testimony.  [See  page 
108,  of  the  report  <  f  my  trial.] 

I  will  now  consider  the  situation  of  the  detachment  under 
the  command  of  Colonels  McArthur  and  Cass  at  this  time.  On 
the  14th  of  August,  this  detacl  ment  marched  from  Detroit,  and 
as  Colonel  Miller,  with  six  hundred  of  the  best  men  of  the 
army,  on  the  8th  of  August,  had  not  been  able  to  open  the  com- 
munication to  the  river  Raisin,  I  directed  these  two  Colonels 
to  take  all  the  effective  men  of  their  regiments,  and  make  an- 
other attempt.  Having  received  information  that  there  was  an 
Indian  path  through  the  wilderness,  to  avoid  being  attacked 
from  Maiden,  in  passing  that  garrison  at  Brownstown,  I  thought 


120 

it  expedient  to  direct  Colonel  McArthur  to  take  that  rout.  On 
this  rout,  the  distance  from  Detroit  to  the  river  Raisin  was  about 
fifty  miles. 

At  this  time,  not  having  received  information  of  the  arrival  of 
General  Brock,  with  the  re-enforcements  from  fort  Erie,  and  a 
number  of  cattle  having  arrived  at  the   river  Raisin,  for  my 
army,  guarded  by  a  company  of  militia,  I  then  thought,  and 
now  think,  under  the  circumstances  which  existed,  the  measure 
of  ordering  this  detachment  was  expedient.     On  the  morning  of 
the    16th,  when   General  Brock  landed  at  the  Spring   Wells, 
under  cover  of  his  naval  armament,  1  had  received  no  informa- 
tion of  this  detachment ;    I  had  therefore  the  strongest  reasons 
to  believe,  as  they  had  been  absent  two  days,  that  they  were  at 
that  time  at  the  river  Raisin,  fifty  miles   from  Detroit,  the  rout 
they  marched,  and  thirty  by  the  way  of  Brownstown.    As  Colo- 
nels McArthur  and  Cass  were  going  themselves  on  this  hazard- 
ous enterprize,  and  as  they  had  an  authority  to  select  all  the 
effective  men  of  their  regiments,  I  ask  you  whether,  under  these 
circumstances,    they  would,   and   did   not   take  all  that   they 
thought  would  be  useful  and  necessary  to  effect  the  object. 
There  is  another  reason  which  is  conclusive,  in  my  mind,  that 
they  did.     On  the  15th  of  August,  after  I  had  received   infor- 
mation of  the  arrival  of  General  Brock,  the  remainder  of  these 
two  regiments  which  were  left  behind,  were  paraded,  and  I  ex- 
amined them  :  the  number  was  very  small,  and  I  saw  none  but 
sickly  invalids. 

I  believe  the  situation  of  this  detachment,  which  must  have 
amounted  to  more  than  four  hundred  of  the  most  effective  men 
of  the  Ohio  regiments,  will,  by  every  candid  reader,  be  con- 
sidered such,  that  in  case  of  an  action  at  Detroit,  I  could  have 
had  no  assistance  from  them. 

Colonel  Cass,  in  his  letter  to  the  government,  stated,  that 
the  number  in  the  detachment  amounted  to  three  hundred  and 
fifty.  Colonel  McArthur,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Court 
Martial,  says,  he  received  an  order  from  me  to  detach  from  his 
regiment  one  hundred  and  fifty. 

I  ask  why  he  did  not  produce  the  order  to  prove  the  fact? 
The  loss  of  my  papers,  in  the  manner  I  have  stated,  is  the 
reason  why  I  do  not  produce  it. 
Having  thus  stated  the  numbers,  which   were  ordered  for 


121 

my  command,  by  the  government,  it  will  be  proper  in  estimat- 
ing my  forces  on  the  1 6th  of  August,  to  deduct,  those  which 
were  left  to  garrison  the  block  houses ;  those  who  were  made 
prisoners  in  the  vessel  on  the  1st  of  July,  those  killed,  wound- 
ed, and  missing,  in  the  different  actions  at  the  river  Au-<  anard, 
and  at  other  places,  between  Sandwich  and  Maiden  ;  and  like- 
wise, those  who  were  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  in  the  two 
actions  at  Maguago  and  Brownstown,  where  Colonel  Vanhorn 
and  Colonel  Miller  commanded. 

When  you  have  before  you  the  fact,  proved  by  the  testimony 
of  Colonel  Anderson,  who  commanded  the  militia  at  the  river 
Raisin,  that  the  whole  of  them  were  not  sufficient  for  the  pro- 
tection of  that  settlement,  and  he  requested  succour  from  De- 
troit, for  safety  to  the  inhabitants  j  when  you  likewise  consider, 
that  in  addition  to  the  militia  at  the  Miami,  I  was  obliged,  by 
the  orders  of  the  government,  to  leave  an  officer  and  thirty  men, 
for  the  protection  of  that  settlement ;  when  you  likewise  con- 
sider the  scattered  situation  of  the  other  inhabitants  of  the  ter- 
ritory, surrounded  by  Indian  villages,  on  all  sides  of  them;  and 
further  that  a  part  of  those  belonging  to  the  settlement  at  De- 
troit, joined  the  British  forces,  as  soon  as  they  landed ;  and  the 
further  information,  I  received,  that  the  whole  would  desert 
and  join  them,  [  cheerfully  submit  to  your  judgment,  under 
these  facts  and  circumstances,  whether  I  had  a  right  to  calcu- 
late on  any  assistance  from  these  militia ; — and  rather,  as  I  had 
been  informed  a  part  of  them  had  joined  the  enemy,  and  their 
Colonel  gave  it,  as  his  opinion  that  the  whole  would  join  them, 
whether  I  had  not  grounds  to  believe,  that  they  would  add  to 
the  enemy's  force. 

In  making  your  estimate  of  my  effective  force,  it  will  be  pro- 
per, and  I  am  sure  you  will  take  into  consideration,  that  as  it 
was  then  the  middle  of  August,  the  sickly  season  of  the  year ; 
and  as,  by  the  capture  of  the  vessel,  we  had  lost  all  our  medical 
stores,  and  there  was  no  possibility  of  obtaining  the  least  supply, 
from  any  quarter  whatever,  and  as  the  country  was  liable  to 
agues  and  fevers,  that  a  proportion  of  the  troops,  must  have 
been  sickly  and  non-effective. 

I  have  presented  this  statement,  to  furnish  you  with  the  means 
of  determining,  how  much  my  army  must  have  been   reduced, 
on  the  16th  of  August,  and  of  comparing  the  opinions,  you  may 
16 


122 

form  oft  the  tacts  thus  exhibited,  with  the  other  evidence,  I  shall 
now  offer. 

The  evidence,  which  I  shall  now  offer,  is  the  evidence  of 
Major  Jessup,  who  then  acted  as  the  Adjutant-General  of  my 
army,  and  is  now  the  Quarter-Master  General  of  the  United 
States. — With  respect  to  other  testimony,  I  have  referred  to 
the  report  of  my  trial.  I  have  done  this,  because,  that  book  is 
in  circulation,  and  any  reader,  who  is  desirous  of  comparing  the 
documents,  and  evidence,  which  I  have  stated,  can  more  easily 
obtain  it,  and  make  the  comparison,  than  from  the  records,  in 
the  office  at  Washington,  where  is  to  be  found  only  one  copy, 
and  that  in  manuscript.  Colonel  Forbes,  who  published  the 
Report,  was  one  of  the  members  of  the  Court  Martial,  and  the 
documents,  as  well  as  my  defence,  were  furnished  him,  by  the 
administration,  from  the  records  of  the  government. 

As  Major  Jessup  was  the  acting  Adjutant  General,  it  was  his 
official  duty,  to  make  a  return  to  me,  when  ordered,  of  the 
whole  force,  under  my  command — He  was  ordered  at  this  time, 
to  do  it.  In  examining  his  testimony,  I  find  there  is  a  variance, 
between  the  report  of  my  trial,  and  the  copy  I  have  obtained 
from  the  Adjutant- General's  office,  taken  from  the  records,  by 
an  order  from  Mr.  Calhoun,  the  Secretary  of  war.  I  shall 
therefore  transcribe,  precisely  from  both,  that  the  variance  may 
be  seen,  and  if  one  is  more  favourable  to  me  than  the  other, 
that  I  have  tio  disposition,  to  take  advantage  of  it. 

In  the  first  place  I  will  transcribe  from  the  report  of  my  trial, 
his  testimony  with  respect  to  my  numbers — It  will  be  found  in 
page  94.  "  Major  Jessup  stated,  that  he  had  received  a  report 
from  different  Adjutants  of  different  corps,  estimating  the  men, 
fit  for  action,  and  thinks  that  the  amount,  (as  stated  in  General 
Cass'  letter)  exceeded  a  thousand  men.  including  the  Michigan 
militia  of  four  hundred,  and  the  detachments  absent  with  Colo- 
nels Cass  and  McArthur ;  perhaps,  this  estimation,  includes 
tbe  Michigan  legion,  which  on  an  occasion,  when  he  had  two 
companies  of  them  under  his  command,  behaved  as  well  as  any 
troops  he  ever  saw,  having  formed  on  an  island,  where  some 
fighting  was  expected,  in  the  most  regular  manner. — There  were 
also  on  the  evening,  of  the  15th  about  thirty  or  forty  armed 
wagonners." 

Before  I  make  any  comments,  i  will  transcribe  the  same  evi- 


123 

dence  precisely,  from  the  copy  I  received,  from]  the  Adjutant 
General's  office.     It  is  as  follows  : — 

"On  the  evening  of  the  15th,  I  received  an  estimate,  of  the 
Adjutants  of  the  different  corps,  of  the  men,  fit  for  action.  The. 
force,  I  think,  exceeded  a  thousand.  I  gave  Colonel  Cass  a 
statement  of  it  the  next  day  after  the  surrender.  I  subsequent- 
ly saw  a  letter  published,  said  to  have  been  written  by  Colonel 
Cass,  in  which  the  number  was  stated,  I  think,  according  to  the 
statement  I  furnished  him.  I  am  not  certain  whether  the  Mich- 
igan legion  were  included  in  the  estimate,  but  the  militia 
were  not.  It  is  my  impression  that  the  Michigan  legion  were. 
I  suppose  there  were  four  hundred  at  least  of  the  Michigan 
militia  under  arms  at  the  time,  and  I  believe  there  were 
more.  I  was  once  out  on  a  detachment,  with  a  part  of 
the  Michigan  legion, — we  had  to  go  on  to  an  island,  where 
we  expected  to  be  fired  on,  the  moment  we  landed.  They  land- 
ed and  formed  with  as  great  regularity  as  any  regular  troops  I 
ever  saw."  He  then  mentions  the  same  number  of  armed 
wagonners,  as  stated  in  the  report  of  the  trial. 

You  here  have  before  you,  fellow  citizens,  the  number  of 
forces  ordered  for  my  command  by  the  President,  in  the  first 
instance,  and  the  various  casualties  by  which  it  was  reduced. 
You  likewise  have  the  testimony  of  the  Adjutant  General,  the 
official  officer,  whose  duty  it  was  to  make  a  return  of  the  whole 
number  to  me. 

In  the  first  place,  my  fellow  citizens,  as  I  stand  before  you  as 
judges,  and  I  know  that  I  now  stand  before  a  candid,  impartial, 
and  intelligent  tribunal,  I  ask  you  to  make  your  calculations, 
of  the  numbers  of  my  effective  forces  at  Detroit,  on  the  16th  of 
August,  on  the  facts  which  I  have  exhibited,  viz.  the  number 
and  quality  of  troops  ordered  by  the  government ;  the  few  un- 
authorized volunteers,  who  joined  the  army  on  the  march  ;  the 
few  regulars,  which  had  been  stationed  in  the  fort  of  Detroit, 
in  time  of  peace  ;  and  the  militia  which  could  have  been  drawn 
from  the  whole  population  of  the  territory,  which  population 
consisted  of  little  more  than  four  thousand  souls.  From  this 
force  then  deduct  the  number  left  in  three  block  houses,  and  a 
stockade  fort,  at  the  river  Miami,  established  to  assist  in  pre- 
serving the  communication  to  Ohio ;  those  made  prisoners  in 
the  Cayahoga  packet ;   the  sick  which  were  left  at  the  river 


124 

Raisin  ;  the  killed  and  wounded  at  several  rencounters,  at  the 
river  Au-Canard,  and  between  Maiden  and  Sandwich  ;  the 
killed,  wounded  and  missing,  in  the  action  at  Brownstown,  un- 
der the  command  of  Colonel  Vanhorn;  likewise  the  killed  and 
wounded  in  the  battle  between  Maguago  and  Brownstown,  un- 
der the  command  of  Colonel  Miller;  likewise  Colonels  McAr- 
thur  and  C«ss'  detachments,  which  marched  on  the  14th  of 
August,  to  the  river  Raisin,  to  open  the  communication,  and 
obtain  provisions ;  and  likewise  the  state  of  the  Michigan  mi- 
litia— that  a  part  of  them  had  joined  the  enemy's  forces,  with 
their  arms  in  their  hands,  when  they  first  landed,  and  the  infor- 
mation I  had  received  from  their  Colonel,  that  the  whole  num- 
ber would  join  them  ;  likewise  the  number  which  at  this  season 
were  sick,  being  without  medicine,  or  even  necessary  comforts. 
Of  all  these  facts,  you  have  evidence,  in  the  course  of  the  fore- 
going numbers ;  and  without  giving  any  opinion,  I  ask  you  to 
form  a  judgment  for  yourselves. 

I  shall  now  consider  the  testimony  of  Major  Jessup,  the  offi- 
cial officer,  and  acting  Adjutant  General,  on  the  subject  of  the 
numbers  of  my  army  at  this  time. 

He  says,  that  on  the  15th  of  August,  he  had  received  a  report 
from  the  Adjutants  of  the  different  corps,  and  the  amount  ex- 
ceeded a  thousand  men,  (as  stated  in  General  Cass'  letter.) 
That  letter  stated  the  number,  by  that  report,  to  be  a  thousand 
and  sixty.  Colonel  Cass'  letter,  however,  ought  not  to  be  con- 
sidered as  any  evidence.  He  was  not  under  oath  when  he 
wrote  it.  As,  however,  that  part  of  it  which  relates  to  my 
numbers  is  confirmed  by  the  testimony  of  Major  Jessup,  I  am 
willing  to  admit,  under  the  explanation  which  he  afterwards 
mad-.*,  the  correctness  of  it.  He  says,  in  these  identical 
words,  "  exceeded  a  thousand  men,  including  the  Michigan 
militia,  of  four  hundred,  and  the  detachments  absent  with  Colo- 
nels Cass  and  M c Arthur  "  He  then  says,  "  perhaps  this  esti- 
mate includes  the  Michigan  legion."  He  afterwards  states, 
M  there  were  about  thirty  or  forty  armed  wagonners." 

By  referring  to  Colonel  Cass'  letter,  published  in  the  report 
of  my  trial,  you  will  perceive,  he  says,  there  were  three  hun- 
dred and  fifty  in  the  detachment ;  and  Major  Jessup,  in  his  tes- 
timony, aays,  that  this  detachment  was  included  in  the  one 
thousand;  it  consequently  ought  to  be  deducted,  having  been 


125 

absent  two  days,  under  orders  to  march  to  the  river  Raisin. 
This  will  reduce  my  number  to  seven  hundred  and  ten.  He 
also  says,  there  were  about  thirty  or  forty  wagonners  armed  that 
evening ;  say  thirty-five,  which  makes  the  whole  number  seven 
hundred  and  forty  five. 

About  half  of  these,  according  to  his  testimony,  were  Michi- 
gan militia  ;  and  I  have  produced  evidence,  that  a  part  of  them, 
with  their  arms,  joined  the  enemy  the  next  morning,  and  that 
their  Colonel  informed  me  the  whole  of  them  would  desert. 
Therefore  they  ought  not  only  to  be  deducted  from  my  numbers, 
but  added  to  the  enemy's. 

This.  I  believe  you  will  be  of  the  opinion,  is  the  mly  fair  ex- 
planation which  can  be  given  of  the  testimony  of  Major  Jessup, 
the  Adjutant  General,  as  reported  in  my  trial,  by  Colonel 
Forbes,  one  of  the  members  of  the  Court  Martial,  who  was  fur- 
nished with  my  defence,  and  other  documents,  by  the  govern- 
ment, and  published  under  the  auspices  of  the  administration. 

By  comparing  the  two  statements,  both  of  which  have  been 
literally  transcribed,  it  will  be  seen,  that  there  is  this  variance — 

In  the  one,  taken  from  the  report  of  my  trial,  Major  Jessup 
says,  that  the  Michigan  militia  was  included,  and  made  part  of 
the  whole  force,  viz.  one  thousand  and  sixty.  In  the  other, 
taken  from  the  records  furnished  by  order  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  he 
says,  expressly,  that  it  was  his  impression,  the  Michigan  legion 
was  included  in  the  one  thousand  and  sixty,  and  the  militia 
(which  must  have  been  the  other  part  of  the  militia)  were  not. 
This  legion,  as  it  is  called,  was  a  part  of  the  four  hundred 
Michigan  militia,  and  it  is  very  immaterial  whether  the  men 
who  composed  them  were  included  or  not,  for  the  reasons  which 
have  been  just  stated,  as  they  added  to  the  force  of  the  enemy. 

Perhaps  the  inquiry  may  be  made,  in  what  manner  General 
Brock,  in  his  official  report  to  his  government,  made  the  number 
of  prisoners  so  much  greater  ?  Such  an  inquiry  is  easily  an- 
swered. All  the  prisoners  from  Michilimackinack  were  at 
Detroit  on  their  parole,  and  included  in  the  number.  All  the 
militia  at  the  river  Raisin,  and  in  every  part  of  the  territory ; 
all  persons,  indeed,  of  every  description,  who  were  found  at 
Detroit,  were  in  his  power,  and  considered  as  prisoners.  It 
was  easy  for  him  to  make  the  numbers  as  large  as  he  pleased. 
He  had,  indeed,  a  great  object  in  making  them  as  large  as  pos- 


126 

siblc.  His  official  communication  was  to  be  sent  to  London, 
and  presented  to  his  Majesty,  the  fountain  of  distinctions  and 
honours.  In  proportion  as  the  achievement  could  be  magnified, 
he  expected  distinctions  and  honours  would  be  conferred.  In 
this  he  was  not  disappointed  ;  the  order  of  knighthood  was  con- 
ferred on  him,  as  soon  as  his  dispatches  were  received. 

From  the  statement  and  evidence  offered  for  your  considera- 
tion in  this  and  the  former  number,  I  have  the  happiness  to  be- 
lieve you  will  be  satisfied,  that  the  pledge  which  I  gave  in  my 
second  number,  viz.  that  I  would  prove  to  your  satisfaction, 
that  on  the  16th  of  August,  1812,  General  Brock  invaded  our 
territory,  with  more  than  double  the  effective  force  which  I  had 
to  oppose  to  it,  has  more  than  been  redeemed ;  and,  if  I  had 
pledged  myself  to  have  proved  that  he  had  at  that  time  more  than 
three  times  my  effective  force,  the  statement  would  have  been 
correct.  On  the  evidence  furnished  by  the  administration,  my 
prosecutors,  I  could  net  have  carried  into  the  field  one  third 
part  of  the  force  with  which  our  territory  was  invaded  ;  and  as 
the  suspension  of  hostilities,  was  at  that  time  in  full  operation, 
in  every  other  part  of  Canada,  and  all  the  British  troops,  militia 
of  the  province,  and  all  the  savages,  were  subject  to  the  au- 
thority of  the  British  General,  and  were  moving  in  all  directions 
to  the  only  point  where  their  services  were  necessary,  I  again 
ask  you,  whether  you  are  not  fully  satisfied,  that  his  army  might 
have  been  re-enforced  to  much  more  than  double  the  numbers 
then  present,  before  I  could,  by  any  posibility,  have  received 
assistance  ? 


No.  XXVIII. 

Perhaps,  after  reading  the  two  last  numbers,  in  which  were 
exhibited  evidence  of  General  Brock's  forces,  and  those  under 
my  command,  an  inquiry  may  be  made,  why  this  statement  and 
evidence  was  not  presented  more  particularly  in  my  defence  ? 
to  satisfy  you  in  relation  to  such  an  inquiry,  it  will  be  perceiv- 
ed the  whole  of  the  evidence  now  exhibited  was  not  before  the 
Court  Martial,  and  the  part  which  was,  I  expected  the  members 
would  critically  examine,  and  form  their  judgments  on  the  facts 
which  were  proved,  and  not  on  the  opinions  of  the  witnesses. 


127 

There  was  another  reason,  which  was  the  principal  one ;  viz. 
the  very  short  time  allowed  by  the  Court,  to  prepare  my  de- 
fence. 

The  evidence  was  closed  on  Friday,  the  11th  day  of  Februa- 
ry, and  the  Court  met  again  the  next  Tuesday — a  Sabbath  in- 
tervened, which  ought  to  be  devoted  to  the  worship  of  our  God. 
Consequently,  I  had  only  Saturday  and  Monday,  to  arrange  all 
the  evidence,  both  written  and  oral,  which  had  occupied  thirty- 
two  days  in  presenting  to  the  Court,  where  I  had  constantly 
attended  at  the  bar,  in  examining  witnesses,  &c.  without  any 
assistance.  This  evidence  was  to  be  applied  to  a  volume  of 
charges  and  specifications ;  and  the  administration,  my  prosecu- 
tors, had  employed  two  of  the  most  eminent  Counsellors  in  the 
United  States,  to  assist  the  Judge  Advocate  in  preparing  these 
charges  and  in  hunting  up  and  examining  witnesses,  and  taking 
down  minutes  of  their  testimony,  long  before  the  trial  com- 
menced. 

I  believe  no  law  can  be  found,  authorizing  the  employment 
of  these  Counsellors,  or  the  payment  of  tiie  large  sums  of  public 
money,  they  received  for  their  services. 

Until  the  whole  of  the  testimony  was  offered  it  was  impossi- 
ble to  make  an  arrangement  of  it,  and  apply  it  to  the  numerous 
charges.  Every  day  witnesses  were  examined  on  all  the  differ- 
ent specifications.  I  have  not  made  this  statement  to  implicate 
the  conduct  of  the  Court  in  this  particular,  as  I  did  not  urge  for 
a  longer  time.  The  reason  why  I  did  not,  was,  that  every  ap- 
plication of  any  importance,  which  I  had  made  during  the  whole 
trial,  had  been  denied — I  therefore  thought  it  would  be  a  useless 
waste  of  time.  I  have  only  stated  this  fact  as  a  reason,  why 
my  defence  was  not  presented  in  so  clear,  particular,  and  intel- 
ligible a  manner,  as  it  might  have  been,  had  more  time  been  al- 
lowed. It  was  impossible  to  arrange  such  a  mass  of  testimony 
in  so  short  a  time,  as  to  have  the  case  distinctly  understood  by 
the  most  attentive  readers.  These  are  reasons,  why  my  case 
has  not  been  more  clearly  and  fully  explained. 

In  a  former  number,  I  referred  to  the  convention  of  Saratoga, 
to  show  the  fatal  consequences  of  an  army  being  ordered  into  a 
situation  where  its  communication  with  its  magazines  cannot 
be  preserved. 

As  the  events  of  the  northern  campaign,  in    1777,  are  an  im- 


128 

portant  portion  of  the  history  of  our  revolution,  and  as  in  many 
respects,  there  appears  to  be  a  similarity  between  the  misfor- 
tunes, which  attended  the  army,  commanded  by  General  Bur- 
goyne  and  the  case  which  I  have  presented  for  your  considera- 
tion, it  nfay  afford  some  illustrations  of  the  subject,  to  describe 
them,  and  trace  the  similarity. 

The  invasion  of  the  United  States,  in  the  year  1777,  from 
Canada,  was  a  favourite  object  of  the  British  administration, 
planned  in  the  cabinet  of  London,  and  the  execution  of  it  com- 
mitted to  General  Burgoyne.  Early  in  the  spring  of  that  year, 
he  advanced  from  Canada  with  a  large  army,  as  distinguished 
for  character  and  discipline,  as,  perhaps,  that  nation  ever  fur- 
nished. Attached  to  his  command  were  the  Canadian  militia* 
and  savages  of  the  northern  and  western  regions.  Distinguish- 
ed, not  only  by  his  talents,  as  a  civilian,  but  by  long  experience 
in  the  wars  of  Europe,  and  having  acquired  the  highest  reputa- 
tion, as  a  military  commander,  he  was  selected  for  this  impor- 
tant command.  Aided  by  a  naval  force  on  lake  Champlain,  he 
passed  over  those  waters,  and  possessed  himself  of  Tyconderoga. 
Calculating  on  assistance,  and  co-operation  with  the  army  un- 
der the  command  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  in  New  York,  and  ex- 
pecting to  form  a  junction  with  that  army,  at  Albany,  he  pene- 
trated to  the  Hudson,  and  crossed  that  river,  at  fort  Edward. 
If  his  communication  should  be  cut  off  from  his  magazines  in 
Canada,  he  expected  when  a  junction  was  formed  with  the  army 
at  New  York,  it  would  be  opened  for  the  supply  of  his  army, 
from  those  below.  Not  receiving  that  co-operation,  on  which 
he  depended,  and  his  communication  between  his  army,  and  his 
magazines  in  Canada,  being  intercepted  by  the  American  forces, 
he  considered  it  his  duty  to  accept  the  best  terms  which  could 
be  obtained,  and  surrendered  his  army  as  prisoners  of  war,  un- 
der a  convention,  to  which  the  American  General  acceded. 
This  was  occassioned  by  the  want  of  co-operation  on  the  part 
of  his  superiour  officer,  from  New  York.  1  ask  you,  my  fellow 
citizens,  to  compare  the  two  cases,  and  although  it  may  be  said, 
it  is  comparing  great  things  with  small,  yet  they"  depend  on  the 
same  principle,  and  are  offered  as  an  illustration  of  the  subject 
under  review.  I  was  ordered  to  make  the  invasion  of  Upper 
Canada,  from  Detroit.  General  I  urgoyne  was  ordered  to  in- 
vade the  United  States,  from  Canada.    After  my  army  invaded 


129 

Canada,  its  communication  was  cut  oft",  by  the  enemy's  naval 
force  on  lake  Erie,  and  his  land  forces,  and  savages,  on  the 
road  which  had  been  opened  from  Ohio,  and  no  supplies  could 
be  obtained  from  any  magazines  from  my  country.  After  Gen- 
eral Burgoyne's  army  invaded  the  United  States,  and  advanc- 
ed to  Saratoga,  his  communication  was  intercepted  from  his 
magazines  in  Canada,  and  no  supplies  could  be  obtained  from 
that  quarter. 

It  was  a  part  of  the  plan  of  the  campaign  in  1812,  that  Gen- 
eral Dearborn  should  cross  the  Niagara  river  and  co  operate 
with  me,  with  an  army  sufficient  for  the  conquest  of  Upper 
Canada,  by  which  event,  my  communication  would  have  been 
opened  to  the  magazines,  in  our  country  on  the  Niagara  river. 
Had  Sir  Henry  Clinton  successfully  co-operated  with  General 
Burgoyne,  his  communication  would  have  been  opened  to  his 
magazines  in  New  York,  from  which  his  army  would  have  re- 
ceived its  supplies.  The  want  of  that  co-operation  alone  be- 
came fatal  to  Burgoyne.  I  had  no  communication  with  my 
country,  excepting  through  lake  Erie,  and  the  road  I  had  open- 
ed through  the  wilderness  to  Ohio.  After  the  declaration  of 
war  lake  Erie  was  closed  against  me,  by  the  enemy,  and  the 
road  by  the  savages.  As  General  Dearborn  neglected  to  assist 
and  co-operate  with  me,  my  communication  being  entirely  in- 
tercepted, I  considered  it  my  duty  to  negotiate  and  accept  the 
best  terms  which  could  be  obtained. 

Thus  far  there  appears  to  be  a  similarity  between  the  two 
cases.     Had  General  Washington  at  that  time  proposed  to  Sir 
William  Howe,  who  commanded  the  British  army,  an  armistice, 
and  had  it  been   agreed    to,   without   including  General  Bur* 
goyne's  army,  the  similarity  would  have  continued ; — and  in  an 
event  of  that  kind  General  Washington  might  have  marched  hi; 
whole  army,  or  as  large  a  part  as  he  deemed  necessary  to  havt1 
assisted  General  Gates  with  the  most  perfect  safety  to  the  othe» 
parts  of  the  country,  and  at  once  overwhelmed  General   Bur 
goyne's  army.      By  a  calculation  on  the  subject  it  will  appear, 
that  General  Burgoyne  had  a  larger  force,  in  proportion  to  Ger 
eral  Gates'  than  I  had  in  proportion  to  General  Brock's. 

The  surrender  of  General  Burgoyne's  army,  was  occasion* 
by  the  want  of  co-operation,  from  the  army  at  New  York,  com- 
manded by  Sir  Henry  Clinton;  and  I  am  satisfied,  you  will  ' 
17 


130 

fully  convinced,  that  the  disas  ers  of  my  army  were  caused  by 
the  neglect  of  General  Dearborn,  in  not  assisting  -and  co-operat- 
ing with  me  as  he  was  ordered. 

I  will  now  ask  your  indulgence,  for  a  moment,  in  examining 
the  conduct  of  the  British  administration  towards  this  unfortun- 
ate General.  I  do  it  with  a  view  to  contrast  it  with  the  treat- 
ment I  have  received  from  the  administration  under  which  I  serv- 
ed. This  treatment  is  so  well  known  to  you,  that  it  is  unnec- 
essary to  repeat  it.  Indeed,  no  language  can  describe  the  base 
injustice  I  have  experienced,  or  the  vile  and  disgraceful  mo- 
tives from  which  such  injustice  originated. 

Let  me  then  ask  you  whether  the  officers  of  the  British  Ad- 
ministration received  and  published  to  the  nation  and  to  the 
world,  an  official  account  of  the  causes  of  that  surrender,  from 
a  subordinate  officer,  before  that  of  the  commander  of  the  army 
was  received  and  published  ?  Were  capital  charges  in  the  first 
instance,  exhibited  against  General  Burgoyne;  and  was  Sir 
William  Howe,  whose  duty  it  was  to  have  assisted  and  co-oper- 
ated with  him,  and  who  was  de<  ply  interested  in  the  event  of 
an  inquiry,  appointed  President  of  a  court  martial  for  his  trial  ? 
Did  General  Burgoyne's  officers,  selected  as  witnesses,  receive 
the  patronage  of  the  British  administration,  by  being  promoted 
two  or  three  grades,  to  prepare  them  to  give  the  most  unfavour- 
able testimony  aganst  him  ?  Wrere  the  newspapers  of  England, 
by  the  influence  of  the  administration,  filled  with  false  and 
scandalous  accounts  of  his  conduct,  and  the  oaths  and  affirma- 
tions of  every  unprincipled  adventurer  and  follower  of  his  army, 
taken  and  circulated  to  excite  the  clamour  of  the  nation  against 
him  ? 

No,  fellow  citizens,  the  officers  of  the  administration  of  the 
nation  from  which  you  descended,  had  too  much  honour  and 
justice  to  make  use  of  such  dishonourable  practices  even  for 
their  own  preservation  in  office.  As,  however,  they  knew  that 
an  inquiry  would  produce  a  re-action  on  themselves,  who  form- 
ed the  plan  of  the  campaign,  and  on  Sir  William  Howe,  the 
commander  in  chief  of  the  army,  who  neglected  to  co-operate, 
or  to  provide  the  necessary  means  of  co-operation,  with  General 
Burgoyne,  no  trial  was  ordered,  and  he  retired  to  private  life, 
with  the  esteem  and  affection  of  his  fellow  citizens. 

He  was  the  unsuccessful  general,  and  as  the  plan  of  the  cam- 


jjaign  had  been  formed  by  the  officers  of  the  administration,  and. 
its  want  of  success,  had  excited  a  clamour  in  the  nation,  it  was 
well  known,  that  the  public  censure  would  have  rested  on  them, 
and  the  generals  who  had  neglected  to  co  operate  with  him,  had 
a  trial  been  ord  •  *  I.  That  nation  would  never  have  suffered 
such  an  outrage  on  justice  as  has  been  here  practised. 

By  examining  the  most  celebrated  historians  of  the  war  of 
our  revolution,  it  will  be  seen,  that  the  causes  of  the  disasters 
of  General  Burgoyne's  army  are  attributable  to  the  want  of  the 
eo  operation  which  was  expected. 

In  proof  of  this  declaration,  I  will  here  transcribe  a  few  sen- 
tences from  Botta's  history  of  the  war  of  our  independence, 
translated  by  our  countryman  G.  A.  Otis,  Esq. ;  a  work  highly 
creditable,  both  to  the  author  and  translator,  as  well  as  to  the 
rising  literature  of  our  country. 

Speaking  of  Burgoyne's  expedition,,  he  remarks,  "that  Ks 
success  depended  on  the  combined  efforts  of  the  generals  who 
commanded  on  the  lakes,  and  of  those  who  had  the  manage- 
ment of  the  war  in  the  State  of  New  York.  But  far  from  mov- 
ing in  concert,  when  one  advanced,  the  other  retired.  When 
Carleton  had  obtained  the  command  of  the  lakes,  Howe,  instead 
of  ascending  the  Hudson  towards  Albany,  carried  his  arms  in- 
to New  Jersey,  and  advanced  upon  the  elaware.  When,  af- 
terwards, Burgoyne  entered  Tyconderoga  in  triumph,  Howe 
embarked  upon  the  expedition  against  Philadelphia;  and  thus 
the  army  of  Canada  was  deprived  of  the  assistance  it  expected 
from  New  York." 

The  author  then  makes  the  following  reflections  :  "  Perhaps 
Howe  imagined,  that  the  reduction  of  such  a  city  as  Philadelphia, 
would  so  confound  the  Americans  and  so  derange  their  plans? 
that  they  would  either  easily  submit,  or  make  but  a  feeble  re- 
sistance. Perhaps,  also,  he  believed,  that  by  attacking  the  centre, 
and  as  it  were  the  very  heart  of  the  confederation,  he  effected 
the  most  useful  diversion  in  favour  of  \ he  army  of  the  north, 
thereby  depriving  the  Americans  of  the  ability  to  oppose  it  with 
a  sufficient  force  upon  the  Hudson.  Finally,  it  is  not  impossi- 
ble, that,  listening  to  his  ambition,  he  had  flattered  himself,  that 
with  his  own  means  alone,  he  could  acquire  the  exclusive  glory 
of  having  put  an  end  to  the  war.  But  whatever  might  have 
been  the  importance  of  the  acquisition  of  Philadelphia,  every 


132 

one  must  readily  perreive  how  much  greater  was  that  of  the 
junction  at  Albany  of  the  two  armies  of  Canada  and  New  York* 
It  was  very  doubtful,  whether  the  conquest  of  a  single  city 
would  decide  the  issue  of  the  war;  whereas  the  junction  of  the 
armies  offered  almost  an  assurance  of  it."  In  the  next  page  it 
is  further  observed,  ik  Perhaps,  also,  (speaking  of  the  British 
administration)  they  erred  in  this,  that  having  too  great  confi- 
dence in  the  reputation,  rank,  and  military  experience  of  Sir 
William  Howe,  they  neglected  to  send  him  more  minute  in- 
structions. For  it  appears  by  the  best  information  we  have 
found  on  this  subject,  that  the  orders  given  to  that  general 
in  regard  to  his  co-operation  with  the  army  of  Canada,  were 
rather  riiscretion-itv  than  absolute;  but  all  the  ruin  of  the  enter- 
prize  is  clearly  attributable  to  this  want  of  co-operation." 

Sir  William  Howe  had  taken  so  large  a  portion  of  the  army 
from  New  York,  in  his  expedition  to  Philadelphia,  that  it  pro- 
bably was  not  in  the  power  of  Sir  Kenry  Clinton,  consistent 
with  the  safety  of  the  posts  below,  to  co  operate  with  General 
Burgoyne.  After  tl  ese  events  took  place,  Sir  William  Howe 
was  recalled,  and  the  command  of  the  armv  given  to  Sir  Henry 
Clinton.  General  Howe's  conduct  was  severely  censured  by 
the  British  government,  for  not  supporting  and  co-operating 
with  General  Burgoyne. 

Thus  it  appears,  that,  Sir  William  Howe  was  censured  by  his 
government,  and  recalled  from  his  command,  for  not  taking 
measures  to  assist  and  co-operate  with  General  Burgoyne's 
armv,  when,  as  it  appears,  his  orders  were  only  discretionary 
on  the  subject. 

I  now  ask  you  to  consider  tiie  case  of  General  Dearborn  He 
retained  the  confidence  of  the  administration,  and  was  continu- 
ed in  his  command;  although  he  took  no  measures  to  cooperate 
with  my  army,  although  Ms  orders  were  positive  to  do  it. 

Although  it  appears  by  the  authority  of  this  historian,  that  Sir 
William  Howe  had  not  received  positive  orders  to  co-operate 
with  General  Burgoyne ;  and  although  he  had  not  made  an  ar- 
mistice with  General  Washington,  which  left  all  the  forces  of 
the  United  States  at  liberty  to  have  marched  and  joined  Gen- 
eral Gates'  army  against  General  Burgoyne,  yet  I  will  here  ap- 
ply the  same  reflections  in  relaton  to  the  disasters  of  1812,  and 
on  General  Dearborn's  conduct,  as  the  historian  has  made  on 


133 

the  events  of  the  campaign  of  1777,  and  on  Sir  William  Howe's 
conduct.  In  relation  to  the  events  of  1812,  it  will  thus  stand. 
44  That  the  conquest  of  Upper  Canada  depended  on  the  combin- 
ed efforts  of  the  generals  who  commanded  on  the  east  and  west 
side  of  lake  Erie.  That  when  I  crossed  the  Detroit  river,  and 
invaded  Canada  on  the  west  side,  General  Dearborn  advanced 
the  principal  part  of  his  army  to  Plattsuurg  and  Burlington,  in 
the  direction  of  Montreal.  Perhaps  General  Dearborn  imagin- 
ed, that  even  the  appearance  of  the  reduction  of  such  a.  city  as 
Montreal,  would  so  confound  the  Canadians  and  so  deivnge 
their  plans,  that  they  would  either  easily  submit,  or  make  but  a 
feeble  resistance.  Perhaps,  also,  he  believed,  that  bv  attacking 
the  centre,  and  as  it  were  the  very  heart  of  the  province,  he  ef- 
fected the  most  useful  diversion  in  favour  of  the  north  western 
army,  thereby  depriving  the  Canadians  of  the  ability  to  oppose 
it,  with  sufficient  force,  on  the  Detroit  river.  Finally,  (as  the 
historian  observes,  only  changing  names)  it  is  not  impossible,  that 
General  Dearborn,  listening  to  his  ambition,  had  flattered  him- 
self, that  with  his  own  means  alone,  he  could  acquire  the  ex- 
clusive glory  of  having  put  an  end  to  the  war." 

I  will  continue  the  same  reflections  as  the  historian  has  made 
in  the  other  case,  and  you,  my  fellow  citizens,  will  judge  how 
far  they  are  applicable  :  "  But  whatever  might  have  been  the 
importance  of  the  acquisition  of  Montreal,  (waving  the  probabil- 
ity of  obtaining  it)  every  one  must  readily  perceive  how  much 
greater  was  that  of  the  junction  of  the  two  armies  in  the  centre 
of  the  upper  province.  It  was  very  d«  ubtful,  whether  the  con- 
quest of  a  single  city  would  decide  the  issue  of  the  war;  where- 
as the  junction  of  the  two  armies  offeicd  almost  an  assurance 
of  it.  Perhaps  they  erred  (only  changing  the  British  for  the 
American  administration)  in  this,  in  placing  too  great  confidence 
in  the  reputation,  rank  and  military  experience  of  General 
Dearborn.  But  all  the  ruin  of  the  enterprize  is  clearly  attribut- 
able to  this  want  of  co-operation." 

If  the  observations  made  by  this  celebrated  historian,  in  the 
case  which  he  was  reviewing  are  correct,  the  same  observations 
will  more  strongly  apply  to  the  case  here  presented  to  your 
consideration,  because  General  Dearborn  had  particular  instruc- 
tions which  he  did  not  comply  with,  but  agreed  to  a  suspension 
of  hostilities. 


134 

IF  Sir  William  Howe  was  thus  censured  and  recalled  from  his 
command,  when  his  orders  were  only  discretionary  with  respect 
to  co-operation  with  General  Burgoyne's  army,  I  ask,  and  I 
solemnly  ask,  what  would  have  been  his  fate,  had  his  orders 
from  his  government  been  positive  to  have  co-operated  with 
Burgoyne — and  instead  of  obeying  those  orders,  in  imitation  of 
Dearborn,  he  had  agreed  to  an  armistice  with  General  Wash- 
ington, without  including  Burgoyne's  army,  and  without  mak- 
ing any  provision  that  General  Washington's  army  should  re- 
main, during  the  armistice,  in  the  position  it  then  occupied, 
and  any  part  of  it,  or  the  whole,  with  the  General  at  its  head, 
had  marched  to  the  Hudson,  and  re-enforced  Gates'  army. 

This  might  have  been  done,  under  such  circumstances,  with 
the  most  perfect  safety  to  every  other  part  of  the  country  dur- 
ing this  suspension  of  hostilities  between  Washington  and 
Howe. 

I  believe  you  will  accord  with  me  in  the  opinion,  that  if  Howe 
had  made  such  an  agreement  with  Washington,  it  would  have 
caused  the  immediate  and  certain  destruction  of  Burgoyne  ;  and 
nothing  could  have  sheltered  him  from  te  vengeance  of  any 
administration  which  had  any  regard  to  character,  policy,  or 
justice. 


No.  XXIX* 

On  the  return  of  this  joyful  anniversary  of  our  independence, 
it  would  be  most  grateful  indeed  to  me  only  to  indulge  in  a  re- 
collection of  the  means  by  which  it  was  produced,  and  the  hon- 
ours and  blessings  it  has  afforded,  unmingled  with  any  regrets 
for  subsequent  misfortunes. 

Indeed,  this  event  is  considered  so  important  that  the  cele- 
bration of  it  is  not  confined  to  our  own  country,  but  patriots  and 
sages,  throughout  the  civilized  world,  hail  the  example  as  the 
dawn  of  their  freedom. 

It  affords  me  happiness,  which  no  language  can  express,  that 
I  lived  at  the  period  when  these  great  events  were  passing,  that 
my  little  bark  followed,  and  sailed  attendant,  with  that  of  our 

*  First  published,  in  the  American  Statesman,  Monday,  July  5th,  1824. 


135 

illustrious  deader,  partook  in  a  small  degree  of  the  same  auspi- 
cious gale,  and  witnessed  the  same  glorious  triumph.  When 
those  invaluable  privileges,  which  had  been  acquired,  with  so 
much  success  and  glory,  were  assailed,  I  was  willing  again  to 
raise  my  feeble  arm  for  their  sup>  ort. 

To  what  causes  ought  to  be  attributed  the  misfortunes  which 
succeeded,  is  the  object  of  the  memoirs  which  I  am  now  pre- 
senting for  your  consideration.  I  should  be  wanting  in  grati- 
tude, did  I  not  both  feel  and  express  my  sincere  and  unfeigned 
thanks  for  the  candour  with  which  they  have  been  received, 
and  the  attention  with  which  they  have  been  read.  I  cannot 
omit  on  this  occasion,  to  make  my  particular  acknowledgements 
to  the  conductors  of  our  free  presses,  for  their  liberality,  in 
giving  publicity  to  my  narrative,  and  for  the  candour  and  im- 
partiality which  has  appeared  in  their  editorial  remarks  As 
long  as  this  blessing  is  maintained,  truth  will  break  down  the 
barriers  of  falsehood,  and  overcome  all  opposition. 

This  number  coming  in  its  regular  course,  on  this  auspicious 
day,  no  considerations  ought  to  induce  me  to  deviate  from  the 
system  I  have  adopted.  I  shall  deeply  regret  the  necessity  of 
stating  a  single  fact,  or  drawing  a  single  inference,  which  may 
have  the  least  tendency  to  disturb  the  repose  of  His  Excellency, 
Governour  Eustis,  both  on  account  of  the  personal  friendship, 
which  long  subsisted  between  us,  and  the  high  esteem  I  have 
entertained  for  his  character,  but  likewise  on  account  of  the 
profound  respect  for  the  majority  of  his  electors,  and  my  un- 
shaken attachment,  notwithstanding  all  I  have  suffered,  to  the 
principles  which  have  elevated  him  to  the  chief  magistracy  of 
the  commonwealth.  They  are  principles,  which  I  early  im- 
bibed, for  which,  in  my  youth  I  have  often  fought,  and  which  I 
hope  to  cherish  during  the  future  remnant  of  my  life.  Princi- 
ples are  fixed  and  immutable,  and  it  is  no  reason  to  abandon 
them  because  they  are  sometimes  abused  and  perverted  by  those 
who  profess  to  follow  them,  or  because  innocence  sometimes 
suffers  by  such  abuse,  and  perversion.  I  shall  therefore  now 
present  to  you  an  official  letter  from  His  Excellency,  then  Se- 
cretary of  War,  to  General  Dearborn,  dated  after  the  disasters 
of  the  campaign  had  happened,  which  seems  very  clearly  to  un- 
fold the  views  and  intentions  of  the  administration,  in  relation 
*o  its  misfortunes.     [Vol.  6.  p.  253.] 


136 


"  War  Department^  Dec,  18,  1812. 


"SIR, — Your  letter  of  the  11th  inst.  is  received.  Fortu- 
nately for  you,  the  want  of  success  which  has  attended  the  cam- 
paign will  be  attributed  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  So  long  as 
you  enjoy  the  confidence  of  the  government,  the  clamour  of  the 
discontented  should  not  be  regarded. 

"  Ycu  are  requested  to  make  an  exchange  of  General  Hull, 
as  soon  as  possible. 

[Signed,]        W.  EUSTIS. 

"  Major  General  H.  Dearborn." 

By  this  letter,  it  appears,  that  at  the  time  it  was  dated,  T  was 
a  prisoner,  and  General  Dearborn  was  requested  to  make  an 
arrangement,  and  effect  my  exchange,  as  soon  as  was  possible. 
This  letter,  under  the  circumstances,  speaks  in  language  loo 
plain  to  be  misunderstood.  General  Dearborn  is  informed  that 
it  is  fortunate  for  him,  that  the  want  of  success  which  has  at- 
tended the  campaign  will  be  attributed  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 
H-  re  His  Excellency,  then  Secretary  of  War.  in  a  very  kind 
manner,  agrees  that  all  the  misfortunes  of  the  campaign,  shall 
rest  upon  himself.  He  informs  the  General  that  he  ought  not 
to  regard  the  opinions  of  those  who  are  dissatisfied,  as  long  as 
he  retains  the  confidence  of  the  government. 

What  is  the  proper  construction  to  be  given  to  the  foregoing 
sentence  ?  Is  it  not  obviouslv  this,  that  the  opinions  of  the 
people  ought  to  be  disregarded  as  long  as  General  Dearborn  re- 
tained the  confidence  of  the  administration,  the  servants  of  the 
people  ?  Your  opinions  ought  tc  be  held  in  contempt,  while 
the  opinions  of  those  to  whom  you  have  committed  a  temporary 
authority  ought  to  be  respected  !  Is  this  the  genius  and  spirit 
of  the  government  under  which  you  live?  Can  a  sentiment 
like  this  receive  your  approbation,  however  decorated  with  titles 
and  authority  the  individual  may  be  from  whom  it  proceeds? 
The  opinions  of  the  administration,  to  be  respected,  and  your 
opinions,  my  fellow  citizens,  to  be  disregarded  !  ! — Here  the 
Secretary  acknowledged,  from  under  his  own  hand,  thai  the 
misfortunes  of  the  campaign  would  be  attributed  to  him.  His 
character,  therefore,  as  Secretary  of  War,  by  his  own  confes- 
sion, was  implicated.     Did  it  comport  with  the  dignity  of  his 


137 

office  ar  the  honour  of  his  character,  to  retire,  borne  down  with 
such  a  load  of  opprobrium  ? 

When  he  voluntarily  consented  to  take  these  misfortunes 
from  the  shoulders  of  General  Dearborn  he  knew  they  would 
not  evaporate  in  smoke,  and  that  it  would  require  some  power- 
ful engine  to  remove  them.  Thus  commenced  the  plan  de»- 
signed  for  my  destruction.  By  General  Dearborn's  arrange- 
ments I  was  immediately  exchanged  ;  and,  at  the  same  time 
that  I  received  notice  of  my  exchange,  I  was  arrested,  and 
called  to  answer  to  a  volume  of  charges  prepared  by  Mr.  Dal- 
las, who  had  been  specially  employed  by  the  administration  for 
the  purpose.  He  was  assisted  by  a  number  of  my  officers,  who 
seeing  the  favour  and  patronage  Colonel  Cass  had  received  from 
his  official  letter,  were  willing  to  follow  his  example,  and  were 
not  disappointed  in  their  reward.  All  the  prominent  acts  of  the 
campaign,  in  this  volume  of  charges,  were  made  capital  offences, 
although  many  of  these  very  acts,  had  before,  been  highly  ap- 
proved by  the  very  administration  which  now  exhibited  them. 
This  was  the  engine  which  was  prepared  to  relieve  the  Secre- 
tary, from  the  burden,  which  he  had  in  so  generous  a  manner 
taken  from  the  General's  shoulders.  The  success  of  the  plan 
which  was  formed  for  my  destruction,  is  well  known  to  you,  as 
well  as  the  rewards  which  have  been  given  to  those  who  formed 
and  executed  it.  General  Dearborn  was  continued  in  office, 
with  all  the  emoluments  of  commanding  General,  to  the  close 
of  the  war,  without  any  inquiry  into  his  conduct  for  not  obeying 
the  President's  orders,  and  has  since  been  appointed  Ambas- 
sador to  a  foreign  court,  with  a  compensation  of  thirty-six  thou- 
sand dollars  of  your  money,  for  three  years'  services.  The 
Secretary  of  War,  Governour  Eustis,  retired  from  the  war  de- 
partment, with  the  misfortunes  of  the  campaign  upon  his  shoul- 
ders, and  as  soon  as  he  had  been  relieved  by  the  plan  that  had  been 
adopted,  was  rewarded  with  the  appointment  of  Ambassador  to 
Holland,  with  the  same  compensation  of  thirty-six  thousand 
dollars  for  three  years'  services.  This  letter,  which  until  very 
lately  has  not  been  obtained,  unfolds  the  plan  >f  the  adminis- 
tration, and  a  scene  of  injustice  and  oppression  which  has  few 
examples  in  the  annals  of  the  world. 

This  conduct  of  his  Excellency  will  probably  seem  unac- 
countable and  mysterious.  Every  impartial  man  must  be  of 
IB 


138 

the  opinion  the  misfortunes  of  the  campaign,  ought  to  have  rest- 
ed on  the  officer,  whose   conduct  had  produced  them — notwith- 
standing a  declaration  of  war  was  made  before  a  navy  was  built 
on   lake  Erie,  and  before  other  necessary  preparations    were 
made,  yet  no  fault,  on  that  account  ought,  perhaps  to  have  been 
imputed  to  the  Secretary — notwithstanding  the  delay  in  giving 
me   notice  of  war  being  declared,  and  the  misfortunes  which 
arose  from  that  delay;    and  notwthstanding  the  orders  I  receiv- 
ed to  march  the  army,  I  commanded  to  Detroit,  eighteen  miles 
in  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  principal  fortress,  and  from  thence  to 
commence   offensive   operations,    yet   had    General    Dearborn 
obeyed  the  orders  he  repeatedly  received,  from  Governour  Eus- 
tis,  then  Secretary  of  War,  Upper  Canada  would,  without  any 
doubt  have  been  conquered  that  campaign,  and  we  being  in  pos- 
session of  all  the  harbours,  on  every  side  of  the  lake,  the  navy 
of  the  enemy  must   have   fallen  into   our  possession— -There  is 
the  strongest  possible  grounds  for  an  opinion  of  this  kind,  all 
the  regular  troops  in  the  northern   sections  of  the  country  were 
placed   under  General  Dearborn's  command;  all  the  militia  of 
the  powerful  state  of  New  York,  were  under  his  controul  and 
orders.     Indeed  he  had  the   means  in  his  power  of  making  the 
invasion  from  the  Niagara  River,  with  an  army  capable  of  con- 
quering, as  fast  as  it  could  have  marched,  and  in  his  official  dis- 
patches to  the  government,  in  imitation  of  Caesar — three   words 
only  would  have  been  necessary,   "  Veni,  vidi,  vici."     He  was 
ordered  to  place  the  forces,  under  his  command,   in  suitable 
situations  for  this  purpose,  as  appears  by  the  Secretary's  letters 
to  him,  and  to  attack  the  enemy's  posts,  and  to  co-operate  with 
my  forces — He  did  not  obey  these  orders  of  the  President,  com- 
municated by  the  Secretary,  but  agreed  to  the  armistice,  which 
has  been  fully  stated — This  disobedience  of  orders  was  the  great 
cause  of  the  misfortunes  of  the  campaign — After  the  Secretary 
had  given  the  necessary  orders,  had  they  been  obeyed,  the  ob- 
ject would  have  been  obtained,  and  the  campaign    would  have 
closed  with  conquest  and  glory,  instead  of  misfortune.      Why 
was  he  willing,  to  take  on  himself  that   misfortune,  and  inform 
General  Dearborn  that,  he   was  to  retain  the  corfidence  of  the 
administration,  and  ought  to  disregard  your  opinions  ? 

The  Secretary  well   knew  the  orders  he  had  given  General 
Dearborn,  to  co*operate  with  my  army,  and  how  he  had  disre- 


139 

yarded  them — He  knew  the  manner  in  which  he  had  made  an 
armistice,  and  how  it  was  disapproved  by  the  President — He 
knew  that  it  was  done  without  any  authority,  and  the  effects  it 
had  on  the  operations  of  the  campaign — He  must  have  known 
then  General  Dearborn  ought  to  have  been  responsible,  for  the 
misfortunes,  which  he  took  on  himself  in  his  letter,  which  has 
been  recited.  Why  then,  I  ask  you,  did  he  consent  to  relin- 
quish his  important  office,  in  the  midst  of  a  war,  and  carry  with 
him  disasters,  which  belonged  to  another  ? 

In  reflecting  on  this  subject,  there  certainly  is  great  difficulty 
in  determining,  what  possible  motives  could   have  induced  Vis 
Excellency  to  have  written  this  letter. — He  must  have  known 
better  than  any  other  officer  of  the  government,  all  the  circum- 
stances attending  the  campaign — Fie  well  knew  that  I  had  obey- 
ed every  order,  which  I  had  received  from  the  government,  be- 
cause he  himself  as  the  military  organ,  had  communicated  them 
— He  knew,  that  in  obedience  to  his  orders,  I  had  marched  the 
army  to  Detroit,  after  the  declaration  of  war,  contrary  to  my 
own  opinion. — He  knew  that  I  had  made  the  invasion  of  Cana- 
da, in  conformity  to  the  orders  I  had  received  from  him. — He 
knew  that  an  attack  on  Maiden,   and  all  my  other  orders  ex- 
cepting those  I  have  mentioned  were  discretionary. — With  res- 
pect to  General  Dearborn,  he  well  knew,  that  he  had  neglected 
to  assemble  his  forces  on  the  Niagara  river,  and  co-operate  with 
me  according  to  the  repeated  and  positive  orders  of  the  Presi- 
dent, communicated  by  him.     He  had  a  perfect  knowledge, 
that  without  any  authority,  General  Dearborn  had  agreed  with 
the  enemy,  to  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  in  which  my  army  was 
not  included,   and  that  it  was  disapproved  by  the  President 
and  the  effect  which  it  had  on  the  forces  under  my  command, 
and  on  the  fate  of  the  campaign. — Knowing  therefore  that  Gen- 
eral Dearborn,  had  been  the  cause  of  the  misfortunes  of  the 
campaign,  why  did  he  consent,  to  become  not  only  the  agent  of 
purging  him  from  them,  but  taking  them  on  himself?    If  Gene- 
ral Dearborn  had  done  his  duty,  these  misfortunes  would  not 
have  taken  place. 

I  again  repeat  the  question,  what  could  have  been  the  motives 
of  his  conduct  ? 

They  undoubtedly  were,  to  shelter  the  administration,  and 
especially  the  President,  whose  re-election  was  approaching, 


140 

from  any  censure,  in  consequence  of  these  misfortunes.  Con- 
sidering probably,  that  the  safety  of  the  people,  is  the  supreme 
law,  and  how  much  that  safety  depended,  on  the  officers  of  that 
administration,  as  a  good  patriot,  and  a  dear  lover  of  his  country-, 
he  probably  thought,  that  any  measures  were  justifiable,  which 
were  necessary  to  effect  so  desirable  an  object.  I  was  then  an 
unfortunate  prisoner,  and  the  most  unprecedented,  outrageous, 
and  wicked  measures  had  been  adopted  to  exrite  your  indigna- 
tion against  me.  The  Secretary  himself,  was  one  of  the  admin- 
istration, and  by  his  own  confession,  in  the  letter  which  has 
been  recited,  the  misfortunes  of  the  campaign  were  attributed 
to  him. 

By  General  Dearborn's  letter  of  the  11th  December,  to  which 
the  Secretary's  of  the  18th  was  an  answer,  it  appears  that  he 
was  trembling  on  account  of  discontents,  and  an  opinion  that 
very  generally  prevailed,  that  he  was  most  justly  entitled  to  a 
large  share  of  these  misfortunes.  How  unfortunate  for  His 
Excellency,  whom  we  all  know  to  be  an  honourable  man,  that 
he  ever  consented  to  write  this  letter  in  behalf  of  the  adminis- 
tration, and  to  wipe  off  every  stain  from  the  commanding  Gene- 
ral. Better  for  his  honour,  had  his  hand  been  paralized,  be- 
fore he  suffered  it  to  do  an  act,  which  he  must  have  known  was 
so  evidently  unjust.  His  own  letters,  written  with  the  same 
hand,  to  General  Dearborn,  have  been  recited  in  these  memoirs. 
In  them  it  appears,  he  was  commanded  to  co-operate  with  my 
forces,  in  the  conquest  of  Upper  Canada,  and  instead  of  obey- 
ing those  orders,  he  agreed  to  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  in 
which  my  army  was  not  included*  which  measure  was  disap- 
proved by  the  President.  When  therefore,  he  wrote  this  letter, 
he  perfectly  knew,  that  General  Dearborn  had  not  obeyed  his 
orders,  and  had  done  an  act  which  was  disapproved  by  his  mas- 
ter, which  was  the  final  fatal  cause  of  these  misfortunes.  On 
what  grounds,  then,  could  he  say  to  General  Dearborn,  you  re- 
tain the  confidence  of  the  government,  and  ought  not  to  regard  the 
opinions  of  the  people  !  I  ask  whether  a  greater  insult  on  your 
sovereignty  and  rights,  and  a  more  barefaced  outrage  on  justice 
was  ever  committed  ?  And  why  was  this  done  ?  Perhaps  His 
Excellency  may  say,  that  this  was  an  official  letter,  and  he 
wrote  it  merely  as  the  military  organ  of  the  administration  ? 
—Granted.    Being  however,  one  of  the  administration,  ought 


141 

he  not  to  have  had  more  regard  to  himself,  than  to  have  retired 
from  office  with  misfortunes  winch  did  not  belong  to  him  ;  and 
is  there  any  principle  which  can  justify  him  in  his  attempt,  to 
purify  General  Dearborn,  when  he  must  have  been  sensible, 
how  deeply  he  was  infected. 

With  confidence  I  submit  to  your  consideration,  and  1  be- 
lieve, I  might  now  with  safety,  to  the  candid  judgment  of  His 
Excellency,  whether  it  would  not  have  much  better  comported 
with  the  importance  of  the  occasion,  and  the  principles  of  jus- 
tice, to  have  instituted  an  inquiry  into  the  causes  of  those  mis- 
fortunes, and  to  have  ascertained  to  whom  they  ought  to  have 
been  attributed,  rather  than  to  have  determined  themselves,  my 
fate,  and  only  to  have  appointed  a  court  martial  for  the  mere 
ceremony  of  a  trial  r  The  administration,  however,  did  not 
consider  this  a  safe  mode  of  proceeding  for  themselves,  and  I 
having  been  the  unsuccessful  General. — ir  was  thought  the  pub- 
lic indignation  could  be  transferred  from  them,  and  more  easily 
fixed  on  me,  than  on  any  other  officer.  Hence,  for  more  than 
a  year  every  possible  effort  was  made,  to  excite  this  indignation 
against  me,  and  all  the  officers,  who  could  be  induced  to  be- 
come witnesses  against  me,  were  promoted,  and  patronized  be- 
fore the  trial  commenced. 

I  believe,  my  fellow  citizens,  you  will  be  astonished,  that 
General  Dearborn  should  be  appointed  by  the  administration 
President  of  the  court  martial ;  or  that  he  accepted,  when  he 
knew  how  deeply  he  was  interested  in  the  result  of  the  trial; 
your  astonishment,  however,  I  have  no  doubt,  will  cease  when 
you  read  the  evidence  contained  in  these  memoirs,  and  perceive, 
that  neither  the  administration  nor  the  General,  had  any  other 
safety,  than  by  my  condemnation. 

I  have  stated,  before,  generally,  the  reasons  why  I  did  not 
make  objections. 

In  addition  to  those  reasons,  I  will  now  answer,  that  I  had 
served  with  him  during  the  war  of  the  revolution,  and  that  he 
then  sustained  the  character  of  a  brave  officer.  I  then  could 
not  entertain  the  suspicion,  that  a  brave  man,  could  be  a  dis- 
honourable man. 

Bravery,  honour,  and  impartiality,  I  considered  inseparable 
companions. — The  old  maxim  has  been  confirmed  by  his  con- 
duct, that  there  are  exceptions  to  all  general  rules. 


142 

At  that  time  I  did  not  know  how  deeply  he  was  interested  in 
the  event  of  the  trial.  Although  I  requested,  that  all  the  let- 
ters which  had  any  relation  to  the  campaign,  might  be  sent  to 
the  court  martial,  yet  many,  which  were  favourable  to  me,  were 
withheld  and  could  not  be  found  in  the  public  offices ;  others 
were  likewise  withheld  and  no  reason  given.  It  will  appear  by 
my  defence,  that  when  they  could  not  be  obtained  from  the  of- 
ficers of  the  departments,  I  applied  to  the  President  for  his  in- 
terference, but,  without  success. 

It  will  be  recollected,  that  it  was  then  nearly  two  years  after 
the  events  of  the  campaign  had  taken  place.  That  during  that 
time,  I  had  been  in  arrest,  and  the  administration,  had  exhibit- 
ed capital  charges  against  me ;  that  an  honourable  and  inde- 
pendent court  martial  had  been  appointed  to  assemble  at 
Philadelphia,  the  year  before,  where  I  voluntarily  appeared, 
and  was  ready  for  my  trial ;  that,  that  court  martial  was  dis- 
solved by  the  President,  without  giving  any  reason  for  its  dis- 
solution. That  I  had  been  continued  another  year  in  arrest, 
when  a  new  court  martial  was  selected,  of  which  this  interested 
officer  was  appointed  President.  As  I  had  been  sincerely  de- 
sirous that  all  my  conduct,  during  that  campaign,  should  be  in- 
vestigated, I  feared,  had  I  objected  to  the  organization  of  the 
court,  it  would  have  occasioned  further  delay.  I  felt  so  con- 
scious of  innocence,  and  of  having  faithfully  performed  my  du- 
ties, that  I  preferred  even  a  trial  by  my  enemies,  rather  than  a 
further  procrastination. 

I  did  not  believe  it  was  possible,  that  men,  distinguished  by 
badges  of  honour,  could  act  a  dishonourable  part ;  1  did  not  be- 
lieve it  possible,  that  any  patronage  which  could  be  given  them, 
by  the  administration,  or  indeed  any  considerations  could  in- 
duce them,  to  deviate  from  the  paths  of  Justice  and  Honour, 
which  in  all  ages  have  been  the  glcry  of  the  military  profes- 
sion. 

When,  however,  I  saw  the  commander  in  chief  of  our  armies 
at  the  head,  and  when  I  beheld  a  majority  of  the  members, 
young  Lieutenant  Colonels,  very  lately  promoted  to  that  rank, 
and  some  of  whom,  I  knew  had  been  his  Aids-de-Camp,  and  in- 
troduced into  the  army  by  his  patronage,  and  others,  whose 
names  I  never  had  heard,  until  they  were  called  on  that  service, 
I  thought  it  a  strange  organization  of  a  court   martial  for  the 


143 

trial  of  a  General  officer.  Especially  when  invariable  custom, 
and  the  articles  of  war  provided,  that  officers  should  be  tried  by 
those  of  at  least  as  high  rank  as  themselves,  where  such  officers 
could  be  obtained. 

With  respect  to  the  President,  it  was  strange,  and  indeed 
unprecedented,  to  see  the  first  officer  of  the  army,  serving 
on  a  court  martial.  Some  very  special  reasons,  must  have 
induced  the  President  to  have  made  this  appointment  and  the 
General  to  have  accepted  it.  He  was  the  commanding  General 
of  the  armies  of  the  United  States.  The  spring  of  1814,  was  a 
critical  period  of  the  war  :  it  was  an  established  principle  dur- 
ing the  revolutionary  war,  that  the  commander  in  chief  never 
served  on  a  court  martial  ;  the  reason  is,  that  an  officer  appoint- 
ed a  member,  from  the  time  a  court  martial  is  ordered  until  it  is 
dissolved,  is  not  called  on  to  perform  any  other  duty.  It  was 
several  months  after  this  court  was  instituted  before  it  was  dis- 
solved. The  command  of  the  army  therefore,  during  this  time 
must  have  devolved  on  a  junior  officer.  Unless,  therefore,  some 
very  particular  reasons  had  operated,  would  General  Dearborn 
have  relinquished  the  command  of  the  army,  and  degraded  him- 
self by  performing  a  duty  to  which  the  youngest  General  was^ 
competent  ?  I  believe,  my  fellow  citizens,  you  will  form  a  cor- 
rect opinion  on  this  subject,  and  believe,  that  both  the  fate  of 
the  administration  and  the  fate  of  the  General  depended  so 
much  on  this  trial,  that  they  were  not  willing  to  trust  it  to  other 
hands;  and  likewise  that  the  first  court  martial,  composed  of 
honourable  and  independent  characters  was  dissolved  for  the 
same  reasons. 

I  have  thus  explained  the  preparatory  plan  of  the  administra- 
tion that  you  may  compare  it  with  the  tyrannical  and  barbarous 
principles  the  court  martial  adopted,  and  the  measures  which  it 
pursued. 


144 


No.  XXX. 

On  the  3d  of  January,  1814,  the  Court  Martial,  of  which 
General  Dearborn  was  President,  assembled  at  Albany.  On 
receiving  notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  its  meeting,  I  volun- 
tarily attended.  Although  I  had  been  more  than  a  year  in  ar- 
rest, on  capital  charges,  yet  I  had  never  been  for  a  moment  re- 
strained of  my  liberty,  in  the  least  degree;  and  the  established 
military  custom  of  depriving  an  officer  in  arrest  of  his  sword, 
had  been  waved.  From  a  sense  of  propriety.  I  resigned  it  to 
the  court,  with  the  most  well  founded  expectation,  as  I  firmly 
believed,  it  would  have  been  returned  with  honour.  I  cannot 
but  think  you  will  rightly  estimate  the  motives  of  these  indul- 
gences, and  will  be  satisfied,  they  weie  not  granted  from  any 
favourable  disposition  towards  me.  The  officers  of  the  ad- 
ministration well  knew,  that  I  had  obeyed  every  order  which 
haH  been  given  me,  and  that  I  had  not  been  guilty  of  any  crime 
unless  the  honest  exercise  of  my  discretion,  in  which  they  had 
fully  confided,  was  one.  I  believe  every  man  who  obtains  a 
correct  knowledge  of  the  facts,  will  not  entertain  a  doubt  of  the 
motives  of  this  apparent  liberality.  It  was  undoubtedly  hoped 
that  the  terrour  of  the  charges  would  have  driven  me  from  my 
country,  and  that  such  a  desertion  would  have  been  considered 
as  an  acknowledgment  of  my  guilt,  and  an  absolution  of  the 
faults  of  the  administration. 

If  any  doubts  can  exist,  with  respect  to  the  motives  of  my 
prosecutors,  in  relation  to  this  apparent  liberality,  I  think  they 
must  be  removed  by  the  fact  which  I  shall  now  relate.  On  the 
day  the  sentence  was  passed,  the  28th  of  March,  1814,  by  di- 
rection of  the  Court  Martial,  the  President  wrote  a  letter,  of 
which  the  following  is  a  copy. 

Albany,  March  28th,  1814. 

SIR, — You  will  please  to  return  to  your  usual  place  of  resi- 
dence, in  Massachusetts,  and  there  continue,  until  you  shall  re- 
ceive orders  from  the  President  of  the  United  Stales. 
Your  humble  servant, 

H.  DEARBORN,  Major  Gen. 
and  President  of  the  Court. 
Brig.  Gen.  Wm.  Hull. 


145 

The  seat  of  the  court  martial  was  at  Albany,  and  the  seat  o£ 
the  government  at  Washington,  where  the  President  resided. 
The  sentence  was  capital.  I  ask  you,  my  fellow  citizens,  on 
\vhat  grounds  the  court  martial  would  have  dared,  thus  to  have 
left  me,  by  its  own  order,  at  perfect  liberty  after  such  a  sen- 
tence ?  Is  not  this  conclusive  evidence  in  your  minds,  that  there 
was  a  concert,  and  understanding  between  the  leading  members 
of  the  court  martial  and  the  administration,  and  that  the  sen- 
tence, which  was  to  be  pronounced,  was  determined  in  the  cab- 
inet at  Washington,  before  I  was  called  to  answer,  or  a  witness 
was  examined  ?  And  whether  it  was  not  likewise  determined 
that  the  sentence  should  be  remitted  ?  i  ask  you  to  account  for 
this  conduct,  on  any  other  principles  ? 

Conscious  of  innocence,  I  never  asked  myself  for  mercy  nor 
authorized  a  friend  to  intercede  in  my  behalf.  Had  I  been 
guilty  of  the  crimes  with  which  I  had  been  charged,  I  ought  in 
justice  to  you,  to  have  made  an  atonement  by  my  blood.  I  must 
again  repeat  the  question,  whether  the  court  martial  could  have 
dared  thus  to  have  given  me  my  liberty,  by  which  I  might  have 
avoided  the  execution  of  the  sentence,  unless  such  a  concert 
and  understanding  existed  before  the  trial  i9  Such  conduct 
would  be  trifling  with  the  most  important  duties,  which  men 
can  be  called  to  perform ;  it  would  indeed  have  been  making, 
not  only  a  mere  ceremony,  but  even  a  mockery  of  justice.  The 
despicable  meanness  of  leaving  me  in  a  situation,  to  avoid  the 
sentence,  of  which  they  were  ashamed,  no  language  can  de- 
scribe, and  no  example  can  be  found,  from  Adam  to  the  present 
moment. 

Before  the  trial  commenced,  I  objected  to  the  employment  of 
other  counsel  than  the  Judge  Advocate  in  the  following  lan- 
guage. [See  Lt.  Col.  Forbes'  report  of  the  trial,  page  12.] 
"  Whatever  reasons  may  be  urged,  to  exclude  professional  aid 
on  the  part  of  the  prisoner,  let  me  ask  with  great  respect  why 
they  will  not  equally  apply,  on  the  part  of  the  prosecution. 
And  yet  it  is  most  evident,  that  the  officers  of  the  government 
who  have  instituted  this  prosecution,  have  not  felt  the  force  of 
those  reasons  : — If  they  had,  they  would  have  left  the  prosecu- 
tion, to  be  conducted  by  the  military  prosecutor.  And  yet  it  is 
seen,  to  the  charges  drawn  up  against  me,  the  name  of  one  of 
the  most  eminent  counsel  in  the  United  States  :  and  I  likewise 
19 


146 

lind  enlisted  against  me,  in  aid  of  the  military  Judge  Advocate, 
a  professional  gentlemen  of  this  State,  not  less  distinguished 
for  his  talents." 

I  have  made  this  statements  in  order  to  show  to  you  in  the 
plainest  manner,  the  inconsistent,  unequal,  and  tyrannical 
principles  which  were  adopted  by  the  court  martial  in  the  com- 
mencement of  the  trial,  to  contrast  them  with  the  decision, 
which  at  the  same  time  was  made  on  my  application  for  coun- 
sel, to  assist  me  in  my  defence. 

I  cannot  but  here  observe,  that  not  only  the  character,  which  I 
had  established  in  a  life  of  public  services,  for  near  half  a  cen- 
tury, and  particularly  in  fighting  the  battles  for  your  safety, 
glory,  and  independence,  was  at  stake,  but  tiaat  life  which  God 
has  given  me. 

I  did  not  ask  to  be  permitted  to  employ  counsel  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  government,  but  at  my  own  expense. 

I  will  now  inform  you,  what  was  the  decision  of  the  court, 
which  was  rigidly  adhered  to  throughout  the  whole  trial. 

That  the  counsel,  employed  by  the  administration,  my  prose- 
cutors, should  be  admitted  to  examine  the  witnesses,  produce 
the  documents,  speak  to  all  collateral  questions,  and  lastly,  to 
the  final  question,  and  that  I  should  not  be  permitted  to  em- 
ploy counsel,  even  at  my  own  expense,  to  open  their  lips,  in 
the  presence  of  the  court,  in  examining  witnesses,  producing 
documents,  or  speaking  on  any  collateral  questions  of  law, 
which  might  arise,  in  the  course  of  the  trial,  or  on  the  final 
question,  whether  guilty  or  not  guilty.  Here  you  see,  one  rule 
was  established  for  the  prosecution,  and  another  for  the  prisoner 
in  his  defence.  My  object  will  be,  now,  to  prove  to  you,  that 
this  decision  of  the  court  martial,  was  not  only  unequal,  incon- 
sistent, and  tyrannical,  but  that  it  was  contrary  to  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  our  government,  and  the  spirit  of  the  con- 
stitution of  our  country.  To  that  constitution  which  was  ob- 
tained, by  the  blood  of  many  of  your  Fathers  I  now  appeal, 
and  if  the  members  of  that  court  martial  will  read  it  in  the 
spirit  of  candour,  they  must  feel  shame  and  remorse,  for  the 
principle  they  adopted. 

By  this  constitution,  it  is  provided,  that  in  all  criminal  prose- 
cutions, the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right,  to  have  the  assistance 


147 

of  counsel  for  his  defence.      Here  the  right  is  placed  on  the 
broadest  foundation. 

This  right  is  the  property  of  every  individual.  No  power 
can  deprive  him  of  it.  It  is  the  first,  and  highest  law  of  the 
land — Congress  has  no  authority  to  make  a  law  contrary  to  it — 
It  is  binding  on  all  courts,  both  civil  and  military. 

Instead  of  adopting  the  rational  and  liberal  principles,  and 
spirit  of  our  constitution,  which  ought  to  be  engrafted  on  all  our 
institutions,  the  court  martial  searched  the  records  of  that  na- 
tion with  which  we  were  then  at  war,  and  from  which  we  had 
separated,  on  account,  of  the  oppression,  and  tyranny  of  its  gov- 
ernment. In  those  records  far  back,  in  the  dark  ages  of  arbi- 
trary and  despotic  government,  when  a  prosecution  by  the 
Crown,  was  in  effect,  a  sentence  of  death,  and  when  the  object 
was  to  guard  against  every  interposition,  between  the  accused, 
and  the  sword  of  the  king.  The  court  martial,  with  the  assis- 
tance of  their  unauthorized  special  Judge  Advocate,  found  some 
authorities,  on  which  to  ground  their  decision. 

In  recurring  to  the  authorities,  on  which  those  tyrannical 
principles  adopted  by  the  court  martial  were  founded,  it  will  be 
seen,  that  the  English  writers,  who  have  attempted  to  support 
them,  finding  they  were  contrary  to  the  fundameL'al  principles 
of  the  British  government,  were  obliged  to  refer  to  the  practice 
of  the  Egyptians  for  their  support. 

As  I  observed  to  the  court  martial,  every  commentator  who 
has  written  on  the  subject,  has  blushed  for  the  absurdity  and 
barbarity  of  the  reasons  on  which,  the  exclusion  of  counsel,  in 
behalf  of  the  prisoner,  is  founded.  Speaking  of  this  rule,  Black- 
stone  says,  "  It  is  a  rule,  which  however,  it  may  be  palliated, 
seems  not  to  be  of  a  piece  with  the  rest  of  the  humane  treatment 
of  prisoners,  by  the  English  law;  for  on  what  face  of  reason 
can  that  assistance  be  denied  to  save  the  life  of  a  man,  which  is 
allowed  him  in  every  petty  trespass." 

Christian,  in  his  Notes  on  Blackstone,  says — "It  is  very  ex- 
traordinary, the  assistance  of  counsel  should  be  denied,  where  it 
is  wanted  most.  That  i9  when  it  is  wanted  to  defend  the  life, 
the  honour,  and  all  the  property  of  an  individual." 

Thus  we  see  the  light  in  which  the  liberal  commentators,  con- 
sider this  subject. 

Shall  we,  then,  who  live  under  the  freest  government  in  the 


148 

world,  be  governed  by  rules,  which  are  derived  from  such  '& 
source,  and  have  originated  in  such  motives  ?  Shall  we  adopt 
rules  at  which  the  sense,  reason,  and  humanity  of  mankind, 
since  the  civilization  of  the  world,  have  revolted  ?  I  ask  these 
questions  ith  a  confidence,  that  when  you,  my  fellow  citizens, 
have  considered  them,  you  will  answer  them,  with  the  spirit  of 
freemen,  and  stamp  your  indignation  on  any  tribunal,  acting  un- 
der your  mild  constitution,  which  has  adopted  such  inhuman, 
and  barbarous  principles ;  principles  so  contrary,  to  the  genius 
and  spirit  of  the  government,  under  which  you  live. 

If,  my  fellow  citizens,  you  find  such  principles,  as  have  here 
been  exhibited,  adopted  by  the  court  martial,  at  the  commence- 
ment of  its  proceedings,  what  will  be  your  expectations  in  the 
progress  and  final  issue  of  the  cause.  To  your  candid  judg- 
ment I  submit  the  subject  of  this  memoir,  and  in  my  next,  shall 
consider  the  conduct  of  the  court,  in  admitting  the  opinions  of 
the  witnesses  to  prove  the  charges  against  me. 


No.  XXXI. 


I  much  fear  that  I  shall  not  be  able  to  do  justice  to  the  sub- 
ject of  this  number.  Each  of  you,  my  fellow  citizens,  as  v/ell 
as  myself,  have  a  deep  interest  in  the  principles  which  will  be 
considered— not  only  your  characters  and  all  that  is  dear  to 
you,  L>ut  your  lives  may  depend  on  them.  It  is  easy  to  make 
out  a  string  of  capital  charges  against  any  individual  in  public 
or  private  life.  If  the  opinions  of  witnesses  are  admitted  as 
evidence  to  prove  such  charges,  the  witnesses  themselves  become 
the  judges,  and  the  necessity  of  any  other  judicial  tribunal  is 
superceded.  All  the  proceedings  may  be  summary;  it  will  on- 
ly be  necessary  for  the  accusers,  which  in  this  case  were  the  ad- 
ministration, to  call  up  the  witnesses,  take  their  opinions,  and 
execute  the  sentence.  Such  a  precedent  becomes  law  !  and 
must  govern  in  future  similar  cases.  Whenever  the  court  ad- 
mits the  opinion  of  witnesses  as  evidence  of  the  proof  of  facts, 


149 

it  yields  up  its  prerogative  to  the  witnesses,  and  they  really  ap- 
pear in  the  novel  character  of  judges. 

In  the  present  depraved  state  of  human  nature,  the  most  in- 
calculable evils  would  be  produced  by  a  system  of  this  kind. 
Interest,  prejudice,  revenge,  and  malice  have  so  powerful  an 
influence  on  human  conduct,  that  the  ties  of  moral  obligation 
are  broken  by  them,  like  cobwebs,  and  lose  all  their  binding  in- 
fluence. By  the  admission  of  such  a  principle,  therefore,  the 
lives  and  dearest  interests  of  any  individual  may  easily  be  sa- 
crificed on  any  altar,  where  such  passions  are  kindled. 

Where  facts  are  necessary  to  prove  charges,  witnesses  are 
restrained  by  the  obligations  of  oaths.  Their  testimony  is  lia- 
ble to  be  controulled  by  other  testimony,  and  if  it  appears  they 
have  testified  falsely  they  are  liable  to  be  indicted,  and  punish- 
ed for  the  crime  of  perjury.  The  obligation  of  an  oath,  for  the 
proof  of  facts  is  the  best  security  that  can  be  afforded.  This 
security  is  entirely  removed  where  the  opinion  of  witnesses  are 
taken.  For  no  man  is  liable  to  punishment  for  his  opinion,  and 
it  would  be  impossible  to  prove  the  motives  that  induced  hi  in  to 
give  it.  They  remain  in  his  own  breast.  The  Court  Martial 
was  appointed  to  determine  whether  certain  facts  were  true 
which  constituted  criminal  charges.  The  witnesses  were  per- 
mitted by  the  court  to  give  their  own  opinions,  without  stating 
any  facts  which  would  be  the  least  foundation  for  them.  The 
facts  on  which  the  charges  against  me  were  founded,  were — 

1st.  For  employing  a  small  vessel  at  the  Miami  of  lake  Erie, 
to  transport  the  sick  and  baggage  not  wanted  on  the  march,  to 
Detroit,  the  distance  being  about  seventy  miles. 

2dly.   For  not  attacking  the  enemy's  fortress  at  Maiden. 

3dly.  For  retreating  to  Detroit  and  there  taking  a  defensive 
position. 

4thly.  For  not  opening  my  communication  to  Ohio  ; — and 
5thly,  for  agreeing  to  the  capitulation. 

For  the  employment  of  the  vessel  a  charge  of  treason  was 
founded.  By  the  foregoing  numbers  it  will  appear,  that  this 
measure  would  have  been  highly  proper,  in  time  of  peace,  and 
that  I  had  received  no  knowledge  of  the  war.  And  this  want 
of  knowledge,  was  occasioned  by  the  fault  of  the  Secretary  of 
"War,  in  not  giving  me  as  early  notice  of  it  as  might  have 
been  given, — and  the  evidence  was  stronger  (if  there  had  beea 


150 

treason)  that  it  was  at  Washington,  than  at  my  camp.  It'  any 
precedents  could  have  been  found,  where  the  opinions  of  wit- 
nesses had  been  admitted  to  have  proved  overt  acts  of  treason, 
this  charge  might  undoubtedly  have  been  proved.  To  establish 
a  new  precedent,  after  great  deliberation,  was  thought  too  open, 
and  too  outrageous  an  attack  on  justice.  The  reaction  it  would 
have  on  the  administration,  probably  operated  more  powerfully, 
than  any  other  consideration.  As  I  have  before  observed, 
on  this  charge,  and  its  specifications,  I  was  acquitted,  and  opin- 
ions were  reserved  for  those  which  followed.  By  a  recurrence 
to  the  evidence  which  has  been  exhibited,  contained  in  the  let- 
ters of  the  Secretary  of  War,  it  will  be  seen,  that  I  had  no  or- 
ders on  any  of  the  subjects,  and  that  all  these  acts  were  intrust- 
ed by  the  administration  to  my  discretion.  The  crimes,  there- 
fore, of  which  the  administration  accused  me,  were,  for  not 
exercising  this  discretion  properly;  for  not  exercising  it  in  the 
manner  which  some  of  the  militia  officers  of  the  state  of  Ohio* 
thought  they  would  have  exercised  it,  had  they  commanded  the 
army,  and  had  it  been  intrusted  to  them.  If  they  had  been 
Generals,  (and  some  of  them  were  so  created,  immediately  af- 
ter the  campaign,  by  the  administration,  for  their  wordy 
valour,)  they  would  have  attacked  Maiden,  they  would  not 
have  recrossed  the  Detroit  river,  they  would  have  opened  the 
communication  to  Ohio,  they  would  not  have  agreed  to  the  ca- 
pitulation. 

By  an  attention  to  the  evidence  against  me  on  the  four  last 
charges,  it  will  likewise  be  seen,  that  the  opinions  of  these  same 
inexperienced,  and  interested  officers,  were  received  by  the 
court  martial,  to  prove  my  depression  of  spirits,  and  the  altera- 
tion of  my  countenance.  For  two  or  three  nights,  I  had  little  or 
no  sleep,  and  had  very  few  officers  to  assist  me,  in  whom  1 
could  place  the  least  confidence.  My  principal  officer,  Colonel 
Miller,  was  sick  and  unable  to  perform  any  duty.  With  entire 
confidence  I  shall  submit  to  your  judgment,  whether  the  fatigues 
I  had  endured,  the  high  responsibility  of  my  situation,  and  the 
want  of  any  kind  of  assistance,  on  which  I  could  depend,  will 
not  sufficiently  account  for  a  depression  of  spirits,  and  a  differ- 
ent appearance  of  countenance  ?  Colonel  Snelling  was  promot- 
ed and  selected  as  a  leading  witn^stf  against  me.  It  is  a  duty 
I  owe  both  to  myself  and  to  you,  to  state  his  situation  at  that 


151 

time,  and  show  how  deeply  interested  he  was  in  the  result  of 
my   trial. 

On  the  night  of  the  15th  of  August,  he  commanded  the  guard, 
stationed  at  the  Spring  Wells,  and  there  was  attached  to  his 
command  a  piece  of  artillery.  At  this  place  General  Brock 
landed  with  his  army  the  next  morning  at  day-light.  Colonel 
Snelling  was  ordered  to  remain  at  this  post,  until  he  received 
orders  from  me  to  retreat,  or  until  he  was  compelled  by  a  supe- 
riour  force  of  the  enemy — and  to  give  me  information  of  any 
movements  of  the  enemy  The  Spring  Wells  were  opposite  to 
Sandwich,  where  General  Brock's  forces  were  stationed,  and 
his  vessels  of  war  were  on  the  river  between  the  two  places. 
Colonel  Snelling  without  any  orders  from  me  left  his  post,  and 
marched  his  men  to  the  fort,  with  the  piece  of  artillery,  a  little 
before  day  light  on  the  morning  of  the  16th.  His  testimony 
before  the  Court  Martial  is  in  these  words — u  I  returned  with 
my  detachment  before  day,  I  think  the  dawn  was  perceptible  on 
my  arrival  at  the  fort,  but  am  not  certain  ;  the  piece  of  artille- 
ry I  left  at  the  gate  of  the  citadel — my  detachment  I  marched 
into  the  fort." 

When  Col.  Snelling  was  giving  his  testimony,  and  was  in- 
quired of,  from  whom  he  received  orders  to  return  from  his  sta- 
tion at  the  Spring  Wells  at  day  light,  in  the  morning,  he  an- 
swered— "  From  some  person  in  the  General's  family,  I  do  not 
recollect  whom,  I  believe  from  Brigade-Major  Jessup,  but  am 
not  certain."  Col.  Snelling  wished  afterwards  to  alter  this 
testimony,  and  then  said  there  was  a  man  called  Col.  Wallace, 
not  recognized  by  the  officers,  He  did  not,  however,  say  he 
received  orders  from  him. 

These  facts  he  acknowledged,  and  thus  he  equivocated  in  his 
testimony. 

Major  Jessup  was  present,  when  he  made  this  acknowledg- 
ment in  hi9  testimony,  of  leaving  his  post,  and  undoubtedly  in- 
formed him  that  he  did  not  give  him  the  orders,  which  induced 
him  to  alter  his  testimony.  His  mere  hint,  with  respect  to 
Col.  Wallace,  was  probably  intended  to  make  an  mqyession 
that  he  received  the  orders  from  him.  Although  he  does  not 
say  it,  as  Col.  Wallace  was  present,  and  would  have  contradict- 
ed it;  and  there  was  this  further  reason,  ashehk.  se'f  declared, 
that  Colonel  Wallace,  was  not  recognized  bv  the  officers,  as  an 


152 

sid-de-camp,  and  consequently,  had  no  authority  to  give  such 
orders. 

Knowing  the  fact,  that,  he  had  abandoned  his  post  without 
orders,  he  well  knew  what  his  fate  must  have  been,  had  I  been 
acquitted.  Nothing  but  the  events  of  the  16th,  prevented  me 
from  arresting  him  at  that  time.  In  forming  a  judgment  on  his 
testimony  the  fact  here  related,  you  will,  undoubtedly,  think 
ought  to  be  kept  in  mind.  Col.  Snelling  was  not  on  trial,  and 
the  court  did  not  think  proper  to  investigate  the  fact,  although  I 
stated  I  had  not  authorized  any  officer,  to  order  him  from  his 
post. 

As  his  opinion  was  relied  on  to  prove  the  most  important 
charges,  it  would  have  been  dangerous  to  have  suffered  any 
thing  to  have  been  said  which  would  have  invalidated  his  testi- 
mony. These  opinions  were  received  to  prove  entire  charges, 
and  entire  specifications  of  charges.  By  thus  receiving  the 
opinions  of  a  witness  in  the  whole  matter  in  issue,  or  on  a  par- 
ticular specification,  in  a  charge,  is  precisely  the  same,  as  pre- 
senting the  list  of  charges,  and  asking  each  individual  witness, 
whether  he  believes  the  accused  guilty  ?  If  the  witness  is  cred- 
ited, of  what  use  is  it  for  the  court  to  go  farther  ?  The  accused 
is  found  guilty  by  the  opinion  of  the  witness,  and  the  members 
of  the  Court  Martial  become  the  mere  organs  of  his  opinion. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  the  witness  swears  to  facts,  the  court  is  left 
to  decide,  whether  the  facts  are  proved,  and  whether  the  facts 
thus  proved  constitute  the  charges.  As  a  fact,  a  witness  can 
answer  with  certainty ;  his  testimony,  if  untrue,  can  be  im- 
peached, circumstances  may  be  introduced,  to  rebut  its  infer- 
ences ;  but  where  is  the  restraint  on  opinion  r  The  witness  is 
licensed  and  free  I  He  roams  at  large,  and  if  unchecked  by  any 
moral  obligation,  he  finds  an  easy  victim  in  any  individual, 
against  whom  the  want  of  success  alone,  has  excited  the  public 
clamour. 

To  engraft  a  scion  of  this  kind,  on  the  tree  of  liberty,  which 
was  not  only  planted  by  our  forefathers,  in  this  soil  of  freedom, 
but  protected  by  their  valour,  and  nurtured  and  defended  by 
their  gallant  descend.ints,  would  produce  a  branch,  whose  fruit 
would  be  as  dissimilar  to  that  of  the  original  stock,  as  despotism 
is  dissimilar  to  freedom, — and  the  laste  of  which  could  never 
be  relished,  by  the  present  or  future  generations. 


i53 

If  the  human  feelings  and  passions  can  be  determined  by  the 
appearance  of  the  countenance,  and  witnesses  are  admitted  to 
testify  what  those  feelings  and  passions  are  by  this  standard., 
and  capital  offences  are  to  be  proved  in  this  manner,  I  ask  you 
to  consider  to  what  dreadful  consequences  such  a  doctrine 
would  lead,  \llow  me  here  to  offer  an  illustration.  When 
Colonel  Snelling  was  on  the  stand,  giving  his  testimony  before 
the  court  martial,  I  myself,  and  many  others  present,  observed 
a  strange  and  unusual  appearance  in  his  countenance ;  we  were 
of  the  opinion  that  it  indicated  strong  features  of  prejudice, 
malice,  and  revenge  against  me,  and  a  fixed  determination  to 
say  every  thing  he  could  bring  to  his  recollection  to  injure  me, 
and  prove  the  high  charges  which  were  exhibited  against  me. 
Suppose  Colonel  Snelling  had  been  indicted  for  perjury,  for  giv- 
ing this  testimony— and  suppose  we  had  been  called  on  as  wit- 
nesses, to  have  proved  that  he  had  been  guilty  of  perjury — 
w»uld  our  testimony,  whatever  knowledge  we  might  have  pro- 
fessed to  have  acquired  in  physiognomy,  have  been  admitted  by 
any  court,  to  have  proved,  by  the  expression  of  his  countenance, 
that  he  had  been  guilty  of  perjury  ? 

It  is  impossible  to  conceive  the  evils  which  would  result  from 
admitting  the  opinions  of  witnesses  in  proof  of  charges  of  this 
kind.  The  judgment  of  the  court,  distracted  amidst  the  con- 
flicting opinions  of  conflicting  interests,  has  no  guide ;  its  pow- 
ers are  transferred  to  another  tribunal ;  and  tbe  unfortunate 
prisoner  stands  convicted,  not  on  facts,  but  on  opinions.  The 
result  of  such  proceedings  must  necessarily  lead  to  the  most  un- 
heard of  abuses.  An  administration,  instead  of  resorting  to  the 
ordinary  modes  of  criminal  proof,  would  have  only  to  hunt  up 
opinions,  to  bring  to  the  scaffold  the  most  meritorious  charac- 
ters. The  experience,  knowledge  and  characters  of  the  wit- 
nesses, in  the  case  now  under  review,  will  present  a  striking 
illustration  of  the  subject.  They  were  principally  militia  offi- 
cers,  born  and  educated  in  the  wilderness  of  Ohio,  who  had  no 
other  knowledge  of  military  movements,  excepting  what  they 
had  acquired  in  the  training  of  companies  about  their  doors. 
They  had  been  elected  as  officers  by  the  men  they  commanded 
who  considered  themselves  in  every  respect  as  their  equals,  and 
would  not  submit  to  the  necessary  restraints  of  military  disci- 
pline. If  they  received  any  orders  from  these  officers  which 
20 


154 

they  disapproved,  it  was  their  custom  to  consult  together,  and 
determine  what  measures  should  be  pursued.  It  frequently 
happened,  that  these  officers  were  treated  with  the  greatest  in- 
dignity ;  and  one  of  the  officers  of  the  4th  regiment  testified,  on 
my  trial,  (see  Lieut.  Col.  Forbes'  report,  page  124)  "that<ne 
evening,  at  Urbanna,  there  w:ts  a  noise ;  when  he  [witness]  ran 
out  to  inquire  the  cause,  and  saw  some  men  of  his  regiment, 
who  informed  him,  it  was  only  some  of  the  Ohio  militia  riding 
one  of  their  officers  on  a  railP 

It  is  with  deep  regret  that  I  mention  circumstances  of  this 
kind,  and  should  not  do  it,  were  it  not  necessarv  you  should 
know  the  character  of  both  officers  and  soldiers  who  composed 
the  army  furnished  by  the  administration. 

Farther  to  illustrate  the  subject  under  review;  I  will  here  re- 
peat the  same  observations  which  I  made  before  the  court  rnar- 
tian  in  my  defence.  I  recite  the  words  of  my  defence,  because 
if  I  had  then  made  any  statement  which  was  not  founded  in 
truth,  the  court  would  have  corrected  me. 

"  It  seems  extraordinary,  that  there  has  not  been  a  witness 
examined  on  the  part  of  the  prosecution,  who  has  not  been  pro- 
moted since  he  was  under  my  command.  A  great  majority  of 
the  young  gentlemen  who  have  been  called  by  the  Judge  Advo- 
cate, have  appeared  decorated  with  their  epaulets ;  these  have 
been  bestowed,  and  sometimes  with  the  augmentation  of  a  star, 
Upon  gentlemen  who  began  their  military  career  with  my  unfor- 
tunate campaign. 

"  By  what  services  many  of  these  gentlemen  have  merited 
such  rapid  promotion,  I  have  not  learned  But  if  it  all  arises 
out  of  their  achievements  while  under  my  command,  I  must  say, 
that  it  appears  to  me  my  expedition  was  more  prolific  of  promo- 
tion than  any  other  unsuccessful  military  enterprise  I  ever 
heard  of. 

"  It  cannot  be  that  it  has  been  intended  to  give  a  weight  to 
the  testimony  of  these  witnesses,  by  giving  them  ranks  and 
honours,  which  it  would  not  otherwise  have  had.  But  when 
my  military  character  and  measures  are  to  be  tested  by  the 
opini  ns  of  gentlemen,  with  high  sounding  titles  of  military 
rank,  I  think  it  necessary  to  remind  the  court,  that  with  the  ex- 
ception of  a  few  of  the  young  officers,  there  are  none  of  them 
who  have  not  been  promoted  to  their  high  stations  without  hav- 


155 

ing  had  any  military  experience,  and  without,  as  far  as  I  have 
heard,  ever  having  discovered  any  military  talent  or  genius. 

"If  the  opinions  of  witnesses,  on  military  subjects,  ought  in 
any  case  to  be  listened  to,  (which  I  conceive  ought  not  to  be) 
yet  I  think  the  opinions  of  men  of  these  descriptions  ought  to  be 
received  with  the  greatest  caution." 

Without  imputing  unworthy  motives  to  die  administration, 
in  making  these  promotions,  as  inducements  to  the  witnesses  to 
give  a  high  colouring  to  their  testimony.  I  endeavoured  to 
account  for  it  in  the  following  language. 

"  The  extraordinary  promotions  which  the  witnesses  against 
me  have  generallv  attained,  I  think  may  be  accounted  for,  by  a 
recurrence  to  the  fact  of  which  this  trial  has  afforded  the  most 
conclusive  evidence ;  which  is,  that  each  of  the  witnesses,  from 
the  General  to  the  youngest  and  lowest  officer  that  has  been 
called  by  the  Judge  Advocate,  is  himself,  in  his  own  opinion,  a 
hero. 

"From  General  McArthur,  who  thought  himself  capable  of 
fighting  a  whole  garrison,  down  to  the  lowest  rank,  every  officer 
seems  to  have  thought,  that  if  he  had  been  the  commanding 
General,  or  if  I  had  taken  his  advice,  all  would  have  gone  well. 
No  doubt  they  have,  in  justice  to  themselves,  made  these  repre- 
sentations to  the  government ;  and  their  rank  must  be  consider- 
ed a  reward  for  the  great  things  which  they  said  they  would 
have  done,  rather  than  to  have  been  acquired  by  any  actual 
service." 

Before  I  close  this  number,  I  cannot  omit  to  make  some  ob- 
servations on  the  unprecedented  rule  which  the  court  adopted 
in  the  examination  of  the  witnesses,  which  was,  to  examine  each 
witness  in  the  presence  of  the  rest.  And  here  I  will  make  the 
same  remarks  which  I  made  in  my  defence. 

"Till  this  court  decided  that  it  should  be  so,  I  did  think  it 
was  a  well  established  rule  of  martial  as  well  as  civil  law,  that 
the  witnesses  should  be  examined  separately.  The  justice  and 
propriety  of  this  rule  I  have  very  sensibly  felt  on  this  occasion. 
In  a  case  where  so  much  may  depend  upon  the  language  or 
phrases  in  which  the  witnesses  express  themselves,  it  would 
have  been  desirable,  that  each  should  have  been  left  to  the  ne- 
cessity of  selecting  his  own  language  to  express  his  meaning, 
But  according  to  the  course  pursued,  each  witness  was  at  liber- 


\ 


156 

ty  to  adopt  the  words  which  had  been  used  by  any  other  wit' 
ness  on  the  same  point.— -The  disposition  of  several  of  the  wit- 
nesses to  do  so,  has  been  very  plainly  manifested,  by  their 
answering,  when  interrogated  respecting  my  personal  beha- 
viour, that  it  was  the  same  as  had  been  represented  by  a  prior 
witness." 

In  these  courts  martial,  when  the  members,  among  whom 
there  may  be  great  inequality  of  grades,  are  intended  to  be  put 
on  an  equal  footing  as  judges,  care  has  been  taken  to  avoid,  as 
far  as  possible,  the  influence  likely  to  arise  from  authority.  It 
is  on  this  account,  that  the  opinion  of  the  youngest  is  always 
first  taken.  And  it  was  on  the  same  account,  as  I  conceive, 
that  the  rule  was  established,  that  witnesses  should  be  examin- 
ed separately — that  the  younger  might  not  be  influenced  in  his 
testimony  by  what  might  be  said  by  his  superiour  It  would  be 
contrary  to  experience  of  the  human  disposition  to  suppose,  af- 
ter a  subaltern  had  heard  two  or  three  Generals,  and  officers  of 
higher  rank  'han  himself,  testify,  to  whose  authority  he  is  per 
haps  subservient,  or  to  whose  good  word  he  may  have  owed,  or 
expects  to  owe,  his  promotion,  that  he  will  be  willing  to  contra- 
dict what  his  superiours  have  said,  or  even  to  make  a  repre- 
sentation which  will  vary  from  theirs. 

If,  in  any  case,  the  weight  of  this  sort  of  influence  could 
be  felt  on  the  testimony,  the  mode  which  was  pursued  gave  it 
the  fairest  scope. 

The  witnesses  were  generally  arranged,  and  produced  ac- 
cording to  their  rank,  commencing  with  those  who  had  been  pro- 
moted from  the  rank  of  Lieutenant  Colonels  in  the  Ohio  militia, 
to  the  rank  of  Generals  in  the  standing  army,  and  the  principal 
one  with  an  additional  appointment  as  Governour  of  the  terri- 
tory of  Michigan,  which  appointment,  for  nine  years,  I  had 
held,  during  which  time  my  conduct  in  that  station  had  uni- 
formly received  the  approbation  of  the  government.  When  the 
trial  commenced,  the  question  arose,  whether  the  witnesses 
ought  to  be  examined  in  the  presence  of  each  other;  to  which 
the  President,  General  Dearborn,  replied,  that  it  was  not  ne- 
cessary, in  his  judgment,  to  examine  them  apart.  [See  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Forbes'  report,  page  llf.]  As  all  the  proceed- 
ings of  the  court  were  regulated  by  his  opinion,  it  would  have 
been  only  a  useless  waste  of  time  to  have  discussed  the  ques- 


157 

tion.-^-His  judgment  was  pronounced  in  a  positive  manner,  and 
the  Court  at  once  acquiesced  in  it.  As  the  strong  barriers  of 
the  constitution  had  been  no  security,  but  had  been  overleaped, 
on  other  questions  ;  and  objections  on  this  could  only  have  been 
drawn  from  precedent,  and  the  authority  of  the  best  writers  on 
military  subjects  ;  I  believe  you  will  be  satisfied  that  any  rea- 
sons I  might  have  offered  would  have  been  unavailing — especial- 
ly after  the  judgment  of  so  gjreat  an  authority  as  the  command- 
er in  chief  had  been  pronounced  ;  especially  as  the  whole  plot 
which  had  been  concerted  might  have  failed. 

Thus  have  1  exhibited  some  of  the  leading  principles  by 
which  the  proceedings  of  the  Court  Mar  ial  were  governed,  tor 
the  purpose  of  giving  you  a  knowledge  of  the  manner  in  which 
my  trial  was  conducted. 

If  this  were  the  conduct  of  the  Court  Martial,  it  may  be  ask- 
ed why  I  addressed  them  in  different  language  in  my  defence. 
The  reason  is,  my  observations  were  then  made  according  to 
the  knowledge  I  possessed.  The  necessary  documents  to  show 
how  deeply  interested  the  President  of  the  court  was,  could  not 
be  obtained.  I  acknowledged  the  patience  of  the  court,  as  it 
had  been  manifested  by  a  session  of  more  than  forty  days.  In 
many  instances,  the  course  which  was  pursued  was  contrary  to 
any  experience  of  which  I  had  any  knowledge,  and  to  which  I 
objected.  The  President  and  members  were  constitutional 
judges,  and  if  they  erred,  as  all  men  are  liable  to  err,  I  hoped 
they  were  honest  errours  I  observed  1  had  confidence  in  their 
honour  ;  from  my  youth  I  had  always  been  taught  to  confide  in 
the  honour  of  military  characters  ;  indeed  those  observations 
were  made  on  the  ground  that  it  is  human  to  err.  I  objected, 
however,  and  stated  my  own  ideas  at  the  time.  It  would  have 
been  improper  for  me  then  to  have  imputed  other  than  honoura- 
ble motives  ;  although  there  appeared  to  me  a  deviation  in  the 
course,  yet,  in  the  end,  I  expected  justice.  The  pill  which  had 
been  made  for  me  had  been  prepared  in  secret,  and  it  was  so 
covered  that  I  could  not  discern  the  deadly  poison  which  it 
contained.  Having  now  obtained  and  spread  before  you  the 
evidence,  with  respect  to  the  deep  interest  which  both  the  ad- 
ministration and  the  head  of  the  court  had  in  the  result  of  the 
trial,  I  believe  the  answer  I  have  given  to  the  inquiry  I  have 
mentioned,  will  be  satisfactory. 


158 

Every  member  of  that  court  martial  depended  on  the  admin- 
istration for  his  miiitarj  existence  ;  and  on  you,  fellow  citizens, 
the  administration  depended  for  the  continuance  of  power. 

The  declaration  of  war,  without  suitable  preparation,  and  the 
misfortunes  which  had  attended  its  progress,  excited  your  just 
resentment.  The  language  of  discontent,  in  ilie  first  instance, 
was  pronounced  by  you,  with  a  freedom  becoming  your  charac- 
ter, and  pointed  against  those  to  whom  you  had  committed 
your  safety.  The  very  ground  trembled  on  which  the  adminis- 
tration stood.  To  satisfy  your  just  resentment,  it  was  evident 
a  sacrifice  must  be  prepared.  The  plan  presented  in  my  last 
number  was  devised,  and  the  execution  of  it  committed  to  the 
the  court  martial,  whose  leader  had  been  rendered  immaculate, 
by  the  Secretary  of  War,  who  retired  from  office,  loaded  with 
all  the  misfortunes  this  leader  had  occasioned. 

Having  now,  fellow  citizens,  presented  to  you  a  narrative  of 
the  north-western  campaign,  with  the  documents  and  evidences 
relating  to  it ;  I  shall  relieve  your  patience,  after  furnishing  one 
number  more,  in  which  will  be  condensed  a  summary  of  the 
principal  facts,  contained  in  the  whole.  The  object  of  this  sum- 
mary, is  to  exhibit  to  you,  at  one  view  the  most  important  facts, 
•which  caused  the  misfortune,  which  the  Secretary  of  War,  was 
of  the  opinion  would  be  attributed  to  him.  This  summary  will 
be  published,  as  soon  as  I  am  able  to  prepare  it. 


No.  XXXII. 

In  the  second  memoir  which  I  presented  for  your  considera- 
tion, I  exhibited  a  general  outline  of  the  facts  which  it  was  my 
object  to  prove  in  the  subsequent  numbers.  I  have  endeavour- 
ed faithfully  to  redeem  the  pledge  which  I  then  gave.  After 
having  stated  the  facts  and  produced  the  evidence  it  was  my 
intention  to  have  relieved  your  patience  and  submitted  the  pro- 
priety of  my  conduct  to  your  judgement  on  the  facts  and  evi- 
dence contained  in  those  numbers  without  recapitulating  them. 
But  as  some  of  my  readers,  from  the  manner  in  which  they  have 
been  published,  have  not  been  able  to  obtain  the  whole  of  them* 


159 

and  preserved  the  connexion,  an  opinion  has  been  expressed 
that  the  subject  will  be  more  clearly  and  generally  understood 
by  condensing  and  bringing  into  one  view  the  material  facts 
which  they  contain.  In  compliance  with  this  opinion,  I  will  de- 
vote this  number  in  as  concise  a  manner  as  possible,  to  the  at- 
tempt. 

In  the  first  place,  the  reasons  are  stated  why  this  communi- 
cation has  not  before  been  made,  and  why  the  evidence  and 
documents  now  introduced  were  not  produced  in  my  defence. 
The  delay,  I  told  you,  was  occasioned  by  the  loss  of  my  papers 
and  copies  of  the  duplicates  having  been  withheld,  though  fre- 
quently applied  for  until  the  autumn  of  1823,  when  on  applica- 
tion they  were  immediately  forwarded  me  by  the  present  Secre- 
tary of  War,  Mr.  Calhoun.  I  then  disclosed  to  you  the  motives 
which  induced  me  to  accept  a  military  appointment  in  the 
spring  of  1812,  and  take  the  command  of  the  forces  which  com- 
posed the  north  western  army.  In  consequence  of  an  expecta- 
tion of  war  with  Great  Britain,  the  savages  of  the  north  and 
west  had  been  excited  to  hostility  by  the  military  officers  and 
Indian  agents  of  Canada,  and  it  was  deemed  by  our  government, 
both  expedient  and  necessary  to  provide  a  force  for  the  safety 
and  protection  of  the  defenceless  inhabitants  of  the  frontiers. 
To  effect  this  purpose,  twelve  hundred  militia  from  the  State  of 
Ohio  and  the  4th  United  States'  regiment,  then  at  St.  Vincen- 
nes,  were  detached  by  the  President.  I  was  then  Governour  of 
the  Michigan  territory,  and  in  connexion  with  that  office,  I  ac- 
cepted the  command  of  these  troops,  not  by  my  own  wish  or  re- 
quest, but  at  the  urgent  desire  of  the  administration.  About 
the  middle  of  April  I  left  Washington  and  previously  to  my 
departure,  I  stated  to  the  President  in  repeated  communications 
through  the  Secretary  of  War,  my  views  with  respect  to  the 
command,  declared  that  I  considered  the  force  not  only  suffi- 
cient in  point  of  numbers,  but  likewise  a  of  suitable  character  for 
the  object  for  which  it  was  designed.  That  this  object  was  the 
protection  of  the  frontier  against  the  savages,  appears  from  the 
instructions  I  received  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  in  which 
letter  I  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Ohio^  take  the  command  of 
these  troops  and  march  them  to  Detroit,  where  I  must  make  the 
best  arrangements  in  my  power,  for  the  safety  of  that  part  of 
the  country.     It  was  then  understood  that  in  time  of  peace,  De*- 


160 

troit  or  some  other  position  on  the  west  part  of  lake  Erie,  was  a 
suitable  station  for  that  purpose  because  all  necessary  supplies 
could  easily  be  transported  over  that  lake.  I  not  only  com- 
municated to  the  government  my  views  in  time  of  peace  with 
Great  Britain,  but  also  in  the  event  of  war  with  that  nation — 
and  stated  in  the  most  explicit  manner,  that  a  navy  on  lake 
Erie,  sufficient  to  preserve  the  communication,  would  be  indis- 
pensably necessary,  and  that  without  such  a  navy,  the  posts  of 
Detroit,  Michillimackanack,  and  Chicago,  could  not  be  main- 
tained. That  likewise,  in  such  an  event,  all  the  savage  war- 
riours  residing  both  in  the  British  dominions,  and  our  own  ter- 
ritories, would  probably  join  the  British  standard.  After  mak- 
ing these  statements,  I  took  the  command  of  the  army  in  Ohio, 
and  opened  a  road  two  hundred  miles  through  a  wilderness. 
On  this  road  I  bui't  a  number  of  block  houses,  leaving  in  them 
a  small  force  for  defence,  and  made  use  of  the  best  means  in 
my  power  to  preserve  my  communication. 

While  I  was  yet  in  the  wilderness,  the  government  on  the 
18th  of  June  declared  war.  I  received  no  account  of  it  until 
the  2d  day  of  July,  while  the  enemy  at  Maiden  were  apprised 
of  it  several  days  before,  although  that  place  was  much  farther 
from  Washington  than  my  army.  If  proper  measures  had  been 
taken,  this  important  event  might  have  been  made  known  to 
me  in  less  than  half  that  time.  In  consequence  of  this  neglect 
of  the  administration,  a  vessel  was  taken  by  the  enemy  with  the 
sick  of  my  army  and  the  haspital  stores,  while  on  her  passage 
from  the  rapids  of  the  Miami  to  Detroit,  which  vessel  would 
not  have  been  employed  in  this  service,  had  I  received  intelli- 
gence of  the  declaration  of  war  even  one  day  sooner.  For  send- 
ing this  vessel  1  was  accused  of  the  crime  of  treason  by  the  ve- 
ry administration  by  whose  neglect  alone  the  misfortune  had 
been  occasioned.  In  this  letter,  giving  me  information  of  the  de- 
claration of  war,  I  received  positive  orders  to  march  the  army  to 
Detroit,  eighteen  miles  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  principal  for- 
tress at  Maiden,  and  there  wait  for  further  orders.  According- 
ly I  proceeded,  and  on  the  5th  July,  the  army  arrived  at  e- 
troit  I  then  called  a  council  of  war,  at  the  earnest  import  unity 
of  my  officers,  when  it  was  declared  expedient  to  cross  -lie  De- 
troit river,  and  make  the  invasion  of  Canada,  notwithstanding 
it  was  well  known  that  my  instructions  were  to  remain  there 


161 

for  further  orders.  Much  discontent  was  excited  among  som# 
of  them  by  my' refusal  to  comply  with  their  wishes.  On  the 
evening  of  the  9th  of  July.  I  received  the  letter  of  the  Secreta- 
ry of  War,  containing  orders  to  cross  the  river  and  invade  the 
enemy's  territory,  and  in  the  same  letter  was  contained  a  dis- 
cretionary authority  to  make  an  attack  on  the  fortress  at  Mai- 
den, if  in  my  opinion,  my  force  was  adequate  to  the  enterprise, 
and  it  could  be  done  consistently  with  the  safety  of  my  other 
posts. 

On  the  same  evening  I  received  this  letter  from  the  Secreta- 
ry, I  wrote  to  him,  that  it  was  my  opinion  that  my  force  was  not 
adequate  to  the  enterprise,  and  stated  my  reasons.  This  letter 
was  received  by  the  Secretary,  and  laid  before  the  President, 
who  fully  approved  of  it*  and  of  all  my  conduct,  aad,  notwith- 
standing the  measure  of  attacking  Maiden  was  left  to  my  discre- 
tion, and  notwithstanding  I  had  stated  as  my  opinion  that  my 
force  was  not  equal  to  the  enterprise,  and  although  this  opinion 
had  been  approved  by  the  President,  yet  this  very  measure  was 
made  a  charge  of  a  most  serious  nature — supported  alone 
by  the  opinions  of  some  of  my  officers,  that  Maiden  might  have 
been  taken. 

In  the  course  of  my  numbers,  I  stated,  as  reasons  which  in- 
duced me  to  think  it  expedient  to  commence  offensive  opera- 
tions in  conformity  with  the  orders  I  received — that  I  should  be 
enabled  to  obtain  supplies  for  my  army  from  the  enemy's  coun- 
try— that  it  would  satisfy  the  apparent  impatience  of  my  offi- 
cers— and  that  a  display  of  the  American  flag  on  both  sides  of 
the  river  would  have  a  favourable  effect,  both  on  the  savages  and 
the  militia  of  Upper  Canada — but  that  the  most  powerful  in- 
ducement was,  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  the  opposite  bank, 
where  he  was  erecting  batteries,  which  would  have  greatly  an- 
noyed the  town  of  Detroit.  Immediately  after  making  the  in- 
vasion according  to  my  orders  from  the  administration,  I  issued 
a  Proclamation  to  the  inhabitants  of  Upper  Canada,  pledging  to 
them  the  faith  of  the  government,  that  they  should  be  protected 
in  their  persons,  property,  and  rights,  I  have  stated  also  the 
manner  in  which  this  proclamation  was  received  and  approved 
by  the  President,  as  well  as  the  use  which  was  made  of  it  at  the 
treaty  of  Ghent. 

By  an  examination  of  the  evidence  wjiich  I  have  exhibited  * 
?A 


162 

the  objects  of  the  government  in  ordering  the  forces  uncles 
my  command,  are  fully  unfolded.  This  evidence  is  the  highest 
which  the  nature  of  the  case  will  admit.  It  is  contained  in  the 
message  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  Congress,  after 
the  campaign  closed.  By  this  message  it  ap>  ears,  that  these 
forces  were  ordered  to  Detroit  in  time  of  peace,  with  a  view  to 
the  protection  of  the  territory  against  the  savages,  and  in  the 
event  of  war,  to  take  possession  of  lake  Erie,  and  to  co-operate 
with  other  forces  in  the  conquest  of  Upper  Canada.  This  ob- 
ject of  taking  possession  of  lake  Erie  against  a  strong  naval 
force  of  the  enemy,  by  a  small  band  of  Ohio  militia,  was  never 
communicated  to  me  by  the  administration,  and  the  first  know- 
ledge I  had  of  it  was  from  reading  this  message  seven  months 
after  the  campaign  ended. 

The  projects  of  the  President,  as  communicated  by  his  mes- 
sage, not  being  realized,  such  a  navy  was  immediately  ordered 
to  be  built  as  I  had  at  first  recommended.  With  regard  to  co- 
operation, I  had  the  fullest  reason  to  suppose  that  I  should  be 
assisted  by  the  army  on  the  Niagara  river,  at  the  east  end  of 
lake  Erie.  The  enemy's  principal  station  was  at  Maiden, 
eighteen  miles  below  Detroit,  on  the  other  side  of  the  river. 
The  number  of  troops  it  contained,  from  the  time  of  the  decla- 
tion  of  war  to  the  16th  of  August,  has  been  stated,  and  the 
proof  furnished.  I  remained  four  weeks  at  Sandwich,  on  the 
British  side  of  the  river;  and  during  that  time  I  called  two 
councils  of  war,  to  consider  and  determine  whether  it  were  ex- 
pedient to  attack  the  fort  at  Maiden  with  the  bayonet  alone. 
No  cannon  were  on  carriages  suitable  to  assist  in  the  operation  j 
every  possible  exertion  had  been  made,  and  was  then  making, 
to  prepare  them.  It  was  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  the  first 
council,  that  it  was  not  expedient  to  make  the  attack,  without 
the  assistance  of  cannon-  At  the  second  council,  I  stated,  that 
the  heavy  artillery  was  not  in  readiness,  but  would  be  in  two  or 
three  days.  The  question  was  ther.  submitted  to  the  council, 
whether  it  were  expedient  to  wait  for  the  heavy  artillery,  in  or- 
der to  make  a  breach  in  the  works,  or  immediately  to  make  the 
attempt  with  the  bayonet  alone.  Before  the  question  was  tak- 
en, I  observed  to  the  members,  that  if  it  should  be  their  opinion 
that  it  vvas  best  to  make  the  assault  immediately,  and  they 
would  answer  for  their  men,  I  would  lead  them  to  the  attack. 


163 

Colonel  Miller,  who  commanded  the  regutars,  replied  that  tie 
would  be  answerable  for  the  men  he  commanded.  Colonels 
Mc Arthur,  Cass,  and  Findley,  who  commanded  the  militia,  said 
they  would  not  be  answerable  for  their  men,  but  hoped  they 
would  behave  well.  The  council  then  determined  that  it  was 
expedient  to  wait  two  days  longer  for  the  heavy  artillery.  In 
the  afternoon  of  the  7th  of  August,  I  received  letters  from  Gen- 
eral Hall  and  General  Porter,  who  commanded  on  the  Niagara 
river,  informing  me  that  the  principal  part  of  the  troops  in  the 
enemy's  stations  at  fort  George,  fort  Erie,  and  other  posts  on 
the  east  part  of  the  province,  were  advancing  to  Maiden  ;  and 
that  a  large  body  of  troops  had  passed  over  and  landed  on  the 
west  side  of  lake  Ontario.,  and  were  likewise  marching  against 
my  army.  These  letters  further  stated,  that  there  was  no  pro- 
bability that  any  assistance  would  be  afforded  from  that  quar- 
ter. Thus  it  appeared,  from  the  information  sent  me,  that  the 
whoie  weight  of  the  war  in  Canada  rested  on  the  few  troops  un- 
der my  command,  and  certainly  they  were  not  equal  both  to  of- 
fensive and  defensive  operations. 

Miehillimackanack  had  fallen,  and  all  the  forces  from  that 
direction  were  descending  the  lakes  to  operate  against  me.  The 
savages  from  lake  Michigan  had  arrived  on  the  head  waters  of 
the  rivers  Raisin  and  Huron  in  thousands,  (as  Colonel  Ander- 
son expressed  himself  in  his  letter)  and  were  marching  to  Mai- 
den. The  defeat  of  Majar  Van  horn  had  taken  place  at  Browns? 
town,  in  liis  attempt  to  open  the  communication  to  the  river 
Raisin;  and  indeed,  every  avenue  to  my  country,  both  by  land 
and  water,  was  entirely  closed.  With  this  information  before 
me,  and  under  this  unexpected  change  of  circumstances,  I  con- 
sidered that  it  was  my  duty  to  abandon  the  enterprise,  and  re- 
cross  the  river  with  the  principal  part  of  the  army,  which  I  did 
on  the  night  and  morning  of  the  8th  of  August.  The  great  rea- 
son which  induced  me  to  adopt  this  measure,  and  which  indeed 
was  decisive  in  my  mind,  was,  that  the  very  existence  of  my 
army  depended  on  opening  the  communication  to  Ohio — for 
though  success  might  have  attended  my  arms  in  the  attack  on 
Maiden,  I  should  yet  have  been  left  under  the  same  embarrass- 
ment, in  having  my  communication  ith  Ohio  still  closed.  In 
addition  to  these  reasons,  I  had  received  information  that  Brit- 
ish troops  had  arrived  in  several  vessels  from  fort  Erie,  as  rer 


enforcements,  and  that  the  militia,  which  before  had  left  Mai- 
den, had  returned  to  their  duty,  on  a  proclamation  of  pardon 
from  the  commanding  officer.  On  the  8th  of  August,  the  day  I 
recrossed  the  river,  a  detachment  was  made  of  six  hundred  of 
the  best  of  my  troops,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Miller, 
to  open  the  communication  to  the  river  Raisin.  This  detach- 
ment was  met,  near  Brownstown,  by  a  superiour  number  of  the 
enemy,  and  a  severe  contest  ensued,  and  terminated  with  hon- 
our to  the  American  arms.  The  loss  on  our  side  was  between 
eighty  and  ninety  killed  and  wounded.  Nothing  however  but 
glory  was  acquired  by  this  victory ;  the  fatigue  which  had  at- 
tended the  expedition,  the  loss  of  killed  and  wounded,  and  a  se- 
vere storm,  prevented  the  detachment  from  proceeding  on  the 
expedition.  On  the  14th  of  August,  I  made  another  attempt  to 
open  the  communication.  For  this  purpose,  I  ordered  another 
detachment,  consisting  of  the  effective  officers  and  men  of  Col- 
onels McArthur  and  Ca3s'  regiments.  This  body  was  directed 
to  proceed  to  the  river  Raisin,  a  number  of  miles  west  of  the  De- 
troit river,  by  a  circuitous  Indian  path,  to  avoid  further  molesta- 
tion from  the  enemy.  The  distance  was  greater,  but  it  was  my 
only  alternative. 

The  effort  to  open  the  communication,  by  the  detachments 
under  Major  Van-horn  and  Colonel  Miller,  proving  abortive, 
and  before  the  one  under  Colonel  McArthur  marched,  I 
stated,  to  some  of  my  principal  officers,  that  from  the  informa- 
tion I  had  received,  it  was  evident  that  the  whole  force  of  the 
enemy,  of  all  descriptions,  from  the  east  part  of  Upper  Canada, 
from  Michillimackanack,  and  from  lake  Michigan,  were  pro- 
ceeding to  join  the  forces  at  Maiden  ;  that  the  lake  was  closed 
against  usj  that  the  road  which  we  had  opened  from  Ohio  was 
obstructed  by  hostile  savages,  and  that  no  forces  from  our  coun- 
try wrere  prepared  for  its  protection  ;  that  the  provisions  were 
nearly  exhausted,  and  a  supply  could  not  be  obtained  from  any 
quarter;  and  that,  under  these  circumstances,  I  suggested  the 
expediency  of  making  a  movement  of  the  army  to  the  foot  of  the 
rapids  of  the  Miama,  and  there  act  as  circumstances  might  re- 
quire. The  answer  to  this  was,  as  appears  by  Colonel  Cass' 
testimony,  that  the  men,  or  soldiers,  did  not  think  such  a  meas- 
ure necessary,  and  if  the  orders  were  given,  they  would  not  be 
obeyed. 

This  circumstance  I  have  repeated,  to  show  the  materials  of 


which  my  army  was  composed,  and  the  difficulties  which  attend^ 
ed  my  situation.  Had  this  measure,  at  that  time,  been  carried 
into  effect,  the  army  probably  would  have  been  saved. 

On  the  15th  of  August,  the  day  after  McArthur  and  Cass 
marched  to  the  river  Raisin,  the  British  forces,  with  the  militia 
and  savages,  attending  them,  marched  from  Maiden  to  Sand- 
wich, opposite  to  Detroit,  with  General  Brock  at  their  head. 
His  letter,  demanding  a  surrender  of  Detroit,  and  my  answer, 
have  been  recited.  I  immediatly  sent  an  express,  strongly  es- 
corted, to  McArthur  and  I  ass,  with  orders  to  return  with  all 
possible  expedition  to  Detroit;  stating  that  General  Brock  had 
arrived,  with  the  re-enforcements  from  fort  George,  &c.  &c.  &c 
My  situation  had  now  become  most  critical.  The  effective 
strength  of  two  of  my  regiments  was  absent  at  the  river  Raisin, 
for  the  purpose  of  opening  the  communication,  and  guarding 
necessary  supplies,  intended  for  my  camp.  The  British  troops 
which  had  composed  the  garrisons  on  the  east  end  of  the  lake, 
with  the  re-enforcements  from  various  parts  of  Upper  Canada, 
had  arrived,  and,  together  with  the  force  at  Maiden,  were  now 
encamped  at  Sandwich,  opposite  to  Detroit.  Information  was 
received,  that  the  Canadian  militia  were  coming  upon  me  from 
every  quarter.  How  all  this  force  had  been  brought  from  so 
many  necessary  points  of  defence  to  bear  upon  my  army,  I 
could  not  imagine.  What  possible  reasons  could  have  induced 
General  Brock  to  draw  his  troops  from  the  vital  part  of  his  pro- 
vince, and  leave  his  most  important  posts  exposed  to  be  taken 
by  our  troops  on  the  Niagara  river,  was  truly  mysterious. 
Could  I  have  supposed  that  a  suspension  of  hostilities  had  taken 
place  in  that  quarter,  it  seems  reasonable  that  it  would  have 
been  under  the  condition  for  the  twobeligerent  parties  to  have 
been  confined  to  that  location  in  which  they  were  situated  at  the 
commencement  of  the  truce. 

By  a  reference  to  the  preceding  numbers,  it  will  appear,  by 
the  letters  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General  Dearborn,  that 
he  was  commanded  by  the  President  to  concentrate  his  troops 
on  the  Niagara  river,  invade  Upper  Canada  from  that  quarter, 
attack  the  enemy's  posts,  and  co-operate  with  the  forces  under 
my  command.  It  will  further  appear,  that  he  did  not  carrv 
these  orders  into  effect,  but  agreed  to  the  armistice  which  has 
been  mentioned,  which  must  have  been  unauthorized  by  the 


166 

s 

President,  because  it  was  disapproved  in  the  most  pointed  lan- 
guage. My  army  not  being  included  in  the  measure,  and,  as 
has  been  observed,  no  condition  having  been  made,  that  the 
troops  should  remain  in  the  situation  they  were,  during  its  con- 
tinuance, the  effect  it  had  on  my  operations  is  too  evident  to  be 
here  repeated  ;  it  must  be  considered  as  the  principal  arid  im- 
mediate fatal  cause  of  the  disasters  of  the  campaign. 

After  the  capitulation,  I  first  learned  from  the  lips  of  the 
British  commander,  the  true  state  of  the  case — that  the  armis- 
tice of  General  Dearborn  had  been  eight  days  in  operation,  and 
that  that  circumstance  alone  had  enabled  him  to  bring  such  a 
force  against  me. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  16th  of  August,  General  Brock 
landed  his  force  at  the  Spring  Wells,  three  miles  below  Detroit, 
under  cover  of  the  guns  of  his  navy.  From  the  date  of  the  facts 
contained  in  the  two  numbers  I  have  mentioned,  I  presume  you 
must  be  satisfied,  that  his  effective  force,  was  more  than  three 
times  greater  than  mine,  and  that  he  might  have  brought  to  his 
standard,  more  than  ten  times  my  number,  before  I  could  have 
received  any  assistance.  This  will  appear,  from  the  knowledge 
of  the  numbers  which  originally  composed  my  army,  from  the 
losses  by  capture,  by  the  killed  and  wounded  in  the  battles 
which  had  been  fought,  by  sickness  and  a  variety  of  other  casu- 
alties ;  and  likewise  from  the  return  of  the  Adjutant  General 
Major  Jessup.  and  the  testimony  of  Colonel  Cass.  Being  at 
this  time,  not  only  the  General  of  the  army,  but  the  Governour 
of  the  territory,  and  without  instructions,  as  to  the  course  I 
should  pursue,  all  the  measures  were  entrusted  to  my  discre- 
tion. Being  responsible  for  the  safety  of  the  inhabitants,  it  be- 
came my  duty,  if  it  was  possible,  to  adopt  such  measures  as 
would  effect  that  object.  My  situation  was  such,  that  there 
was  no  possibility  of  affording  the  inhabitants  protection,  fur- 
ther than  the  balls  from  the  cannon  in  the  fort  could  be  carried. 
These  inhabitants  were  scattered  over  a  territory  of  several 
hundred  miles.  The  savages  had  invaded  every  part  of  this  ter- 
ritory, and  while  the  contest  lasted,  there  was  nothing  which 
could  restrain  their  barbarity.  The  work  of  desolation  and 
cruelty  had  commenced,  and  nearly  half  my  effective  force  was 
absent,  and  from  the  time  it  had  marched  and  the  orders  it  had 
received  from  me,  I  had  reason  to  believe  it  was  nearly  ft% 


167 

miles  distant  from  me.  With  the  feeble  force  under  my  com- 
mand, I  did  not  believe  there  was  the  most  distant  pros- 
pect of  success,  in  the  event  of  a  battle ;  and  had  the  forces  at 
Detroit  been  defeated,  the  fate  of  the  detachment  under  Mc  Ar- 
thur and  Cass  would  have  been  inevitable.  From  the  informa- 
tion I  had  received,  with  respect  to  Ger  eral  Brock's  force, 
there  could  have  been  little  hope  indeed  of  victory.  What  was, 
however,  decisive  on  my  mind,  was  my  situation,  even  in  a 
possible  event  of  success  over  his  white  force.  I  should  have 
then  been  without  provisions,  as  will  appear,  by  the  evidence 
contained  in  my  twentieth  number ;  and  I  had  no  means  of  ob- 
taining possession  of  the  enemy's  navy,  and  opening  my  com- 
munication over  the  lake.  It  would  in  this  case  have  become  a 
war  with  savages,  who  would  have  been  aided  by  all  the  re- 
maining forces  of  Upper  Canada,  and  the  navy  on  the  lake.  In 
addition  to  the  savage  force,  which  was  with  General  Brock, 
I  have  produced  evidence  to  show  that  several  thousands  of  this 
description  were  descending  the  lakes  from  the  north  and  from 
the  west.  Had  my  army,  however,  not  been  divided,  and  had 
the  detachment  absent  with  McArthur  and  Cass,  equal  to  about 
one  half  my  effective  force,  been  with  me",  or  had  I  received  the 
least  information,  that  it  had  been  in  a  situation  where,  by  any 
possibility,  it  could  have  co-operated,  I  should  have  risked  the 
consequences  of  a  battle ;  and  those  officers  would  have  had 
an  opportunity  of  proving  by  their  deeds  the  valour  which  has 
been  only  manifested  by  their  words. 

Under  the  circumstances  which  existed  after  the  enemy  land- 
ed, and  no  information  having  been  obtained  from  McArthur 
and  Cass,  I  determined  to  send  a  flag  of  truce,  open  a  treaty, 
and  accept  the  best  terms  which  could  be  obtained.  For  this 
purpose,  I  authorized  two  commissioners,  Colonels  Miller  and 
Brush,  to  negotiate  on  the  subject. 

By  the  articles  of  capitulation,  protection  and  safety  were  se- 
cured to  the  inhabitants  of  Michigan  in  their  persons  and  pro- 
perty. All  the  militia,  both  of  Michigan  and  Ohio,  returned 
immediately  to  their  homes,  and  none  were  retained  as  prison- 
ers, excepting  the  few  regulars,  consisting  then  of  little  over 
two  hundred.  This  measure,  under  the  circumstances,  was 
dictated  in  my  opinion  by  a  sense  of  duty  and  attended  with 
fess  public  calamity  then  any  other  which  could  have  been 


168 

adopted,  and  I  was  willing:  to  assume,  and  in  my  official  commu- 
nication to  the  government,  took  the  whole  responsibility  of  it  on 
myself.     It  required  more  firmness  and  independence  than  any 
other  act  of  my  life — it  was  dictated  by  my  best  judgment  and 
a  conscienti  jus  regard  to  what  I  believed  to  be  my  duty,    and 
I  now  sincerely  rejoice,  and  there  never  has  been  a  moment  that 
I  have  not  rejoiced,   notwithstanding  all  I  have  suffered,  that  I 
dared  thus  independently  to  do  my  duty.     Had  that  contest 
continued,  every  moment  would  have  been  attended  with  great- 
er disasters,  and  I  availed  of  the  only  measure  in  my  power  to 
put  an  end  to  such  calamities.     In  the  capitulation  I  made  no 
provision  for  myself,  and  was  ordered  to  Montreal  an  uncondi- 
tional prisoner.     A  provision  was  made  for  all  the  officers  and 
soldiers  of  the  militia,  and  they  immediately  returned  to  their 
homes.     Colonel  Cass,  taking  advantage  of  my  situation  after 
the  indulgence  I  had  procured  for  him,  proceeded  directly  to 
Washington,  where  he  was  most  graciously  received  by  the  ad- 
ministration, and  then  presented  an   account  of  the  campaign, 
before  it  had  been  possible  for  me  to  have  made  any  communi- 
cation.    This  letter,  written  by  himself,  giving  particular  de- 
tails of  events,  of  which  he  had  no  knowledge,  as  he  was  absent 
when  they  took  place,  was  received  by  the  administration  and 
published  as  an  official  account  in  all  the  newspapers  through- 
out the  United  States.     Search,   fellow  citizens,  the  annals  of 
history,  and,  I  am  persuaded,  such  an  outrage  cannot  be  found  ! 
While  I  was  a  prisoner,  my  other  officers,  for  whose  liberation 
I  had  provided  in  the  treaty,  followed  Colonel  Cass  to  Wash- 
ington, and  seeing  the  favours  and  patronage  he  had  received 
by  his  representation,  imitated  his  example,  and  were  not  dis- 
appointed in  their  rewards. 

From  one  end  of  the  continent  to  the  other,  the  same  news- 
papers which  had  published  Cass's  letter,  uere  filled  with  a 
series  of  the  most  scandalous  falsehoods  to  excite  your  resent- 
ment against  me,  and  before  I  was  exchanged,  and  yet  a  prison- 
er, the  plot,  which  is  unfolded  in  my  29th  number  by  the  letter 
of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General  Dearborn,  wis  sealed  for 
my  final  destruction.  As  soon  as  General  Dearborn  could  make 
arrangements  for  my  exchange,  I  was  arrested,  capital  charges 
were  preferred  against  me,  and  a  court  martial  was  ordered  to 
assemble  at  Philadelphia  for  my  trial,  of  which  Major  General 


169 

Wade  Hampton  was  appointed  the  President.  In  conformity  to 
the  orders  of  the  President,  I  appeared,  ready  for  my  trial.  Rut 
without  any  reason  being  assigned,  this  court  martial  was  dis- 
solved in  the  manner  I  have  stated.  I  was  continued  by  the 
administration  a  prisoner  in  arrest  another  year,  that  ample 
time  might  be  afforded  for  selecting  such  a  court  martial,  and 
patronizing  and  promoting  officers,  who,  in  their  testimony 
would  give  opinions  which  would  effect  the  object  of  the  plot* 
which  had  been  formed.  After  thus  remaining  a  prisoner  for 
this  length  of  time,  which  I  believe  is  unexampled  in  military 
history,  and  every  preparation  being  made,  I  was  ordered  to 
appear  at  Albany  for  my  trial  the  beginning  of  January,  1814. 
At  this  court  martial  I  requested  the  privilege  of  being  heard  by 
counsel.  The  court  denied  me  such  aid.  In  the  progress  of  the 
trial,  the  opinions  of  witnesses  were  admitted  as  evidence  to 
prove  entire  charges  against  me.  The  character  of  these  wit- 
nesses has  been  fully  shewn.  They  were  officers  of  no  mili- 
tary knowledge  or  experience,  and  many  of  them  deeply  inter- 
ested in  the  event  of  the  trial,  and  had  nothing  to  recommend 
them  but  the  patronage  and  promotion  they  had  received  imme- 
diately after  my  unfortunate  campaign,  but  previously  to  their 
appearing  to  testify  against  me. 

The  court  martial  of  which  General  Dearborn  was  President, 
was  selected  the  7th  day  of  November,  1813,  during  the  admin- 
istration of  John  Armstrong  over  the  Department  of  War,  and 
this  court  was  not  dissolved  until  the  last  of  March,  or  the  be- 
ginning of  April,  1814.  Thus  was  established  a  new  military 
precedent,  and  it  must  be  recorded  in  the  history  of  our  coun- 
try, that  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  American  army,  at  a 
most  critical  period  of  the  war,  Tor  about  four  months,  relin- 
quished his  high  duties  as  commanding  General,  and  performed 
subordinate  duties  on  a  court  martial,  to  which  the  youngest 
General  in  the  army  was  competent.  The  question  will  natu- 
rally arise,  what  motives  could  have  induced  so  unprecedented 
an  arrangement  ?  A  constant  correspondence  was  kept  up  be- 
tween the  court  martial  and  the  secretary  of  War,  and  direc- 
tions were  given  respecting  the  manner  of  proceeding.  See  Ap- 
pendix to  my  trial,  page  29.  In  some  of  the  public  newspapers, 
it  is  said  lam  ungrateful  for  the  lenity  which  Mr.  Madison,  the 
President,  has  shown  me.  As  1  never  asked  him  or  the  court 
22 


170 

tnartial  for  mercy,  but  only  for  justice,  I  cannot  feel  under  any 
obligations  to  either.  The  truth  is,  fellow  citizens,  the  admin* 
istration  well  know  your  independent  spirit  and  sense  of  right, 
and  dared  not  execute  that  sentence,  which  injustice  had  pro- 
nounced. The  Secretary  was  the  same  John  Armstrong,  who 
has  the  reputation  of  having  commenced  his  career  at  Newburg, 
in  1T83,  and  ended  it  at  Bladensburg,  in  1814  I  The  two 
events  here  alluded  to,  are  well  known,  and  must  make  a  part 
of  the  history  of  our  country.  The  one  will  do  the  highest  cred- 
it to  the  virtue  and  unshaken  patriotism  of  the  revolutionary 
army,  in  resisting  a  most  artful  and  insidious  attempt  to  induce 
them  to  turn  those  arms  against  their  country  which  had  been 
employed  in  acquiring  its  independence.  The  other  must  stand 
as  a  monument  of  disgrace  to  those  to  whom  the  protection  of 
the  country  was  entrusted,  and  particularly  to  the  officer  at  the 
head  of  the  Department  of  War,  at  whose  disposal  was  placed 
the  forces  and  means  of  national  safety. 

After  I  received  the  order  to  invade  the  enemy's  territory,  all 
the  operations  were  entrusted  to  my  discretion.  This  discretion 
was  exercised  according  to  my  best  judgment.  The  dictates  of 
duty  alone  influenced  my  conduct.  Had  I  consulted  my  feel- 
ings alone,  and  not  been  guided  by  this  principle,  I  should  have 
pursued  a  very  different  course.  To  perform  what  I  then  be- 
lieved and  now  believe  to  have  been  my  duty,  it  was  necessary 
to  call  into  exercise  more  firmness  and  more  energy,  than  on 
any  other  occasion  during  my  life.  If  it  will  be  any  satisfaction 
to  my  enemies,  I  am  now  willing  to  acknowledge,  that  I  dare 
not  do  that  which  my  best  judgment  and  duty  forbid.  Consid- 
erations of  personal  fame,  compared  to  duty,  where  as  a  feather 
in  one  scale  to  a  mountain  in  the  other. 

My  respect,  fellow  citizens,  for  your  discernment  and  judg- 
ment, induces  me  to  leave  the  application  of  the  facts  and  evi- 
dence, contained  in  the  preceding  numbers,  to  your  own  delib- 
erations ;  with  my  sincere  thanks  for  the  candour  which  has 
been  already  manifested, 
I  am, 

With  affection  and  respect, 
Your  fellow  citizen, 
Newton,  July  26/A,  1824.  \\  Ii^LlAM  HULL. 


171 


No.  XXXIII. 

A  series  of  papers  published  in  the  u  American  Statesman,5r 
by  the  son  of  General  Dearborn,  in  defence  of  his  father,  in  an- 
swer to  the  memoirs  I  have  addressed  to  you  on  the  subject  of 
the  north  western  campaign,  in  1812,  renders  it  a  duty  which  I 
owe  to  myself,  to  you  and  to  truth,  to  make  a  reply.  Filial 
affection  is  justly  ranked  among  the  amiable  virtues,  and  when- 
ever it  is  properly  manifested,  excites  both  esteem  and  admira- 
tion. Under  feelings  properly  tempered,  the  son,  would  have 
reason  to  expect  your  sympathies,  which  would  not  only  have 
been  enlisted,  but  deeply  interested  in  favour  of  the  attempt. 
Had  cool,  dispassionate  reason  been  substituted  in  the  place  of 
violent  declamation,  and  candid  inquiry  after  truth  been  evinced, 
instead  of  a  spirit  of  abuse  and  malignity,  he  probably  would 
have  realised  the  feelings  I  have  described. 

It  is  among  the  other  misfortunes  of  my  life,  that  I  have  now 
no  son  on  whom  to  rest  for  support  in  my  declining  years.  In 
the  memorable  battle  of  Bridgewater,  in  1814,  my  only  son,  in 
his  ardour  to  perform  his  duty,  advanced  at  the  head  of  is 
company  to  the  most  dangerous  part  of  the  sanguinary  field, 
where  he  fell,  covered  with  wounds  and  surrounded  by  the  prin- 
cipal part  of  his  brave  men,  bleeding  by  his  side.  Alone  and 
unassisted  by  any  thing  but  truth,  and  the  candour  and  patience 
you  have  manifested  to  obtain  it,  I  am  prepared  to  meet  both 
father  and  son,  before  the  tribunal  of  my  fellow  citizens  to 
which  I  have  made  my  appeal.  The  day  may  arrive,  when  this 
ardent  young  man  will  deeply  regret  the  wanton  and  abusive 
language  with  which  he  has  assailed  me,  and  for  the  present,  I 
am  willing  to  forgive  him  on  account  of  his  laudable  effort  to 
discharge  a  filial  duty. 

My  reply  will  be  confined  principally  to  the  plan  of  the  cam- 
paign, as  stated  in  young  General  Dearborn's  defence  of  his 
father — The  orders  which  General  Dearborn  received,  and  his 
duty  to  have  co-operated  with  my^army — -The  armistice  to  which 
he  agreed  with  Sir  George  Prevo^t  and  General  Brock's  Setter 
to  eneral  Van  Rensalaer  respecting  it — The  forces  under  my 
command  and  those  under  the  command  of  General  Brock— 


172 

The  testimony  of  Colonel  Snelling  and  others,  and  my  letters 
to  the  Secretary  of  War.  It  appears  from  this  defence,  that 
before  General  Dearborn  left  Washington  in  the  spring  of  1812, 
a  plan  of  the  anticipated  campaign  against  the  Canadas,  was 
submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  War  by  him,  in  which  he  recom- 
mended, that  one  army  should  advance  upon  Montreal*  by  the 
way  of  lake  Champlain,  while  three  others  should  enter  upon 
Canada  from  Sackett's  Harbour,  Niagara  and  I  etroit — Here 
fellow  citizens,  you  have  for  your  own  information,  and  for  the 
use  of  the  future  historian,  the  plan  of  the  campaign  of  1812. 
Although  I  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  one  of  the  three 
armies,  yet  this  plan  was  never  communicated  to  me  by  the  ad- 
ministration or  by  General  Dearborn,  and  I  received  no  know- 
ledge of  it,  until  I  read  the  President's  message  to  Congress,  af- 
ter the  campaign  ended,  in  which  it  was  partially  stated,  and 
when  it  was  afterwards  more  fully  unfolded  by  the  publication* 
in  defence  of  General  Dearborn.  The  plan  of  the  campaign, 
being  formed  by  General  Dearborn,  he  must  have  had  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  it,  and  he  being  the  commanding  General  of  our 
armies,  it  became  his  duty  to  make  arrangements  for  its  execu- 
tion, especially  as  the  troops  designed  for  the  formation  of  two 
of  the  armies,  one  at  Niagara  and  the  other  at  Sackett's  Har- 
bour were  under  his  controul  and  subject  to  his  command. 
This  would  have  been  his  duty,  even  wit!  out  special  orders  on 
the  subject.  Notwithstanding  this,  young  General  Dearborn 
states  that  his  father  made  no  arrangements  to  form  these  two 
divisions  of  the  army  at  Niagara  and  Sackett's  Harbour,  until 
the  2Gth  July,  and  assigns  this  reason, — that  he  had  not  receiv- 
ed orders  for  the  purpose.  I  believe  you  will  be  satisfied,  as 
he  formed  the  plan  of  this  campaign— was  the  commanding 
GeneraL  and  the  troops  which  were  to  compose  these  divisions 
were  subject  to  his  controul  and  indeed  under  his  command, 
that  it  would  have  been  his  duty  to  have  given  orders  for  the 
execution  of  the  plan  he  had  designed.  Individuals  without 
military  knowledge  and  experience,  from  common  observation, 
I  think  must  accord  with  the  opinion  I  have  expressed.  Among 
military  men,  I  am  confident  there  can  be  but  one  opinion  on 
this  subject.  Whatever  opinion  may  have  been  formed,  I  shall 
now  show  that  he  had  orders  from  the  war  department  on  this 
subject  as  early  as  the  26th  June,  eight  days  after  war  was  de^ 


173 

ciaied,  and  while  mv  army  was  labouring  in  the  wilderness  and 
had  received  no  intelligence,  of  its  declaration.  The  following 
js  a  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General  Dearborn, 
dated 

War  Department,  9&lh  June,  1812. 

SIR, — Having  made  the  necessary  arrangements  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  sea-board,  it  is  the  wish  of  the  President,  that  you 
should  repair  to  Albany  and  prepare  the  force  to  be  collected  at 
that  place,  for  actual  service.  It  is  understood,  that  being  pos- 
sessed of  a  full  view  of  the  intentions  of  government,  and  being 
also  acquainted  with  the  disposition  of  the  force  under  your 
command,  you  will  take  your  own  time  and  give  the  necessary 
orders  to  the  officers  on  the  sea-coast. 

It  is  altogether  uncertain  at  what  time  General  Hull  may 
deem  it  expedient  to  commence  offensive  operations.  The  pre- 
parations, it  is  presumed  will  be  made,  to  move  in  a  direction 
for  Niagara,  Kingston,  and  Montreal.  On  your  arrival  at  Al- 
bany, you  will  be  able  to  form  an  opinion  of  the  time  required 
to  prepare  the  troops  for  action. 

Maj.  Gen.  H.  Dearborn. 

By  this  letter,  General  Dearborn  was  directed  to  repair  to 
Albany,  and  prepare  the  force  to  be  collected  at  that  place  for 
actual  service.  What  was  the  actual  service  for  which  the  force 
was  to  be  prepared  t  War  against  Great  Britain  had  been  de- 
clared. The  commanding  General  of  our  armies  had  formed  a 
plan  of  the  campaign  which  had  been  approved  by  the  adminis- 
tration. This  plan  was,  that  besides  my  army,  three  others 
were  to  be  formed  to  move  against  the  British  posts  on  the  Nia- 
gara, against  Kingston  and  Montreal — and  by  this  letter  the 
General  was  ordered  to  Albany,  to  prepare  the  force  for  actual 
service.  Is  it  possible  that  General  Dearborn  could  have  mis- 
understood this  language  ?  Could  this  actual  service  have  been 
any  other  service  than  the  execution  of  the  plan  which  the  Gen- 
eral himself  had  planned  ?  It  requires  nothing  more  than  com- 
mon understanding  to  answer  this  question.  The  order  must 
have  been  as  plain  to  him,  as  if  an  order  to  this  effect  had  been 
given — "  You  are  commanded  to  order  a  sufficient  force  to  the 
Niagara  and  invade  that  part  of  Upper  Canada  as  soon  as  Gen- 
eral Hull  commences  offensive  operations  from  Detroit.     You 


in 

are  likewise  commanded  to  order  another  force  to  Sackett's 
Harbour  to  keep  in  cheek  the  troops  at  Kingston  and  prevent 
them  from  re-enforcing  the  posts  on  the  Niagara."  rIhe  next 
sentence  of  this  letter  of  the  26th  June,  seems  to  remove  all 
doubt  with  respect  to  the  construction  of  it. 

General  Dearborn  is  told  that  he  is  possessed  of  a.  full  view 
of  the  intentions  of  the  government,  and  also  that  he  is  acquaint- 
ed with  the  disposition  of  the  force  under  his  command.  The 
time  and  manner  of  executing  this  part  of  his  duty  is  then  left 
to  his  discretion.  Had  there  been  a  possibility,  of  doubt  with 
respect  to  its  true  meaning  and  intention,  (he  concluding  para- 
graph rendered  it  as  plain,  as  though  it  had  been  in  the  words 
I  have  substituted  above.  The  Secretary  tells  him  that  it  is 
uncertain  at  what  time  General  Hull  may  deem  it  expedient  to 
commence  offensive  operations. — He  then  says,  that  General 
Dearborn's  preparations  will  be  made  to  move  in  a  direction  for 
Niagara,  Kingston,  and  Montreal.  Does  not  this  clearly  and 
distinctly  express  to  him  the  intention  of  the  government,  to 
form  two  of  the  divisions  of  the  forces  under  his  command,  one 
for  the  Niagara  and  the  other  for  Sackett's  Harbour,  to  move 
against  Kingston,  agreeably  to  his  own  plan  of  the  campaign  ? 
The  words  of  the  letter  are,  "  The  preparations  it  is  presumed 
will  be  made  to  move  in  a  direction  for  Niagara,  Kingston,  and 
Montreal." 

Thus  you  see,  fellow  citizens,  that  General  Dearborn  was  or- 
dered by  the  Secretary  of  War,  to  make  preparations  to  move 
in  a  direction  for  Niagara  and  Kingston  as  early  as  the  26th  of 
June.  I  now  ask  you  what  authority  his  son  had  to  say,  that 
his  father  had  no  orders  with  respect  to  the  troops  at  Niagara, 
for  the  purpose  of  co  operating  wit!)  me,  or  to  move  in  a  direc- 
tion for  Kingston  and  Montreal  until  the  26th  July,  a  month  af- 
terwards Young  General  Dearborn  then  recites  his  father's 
letters,  written  from  Albany,  to  show  the  manner  in  which  he 
obeyed  his  orders. 

One  to  General  Van  Rensselaer,  dated  3d  of  August,  1812, 
directing  him  to  keep  up  a  correspondence  with  me. 

One  to  Goverhour  Tompkins,  dated  6th  August — requesting 
him  to  order  into  service  two  thousand  six  hundred  of  the  de- 
tached militia  of  the  State: — one  thousand  to  join  the  troops  at 
Niagara : — eight  hundred  to  join  those  at  Sackett's  Harbour, 


175 

&c. — one  of  the  8th  of  August  to  Major  Mullany,  directing  h& 
to  march  to  Niagara  with  recruits  under  his  command.  One  to 
Golonel  Fenwick,  of  the  8th  of  August,  directing  him  to  prp» 
ceed  to  Niagara  with  two  companies  of  infantry  and  there  take 
the  command  of  the  artillery,  &c 

One  to  Colonel  Macomb  to  prepare  cannon,  &c.  for  Colonel 
Ferlwick,  &c. 

One  to  the  Governour  of  Pennsylvania,  dated  August  13th, 
requesting  him  to  order  two  thousand  militia  to  be  marched  to 
Niagara. 

Thus,  fellow  citizens,  you  are  furnished  by  the  son  of  Gener- 
al Dearborn  with  documents,  to  show  the  manner  in  which  his 
father  obeyed  his  orders  and  fulfilled  the  expectations  of  gov- 
ernment. I  have  only,  you  perceive,  referred  to  the  documents. 
They  are  published  in  extenso,  in  the  defence  prepared  by  the 
son,  and  which  may  be  seen  in  the  "American  Statesman"  29th" 
July,  1824.  By  these  documents  it  appears,  that  General  Dear- 
born did  not  commence  giving  orders  and  making  arrangements 
for  forming  an  army  at  Niagara,  until  the  3d  of  August.  His 
orders  were  continued  on  the  6th,  8th,  and  13th  of  the  same 
month,  and  the  principal  force  was  ordered  on  the  6th,  8th,  and 
13th.  I  now  ask  you  to  examine  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  of  the  26th  of  June,  above  recited,  and  compare  it  with 
the  documents  as  furnished  by  the  son  of  General  Dearborn,  and 
you  will  perceive,  that  it  was  nearly  forty  days  from  the  date 
of  that  letter  before  he  even  gave  orders  for  the  preparations  at 
Niagara,  to  invade  Upper  Canada  and  co-operate  with  me,  and 
a  month  after  I  had  crossed  the  Detroit  river  and  commenced 
offensive  operations.  In  my  memoirs  you  will  find  recited  a 
number  of  other  letters  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General 
Dearborn  from  the  26th  of  June  to  the  time  he  made  the  armis- 
tice, directing  him  to  attack  the  rnemy's  posts,  co-operate  with 
my  army  in  the  invasion  of  Upper  Canada,  and  only  make  a 
feint  against  Montreal. 

When,  fellow  citizens,  you  consider  that  this  plan  of  the 
campaign  of  invading  Upper  Canada  from  Detroit,  Niagara,  and 
Sackett's  Harbour,  was  made  by  General  Dearborn  himself  and 
approved  by  the  administration. — That  as  early  as  the  26th  of 
Jurn\  only  eight  days  after  the  declaration  of  war,  the  Secretary 
of  War  wrote  to  General  Dearborn,  that  he  should  prepare  the 


176 

force  for  actual  service,  and  stated  that  it  was  understood,  thai 
he  was  possessed  of  a  full  view  of  the  intentions  of  government, 
and  acquainted  with  the  disposition  of  the  force  under  his  com- 
mand; and  when  he  perfectly  well  knew  that  I  was  on  my 
march  to  Detroit,  and  was  to  commence  offensive  operations  as 
soon  as  possible  after  my  arrival,  and  that  his  preparations 
would  be  made  to  move  in  a  direction  for  Niagara,  Kingston, 
&c.  I  again  ask  you,  whether  his  remaining  idle  and  inactive, 
and  not  even  having  given  any  orders  for  making  preparations 
at  Niagara,  &c.  for  so  long  a  time,  was  not  a  disobedience  of 
both  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  orders  which  were  given  on  the 
26th  June,  and  from  that  time  continued,  until  he  agreed  to  the 
armistice,  by  which  he  disqualified  himself  from  making  use  of 
the  forces  in  making  diversions  in  the  enemy's  country,  attack- 
ing their  posts,  or  co-operating  with  me  in  any  manner  what- 
ever. 

From  General  Dearborn's  conference  with  Governour  Tomp- 
kins, and  from  his  letter  to  the  Governour  of  Pennsylvania,  pub- 
lished by  his  son,  it  appears  that  he  was  authorized  by  the  Pres- 
dent,  to  call  for  as  many  militia  as  he  deemed  necessary,  to 
form  the  armies  at  Niagara  and  Sackett's  Harbour,  for  the  in- 
vasion of  Upper  Canada ;  and  it  is  well  known,  being  the  com- 
manding General,  all  the  regular  troops  in  the  northern  part  of 
the  United  States  were  at  his  disposal,  and  subject  to  his  com- 
mand. 

In  cases  where  General  Dearborn's  orders  were  discretiona- 
ry, he  would  be  governed  by  his  own  judgment,  and  was  only 
responsible  for  the  manner  in  which  it  was  exercised.  Admit- 
ting he  had  been  vested  with  discretionary  powers  altogether,  I 
believe  you  must  be  satisfied,  that  under  the  circumstances 
which  existed,  nothing  could  have  justified  his  delay  and  neglect 
in  giving  orders  for  the  execution  for  the  plan  of  the  campaign 
which  had  been  planned  by  himself.  But  this  was  not  the  case  ; 
and  ample  proof  has  been  exhibited,  both  in  my  memoirs,  and. 
in  this  reply,  that  as  early  as  the  26th  of  June,  and  at  different 
times,  to  the  period  wnen  he  agreed  to  act  only  on  the  defen- 
sive, he  was  ordered  to  prepare  an  army  at  Niagara  to  co-oper- 
ate with  me,  as  also  at  the  other  posts  for  the  conquest  of  Up- 
per Canada. 


477 

1  think  with  propriety,  fellow  citizens,  T  may  now  ask  you. 
who  has  made  the  rash  and  unfounded  declarations  which   ll  is 
son  of  General  Dearborn  has  with  so  much  malignity  imputed 
to  me  ?  All  his  sensibilities  appear  to  have  been  excited,  and 
all  the  powers  of  his  mind  called  into  exercise   with  a  desire  to 
make  you  believe  that  his  father  had  no  connexion  with  th    ivvo 
armies,  which  by  his  own  plan  were  to  be  formed,  to  co-operate 
with  mine  in  the  invasion  of  Upper  Canada,  until  the  26th  of 
July.     The  investigation  I  am  now  considering,   is  highly  im- 
portant, both  as  it  respects  myself  and  General  Dearborn.     If 
it  can  be  shewn  that  neither  from  his  rank  nor  the  instructions 
he  received,  it  became   his  duty  to  have   given  orders  for  the 
formation  of  the   two  armies  which  were  to  co-operate  with 
mine  and  for  the  invasion  of  Upper   Canada  below,  until  the 
26th  July,   and  that  after  that  period   he  made  use  of  all  the 
means  with  which  the  administration  had   furnished  him,   in 
making  the  necessary  preparations,  I  will  very  cheerfully  say,  I 
have  accused  him  wrongfully,  and  will  make  any  acknowledg- 
ments which  the  propriety  of  the  case  and  justice  to  him  may 
require.    At  present,  however,  I  am  satisfied  that  I  have  not, 
and  I  continue  the  same  accusation  against  him,  that  it  was  his 
duty,  under  his  commission  and  the  orders  of  the  26th  of  June, 
to  have  made  those  preparations,  which  it  fully  appears  he  ne- 
glected to  do. — Again,  fellow  citizens,  I  ask  you  attentively  to 
read  this  letter  of  the  26th  June  and  compare  it  at  the  same 
time  with  the  plan  of  the  campaign  which  has  been  published  by 
the  son  of  General  Dearborn  and  of  which  his  father  had  a  most 
perfect  knowledge,  as  he  formed  it  himself.      When  you  have 
done  this,  I  shall  be  satisfied  with  the  result  of  your  inquiry. 

There  is  another  point  of  view,  in  which  justice  seems  to  re- 
quire, that  this  subject  should  be  considered.  I  will  here  state 
some  principles  and  facts,  in  which  there  will  be  no  disagree- 
ment. Those  entrusted  with  the  government  of  a  nation  never 
ought  to  declare  war,  until  suitable  preparations  are  made.  Al- 
though in  time  of  peace,  a  nation  ought  to  be  prepared,  at  least 
for  defensive  war,  yet  whether  prepared  or  not,  when  war  is 
declared  against  it,  the  event  must  be  met.  For  the  declaration 
of  war  however,  without  suitable  preparation,  there  can  be  no 
excuse.  If  General  Dearborn  can  show  that  the  war  of  1812 
against  Great  Britain,  was  declared  without  suitable  prepara*- 
23 


17tf 

tion,  or  that  for  want  of  orders,  it  was  not  his  duty  to  make  the 
preparations  for  co-operation  in  Upper  Canada,  or  for  the  want 
of  means,  it  was  not  in  his  power  to  make  such  preparations,  in 
either  of  those  cases,  the  blame  must  rest  on  the  administration. 
This  must  be  obvious,  because  it  was  the  duty  of  the  adminis- 
tration, who  had  recommended  the  declaration  of  war  and  had 
adopted  a  plan  of  operations,  to  have  given  timely  orders  and 
to  have  furnished  the  necessary  means  for  making  such  prepar- 
tions.  Certainly  the  fault  could  not  have  rested  on  me,  be- 
cause, by  the  plan  of  the  campaign,  formed  as  has  before  been 
described,  three  armies  were  to  be  provided  for  the  invasion  of 
Upper  Canada  and  none  but  mine  was  ever  brought  into  opera- 
tion. If  my  army  were  sufficient  for  this  object,  it  was  cer- 
tainly a  great  fault  in  the  administration,  to  order  three  armies, 
when  three  times  the  expense  would  be  incurred.  My  object 
is  to  show,  that  the  disasters  of  the  campaign  ought  not  to  be  at- 
tributed to  me.  No  one  will  believe  it  was  in  my  power  to  con- 
quer, with  one  army,  a  country  for  which  the  administration 
had  assigned  three.  It  was  then  either  the  fault  of  the  adminis* 
tration  or  of  General  Dearborn.  Believing  I  shall  satisfy  you 
that  I  faithfully  did  my  duty,  it  is  not  material  to  me,  whether 
the  fault  rests  on  General  Dearborn  or  on  the  administra- 
tion. 

Had  this  defence  of  young  General  Dearborn  rested  on  the 
ground,  that  war  was  declared  without  suitable  preparation — or 
on  the  neglect  of  the  administration,  in  not  communicating 
timely  instructions  to  his  father,  or  had  it  been  shewn  that  ne- 
cessary means  were  not  furnished, it  is  possible  the  effort  which 
has  been  made  to  shield  General  Dearborn,  would  have  been 
crowned  with  more  success.  With  a  chivalrous  spirit  the 
young  General  has  adventured  into  the  field  ai  d  has  not  only 
become  the  advocate  of  his  father  but  of  the  administration.  It 
is  well  known,  fellow  citizens,  that  the  author  of  this  defence 
received  and  has  enjoyed  for  morp  than  twelve  years,  one  of  the 
most  lucrative  offices  in  its  gift,  the  salary  and  emoluments 
from  which  during  that  time,  cannot  have  been  much  less  than 
one  hundred  thousand  dollars.  \  desire  to  retain  so  valuable 
an  office,  or  if  he  pleases,  gratitude  to  his  benefactors,  must 
have  produced  a  severe  and  conflicting  struggle,  with  the  dis- 
charge of  filial  duty.     As  a  large  portion  of  this  defence  con- 


179 

sists  of  a  republication  of  my  trial,  and  as  he  has  studiously  in 
troduced  the  names  of  the  members  of  the  court  martial,  it  must 
be  evident  that  he  does  not  consider  that  you  have  any  right  to 
examine  for  yourselves  the  proceedings  of  that  trial,  but  that 
the  sentence  of  the  court  martial  ought  to  be  considered  as  final. 
Had  this  not  been  the  case,  his  defence  would  have  been  addres- 
sed to  the  same  tribunal  to  which  I  appealed.  The  difficulty  was, 
he  well  knew,  that  you  would  not  be  willing  to  appoint  General 
Dearborn,  President  of  that  tribunal,  on  which  you  are  to  sit  in 
judgment.  He  was  doubtless  also  influenced  by  similar  motives 
to  those  expressed  in  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  his 
father,  which  is  recited  in  the  £9th  number  of  my  memoirs, 
where,  in  his  very  emphatic  language  he  says,  that  "so  long  as 
you  (that  is  General  Dearborn)  enjoy  the  confidence  of  the  gov- 
ernment, the  clamours  of  the  discontented  should  not  be  re- 
garded." 

In  my  next  number  I  shall  reply  to  young  General  Dearborn, 
on  the  subject  of  the  armistice. 


No.  xxxiv, 


It  is  stated  in  the  defence  of  General  Dearborn,  that  no  troops 
or  military  supplies  were  sent  to  the  relief  of  Fort  Maiden,  dur- 
ing the  temporary  armistice — That  General  Brock  had  no 
knowledge  of  it,  until  he  returned  to  Fort  George,  and  that  so 
far  from  neglecting  the  situation  of  General  Hull,  every  precau- 
tion was  taken  by  General  Dearborn,  to  render  the  arrange- 
ment, not  only  not  injurious,  but  advantageous  to  him.  It  is 
very  desirable  to  present  to  you,  a  certified  copy  of  the  Armis- 
tice, entered  into  on  the  8th  of  August  by  General  Dearborn  on 
one  part,  and  by  Sir  George  Prevost  on  the  other  The  son  of 
General  Dearborn  says,  it  was  entered  into  on  the  9th  of  Au- 
gust— but  I  find  he  has  published  a  letter  from  General  Van 
Rensselaer  to  General  Dearborn,  in  which  he  acknowledges  the 
receipt  of  General  Dearborn's  letter  of  the  8th  of  August,  en- 
the  very  agreement  for  an  armistice.    The   letter  re- 


180 

ferred  to,  is  published  by  young  General  Dearborn  in  the  M  A- 
merican  Statesman"  of  the  29th  of  July,  1824.  This  proves 
that  it  was  made  at  least  as  early  as  the  8th  of  August.  I  re- 
ally hoped  he  would  have  published  a  copy  of  it,  in  his  defence 
of  his  father.  I  have  applied  to  the  offices  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and  likewise  of  State,  and  the  original  cannot  be  found  on 
record  or  on  file  in  either  of  those  offices.  I  likewise  applied  to 
Governor  Eustis,  who  was  Secretary  of  War  at  that  time, 
who  declared  that  it  was  received  at  the  War  Office  and  placed 
on  the  file  or  recorded.  Who  has  taken  it  from  the  office,  I 
know  not.  The  son  of  General  Dearborn  has  however  publish- 
ed two  letters  explanatory  of  it,  one  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
and  one  to  me,  for  which  I  ought  to  express  my  obligations  to 
him,  as  the  information  they  contain,  will  be  highly  useful  in 
the  investigation  of  the  subject.  When  I  wrote  my  memoirs,  I 
only  had  the  explanation  of  it,  as  contained  in  a  letter  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  me,  and  likewise  in  another  letter  from  the 
Secretary  to  General  Dearborn .  I  will  now  copy  both  of  the 
letters  which  the  son  has  been  so  kind  as  to  furnish,  and  I  should 
have  been  under  greater  obligations,  if  he  had  furnished  an  au- 
thenticated copy  of  the  original  instrument  itself.  Were  we 
possessed  of  it,  the  true  interest  and  meaning  of  the  armistice 
might  be  better  understood.  The  letters  referred  to  are  as  fol- 
low. 

Letter  from  General  Dearborn  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  inform- 
ing him  of  the  temporary  armistice. 

"Head  Quarters,  Greenbush,  Aug.  9th,  1812. 

SIR, — Colonel  Baynes,  Adjutant  General  of  the  British  army 
in  Canada,  has  this  day  arrived  at  this  place,  in  the  character 
of  a  Flag  of  Truce,  with  despatches  from  the  British  govern- 
ment, through  Mr.  Foster,*  which  I  have  enclosed  to  the  Sec- 
retary. Colonel  Baynes  was  likewise  the  bearer  of  despatches 
from  Sir  George  Prevost,  which  is  herewith  enclosed.  Although 
I  do  not  consider  myself  authorized  to  agree  to  a  cessation  of 
arms,  I  concluded  that  1  might  with  perfect  safety,  agree  that 
our  troops  should  act  merely  on  the  defensive,  until  I  could  re- 
ceive directions  from  my  government ;  but  as  I  could  not  in- 

*  Late  Minister  of  Great  Britain,  then  at  Halifax, 


181 

dude  General  Hull  in  such  an^ arrangement,  he  having  received 
his  orders  directly  from  the  department  of  war,  I  agreed  to 
write  to  him,  and  state  the  proposition  made  to  me,  and  have 
proposed,  his  confining  himself  to  defensive  measures,  if  his 
orders,  and  the  circumstances  of  affairs  with  him,  would  justify 
it.  Colonel  Baynes  has  written  similar  orders  to  the  Britisfy 
officers  in  Upper  Canada,  and  I  have  forwarded  them,  to  our 
commanders  of  posts,  to  be  by  them  transmitted  to  the  British 
commanders. 

I  consider  the  agreement  as  favourable  at  this  period,  for  we 
could  not  act  offensively,  except  at  Detroit,  for  some  time,  and 
there  it  will  not  probably  have  any  effect  on  General  Hull  or 
his  movements,  and  we  shall  not  be  prepared  to  act  offensively 
in  this  quarter,  before  you  will  have  time  to  give  me  orders  for 
continuing  on  the  defensive  or  act  otherwise. 

We  shall  lose  no  time,  or  advantage,  by  the  agreement,  but 
rather  gain  time  without  any  risk.  It  is  mutually  understood, 
that  all  preparatory  measures  may  proceed,  and  that  no  obstruc- 
tions are  to  be  attempted,  on  either  side,  to  the  passage  of 
stores,  to  the  frontier  posts  ;  but  if  General  Hull  should  not 
think  it  advisable  to  confine  himself  to  mere  defensive  opera- 
tions, the  passage  of  military  stores  to  Detroit,  will  not  be  con- 
sidered as  embraced  in  the  agreement  last  noticed. 

Col.  Baynes  informs  me,  that  a  party  of  British  troops  and 
Indians,  had  taken  possession  of  Michilimackanack,  and  that 
our  garrison  were  prisoners.  I  made  no  particular  inquiry  as 
to  the  circumstances,  as  I  entertain  some  doubts  as  to  the  fact. 
I  have  no  expectation  that  the  government  will  consent  to  a 
cessation  of  hostilities,  on  the  strength  of  the  communication 
forwarded  by  Mr.  Foster;  but  all  circumstances  considered,  it 
may  be  well  to  avail  ourselves  of  the  occasion,  until  we  are  bet- 
ter prepared  for  acting  with  effect;  at  all  events,  we  can  lose 
nothing  by  the  arrangement,  I  have  consented  to,  it  being  ex- 
plicitly understood,  that  my  government  will  not  be  under  any 
obligation  to  agree  to  it,  unless  the  despatches  from  the  British 
government  should  be  such,  as  to  induce  the  President  to  pro- 
pose an  armistice,  as  preparatory  for  negotiations  for  peace.  I 
informed  Colonel  Baynes,  that  our  government  would  readily 
meet  any  such  overture  from  Great  Britain,  as  clearly  indicat- 
ed a  disposition  for  making  peace  on  satisfactory  terms ;  but  af- 


182 

ter  what  had  occurred,  in  relation  to  the  adjustment  with  Mr. 
Erskine,  it  could  not  be  expected  that  any  other  than  the  most 
explicit  and  authentic  directions  to  their  agent  in  this  country, 
would  produce  any  change  in  our  measures.  It  is  evident  that 
a  war  with  the  United  States  is  very  unpopular  in  Canada.— 
Colonel  Baynes  arrived  at  our  frontier  post,  at  Plattsburg,  and 
was  conducted  to  this  place  by  Major  Clark,  an  officer  in  the 
detached  militia  of  this  State,  he  returned  this  day  with  the  same 
officer. 

I  am.  Sir,  &c. 

H.   DEARBORN." 

Letter  from  General  Dearborn  to  General  Hull,  announcing  the 
temporary  armistice. 

"Head  Quarters,  Greenbuslu  Aug.  9th,  1812. 

-    SIR, — Having  received  from  Sir  George  Prevost,  Governour 
General,  and  commander  of  the  British  forces  in   Upper  and 
Lower  Canada,  despatches  from  the  British  jrovernment.  said  to 
be  of  a  conciliatory  nature,  which  I  have  forwarded  to  Washing- 
ton, and  a  letter  from  Sir  George  Prevost  to  me,  by  his  Adju- 
tant General,  Colonel  Baynes,  proposing  a  cessation  of  hostili- 
ties on  the  frontiers ;  I  have  so  far  agreed  to  his  proposals  as  to 
consent  that  no  offensive  operations  shall  be  attempted  on  our 
part,  until  I  have  received  further  instructions  from  our  govern- 
ment ;  but  as  you  received  your  orders  directly  from  the  de- 
partment of  war,  I  could  not  agree  to  extend   the  principle  to 
your  command,  but  I  agreed  to  write  to  you,  and  state  the  gen- 
eral facts;  and  propose  to  you,  a  concurrence  in  the  measures, 
if  your  orders  and   situation  would   admit  of  it;  of  course  you 
will  act  in  conformity  with  what  has  been  agreed  upon,  in  re- 
spect to  the  other  posts  on  the  frontiers,  if  not  incompatable 
with  your  orders,  or  the  arrangements  made  under  them,  or  the 
circumstances  under  which  this  letter  reaches  you.     Any  pre- 
parations for  offensive  operations  may  be  continued,  and  when 
it  is  agreed  to  suspend  any  offensive  operations  no  obstacles 
are  to  be  opposed  to  the  transportation  of  military  stores.     In 
all  cases  where  offensive  operations  cease,  by  virtue  of  the  afore- 
mentioned agreement,  four  entire  days  are  to  be  allowed,  after 
either  party  shall  revoke  their  orders,  before  any  offensive  oper- 
ations shall  commence.    A  letter  from  Colonel   Baynes,  to  the 


183 

commanding  officer  at  Amherstburg,  has  been  forwarded  by  me 
to  the  commanding  officer  at  Niagara,  to  be  by  him  transmitted 
to  Detroit.  The  removal  of  any  troops  from  Niagara  to  De- 
troit, while  the  present  agreement  continues,  would  be  impro- 
per, and  incompatible  with  the  true  interest  of  the  agreement. 
I  have  made  no  arrangement  that  should  have  any  effect  upon 
your  command  contrary  to  your  own  judgment. 

I  am,  &c. 

H.  DEARBORN." 

The  publication  of  the  letter  above  recited  addressed  to  me. 
is  the  first  knowledge  I  ever  had  of  it.  It  never  was  received 
by  me. — Without  any  other  feeling  than  a  desire  for  truth,  I 
will  examine  these  letters  with  all  due  caution,  and  give  them 
no  other  construction,  than  such  as  is  obviously  to  be  inferred 
from  the  language  with  which  they  are  clothed.  Here  is  pre- 
sented by  the  son  of  General  Dearborn,  his  father's  own  letters, 
explanatory  of  his  temporary  armistice,  as  it  is  called  by  him.  He 
does  not  present  the  agreement  itself,  for  reasons  which  I  shall 
not  pretend  to  conjecture.  If  it  were  as  favourable  to  his  father, 
as  the  explanation  given  of  it  in  these  letters.  I  am  sure  you  will 
believe  it  would  not  have  been  withheld.  I  will  now  consider, 
what  it  appears  to  have  been  by  these  letters.  Colonel  Baynes, 
the  Adjutant  General  of  the  British  army,  came  to  General 
Dearborn's  head  quarters,  with  a  proposition  from  Sir  George 
Prevost.  The  General  says,  in  his  letter  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  "although  I  do  not  consider  myself  authorized  to  agree  to 
a  cessation  of  arms,  I  concluded  I  might  with  perfect  safety 
agree,  that  our  troops  should  act  merely  on  the  defensive." — 
These  are  the  very  words  he  makes  use  of  There  is  not  one 
word  in  his  letter  to  the  government,  by  which  it  can  even  be  in- 
ferred, that  there  was  any  agreement  on  the  part  of  the  British 
Adjutant  General,  that  the  British  troops  opposite  to  ours,  should 
likewise  act  only  on  the  defensive.  General  Brock,  with  all  the 
forces  of  Upper  Canada,  was  left  at  perfect  liberty  to  march  of- 
fensively against  the  forces  I  commanded.  General  Dearborn 
agreed  to  write  to  me,  that  I  might  act  on  the  defensive  only,  if 
I  thought  proper.  And  it  seems  to  have  been  virtually  under- 
stood, that  the  British  commander.  General  Brock,  might  also 
act  only  on  the  defensive,  if  he  thought  proper.     These  discre- 


184 

tionary  powers  appear  to  have  been   vested   both   in  General 
Brock  and  myself  without  any  special  authority,  either  from  the 
British  Adjutant  General  or  from  General  Dearborn.      Thus  it 
seems,  by  General  Dearborn's  own    letters,  that  General  Brock 
was  at  liberty  to  march  all  the  forces  of  Upper  Canada,  and  in- 
vade our  country,  by  his  attack  on  me,  while  General  Dearborn 
became  pledged,  by  hi3   armistice,  to  confine  himself  to  his 
post,  where  he  was  then  situated,  and  could  not  cross  the  Nia- 
gara river,  to  take  possession  of  fort  Erie  or   fort  George,  al- 
though they  were  left  in  a  perfectly  defenceless  condition,  with- 
out violating  his  own  agreement.     It  must  be  seen,  that  so  long 
as  we  are  deprived  of  the  original  agreement  for  this  temporary 
armistice,  that  I  have  no  other  mode  of  explaining  it,  than  by 
the  information  which  General  Dearborn  has  given  in  his  letters 
explanatory  of  it     If  it  contains  any  thing  more  or  any  thing 
different  from  what  has  been  or  may  be  explained,  let  a  copy  of 
the  original  instrument  be  produced.      General  Dearborn  in  his 
letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  says,  "that  he  did  not  consider 
himself  authorized  to  agree  to  a  cessation  of  hostilities,"  and  in 
another  part  of  his  letter  he  says,  "that  he  has  no  expectation 
that  his  government  will  consent  to  a  cessation  of  hostilities 
on  the  strength  of  the  communications  which  he  had  forwarded 
to  the  Secretary  of  State  on  the  subject."     But  nevertheless,  he 
agreed  to  act  only  on  the  defensive. 

As  it  does  not  appear  by  the  above  letters,  to  have  been  stip- 
ulated, that  the  British  were  to  act  only  on  the  defensive,  I  ask 
whether  such  a  construction  can  be  inferred  from  the  terms 
contained  in  those  letters  ?  According  to  the  common  meaning 
and  acceptation  of  language,  it  cannot.  It  is  proper  to  construe 
this  instrument,  as  it  actually  was,  and  not  as  it  ought  to  have 
been. 

In  the  letter  which  he  says  he  wrote  to  me,  he  gives  the  same 
account,  that  he  had  agreed  to  act  only  on  the  defensive*  which 
is  contained  in  the  one  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  He  further 
says  in  his  letter  to  me,  that  "  the  removal  of  any  troops  from 
T^iagaia  to  Detroit  while  the  agreement  continued,  wonld  be 
improper  and  incompatible  with  the  true  intent  of  the  agree- 
ment." This  is  his  own  construction,  but  there  is  nothing  con- 
tained in  the  letters  referred  to,  as  far  as  I  can  comprehend 
them,  which  will  justify  such  a  construction.    It  is  certain,  Sir 


185 

George  Prevo9t  did  not  put  this  construction  to  the  agreement,  ffer 
it  appears  by  General  Dearborn's  letter  to  General  Van  Rensse- 
laer, dated  twelve  days  after  it  was  made,  and  while  it  was  in 
fuiJ  force,  that  he  refers  to  detachments  which  had  been  sent 
from  Niagara  to  Detroit,  and  General  Van  Rensselaer  was  or- 
dered to  prepare,  to  take  advantage  of  their  reduced  force,  as  soon 
as  there  should  be  orders  to  act  offensively.  And  no  evidence 
has  been  offered,  to  show,  that  this  removal  of  the  troops  from 
Niagara  to  Detroit,  was  ever  complained  of  by  General  Dear- 
born, as  a  violation  of  the  armistice. 

This  then  was  the  temporary  armistice,  which  General  Dear- 
born agreed  to,  as  appears  by  his  own  letters,  and  although  not 
authorized  to  agree  to  an  armistice,  and  having  stated  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  that  "  he  had  no  expectation  that  the  govern- 
ment would  consent  to  a  cessation  of  hostilities,  on  the  strength 
of  the  communication  forwarded  by  Mr.  Foster,"  yet  he  did 
agree  that  his  troops  should  act  only  on  the  defensive,  regard- 
less of  my  situation,  and  leaving  me  to  be  exposed  to  the  united 
forces  from  Niagara  and  at  M  alden. 

Was  it  possible  for  him  to  have  made  an  arrangement  more 
fatal  to  me  r  How  long  did  this  temporary  armistice  continue  ? 
— A  letter  from  General  Van  Rensselaer,  dated  at  Lewistown, 
to  General  Dearborn,  acknowledges  the  receipt  of  General  Dear- 
born's letter  of  the  8th  of  August,  enclosing  the  armistice,  so 
that  it  must  have  been  as  early  as  the  8th  of  August.  This  let- 
ter is  published  by  the  son  of  General  Dearborn.  By  a  letter 
which  he  has  also  published  in  the  same  paper,  from  General 
Brock  to  General  Van  Rensselaer,  dated  the  25th  August,  1812, 
— General  Van  Rensselaer  is  informed,  that  General  Brock  dis- 
patched an  express  to  Amherstburg,  the  day  before,  giving  infor- 
mation of  the  armistice.  By  this  letter  it  appears,  that  the  ar- 
mistice must  have  been  in  operation,  at  least  from  the  8th  to  the 
25th  of  August,  when  if  we  suppose  the  armistice  to  have  end- 
ed, which  was  not  the  case,  however,  and  four  days  being  al- 
lowed thereafter,  for  notice  to  have  been  given  of  its  termina- 
tion, the  period  of  its  operation  would  then  have  amounted  to 
twenty-one  days.  During  all  this  period,  General  Brock  had  it 
in  his  power,  with  all  his  forces  of  every  description,  to  come 
against  me,  while  the  whole  American  forces  on  the  Niagara 
24 


186 

river,  were  confined  to  our  territory,  under  the  armistice  of 
their  commanding  General. 

In  answer  to  young  Gen.  Dearborn's  round  assertion,  that 
at  this  time,  no  troops  left  Niagra  for  Maiden,  I  will  recite  the 
letter  of  his  Father  to  Gen.  Van  Rensselaer,  dated  the  20th  of 
August.  It  is  in  these  words — "  as  it  is  believed  a  detachment 
has  been  made  from  the  British  force  at  Niagra,  to  re-enforce  the 
garrison  at  Maiden,  it  will  be  necessary  to  be  as  well  prepared  as 
possible,  to  take  advantage  of  the  reduced  force  in  your  front,  as 
soon  as  there  shall  be  orders  to  act  offensively." — In  his  let- 
ter likewise  to  the  Secretary  of  War  of  the  7th  of  August,  Gen- 
eral Dearborn  states  the  movement  of  the  British  troops  from 
Niagara  to  Detroit.  This  was  one  day  only,  before  he  agreed 
to  the  armistice,  in  anticipation  of  which,  there  can  be  no  doubt, 
this  detachment  of  the  British,  took  advantage  of  the  contem- 
plated temporary  cessation  of  hostilities.  This  testimony  the 
young  General  Dearborn  has  furnished,  as  will  be  found,  by  re- 
ference to  the  defence  of  his  father  and  expressed,  in  a  letter  of 
which  the  following  is  a  copy,  of  so  much  as  relates  to  that  part 
of  the  subject. 

Letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 

u  Head  Quarters,  Greenbush,  August  7,  1812. 

SIR, — I  have  been  honoured  with  your  letters  of  the  26th, 
27th  and  29th  ult.  and  of  1st  and  5th  inst.  I  have  been  making 
arrangements  with  Governour  Tompkins  for  having  re-enforce- 
ments sent  to  Niagara,  Ogdensburg  and  Plattsburg.  I  trust 
they  will  be  moved  soon  ;  but  too  late,  I  fear,  to  make  the  di- 
version in  favour  of  General  Hull,  which  is  so  desirable. 

M  I  have  ordered  Lieutenant  Colonel  Fen  wick,  with  two  com- 
panies of  Simond's  regiment,  two  18,  and  two  12  pounders, 
to  move  up  the  Mohawk  to  Utica,  where  the  roads  part,  which 
lead  to  Niagara  and  Sackett's  Harbour. 

"  I  shall  order  a  detachment  of  light  artillery,  and  the  infan- 
try, with  the  heavy  pieces,  a  quantity  of  ammunition,  intrench- 
ing tools,  and  other  articles,  to  proceed  to  Niagara. — The  whole, 
except  the  light  artillery,  will  go  by  water  from  fort  Schuyler. 
I  wrote  to  the  commanding  officers  at  Niagara  and  Sackett's 
Harbour,  confidentially,  to  lei  it  be  known  they  had  received 


187 

intelligence,  that  large  re-enforcements  of  regulars  and  militia 
were  on  their  march  to  join  them  :  I  enclosed  a  letter  to  each  of 
them  to  that  effect.  It  is  said,  that  a  detachment  has  been  sent 
from  Nigara.  by  land,  to  Detroit ;  if  so,  I  should  presume,  be- 
fore they  can  march  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles,  General  Hull 
will  receive  notice  of  their  approach,  and  in  season  to  cut  them 
off  before  they  reach  fort  Maiden." 

Here  then  we  have  the  testimony  of  General  Dearborn  him- 
self, that  on  the  7th  of  August,  a  detachment  of  British  troops 
had  marched  from  Niagara  to  re-enforce  the  troops  at  Maiden  ; 
and  on  the  20th  of  August,  General  Van  Rensselaer  was  inform- 
ed, that  a  detachment  had  marched  from  the  same  place.* 
Either  then  there  were  two  detachments  of  the  British  which 
moved  forward  to  Detroit,  as  referred  to  by  General  Dearborn 
on  the  7th  August  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  afterwards  on 
the  20th  of  the  same  month  in  his  letter  to  General  Van  Rensse- 
laer, a  more  minute  account  of  which,  giving  the  amount  of  the 
force  of  one  detachment,  is  given  by  the  above  letter  of  Colonel 
Cass,  or  General  Dearborn  was  criminally  negligent,  in  suffer- 
ing thirteen  days  to  elapse,  between  the  7th  and  20th  August, 
before  he  communicated  to  General  Van  Rensselaer,  informa- 
tion of  so  much  importance.  The  young  General  may  have  his 
choice  of  the  alternatives,  in  making  out  the  defence  of  his 
father. 

There  is  another  consideration  which  must  be  irresistible  on 
this  subject.  Sir  George  Prevost  was  the  commanding  General 
of  both  the  Canadas.  General  Brock  was  acting  governour,  and 
commanded  the  troops  in  Upper  Canada,  and  was  under  the 
command  of  Sir  George  Prevost.  At  this  time  I  had  invaded 
Upper  Canada  from  Detroit.  No  invasion  was  made  from  any 
other  quarter.     It  was  of  great  importance,   to  re-enforce  the 

*  In  addition  to  the  letters  of  General  Dearborn  which  have  been  cited,  it  fur- 
ther appears  by  Colonel  Cass'  letter  to  the  government,  dated  10th  September, 
1812,  which  has  been  published  in  General  Dearborn's  defence,  that  the  enemy 
at  Maiden,  about  the  10th  August,  after  the  armistice  was  entered  into,  re- 
ceived a  re-enforcement  from  the  same  place.  His  words  are  M  about  the  10th 
August,  the  enemy  received  a  re-enforcement  of  about  four  hundred  men." 

It  appears  evident,  from  this  statement  of  Colonel  Cass,  that  the  force  of  four 
hundred  men,  which  arrived  on  the  10th  August,  must  have  been  an  extra  force, 
besides  that  of  General  Brock,  which  did  not  reach  Maiden,  until  the  14th  ci 
the  same  month, 


J  88 

troops  at  Maiden,  to  repel  this  invasion.  Troops  could  not  be 
removed  with  safety  to  the  British  posts  below,  while  our  troops 
at  Niagara,  had  a  right  to  act  offensively. 

I  now  ask  you.  whether  you  do  not  believe  that  this  plan  was 
concerted  by  Sir  George  Prevost,  solely  for  the  purpose  of  ena- 
bling General  Brock  to  carry  his  troops  to  re-enforce  the  troops 
at  Maiden  ?  And  whether  you  do  not  believe,  as  soon  as  the 
plan  was  conceived  and  Sir  George  Prevost  had  determined  to 
send  his  proposals  to  General  Dearborn,  that  he  immediately 
gave  General  Brock  information,  that  a  suspension  of  hostilities 
would  probably  take  place  at  Niagara,  and  that  he  might  with 
safety  to  those  posts*  march  his  troops  to  Maiden,  which  it  ap- 
pears by  the  two  letters  above  recited  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
and  to  General  Van  Rensselaer,  he  actually  did. 

The  facts  thus  proved  by  the  letters  of  General  Dearborn  to 
the  Secretary  of  War  and  to  General  Van  Rensselaer,  shewing 
that  a  detachment  had  moved  from  Niagara  for  Maiden,  and  the 
commentaries  which  have  been  and  will  now  be  made  on  them, 
will  ^ive  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  letter  of  General 
Brock,  which  has  been  published  by  young  General  Dearborn. 
General  Brock  had  carried  his  re-enforcements  to  Maiden,  and 
during  the  existence  of  the  armistice,  was  engaged  in  offensive 
operations.  When  he  wrote  his  letter  of  the  25th  August  to 
General  Van  Rensselaer,  disavowing  any  knowledge  of  the  ar- 
mistice, at  the  time  of  his  attack  on  Detroit  he  had  then  return- 
ed with  his  re-enforcements  to  fort  George.  It  is  true,  the  des- 
patches from  the  British  Adjutant  General,  communicating 
official  intelligence  of  the  armistice,  and  which  General  Dearborn 
had  undertaken  to  transmit  to  the  British  commanding  officer  at 
Niagara  and  to  myself  may  not  have  been  received  by  General 
Brock,  as  he  states,  previously  to  the  25th  of  August.  But  I 
would  ask  how  it  happens  that  this  official  intelligence  of  the 
armistice  was  not  received  by  General  Brock,  before  the  25th 
August,  seventeen  days  after  it  was  agreed  upon  ?  And  what 
became  of  the  despatches,  which  it  is  stated  General  Dear- 
born had  transmitted  to  me,  and  which  I  declare  I  had  never 
received. 

In  a  letter  from  General  Dearborn  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
of  the  7th  of  U'^ust,  he  says,  "Ihave  been  making  arrange- 
ments with  Governour    Tompkins  for  having  re-enforcements 


189 

Sent  to  Niagara,  Ogdensburg,  arid  Plattsburg,  I  trust  they  will 
move  soon,  but  too  late,  I  fear,  to  make  the  diversions  in  favour 
of  General  Hull  which  is  so  desirable."  In  the  same  letter  of 
the  7th  of  August,  he  informs  the  Secretary  "that  a  detachment 
had  been  sent  from  Niagara  to  Detroit."  What  were  the  cir- 
cumstances which  induced  General  Dearborn  to  express  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  his  fears  that  the  re -enforcements  he  had  or- 
dered from  the  State  of  New  York  would  be  too  late  to  make 
diversions  in  favour  of  General  Hull  ?  Although  he  says  these 
re-enforcements  would  move  soon,  yet  he  says  he  fears  they 
would  be  too  late.  Does  he  not  himself  in  this  very  letter  give 
the  reason  why  it  would  be  too  late  for  these  re  enforcements 
to  co-operate  with  me?  viz.  "that  a  detachment  of  the  British 
had  been  sent  from  Niagara  to  Detroit."  With  the  knowledge 
before  him  of  the  movement  of  this  detachment,  I  think  I  may 
then  ask,  what  possible  reason  could  have  induced  him  on  the 
very  next  day  to  have  paralyzed  his  own  troops  on  the  Niagara, 
by  pledging  himself  that  they  should  act  only  on  the  defensive? 
As  soon  as  this  temporary  armistice  was  made,  on  the  8th  Aug- 
gust,  the  British  Adjutant  General  delivered  a  copy  of  it  to 
General  Dearborn  enclosed  in  a  letter  to  General  Brock  or  the 
commanding  officer  at  fort  George,  to  be  transmitted  by  him,  as 
he  had  undertaken  to  have  it  sent.  Permit  me  again  to  ask, 
what  could  have  induced  him  to  have  adopted  a  measure,  which 
he  himself  says  he  was  not  authorized  to  agree  to,  and  which 
he  believed  the  government  would  not  approve  ?  If  he  should 
say  his  object  was  my  relief,  I  must  request  you,  fellow  citizens, 
now  to  consider  the  measures  he  adopted  to  afford  that  relief. 
All  the  letters  containing  this  important  information,  were  en- 
trusted to  General  Dearborn  to  be  communicated.  He  was  the 
commanding  General  of  our  armies  and  must  have  known  how 
materially  this  important  measure  would  effect  mv  army,  and 
having  entered  into  it  himself,  it  evidently  became  his  duty  to 
have  taken  the  most  effectual  means  regardless  of  every  ex- 
pense, to  have  made  this  communication  to  me  with  the  greatest 
possible  expedition. 

The  distance  from  Albany  to  the  Niagara  river,  is  about  three 
hundred  miles  and  thence  to  Detroit  about  two  hundred  and 
fifty  miles  more.  It  appears  then  that  I  was  about  five  hund- 
dred  and  fifty  miles  from  Albany,  where  General  Dearborn 


196 

was  situated  at  the  date  of  the  armistice,  and  that  General 
Brock  was  oh  his  way  to  Maiden.  Intelligence  of  this  armis- 
tice might  have  reached  me  in  five  days  after  it  was  agreed  up- 
on, by  an  express,  travelling  less  than  five  miles  an  hour.  Had 
this  been  done,  I  should  have  received  the  armistice^three  days 
before  the  16th  August,  the  day  that  General  Brock  invaded 
our  territory.  By  the  measures  adopted  by  General  Dearborn 
to  have  these  important  despatches  conveyed,  it  will  be  seen  by 
reference  to  General  Van  Rensselaer's  letter  to  General  Dear- 
born, as  before  recited,  that  he  did  not  receive  them  until  the 
17th  of  August  being  nine  days  in  travelling  three  hundred' 
miles,  and  by  General  Brock's  letter  to  General  Van  Rensse- 
laer, it  appears  he  did  not  receive  them  until  his  return  to  fort 
George,  after  the  capitulation  at  Detroit,  and  as  I  have  before 
stated,  the  despatches  sent  to  me,  I  have  never  received.  Had 
proper  and  efficient  measures  been  adopted  by  General  Dear- 
born, to  forward  the  despatches  with  such  expedition  as  they 
might  have  been  sent,  according  to  his  own  construction  of  the 
terms  of  that  agreement,  General  Brock  would  then  have  re- 
ceived the  official  account  in  due  time  to  have  prevented  his  in- 
vading our  territory  in  his  attack  on  me,  and  I  should  have  had 
it  in  my  power  to  have  exercised  my  discretion  in  agreeing 
likewise  to  the  armistice  or  to  have  acted  otherwise,  as  circum- 
stances might  have  warranted.  General  Brock  having  made 
the  invasion  of  our  country  in  his  attack  on  me,  during  the  oper- 
ation of  the  armistice,  he  felt  the  necessity  in  justification  of 
himself,  of  writing  the  letter  referred  to,  addressed  to  General 
Van  Rensselaer,  protesting  against  any  knowledge  (meaning 
official  knowledge)  of  the  existence  of  such  armistice  at  that 
time.  It  is  well  known  that  the  Adjutant  General  is  the  direct 
organ  of  communication,  through  whom  orders  are  made  known 
to  an  army,  and  if  by  other  means,  a  subordinate  officer  has  re* 
ceived  intelligence  of  such  orders  unless  communicated  in  an 
official  verbal  or  written  form,  from  the  commanding  officer,  he 
is  not  bound  and  indeed  he  dare  not  obey  them.  The  armistice 
having  been  made  nearly  three  weeks  before  General  Broek  had 
returned  from  Maiden  to  his  post  on  the  Niagara,  I  ask  you 
whether  it  is  probable  that  it  was  such  a  profound  secret  in  Up- 
per Canada,  that  General  Brock  should  have  received  wo  indirect 
information  of  it,  when  he  was  in  a  situation  where  it  might 


191 

'have  been  communicated  to  him  in  three  or  four  days  at  most 
Truth  is  frequently  more  clearly  elicited  from  circumstances, 
than  from  any  other  kind  of  testimony  Records  are  liable  to 
be  mutilated ;  thQ,  memory  of  man  is  not  always  correct  and  re- 
tentive ;  interest,  passion,  and  prejudice  frequently  have  a  pow- 
erful operation  on  the  mind.  In  the  case  under  review,  the 
circumstances  which  existed  speak  in  terms  most  convincing 
and  irresistible. 

It  is  necessary  to  take  a  view  of  the  situation  of  both  armies, 
and  their  relation  to  each  other,  with  the  objects  of  both  parties 
in  the  war,  to  form  a  proper  estimate  on  the  subject.  The  ar- 
my I  commanded,  made  the  invasion  from  the  Detroit  river.  I 
had  no  co-operation.  This  was  owing  to  the  neglect  of  General 
Dearborn  in  the  first  instance  and  to  his  temporary  armistice  in 
the  second.  This  armistice  was  proposed  by  Sir  George  Pre- 
vost  at  a  time  when  his  provinces  were  invaded  from  no  other 
quarter  but  Detroit.  I  ask  you,  then,  for  what  purpose  this 
proposal  was  made  ?  To  your  consideration  and  judgment  I 
cheerfully  submit  the  two  following  inquiries.  First,  whether 
the  sole  object  was  not  to  enable  General  Brock  to  march  with 
the  troops  from  the  east  part  of  the  province  to  re-enforce  the 
troops  at  Maiden,  to  repel  the  invasion  I  had  made  ?  Second, 
whether  from  the  evidence  and  circumstances  which  have 
been  related  you  are  not  perfectly  satisfied  that  General  Brock  had 
information  of  the  temporary  armistice  before  he  returned  from 
Maiden,  three  weeks  after  it  had  been  made — a  sufficient  time 
for  the  information  to  have  arrived,  had  it  been  sent  from  Eng* 
land?  In  support  of  this  evidence  and  of  these  circumstances, 
1  do  now  in  the  most  solemn  manner  declare,  as  I  before  stat- 
ed, that  immediately  after  the  capitulation  on  the  16th  August, 
General  Brock  informed  me  that  the  orders  in  Council  had  been 
repealed,  and  General  Dearborn  had  agreed  to  an  armistice  at 
Niagara  and  the  other  posts  where  he  commanded,  and  he  hop- 
ed and  expected  it  would  be  the  foundation  of  peace  between 
the  two  countries  ;  or  words  to  that  effect.  You  all  well  know 
fellow  citizens,  with  what  despatch  expresses  are  sent  almost 
every  day  through  the  country  for  the  benefit  of  commercial 
speculation,  and  that  the  distance  of  five  or  six  hundred  miles  is 
frequently  travelled  over  in  about  three  days.  With  the  know- 
ledge of  such  facts  which  the  experience  of  all  of  you  confirm, 


192 

can  it  be  considered  unreasonable  in  me  to  suppose  that  equal 
vigilance  would  have  been  observed  on  this  occasion,  as  is  prac- 
tised in  a  private  commercial  speculation  ?  On  a  great  national 
occasion,  when  the  fate  of  an  army  and  a  large  section  of 
country  is  exposed,  was  it  not  the  duty  of  the  commanding 
General,  to  whom  was  confided  your  safety  and  the  protection 
of  your  property,  to  have  made  as  great  exertions  for  their  pre- 
servation, as  are  every  day  made  by  individuals,  where  nothing 
is  at  stake,  but  pecuniary  private  interest  ?  But  it  is  further  in 
evidence,  fellow  citizens,  that  General  Dearborn's  expresses  did 
not  travel  with  but  little  more  than  one  third  the  speed  with 
ordinary  expresses  ;  as  General  Van  Rensselaer  on  the  17th  of 
August,  nine  days  after  the  armistice  was  agreed  upon,  which 
was  on  the  8th  of  August,  and  only  three  hundred  miles  from 
Albany,  acknowledges  then  to  have  just  received  General  Dear- 
born's letter,  communicating  the  intelligence  of  it.  So  that  you 
perceive  this  express  travelled  at  the  astonishing  rate  of  not 
quite  a  mile  and  an  half  an  hour.  With  such  evidences  of  the 
vigilance  and  exertions  of  General  Dearborn  in  carrying  into 
execution  the  plan  of  a  campaign  which  he  himself  had  formed 
and  making  preparations  for  conducting  an  offensive  war,  de- 
clared by  an  administration  from  which  he  received  his  commis- 
sions, I  will  leave  you  to  make  your  own  comments. 


No.  xxxv. 


The  temporary  armistice  made  with  Sir  George  Prevost 
by  General  Dearborn,  had  so  fatal  an  effect  on  the  division 
of  the  army  I  commanded,  and  was  so  essentially  the  cause 
of  the  misfortunes  of  the  campaign,  that  I  must  beg  your 
further  attention  to  that  subject.  The  fact  is,  that  as  early  as 
the  Sd  and  7th  of  August,  General  Dearborn  well  knew  my 
critical  situation,  and  how  much  I  stood  in  need  of  co-operation 
and  assistance.  In  the  letter  of  the  3d  to  General  Van  Rensse- 
laer, he  says,  "you  will  please  to  take  measures  for  keeping  up 
a  correspondence  with  General  Hull,  and  ascertain  his  move- 
ments by  expresses  or  otherwise ;  and  as  he  has  crossed  over 


193 

*nio  Upper  Canada,  an<l  taken  possession  of  Maiden,  it  will  be 
expedient  to  make  every  exertion  in  your  power  to  co-operate 
with  him  ;  and  if  your  force  will  not  admit  of  any  strong  offen- 
sive operations,  it  may  be  well  to  make  such  diversions  in  his 
favour  as  circumstances  will  permit,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  detaching  any  force  from  the  vicinity  of  Niagara,  to 
oppose  the  movements  of  General  Hull.  I  trust  you  will  soon 
be  able  to  act  in  a  more  decisive  manner." 

In  his  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  the  7th  of  August, 
he  says,  "I  have  been  making  arrangements  for  having  re-en- 
forcements sent  to  Niagara,  Ogdensburg,  and  Plattsburg.  I 
trust  they  will  move  soon — but  too  late  I  fear,  to  make  the  di- 
version in  favour  of  General  Hull,  which  is  so  desirable. " — In 
the  same  letter  he  informs  the  Secretary  that  a  detachment  of 
the  British  had  been  sent  from  Niagara  to  Detroit. 

General  Dearborn,  as  you  will  perceive,  from  his  letters  of 
the  3d  and  7th  of  August,  knew  that  troops  had  marched  from 
Niagara  to  re-enforce  the  post  of  Maiden — he  was  likewise  aware 
that  in  making  an  Armistice,  he  could  not  include  me — as  shewn 
by  his  letter  to  me  on  the  subject,  where  he  says,  "  that  as  you 
received  your  orders  directly  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  I  could 
not  agree  to  extend  the  principle  to  your  command."  With 
full  and  certain  knowledge  of  these  facts  he  makes  the  armis- 
tice. The  circumstance  of  some  of  the  troops  having  marched 
to  Maiden  previous  to  the  armistice,  only  increased  the  difficul- 
ty, for  it  enabled  the  enemy  to  strengthen  their  posts  and  be 
better  prepared  for  service. 

Knowing  then,  as  he  did,  my  critical  situation,  and  that  a 
part  of  the  force  of  Niagara  had  marched  against  me,  I  ask.  on 
what  grounds  his  conduct  could  be  justified? 

There  is  additional  evidence  to  shew,  that  General  Dearborn 
was  correct  in  stating  that  troops  had  been  sent  to  Maiden,  as 
found  in  the  letter  of  Colonel  Cass  to  the  government  after  the 
capitulation,  which  letter  was  sent  to  the  court  martial  as  evi- 
dence against  me.  Colonel  Cass  says,  "that  about  the  10th  of 
August,  the  enemy  received  a  re-en«orcement  of  about  four  hun- 
dred men."  General  Dearborn  left  it  optional  with  me  to  act 
on  the  defensive,  and  it  was  equally  so  with  the  British — for  as 
a  part  of  their  troops  had  left  Niagara  previous  to  the  armistice 
they  were  not  pledged  by  it.      Now,  had  I  received  his  letter. 


104 

announcing  the  armistice,  and  had  I  found  it  expedient,  to  have 
proposed  a  similar  measure  the  enemy  was  at  full  liberty  to 
do  as  he  pleased,  and  leave  me  no  choice. 

The  son  of  the  General,  in  defence  of  his  father,  says,  "that 
so  far  from  neglecting  the  situation  of  General  Hull,  every  pre- 
caution was  taken  by  General  Dearborn  to  render  this  arrange- 
ment not  only  not  injurious  but  advantageous  to  him!"  On  what 
grounds  was  this  opinion  of  the  son  of  the  General  founded  ?  I 
am  left  to  suppose  that  it  was  on  the  letter  of  his  father  to  (he 
vSecretary  of  War,  in  which  he  observes,  "I have  no  expectation 
that  the  government  will  consent  to  a  cessation  of  hostilities, 
but  all  circumstances  considered,  it  may  be  well  to  avail  our- 
selves of  the  occasion,  until  we  are  better  prepared  for  acting 
with  effect;  at  all  events,  we  can  lose  nothing  by  the  arrange- 
ment I  have  consented  to,  it  being  explicitly  understood,  that 
my  government  will  not  be  under  any  obligation  to  agree  to  it, 
unless  the  despatches  of  the  British  government  are  such,  as  to 
induce  the  President  to  propose  an  armistice,  as  preparatory  for 
negotiations  for  peace  !" 

The  only  reason  given  in  this  letter  is,  that  we  might  be  bet- 
ter prepared*  Whose  fault  was  it  that  we  were  not  better  pre- 
pared ?  In  my  SSd  number,  it  is  proved,  that  it  was  the  duty  of 
General  Dearborn  to  have  made  the  preparations  at  Niagara, 
&c.  and  that  he  neglected,  even  to  give  any  orders  for  the  pur- 
pose, more  than  forty  days,  after  the  Secretary  of  War,  gave 
him  instructions  for  the  purpose. — No  principle  is  better  estab- 
lished, than,  that  a  man  shall  not  take  advantage  of  his  own 
wrong. 

Thus  I  have  proved  that  he  knew  I  required  assistance — that 
re-enforcements  of  the  enemy  had  been  sent  to  aid  in  opposing 
me— that  he  did  not  include  my  army  in  the  armistice,  and  yet 
that  he  made  it  while  possessed  of  this  knowledge.  I  ask  you 
to  consider  what  motives  could  have  induced  him  to  have  agreed 
to  a  measure,  so  fatal  to  my  army  ? 

I  will  now  consider  young  General  Dearborn's  remarks  as  to 
my  views  of  the  conquest  of  Canada,  without  the  assistance  of  a 
navy. — The  best  evidence,  I  can  offer  is  my  official  letters  to 
the  government.  In  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
in  1809  I  say,  4*I  would  likewise  suggest  for  consideration  the 
expediency  of  building  some  armed  vessels  on  lake  Erie,  for  the 


195 

purpose  of  preserving  the  communication.  Consider  you  have 
three  military  posts  to  the  north  and  west  of  these  waters,  and 
no  other  communication  with  them."  In  the  next,  dated  the 
6th  of  March,  1812,  more  than  two  months  before  the  declara- 
tion of  war,  I  observed,  "  If  we  cannot  command  the  ocean,  we 
can  command  the  inland  lakes  of  our  country,  I  have  alwayt 
heen  of  the  opinion,  that  we  ought  to  have  built  as  many  armed 
vessels  on  the  lakes  as  would  have  commanded  them.  We 
have  more  interest  in  them  than  the  British  nation,  and  can 
build  vessels  with  more  convenience."  Both  these  communica- 
tions were  made  before  I  accepted  a  military  appointment. 

After  this  appointment,  and  before  I  left  Washington,  to  take 
the  command  of  the  northwestern  army,  I  presented  another 
letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  I  here  copy  from  my  de- 
fence before  the  court  martial  the  contents  of  it.  Page  38 — 
"It  did  contain,  a  representation,  in  the  most  explicit  and 
strongest  terms,  of  the  necessity  of  our  having  a  naval  force 
superiour  to  the  enemy  on  the  lakes,  and  that  without  it,  and 
unless  the  army  I  was  to  command  was  strengthened  by  addi- 
tions to  its  numbers,  and  unless  it  was  followed  by  detachments, 
to  keep  open  the  communication,  and  insure  it  supplies  from 
Ohio,  and  unless  it  was  supported  by  co-operations  on  other 
quarters,  my  army  could  not  be  able  to  maintain  itself  at  De- 
troit, much  less  carry  on  offensive  operations  in  the  enemy's 
country." 

On  this  subject,  I  will  here  state  the  testimony  of  Captain 
Charles  Stewart  of  the  navy,  who  says  that  at  an  interview  he 
had  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  in  the  beginning  of  April, 
1812,  "the  Secretary  informed  him,  that  it  was  contemplated 
to  give  him  the  command  of  the  lakes ;  that  a  naval  force  su- 
periour to  the  British  on  the  lakes,  had  been  strongly  urged  by 
General  Hull,  as  essential,  and  as  a  certain  means  of  en su ring- 
to  the  army  success."  This  interview  of  Captain  Stewart  with 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  did  not  take  place,  until  I  left  Wash- 
ington for  Ohio,  to  take  the  command  of  the  army,  as  he  had 
not  arrived,  while  I  was  there. 

Young  General  Dearborn  ought  to  have  stated  the  whole  of 
General  Porter's  testimony—it  is  to  be  found  in  pages  126  and 
1 27  of  my  trial . 


196 

He  says,  the  last  of  March  or  the  beginning  of  April,  he 
was  with  me  at  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  I  recom- 
mended that  a  navy  should  be  formed  on  the  lakes,  to  have  a 
superiority  over  the  British  in  case  of  war ;  that  I  stated  the 
Strength  of  the  British  naval  force ;  and  that  I  recommended  a 
sloop  of  war  of  twenty  guns,  and  that  the  brig  Adams,  then  on 
the  stocks,  should  be  taken  into  the  service  ;  and  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  proposed  writing  to  Captain  Stewart  at  Philadel- 
phia, to  repair  to  Washington  to  concert  measures.  He  then 
says,  that  a  navy  agent  was  appointed  on  the  lakes ;  that  he 
was  twice  at  the  President's  with  me,  when  the  subject  of  a  na- 
vy was  talked  over;  at  one  time,  he  says,  that  the  President 
thought  it  would  be  abandoned — at  another  time,  he  agreed  that 
it  should  be  done.  I  have  stated  here  the  substance  of  hie  tes- 
timony on  this  subject,  in  as  concise  a  manner  as  possible. — 
"Whoever  wishes  to  see  the  whole  of  it,  will  find  it  in  the  book 
and  pages  I  have  mentioned. 

It  does  not  appear  that  the  plan  was  abandoned  before  I  left 
Washington ;  because  after  my  departure  a  navy  agent  was  ap- 
pointed to  build  a  navy,  and  Captain  Stewart  was  sent  for  to 
command  it. 

If  the  President  at  any  one  time  suggested  to  General  Porter 
that  it  was  abandoned,  it  must  ha%e  been  mere  loose  conversa- 
tion, and  not  an  official  determination* 

My  letters  to  the  government  on  this  subject,  ought  and  will 
be  considered  the  best  evidence  of  my  opinions ;  and  as  they 
were  received  as  official  communications,  I  had  good  reason  to 
believe  that  the  views  of  the  government  accorded  with  my 
own.  Every  person,  therefore,  who  will  read  these  letters  to 
the  government,  on  the  subject  of  a  navy,  the  last  of  which  was 
written  after  I  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  northwes- 
tern army,  and  a  few  days  only  before  I  left  Washington,  and 
likewise  the  other  testimony  I  have  offered,  must  be  satisfied, 
that  I  had  reason  to  expect  a  navy  sufficient  to  preserve  the 
communication  of  the  lake,  would  have  been  constructed. 

It  is  true,  in  my  official  communications,  and  in  my  conver- 
sation with  the  members  of  the  administration,  that  while  I  urg- 
ed, in  as  strong  language  as  I  was  capable  of  using,  the  expe- 
diency, and  indeed  necessity,  of  commanding  the  upper  lakes, 
in  the  event  of  war  with  Great  Britain,  at  the  same  time  I 


197- 

stated  the  only  measures  by  which  our  territory  and  posts  situ- 
ated on  those  waters  could  by  any  possibility  be  preserved,  pro- 
vided a  navy  could  not  be  prepared. 

Should  not  that  essential  preparation  be  made,  the  plan  which 
I  proposed  was,  as  soon  as  war  was  declared,  to  cross  the  Niag- 
ara river  with  a  large  army,  to  co-operate  with  the  forces  I 
commanded.  I  further  stated,  that  if  with  these  aanies  we 
could  make  the  conquest  of  Upper  Canada,  the  harbours  around 
every  part  of  the  lake  would  be  in  our  possession,  and  the  navy 
of  the  enemy  could  not  be  supported,  and  must  be  destroyed, 
or  fall  into  our  hands. 

If  on  the  alternative,  here  stated,  the  administration  aban- 
doned the  measure  of  building  a  navy  in  1812,  and  adopted  the 
suggestion  I  had  made,  an  army  ought  immediately  to  have 
been  assembled  on  the  Niagara  river,  of  sufficient  strength,  to 
have  co-operated  with  mine,  to  have  taken  possession  of  the 
province,  and  especially  of  the  harbours  on  the  lake.  This  not 
being  done,  was  strong  evidence  to  me,  that  the  alternative  was 
not  adopted,  and  that  a  navy  would  be  prepared,  which  in  all 
my  communications  I  recommended  in  conjunction  with  an  ar- 
my to  be  preferable.  Ever  since  I  have  had  a  knowledge  of 
that  country,  I  have  given  the  opinion,  and  that  opinion  now 
seems  to  be  confirmed  by  experience,  that  the  command  of  the 
lakes,  is  essential  to  its  preservation. 

This  opinion  was  founded  on  its  distant  and  isolated  situa- 
tion, Detroit  being  separated  from  any  other  settlements,  by  a 
wilderness  of  more  than  two  hundred  miles,  Michillimackinack 
five  hundred,  and  Chicago  eight  hundred,  and  the  whole  of  them 
situated  on  navigable  waters. 

This  must  continue  to  be  the  case,  until  they  are  united  to  the 
states,  by  the  progress  of  settlement.  This  explanation  I  have 
been  called  to  make  in  consequence  of  General  Dearborn's  as- 
sertion, and  you  have  now  before  you  both  of  my  views  as  to  the 
conquest  of  the  Canadas. 

In  this  defence  of  General  Dearborn,  it  is  very  frequently  as- 
serted, that  I  could  have  taken  the  British  fort  at  Maiden,  and 
my  instructions  from  the  Secretary  of  War  are  recited,  to  show 
that  it  was  my  duty  to  have  done  it,  indeed,  thaf  I  was  directed 
to  do  it ;  as  it  was  made  a  crime  against  me  for  not  doing  it, 
I  will  ask  your  attention  to  this  part  of  the  subject.    On  the 


198 

first  column  of  the  defence  of  General  Dearborn,  are  recited  the 
only  orders  I  received  on  this  subject.  They  are  dated  the 
24th  of  June,  and  were  received  on  the  9th  of  July;  I  here  cop}' 
them  from  his  defence,  with  my  answer  on  the  same  day  they 
were  received. 

"  Should  the  force  under  your  command  be  equal  to  the  en- 
terprize,  consistent  with  the  safety  of  your  own  posts,  you  will 
take  possession  of  Maiden,  and  extend  your  conquests  as  cir- 
cumstances may  justify.  It  is  also  proper  to  inform  you  that 
an  adequate  force  cannot  soon  be  relied  on  for  the  reduction  of 
the  enemy's  posts  below." 

My  answer  to  this  part  of  the  Secretary's  letter  on  the  sub- 
ject of  taking  Maiden,  written  on  the  9th  of  July,  the  same  day 
it  was  received,  is  in  these  words  :  "  The  British  command  the 
water  and  the  savages.  I  do  not  think  the  force  here  equal  to 
the  reduction  of  Amherstburg,  (meaning  Maiden.") 

I  am  much  obliged  to  the  author  of  the  defence,  for  copying 
the  last  paragraph  of  this  letter,  which  he  says  I  omitted ;  it  is 
a  very  strong  additional  reason  for  the  opinion,  I  gave  for  not 
making  an  attack  on  that  fortress.  I  was  informed  by  it,  that 
the  divisions  of  the  army  at  Niagara,  &c.  were  not  ready  to  co- 
operate in  the  invasion  of  Canada.  It  now  appears  by  this  let- 
ter of  the  Secretary  of  War,  that  I  was  ordered  to  cross  the 
river,  and  make  the  invasion  of  Upper  Canada,  and  the  enter- 
prize  of  attacking  Maiden,  was  left  to  ray  discretion,  and  1  was 
to  make  the  attempt  if  in  my  opinion,  it  could  be  done  consist- 
ent with  the  safety  of  my  other  posts  ;  and  it  likewise  appears, 
that  I  wrote  to  the  Secretary,  on  the  same  day  that  I  received 
this  letter,  that  it  was  my  opinion,  that  it  could  not  be  done 
consistently  with  the  safety  of  my  other  posts.  Here  is  present- 
ed all  the  orders  and  facts,  which  relate  to  this  subject.  I  now 
ask  you,  fellow  citizens,  and  particularly  those  of  you,  who 
have  had  military  experience,  and  paid  particular  attention  to 
military  subjects,  whether,  under  these  orders,  and  the  opinion 
I  had  given  to  the  government,  I  could  have  been  justified,  in 
making  the  attack?  If  I  had  ordered  the  enterprize,  and  it 
had  been  unsuccessful,  would  not  the  administration  have  said, 
and  with  propriety,  that  the  measure  was  left  to  my  discretion, 
and  I  had  given  my  opinion,  that  it  could  not  be  undertaken, 
with  safety  to  my  other  posts  ?    Indeed,  whether  the  true  mean- 


109 

iiig  and  intention  of  this  order,  considering  the  opinions  I  had 
given,  in  conjunction  with  it,  and  the  information  the  letter  con- 
tained, that  I  should  then  have  no  co-operation,  was  not  that  I 
was  not  authorized  to  make  the  attack  ? 

Besides,  after  the  Secretary  of  War  had  received  this  letter, 
in  which  I  stated  that  my  force  was  not  equal  to  the  enterprize, 
I  received  an  answer  from  him,  in  which  he  said,  that  my  con- 
duct was  not  only  approved,  but  viewed  with  the  highest  satis- 
faction, by  the  President.  From  these  facts  and  documents,  it 
must  be  evident,  that  I  strictly  obeyed  the  orders  I  received 
from  the  government,  and  that  different  conduct  would  have 
been  a  violation  of  at  least  the  spirit  and  intention  of  them. 


No.  xxxvr. 

I  will  now  reply  to  that  part  of  the  defence  of  young  Gener- 
al Dearborn  in  protection  of  his  father,  in  which  he  accuses  me 
with  attempting  to  pervert  the  testimony  of  Major  Snelling, 
and  endeavour  to  satisfy  you,  that  there  is  not  the  least  found- 
ation for  this  accusation.  To  exhibit  it  in  the  plainest  possible 
manner,  I  will  here  copy  the  testimony  on  column  No  1.  pre- 
cisely as  it  is  printed  in  the  number  of  my  memoirs,  to  which 
the  young  General  refers,  and  in  which  he  says  it  has  been 
perverted,  and  opposite  to  it  in  No.  2,  you  will  see  the  testimo- 
ny, as  printed  in  the  Report  of  the  trial,  with  the  same  punctua- 
tion, as  in  each. 

No.  II. 
"That  witness  stood  at  the 
the  corner  of  a  slip  leading  to 
the  gate  of  the  fort,  and  at- 
tempted to  count  the  British 
troops  on  entering  the  fort — 
that  the  troops  in  advance 
were  the  41st,  in  platoons  of 
fourteen  files,  as  well  as  the 
York  militia  volunteers-t wen- 
ty-nine  platoons,  two  deep,  in 
red  coats — J  hat  the  militia 
platoons  consisted  of  no  more 


No.  I. 
Witness  says,  "  That  he 
stood  at  the  corner  of  the  slip 
leading  to  the  gate  of  the  fort, 
and  attempted  to  count  the 
British  troops  on  entering  th« 
fort ;  that  the  troops  in  ad 
vance  were  the  41st  regiment, 
in  platoons  of  fourteen  files  as 
well  as  the  York  volunteers, 
twenty-nine  platoons,  two 
deep  in  red  coats ;  that  the 
militia  platoons,  which  were 


20t) 


in  the  rear,  consisted  of  no 
more  than  seven  or  eight  files, 
and  composed  one  third  part 
of  the  whole  force,  probably 
seven  hundred  &  fifty  whites  ; 
of  which  the  remaining  two- 
thirds  were  regulars  and  un- 
uniformed  militia." 


than  seven  or  eight  files,  an& 
composed  one  third  of  the 
whole  force — probably  seven 
hundred  and  fifty  whites* — of 
which  the  remaining  two- 
thirds  were  regulars  and  uni- 
form militia." 


Witness  says,  agreeably  to  statement,  "That  the  troops  in 
advance,  were  the  41st,  (meaning  regiment)  in  platoons  of  four- 
teen files,  as  well  as  the  York  militia  volunteers — (as  well  as, 
that  is,  the  41  st  regiment  with  the  or  as  well  as  the  York  mili- 
tia volunteers)  (York  militia  volunteers,  militia  of  course,  they 
being  volunteers)  twenty  nine  platoons,  two  deep,  in  redcoats 
•i — that  the  militia  platoons  (which  were  in  the  rear,  certainly,  as 
the  41st  regiment  and  the  York  militia  volunteers  were  in  ad 
vance,  as  above  stated)  consisted  of  no  more  than  seven  or  eight 
files,  and  composed  (what  composed,  why  the  militia  platoons 
composed)  one  third  of  the  whole  force — (one  third  of  what,  why 
of  the  whole  force)  probably  seven  hundred  and  fifty  whites — 
(who  do  these  seven  hundred  and  fifty  whites  refer  to,  why,  to 
one  third  of  the  whole  force)  of  which  the  remaining  two  thirds 
were  regulars  and  uniform  militia,"  (what  does,  of  which  refer 
to,  why  to  whole  force)  the  remaining  two  thirds  (one  third 
of  the  whole  force,  being  seven  hundred  and  fifty  whites)  the 
other  two  thirds  must  of  course  have  amounted  to  fifteen  hun- 
dred whites,  as  twice  seven  hundred  and  fifty  is  equal  to  fifteen 
hundred;  and  seven  hundred  and  fifty  being  added  to  fifteen 
hundred,  makes  the  whole  white  force  amount  to  two  thousand 
two  hundred  and  fifty  whites,  as  I  have  represented  in  my 
memoirs,  and  now  have  actually  demonstrated.  It  will  there- 
fore read  thus, 

••  That  the  troops  in  advance  were  the  41st  regiment,  in  pla- 
toons of  fourteen  files,  as  well  as  or  with  the  York  volunteers — 
twenty  nine  platoons,  two  deep,  in  red  coats — that  the  militia 
platoons,  which  were  in  the  rear,  consisted  of  no  more  than 
seven  or  eight  files,  and  composed  one-third  of  the  v  hole  force, 
probably  seven  hurdred  and  fifty  whites,  of  which  the  remain- 
ing two-thirds  were  regulars  and  uniform  itilitia."  From  these 
premises,  I  make  the  following  calculation,  That  the  numb.,  of 
militia  being  seven  hundred  and  fifty  whites,  winch  was  one- 


201 

third  of  the  whole  white  force  and  the  remaining  two-thirds* 
which  were  regulars  and  uniform  milHia,  and  consisting  of 
course  of  fifteen  hundred,  inasmuch  as  the  first  third  seven 
hundred  and  fifty,  gives  therefore  the  aggregate  white  force, 
the  number  of  twenty  two  hundred  and  fifty  men,  as  I  have  be- 
fore stated  in  my  memoirs.  Add  to  this  only  six  hundred  In- 
dians, which  it  is  proved  by  the  testimony  of  Lieutenant  For- 
bush,  before  referred  to,  and  which  he  states  to  have  counted 
the  day  before  the  capitulation,  and  the  whole  number  of  the 
enemy  would  amount  to  two  thousand  eight  hundred  and  fifty 
men. 

In  my  defence  before  the  court  martial,  I  merely  referred  to 
that  part  of  Major  Snellingrs  testimony,  where  he  mentioned 
seven  hundred  and  fifty  whites,  without  considering  it  in  con- 
nexion with  the  other  part  of  it.  In  my  memoirs  I  stated  that 
I  had  only  two  days  allowed  me  to  prepare  my  defence,  and 
arrange  a  mass  of  testimony  which  had  occupied  thirty-two 
days  in  presenting  to  the  court.  I  observed  it  was  not  so  full 
and  intelligible,  as  it  might  have  been,  had  more  time  been  al- 
lowed  me.  Although  however  I  may  have  stated  the  testimony 
of  Major  Sneiling,  on  my  trial,  as  young  General  Dearborn  has 
represented  I  did,  yet  if  any  part  of  it  were  overlooked  by  me 
at  that  time,  which  is  susceptible  of  a  construction  on  a  less 
hurried  examination,  to  operate  in  my  favour,  a  candid  and  lib- 
eral mind  would  at  once  concede,  that  it  was  not  only  my  pre- 
rogative, but  that,  in  justice  to  myself,  it  becomes  my  duty  to 
avail  myself  of  it. 

I  will  now  state  to  you  the  testimony  of  Major  Jessup,  who 
was  the  Adjutant  General  of  my  army,  as  reported  in  my  trial, 
page  94,  in  these  words,  "That  he  had  received  a  report  from 
different  Adjutants  of  different  corps,  estimating  the  men  fit  for 
action,  and  thinks  that  the  amount  exceeded  one  thousand  men, 
including  the  Michigan  militia  of  four  hundred,  and  the  detach- 
ments absent  with  Colonels  Cass  and  McArthur;  perhaps  this 
estimation  includes  the  Michigan  legion." — He  likewise  says, 
"there  were  also  on  the  evening  of  the  15th,  about  thirty  or 
forty  armed  wagonners."  Young  General  Dearborn,  in  his  de- 
fence, says,  the  Michigan  legion  consisted  of  one  hundred. 
After  deducting  these  detachments,  it  will  appear,  that  my 
whole  effective  force  on  the  day  of  the  capitulation,  did  not 
26 


202  X 

exceed   but  about  six  hundred  men,   agreeably  to  this  testi- 
mony. 

By  examining  the  testimony  of  Colonel  Cass,  as  contained  in 
his  memorable  letter  to  the  government,  he  states  the  effective 
men  fit  for  duty  on  the  16th  August  at  one  thousand  and  sixty, 
without  including,  as  he  says,  a  detachment  to  which  he  refers, 
and  the  Michigan  militia  of  three  hundred,  on  duty.  This 
statement,  you  will  perceive,  is  made  thus  minutely  by  a  man, 
who  was  absent  at  the  river  Raisin  with  Colonel  McArthur  on 
the  16th,  and  could  therefore  only  receive  his  information  from 
hearsay  testimony,  whereas  the  statement  of  Major  Jessup,  is 
testimony  furnished  by  an  individual,  the  Adjutant  General  of 
the  army,  and  being  present  on  the  16th  testified  both  to  what 
he  saw  and  heard  on  that  day.  The  variance  of  their  testimo- 
ny I  will  leave  with  you  to  reconcile  or  to  discriminate  between 
them.  From  the  above  view,  it  appears,  my  force  on  the  day 
of.  the  surrender  was  less  than  one  third  of  the  white  force  of 
the  enemy,  and  not  a  fourth  of  his  whole  force,  consisting  of 
white  men  and  Indians. 

The  manner  in  which  young  General  Dearborn  has  given  an 
account  of  the  numbers  of  my  army  renders  it  necessary,  to 
make  some  explanation  of  it.  He  has  extracted  the  whole  num- 
ber in  each  regiment  from  a  return,  which  was  made  at  fort 
Findley  on  the  17th  of  June,  soon  after  the  army  commenced 
its  march  in  the  wilderness — and  has  represented  it  in  such  a 
way,  as  to  induce  you  to  believe,  that  the  number  he  has  men- 
tioned was  present  and  fit  for  duty  at  the  time  of  the  surrender. 
Young  General  Dearborn  has  been  a  military  officer  himself,  and 
must  have  known,  that  such  a  misrepresentation  would  have 
deceived  those  unacquainted  with  military  forms.  He  well 
knew,  when  a  Colonel  makes  a  return  of  his  regiment,  he  is 
obliged  to  include  in  it,  every  officer  and  soldier,  belonging  to 
it,  whether  present  or  absent,  fit  for  duty  or  not  fit  for  duty. 
He  had  the  returns  before  him,  when  he  made  the  extract ;  why 
then  did  he  not  publish  those  returns  instead  of  the  total  aggre- 
gate? It  is  well  known  that  the  fourth  regiment  had  been  sta- 
tioned at  post  St.  Vincennes  and  joined  the  militia  regiments  at 
Urbanna  a  few  days  only  before  the  army  marched.  Ml  the 
sick  and  non-effective  men  of  the  regiment,  wen  left  ai  that 
post,  and  many  were  debilitated  on  the  march  and  did  not  join 


203 

the  regiment  at  Detroit.     When  young  General  Dearborn  was 
stating  a  few  lines  only  of  Colonel  Miller's  testimony,  ought  he 
not  to  have  stated  the  Colonel's  account  of  the  numbers  that 
regiment  contained  ?     If  he  had  stated  this  account  of  the  num- 
ber of  that  regiment,  instead  of  four  hundred  and  eighty-three, 
it  would  have  appeared  that  only  two  hundred  and  fifty  or  two 
hundred  and  sixty  were   at  Detroit  and  considered  effective 
men.     By  reference  to  page    111,  of  my  trial,  it  appears  that 
when  asked  the  strength  of  the  fourth  regiment,  fit  for  duty  on 
the  morning  of  the  surrender,  says,  "There  were  about  two 
hundred  and  fifty  or  two   hundred  and  sixty,    effective  for  du- 
ty."    General  Dearborn  then  makes  it  appear,  that  in  the  three 
Ohio  regiments  of  militia,  with  the  few  dragoons  there  were  fif- 
teen hundred  and  ninety-two  men.     This  number  is  three  hun- 
dred and    ninety-two   more   than  the   President  had   ordered, 
which  number  as  has  been  stated,  was  twelve  hundred,  and   I 
had  no  authority  to  take  any  surplus  under  my  command.    The 
Colonels,  I  presume  at  that  time,  must  have  included  this  sur- 
plus of  three  hundred  and  ninety -two  men,  in  their  returns,  in 
order  to  obtain  provisions  for  them  in  the  wilderness,  as  it  could 
not  be  obtained  in  any  other  way.     These  men  were  volunteers, 
who  had  joined  us  at  intervals  on  our  march,  and  were  not  un- 
der my  orders — they  returned   home  whenever  they  pleased. 
At  the  time  of  the  capitulation,  on   the   16th  August,  young 
General  Dearborn  includes  all  the  straggling  volunteers,  all  the 
men  of  the  fourth  regiment  who  were  left  at  post  St.  Vincennes, 
all  that  were  left  sick  on  the  march,  and  all  the  Michigan  mili- 
tia which  were  then  scattered  over  a  territory  of  five  or  six  hun- 
dred miles  in  extent.   •  If  he  had  been  desirous  of  presenting  to 
you  a  just  statement  of  my  effective  force  on  the  day  of  surren- 
der, he  never  could  have  exhibited  the  statement  which  he  has 
nowr  attempted  to  impose  upon  you.     Michillimackinack,  which 
was  a  part  of  the  territory  and  all  the  militia  at  that  place 
and  the  adjoining  country,  were  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
By  a  letter  I  received  from  Colonel   Anderson,  which  I  recited 
in  a  former  number,  wrho  commanded  at  the  river  Raisin,  he  re- 
quested me,  not  to  order  any  militia  from  that  place  to  Detroit, 
but  desired  I  should  send  re-enforcements  and  ammunition,  for 
the  preservation  of  the  settlements,  against  the  savages.     This 
was  at  that  time  the  largest  settlement  in  the  territory,  except- 


204 

ing  the  one  at  the  Detroit  river.  Under  the  exposed  condition 
of  that  settlement,  as  stated  by  Colonel  Anderson,  no  men  were 
ordered  from  that  quarter  to  Detroit.  Indeed,  there  were  no 
militia  which  could  have  been  collected  at  Detroit,  excepting 
the  few  who  resided  on  that  river.  By  ascertaining  what  popu- 
lation was  on  the  Detroit  river,  and  the  disposition  that  was 
manifested  by  such  of  those  as  were  with  me  on  the  16th  Au- 
gust, you  will  be  enabled  to  form  a  judgment  of  their  numbers 
and  what  dependence  I  could  place  on  them.  I  was  of  the  opin- 
ion, and  I  believe  you  will  agree  with  me,  there  could  have  been 
none  at  all.  A  part  of  them  had  joined  the  enemy  at  the  Spring 
Wells,  and  their  Colonel  informed  me  on  the  morning  of  the 
16th,  that  the  whole  of  them  would  do  the  same. 

In  our  investigation,  we  ought  always  to  make  use  of  the  best 
evidence  the  nature  of  the  case  will  admit.  In  this  case,  the 
return  of  the  Adjutant  General  is  the  best  evidence.  I  have 
stated  his  testimony,  given  under  oath,  relative  to  my  force  on 
the  morning  of  the  16th  of  August,  and  he  says,  *  that  the  num- 
ber of  effective  men,  was  about  one  thousand,  including  Mc 
Arthur  and  Cass's  detachments — "and  by  deducting  them  for 
the  reasons,  which  have  been  fully  stated,  my  force  would  be 
reduced  to  about  six  hundred  men.  Thus  you  see  the  mon- 
strous errours,  which  this  son  of  General  Dearborn  has  commit- 
ted in  his  solicitude  to  defend  his  father.  To  check  his  impet- 
uous ardour,  the  boundaries  of  truth  have  been  no  barrier,  but 
have  been  overleaped  with  as  much  facility,  as  if  straws  only 
had  impeded  his  course. 

It  is  a  duty  which  I  owe  to  myself  and  to  a  proper  investiga- 
tion of  the  subject,  to  state  the  situation  and  inducements  of  the 
witnesses,  immediately  after  the  surrender,  but  before  the  trial, 
the  testimony  of  whom  is  introduced  to  you  by  young  General 
Dearborn,  that  you  may  judge  of  the  degree  of  credibility  to 
which  each  is  entitled. 

In  the  first  place,  I  will  introduce  to  you  Colonel  Cass,  who 
proceeded  to  Washington  immediately  after  the  capitulation, 
and  under  the  eye  of  the  officers  of  the  administration,  address- 
ed a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  giving  such  an  account  of 
the  events  of  the  campaign,  as  they,  who  were  my  prosecutors, 
wished. 


205 

He  was  the  first  witness  examined  by  the  court  Martial.  All 
the  other  witnesses  were  present,  and  attended  to  hear  the  tes- 
timony he  gave.  Before  he  testified,  he  had  been  promoted 
from  the  rank  of  a  lieutenant  colonel  of  militia,  which  he  held 
while  under  my  command,  to  the  rank  of  brigadier  general  in 
the  standing  army,  and  by  looking  at  the  register  of  the  regular 
army  at  that  time,  it  will  be  seen  how  many  colonels  of  that 
army  were  superseded,  to  make  way  for  his  promotion.  When 
he  wis  on  the  stand,  testifying,  he  had  in  his  pocket,  an  addi- 
tional commission,  as  governour  of  the  territory  of  Michigan, 
which  office,  I  had  held  for  nine  years,  and  my  conduct  had  re- 
ceived the  fullest  approbation  of  the  government.  If  you  will 
examine  the  newspapers,  devoted  to  the  administration,  around 
the  capital,  at  Albany,  where  the  court  martial  was  held,  you 
will  there  see,  immediately  after  he  testified,  the  manner  in 
which  his  testimony  was  applauded.  When  the  young  officers 
who  were  left  to  follow  him,  perceived  the  distinguished  favours 
he  had  received,  and  the  manner  in  which  his  testimony  was 
applauded  in  the  newspapers,  and  being  present  and  hearing 
the  testimony  he  had  given,  I  ask  you,  whether,  they  did  not 
expect,  that  following  the  paths  he  had  opened,  they  would 
attain  by  the  most  direct  course,  similar  favours  and  distinc- 
tions ? 

The  letter  which  he  had  written  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  be- 
fore I  was  in  a  situation  to  communicate  official  information  of 
the  event,  has  since  been  published  by  young  General  Dearborn, 
in  defence  of  his  father.  This  letter,  giving  a  minute  account 
of  transactions,  a  knowledge  of  which  he  could  only  have  ac- 
quired by  hearsay,  was  not  only  received  from  a  junior  officer, 
and  published  by  the  administration  as  an  official  letter,  but 
was  sent  by  the  same  administration  to  the  court  martial,  as 
evidence  against  me,  to  prove  capital  charges,  and  has  been  re- 
corded in  my  trial ! !  By  his  own  testimony,  it  appears  that  he 
was  absent  at  the  time,  and  all  the  knowledge  he  had  of  the 
transactions  on  the  14th,  15th,  and  16th  of  August,  as  I  before 
observed,  was  mere  hearsay  evidence. 

I  ask  you  to  compare  the  statements  made  in  this  letter,  with 
the  testimony  of  the  witnesses  under  oath,  who  were  present,  and 
from  whom  he  must  have  received  his  information.  In  his  letter, 
he  says,  after  he  returned  to  Detroit,  Major  Jessup,  the  Adju- 


206 

taut  General,  informed  him  that  my  force  on  the  morning  of  the 
16th  of  August,  was  one  thousand  and  sixty,  and  further  says, 
the  detachment  sent  to  the  river  Raisin,  was  not  included  in 
that  return.  Major  Jessup,  the  Adjutant  General,  says,  he  in- 
formed Colonel  Cass  of  the  return  that  morning,  and  that  there 
was  about  one  thousand,  and  expressly  says,  that  this  detach- 
ment urns  included  in  the  number.  It  would  tire  your  patience 
to  point  out  all  the  variations  of  this  letter  from  the  testimony  ; 
I  therefore  leave  the  comparison  with  you,  as  the  whole  of  the 
letter,  and  the  testimony  of  the  Adjutant  General,  from  whom 
he  says  he  received  the  information,  have  been  published. 

General  McArthur,  was  a  lieutenant  colonel  in  my  army, 
and  after  the  campaign,  and  before  he  gave  in  his  testimony, 
was  appointed  a  Brigadier  General  in  the  regular  army,  without 
having  performed  any  service  to  entitle  him  to  it,  or  ever  hav- 
ing had  any  military  experience,  excepting  while  under  my 
command.  The  administration  could  certainly  have  had  no 
other  motive  in  superseding  all  the  colonels  in  the  regular  army, 
in  making  this  appointment,  than  to  prepare  him  to  testify  a- 
gainst  me.  Colonel  Snelling,  was  a  captain  in  my  army,  and 
before  he  appeared  as  a  witness  against  me,  was  promoted,  and 
soon  after  had  a  regiment  given  to  him.  The  administration 
never  even  instituted  an  inquiry  into  his  conduct,  for  having 
left  his  post  at  the  Spring  Wells,  on  the  night  of  the  15th  Au- 
gust, 1812,  without  orders,  where  General  Brock  landed  the 
morning  after. 

Major  Whistler  was  a  captain  in  my  army.  This  officer  was 
a  soldier  in  General  Burgoyne's  army,  and  deserted  from  it. 
During  the  Indian  war,  while  General  St.  Clair  commanded,  he 
enlisted  in  our  army.  Having  been  in  the  British  army,  he  had 
acquired  some  knowledge  of  the  manual  exercise,  and  was  ap- 
pointed a  sergeant :  afterwards  an  ensign  :  and  finally  advanc- 
ed to  the  rank  of  captain.  The  President  being  informed  of  his 
character  and  situation,  refused  him  further  promotion,  although 
he  became  entitled  to  it  in  regular  succession.  For  a  number 
of  years,  younger  officers  superseded  him.  He  submitted  to 
this  degradation,  and  did  not  resign,  according  to  usual  custom 
in  such  cases.  At  my  trial  his  testimony  was  wanted  by  the 
administration,  and  he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  major,  and 
travelled  from  Ohio,  in  the  midst  of  winter,  to  testify  against 


207 

me.  He  was  certainly  deeply  indebted  to  the  administration, 
and  did  not  fail  in  his  testimony  to  make  a  suitable  reward.  He 
ought,  however,  to  have  remembered,  what  would  have  been  his 
fate  as  a  deserter,  if  I  had  not  made  particular  provision,  in  the 
capitulation,  that  all  belonging  to  my  army,  should  be  protect- 
ed in  their  persons.  Major  Jessup,  was  a  lieutenant  in  my 
army.  I  appointed  him  briaa.de  major,  and  acting  adjutant  gen- 
eral, with  the  brevet  rank  of  major.  After  the  campaign,  but 
before  he  presented  himself  as  a  witness  against  me  on  my  trial, 
he  was  appointed  a  colonel  in  the  army,  and  afterwards,  quar- 
ter master  general,  and  is  now  quarter  master  general  of  the 
United  States.  All  the  other  witnesses,  part  only  of  whose  tes- 
timony have  been  cited  in  the  defence  of  General  Dearborn, 
who  could  be  induced  to  testify  against  me,  were  patronized 
and  promoted,  and  prepared  to  follow  General  Cass,  the  princi- 
pal and  leading  character  in  the  mock  trial,  under  which  I  have 
suffered.  In  considering  the  testimony  of  these  witnesses,  you 
will  find,  that  the  principal  part  of  it  consists  merely  of  their  opin- 
ions^ with  regard  to  my  declining  the  attack  on  Maiden,  in  re- 
treating from  Sandwich,  in  not  keeping  open  my  communication 
to  Ohio,  and  in  agreeing  to  the  capitulation.  The  witnesses 
ought  not  to  have  been  suffered  to  have  stated  any  thing  but 
facts,  and  it  was  the  province  of  the  court  to  have  formed  opin- 
ions^ on  those  facts.  By  this  mode  of  procedure  the  witnesses 
became  the  judges,  and  the  court  was  left  in  the  degraded  char- 
acter of  being  the  organ  of  their  opinions.  I  will  now,  fellow 
citizens  ask  your  patience  a  few  moments,  while  I  present  to 
you,  from  the  reports  of  the  trial,  from  which  young  General 
Dearborn  has  made  his  extracts,  a  small  part  of  the  other  evi- 
dence, which  was  given  to  the  court  martial,  and  will  refer  you 
to  the  report  of  my  trial  for  the  whole  of  it.  I  will  begin  with 
Colonel  Miller's  testimony.  It  is  to  be  found  in  page  115.  He 
says,  "that  he  saw  nothing  in  my  conduct  on  the  16th  of  Au- 
gust, which  the  fatigues  I  had  undergone,  and  the  responsibility 
which  was  upon  me,  might  not  have  produced."  General  Dear- 
born in  defence  of  his  father,  has  only  cited  a  line  or  two  of 
Colonel  Miller's  testimony.  It  contains  several  pages,  and  I 
refer  the  reader  to  the  whole  of  it.  It  will  be  seen  that  Colonel 
Miller,  who  was  constantly  with  me,  saw  nothing  in  my  con- 
duct^ which  the  fatigue  I  had  undergone,  and  the  responsibility 


208 

which  was  upon  me,  might  not  have  produced.  And  in  his  tes- 
timony afterwards,  when  particularly  inquired  of,  could  state 
nothing  but  the  surrender,  which  could  have  made  any  other 
impressions.  Colonel  Miller  was  a  witness,  and  not  a  member 
of  the  court  martial;  and  it  was  his  province  as  a  witness,  only, 
to  have  stated  facts.  It  was  known  that  I  had  surrendered,  and 
the  manner  in  which  I  had  surrendered,  and  it  was  for  the  court 
to  have  determined  whether  it  was  proper  or  not.  His  testimo- 
ny, therefore,  must  be  considered  favourable  to  me.  I  have 
been  the  more  particular  in  making  these  observations,  because 
they  will  apply  to  more  than  half  the  witnesses  on  the  trial. 
They  stated  nothing  but  the  naked  facts,  that  I  refused  to  at- 
tack Maiden,  that  I  retreated  from  Sandwich,  that  my  commun- 
ication with  Ohio  was  not  kept  open,  and  that  I  agreed  to  the 
capitulation ;  all  of  which  was  supported  by  their  opinions  only, 
to  prove  that  I  was  influenced  by  other  considerations  than  a 
sense  of  duty.  On  an  investigation  of  the  causes  which  led 
to  these  events,  the  court  martial  was  sitting  in  judgment,  and 
the  opinion  of  witnesses  ought  not  to  have  been  admitted. — 
Therefore  it  is  unnecessary  to  be  more  particular  in  reciting 
them. 

1  will  here  state  the  "testimony  of  Captain  Bacon,  who  was 
then  an  officer  in  the  fourth  regiment,  page  124,  report  of  the 
trial.  "  Witness  saw  General  Hull  once  on  the  15th  of  August, 
on  the  parapet,  and  once  on  the  16th.  He  saw  him  also,  in  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  fort  during  the  cannonade.  General  Hull 
appeared  engaged  as  usual,  and  agitated  more  than  usual  on  the 
morning  of  the  16th,  but  witness  does  not  know  the  cause.  He 
had  no  suspicion  that  it  preceded  from  personal  fear,  neither 
did  he  hear  any  officers  at  the  time  express  an  opinion  that  it 
did."  The  testimony  of  this  officer  was  favourable  to  me  ;  he 
received  no  favour,  no  promotion  from  the  government.  The 
first  opportunity  that  occurred  when  the  army  was  reorganized. 
Captain  Bacon,  though  a  valuable  officer,  was  not  even  retained 
in  service.  In  page  131  of  my  trial,  will  be  seen  the  testimony 
of  Major  Munson,  a  major  in  one  of  the  Ohio  regiments.  He 
says,  "the  General's  situation  was  a  critical  one;  he  had  a 
great  deal  of  responsibility  and  great  care  on  his  mind,  if  he 
had  any  feelings.  I  saw  nothiwg  in  his  conduct,  but  what 
might  be  accounted  for,  without  recurring  to  personal  fear." 


209 

You  will  observe,  fellow  ci*izen«,  that  the  eourt  martial  a.c 
quitted  me  of  the  charge  of  treason,  ano  every  specification  un- 
der it.  My  trial  was  delayed  nearly  two  years,  by  the  admin- 
istration, to  hunt  up  testimony  on  that  charge.  Not  even  the 
shadow  of  testimony  cou!;<  be  found ;  not  one  act  could  be  dis- 
covered, which  afforded  even  the  colour  of  proof.  The  clan  of 
witnesses,  who  had  been  patronized  and  promoted  in  the  man- 
ner which  has  been  shewn,  were  as  ready  to  have  given  opinions 
on  this  charge,  as  they  were  as  to  my  personal  appearance. 

Loth  the  administration,  and   the  court  martial   thought  it 
would  be  too  great  an  outrage,  on  established  precedent,  to  found 
a  conviction  on  the  opinions  of  witnesses  alone,  without  proving 
a  single  act  in  support  of  this  charge.      They  believed  the  rea- 
sons, good  sense  and  justice  of  mankind,  in  this  enlightened 
age,  would  revolt  at  such  an  attempt.     For  this  reason  alone, 
the  ground  was  changed,  and  all  the  power  of  my  prosecutors 
was  collected  to  a  single  point,  to  prove  that  I  was  under  the 
influence  of  personal  fear.      In  searching  the  records,  far  back 
in  the  days  of  ignorance  and  oppression,  when  the  people  were 
not  allowed  even  to  think,  some  precedents  were  found,  for  the 
admission  of  opinion  on  this  charge.     The  witnesses  therefore 
were  allowed  to  state  their  opinions,  that  I  was  under  the  in- 
fluence of  personal  fear,  because  I  did  not  attack  Maiden,  be- 
cause I  retreated  from  Sandwich,  because  I  did  not  open  any 
communication  with  Ohio,  because  I  agreed  to  the  capitulation, 
finally,  because  they  thought  there  was  the  appearance  of  alter- 
ation in  my  countenance.     It  will  be  perceived  that  when  I  con- 
sidered   it   not  expedient   to   attack    Maiden;  to  retreat  from 
Sandwich,  and  to  take  measures  for  opening  my  communication 
to  Ohio,  there  was  no  enemy  within  eighteen  miles  of  me,  and 
in  reality,  no  appearance  of  immediate  danger.     When  in  the 
exercise  of  my  discretion  and  best  judgment,  I  performed  those 
acts,  was  it  proper  for  the  court  to  take  the  opinions  of  witnes- 
ses, with  respect  to  the  motives  which  induced  me  to  adopt 
them  ?  Was  it  not  their  province  alone  to  determine   the  pro- 
priety of  these  acts  P  I  ask,  whether  the  court  did  not  give  up 
its  prerogative  to  the  witnesses,  when  their  opinions  on  these 
military  acts   were  admitted  as  evidence  ?    for  what  purpose 
were  their  opinions  admitted  ?    Certainly  for  no  other,  than  to 
prejudice  the  minds  of  the  court,  and  induce  it  to  pronounce 
27 


210 

judgment  against  me.  If  then  the  judgment  of  the  eomt  was 
grounded  on  the  opinions  of  the  witnesses,  the  witnesses  might 
as  well  have  been  the  court,  and  have  themselves  pronounced 
sentence.  I  will  here  present  to  you  some  extracts  from  a  cele- 
brated English  historian,  who  gives  an  account  of  the  trial  of 
Lord  George  Sackville,  who  was  tried  for  misconduct  at  the 
battle  of  Minden. 

Doctor  Smollet,  the  historian,  having  stated  that  some  testi- 
mony was  given  to  prove  that  when  certain  orders  were  deliver- 
ed to  Lord  George,  he  was  alarmed  to  a  very  great  degree,  and 
seemed  in  the  utmost  confusion,  subjoins  remarks,  from  which 
the  following  are  extracts.  "  The  candid  reader  will  of  him- 
self determine,  whether  a  man's  heart  is  to  be  judged  by  any 
change  of  his  complexion.  Granting  such  a  change  to  have 
happened ;  whether  it  was  likely  that  an  officer  who  had  been 
more  than  once  in  actual  service,  and  behaved  without  reproach, 
st>  as  to  attain  an  eminent  rank  in  the  army,  should  exhibit 
symptoms  of  fear  or  confusion,  when  in  reality  there  was  no 
appearance  of  danger.  With  regard  to  the  imputation  of  cow- 
ardice levelled  at  Sir  George,  by  the  unthinking  multitude,  and 
circulated  with  such  industry  and  clamour,  we  ought  to  consid- 
er it  as  a  mob  accusation,  which  the  bravest  of  men,  even  the 
Duke  of  Marlborough  could  not  escape.  We  ought  to  view  it 
as  a  dangerous  suspicion,  which  strikes  at  the  root  of  character, 
and  may  blast  that  honour  in  a  moment,  which  the  soldier  has 
acquired  in  a  long  course  of  painful  services,  and  at  the  contin- 
ual hazard  of  his  life.  We  ought  to  distrust  it  as  a  malignant 
charge,  altogether  inconsistent  with  the  former  conduct  of  the 
person  accused." 

In  the  application  of  the  observations  of  this  historian  to  my 
situation  I  hope,  without  the  appearance  of  vanity,  under  cir- 
cumstances which  have  taken  place,  1  may  ask  your  attention 
to  the  actual  service,  and  the  dangers  I  was  called  to  encounter 
during  4he  war  of  the  revolution  r  From  an  examination  of  the 
history  of  that  period,  from  authentic  accounts,  documents,  and 
other  evidence,  which  have  been  recently  published,  and  fiom 
the  knowledge  of  many  of  my  associates  in  those  memorable 
conflicts,  who  are  now  living,  the  manner  in  which  1  conducted 
may  be  made  known  to  you ;  you  may  be  made  acquainted  with 
the  numerous  battles  in  which  I  was  engaged,  and  the  appioba- 


211 

jtion  of  my  conduct  on  every  occasion,  by  the  illustrious  leader^ 
of  our  armies  ;    on  the  other  hand,  there  is  now  presented  to 
you  the  events  of  an  after  period.     The  plan  of  the  campaign 
of  1812  has  been  laid  before  you  ;  the  part  which  I  acted  in  it 
has  been  fully  unfolded.    The  character  of  the  army  I  conv- 
manded  has  been  explained  ;   the  orders  I  received  have  been 
recited,  and  the  object  of  the  government,  with  regard  to  the 
conquest  of  Upper  Canada,  and  the  manner  in  which  I  com- 
menced offensive  operations  from  Detroit,  in  conformity  to  my 
orders,  have  been  spread  before  you.     You  have  likewise  before 
you,  the  orders  which  General  Dearborn  received  from  the  gov- 
ernment, dated  as  early  as  the  26th  June,  eight  days  after  the 
declaration  of  war,  to  form  two  armies,  to  co-operate  with  me, 
in  the  invasion  of  Upper  Canada,  agreeably  to  his  own  plan  of 
the  campaign,  and  the  manner  in  which  he  obeyed  those  orders. 
That  I  was  not  only  left  alone  and  unassisted,  but  that  he  a- 
sreed  to  an  armistice,  which  enabled  General  Brock  with  the 
whole  force  of  Canada  to  march  against  me ;  and  that  he  made 
this  armistice,  when,  as  appears  by  his  letter  of  7th  August,  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  only  one  day  before,  he  acknowledges 
he  had  been  informed  that  troops  were  marching  to  Maiden, 
from  Niagara,  against  me.     In  addition  to  this  force  from  th*e 
east,  Michilimackanack  had  fallen,  and  the  forces  in  that  quar- 
ter were  bearing  upon  me ;  Chicago  had  fallen,  and  the  savages 
from  the  west  were  pressing  forward ;  the  road  I  had  opened 
from  Ohio  was  closed  by  hostile  savages,  and  the  lake  was  shut 
against  me  by  the  British  navy.     Being  not  only  the  General  oj 
the  army  but  the  Governour  of  the  territory,  I  ask  you  to  re- 
flect on  my  situation  at  the  time,  when  General  Brock  landed 
with  a  force  more  than  three  times  superiour  to  mine,  and  in- 
vaded our  territory — to  consider  the  scattered  situation  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  country — that  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  af- 
ford them  protection ;  under  these  circumstances  your  views 
will  no  doubt  accord  with  the  testimony  of  Colonel  Miller,  and 
many  others  of  the  witnesses  on  my  trial,  who  stated  "that 
they  saw  nothing  in  my  conduct,  but  what  the  responsibility  of 
my  situation,  and  the  fatigue  I  had  undergone,  might  occasion. * 
And  when  you  further  consider,  how  deeply  interested,  not  on- 
ly the  administration,  but  the  president  of  the  court  martial 
were  in  the  result,  of  my  trial,  and  likewise  the  manner  i& 


112 

which  the  witnesses  had  been  trained  by  patronage  and  promo- 
tion, before  they  appeared  as  witnesses  against  me,  the  inform- 
ality m  receiving  their  testimony  in  the  presence  of  each  other, 
the  admission  of  opinions,  in  lieu  of  direct  testimony  as  to  facts, 
I  most  willingly  appeal  to  your  judgment,  for  an  approbation 
of  my  conduct. 


No.  xxxvn. 


Young  General  Dearborn  has  published  a  number  of  my  let- 
ters to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  you  will  see  by  the  dates  of 
many  of  them,  they  were  written  while  I  was  in  the  state  of 
Ohio,  and  before  I  had  any  knowledge  of  the  declaration  of  war. 
In  answer  to  his  strictures  on  those  letters,  I  will  observe  that 
I  expressed  my  honest  feelings  of  the  opinion  I  entertained,  of 
the  character  of  the  citizens  of  Ohio.  That  they  manifested  a 
praiseworthy  spirit,  and  had  volunteered  their  services,  with  a 
promptitude  and  energy  which  was  highly  honourable  to  them. 

I  further  observed,  u  that  the  army  was  in  high  spirits,  and 
animated  with  a  laudable  zeal,"  and  in  another  letter  observed, 
"  that  the  patriotism  and  perseverance,  with  which  this  army 
has  sustained  a  march,  attended  with  difficulties,  uncommon  in 
their  nature,  does  honour  to  themselves  and  their  country." 
These  expressions  of  approbation,  I  then  thought,  and  now  think 
were  due  to  them. — I  knew,  and  therefore  said  nothing  of  their 
discipline,  military  experience,  or  subordination. 

It  will  be  recollected  in  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to 
me,  of  the  9th  of  April,  the  force,  which  I  was  to  command,  was 
described,  and  the  object  of  rny  command  then  stated.  The 
force  was  twelve  hundred  militia,  and  the  fourth  United  States 
regiment. — The  object  was  the  security  of  the  Michigan  terri- 
tory, and  the  protection  of  the  exposed  frontier  settlements  from 
the  Indians.  This  force  I  stated  to  the  government,  was  suffi- 
cient for  this  purpose  in  fime  o(  peace.  It  would,  therefore, 
have  been  wrong  for  me,  to  have  asked  for  a  larger  force  under 
those  circumstance?. 


213 

I  stated  likewise,  the  amount  of  my  force  and  the  number* 
which  had  joined  the  army,  after  I  commenced  my  march 
through  the  wilderness.  I  have  explained  to  you  the  manner, 
in  which  this  force  was  formed.  I  stated  that  I  considered  it 
sufficient  to  oppose  any  force  of  Indians  which  could  be  brought 
against  me. 

After  the  declaration  of  war,  and  after  the  desertion  of  some 
of  the  militia,  I  wrote  to  the  Secretary,  that  although  f  might 
take  Maiden,  yet  I  thought  it  would  be  attended  with  too  great 
a  sacrifice.  In  reflecting  on  the  expediency  of  attacking  the 
regular  constructed  fort  at  Maiden,  defended  by  British  troops, 
I  could  not  call  to  my  mind  a  single  instance  during  the  revolu- 
tionary war,  where  militia  had  successfully  marched  up  to,  and 
carried  regular  fortifications.  I  expressed  it  as  my  opinion, 
which  was  also  concurred  in  by  a  council  of  war,  that  we  had 
better  wait  until  heavy  cannon  could  be  provided — my  calcula- 
tion was  made,  and  my  communications  to  the  government  were 
founded  on  the  force,  which  was  then  at  Maiden,  and  the  addi- 
tions which  probably  would  be  made  to  that  force. 

Had  not  the  post  at  Maiden  been  re-enforced  in  any  other 
manner  than  I  had  reason  to  expect,  in  the  common  occurren- 
ces of  war,  my  opinion  then  was  and  now  is,  that  I  should  have 
been  able  to  have  sustained  my  situation  at  Detroit,  provided, 
I  had  been  assisted  from  Ohio,  in  opening  my  communication, 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  have  received  supplies. 

It  will,  however,  be  observed,  that  I  stated  in  one  of  the  let- 
ters, quoted  by  young  General  Dearborn,  that  the  force  at  Mai- 
den, in  point  of  numbers,  was  superiour  to  mine.  And  f  one 
part  of  my  letter  is  recited  to  operate  against  me,  the  otoer  part 
ought  certainly  to  be  entitled  to  equal  credit.  There  is  no 
doubt,  fellow  citizens,  that  the  force  ordered  for  my  command, 
was  sufficient  for  the  protection  of  the  frontier  settlements, 
against  the  Indians,  in  time  of  peace,  under  all  the  excitements 
which  could  have  been  made,  which,  as  I  was  informed  by  the 
government,  was  the  object,  for  which  it  was  ordered. — And 
further,  in  my  opinion,  it  would  have  been  sufficient,  not  only 
to  have  defended  our  territory,  but  successfully  to  have  com- 
menced offensive  operations  against  Upper  Canada,  had  the 
communication  of  the  lake  been  preserved  by  a  navy,  and  had 
the  commanding  General  prepared  suitable  armies  from  Niaga- 


214 

ra  to  have  co-operated  with  it,  instead  of  having,  at  a  critical 
.moment  agreed   by  an   armistice,   to  act  only  on  the  defen- 
sive, and  thereby  leave  the  whole  force  of  tm* province  to  ope- 
rate against  it     It  will  be  distinctly  remembered,  that  when  I 
informed  the  government,  that  Maiden  might  be  taken  with  the 
forces  under  my  command,   I  observed  in  the  same  letter  it 
would  be  attended   witfc  too  great  a  sacrifice.     After  having 
made  this  communication,   "  that  it  was  my  opinion  it  would  be 
attended  with  too  great  a  sacrifice,"  and  that  opinion  having  been 
approved  by  the  President,  I  submit  to  your  judgment,  whether, 
under  those  circumstances,  I  could  have  been  authorized  to 
have  made  the  attempt,  without  a  positive  order  for  the  purpose. 
The  son  of  General  Dearborn  has  endeavoured  to  make  the 
impression,  that  my  complaint  of  the  court  martial,  in  not  suf- 
fering counsel  to  appear  in  my  defence,  was  without  any  foun- 
dation.    It  is  true,  when  I  informed  the  court  of  the  names  of 
the  gentlemen  I  wished  to  employ  as  my  counsel,   the  request 
appeared  to  be  granted.     When  the  trial  commenced,  and  the 
gentlemen  attempted  to  examine  the  witnesses,  they  were  in- 
formed, that  they  would  not  be  permitted  to  examine  the  wit- 
nesses, speak  to  any  collateral  question  of  law,  which  might 
arise  in  the  trial,  or  to  the  final  question,  whether  by  the  evi- 
dence, I  was  guilty  or  not     At  the  same  time,  Mr.  Dallas,  an4 
Mr.  Van  Buren  had  been  employed  by  my  prosecutors  (the  ad- 
ministration) to  assist  the  army  Judge  Advocate,  and  allowed 
to  examine  the  witnesses,  speak  to  all  questions  of  law,  and  to 
the  final  question,  whether  I  was  guilty  of  the  charges  or  not, 
and  I  was  not  permitted  to  reply  in  any  manner  whatever,  to  the 
application  of  the  testimony,  and  the  arguments,  which  were 
made  use  of,  to  enforce  it  against  me.     Of  what  use  was  this 
apparent  candour,  in  consenting  that  I  might  employ  counsel  ? 
Without  the  permission  of  the  court,   I  had  a  right  to  ask  the 
advice  of  any  counsellors,  that  I  chose  to  employ.     It  is  true, 
the  court  did  not  post  centinels  at  my  door,   and  prevent  me 
from  consulting  with  them,  neither  did  they  prevent  them  from 
writing  any  questions,  and  handing  them  to  me,  to  be  proposed 
to  the  witnesses.    All  this  they  certainly  would  have  had  a 
right  to  have  done,  without  the  permission  of  the  court 
It  would  have  been  too  great  an  outrage,  for  the  court  to  have 


215 

determined,  that  no  one  should  be  permitted  to  write  for  me,  6r 
advise  with  me. 

There  could  have  been  no  mode  of  executing  an  order  of  this 
kind,  but  confining  me  in  a  dungeon.  Throughout  the  whole 
trial,  the  order  of  the  court,  that  my  counsel  should  not  be  per- 
mitted to  speak  in  its  presence,  was  rigidly  adhered  to.  It  fre- 
quently happened,  in  the  course  of  the  trial,  that  questions  of 
law  arose,  with  respect  to  the  admission  of  testimony,  and  on 
other  subjects.  Feeling  myself  incompetent  to  the  discussion 
of  these  legal  questions,  the  law  was  explained  by  the  Special 
Judge  Advocate,  who  was  employed  and  paid  by  my  prosecu- 
tors, and  adopted  by  the  court,  according  to  his  explanation. 

It  must  be  obvious,  that  the  manner  in  which  it  was  admitted 
could  have  been  of  no  use  to  me  As  the  administration  had 
employed  special  counsel  to  assist  the  Judge  Advocate  in  the 
prosecution,  the  court  was  not  willing,  in  direct  terms,  to  deny 
my  request.  It  was  however  granted  in  a  manner,  only  to  save 
appearances,  but  not  to  be  of  the  least  use  to  me. 

I  now  ask,  whether  the  scales  of  justice,  held  by  the  hand  of 
General  Dearborn,  the  president  of  the  court  martial,  were 
equally  balanced  in  this  case?  My  right  to  employ  counsel 
was  founded  on  the  liberal  principles  of  our  government,  and 
particularly  on  our  constitution,  which  is  the  highest  law  of  the 
land. 

I  need  only  appeal  to  your  own  sense  of  justice  and  right, 
fellow  citizens,  for  you  to  confirm  the  reasonableness  of  a  re- 
quest, to  be  allowed  the  same  assistance  of  counsel,  in  the  full- 
est extent,  where  not  only  life,  but  character,  which  is  dearer 
than  life,  is  depending  on  the  issue  of  the  trial,  as  is  admitted 
in  the  most  trifling  trespass,  or  question  of  property,  belore  any 
of  the  courts  in  our  country.  The  argument,  fellow  citizens, 
in  favour  of  my  right  to  counsel,  to  assist  me,  in  showing  my 
innocence,  and  defending  my  life  and  reputation,  is  founded 
on  that  constitution,  which  is  the  work  of  your  own  hands,  and 
is  your  unalienable  inheritance. 

The  precedent,  by  which  the  arguments  urged  by  young  Gen- 
eral Dearborn  are  supported,  is  founded  on  a  practice,  estab- 
lished in  the  dark  ages  of  tyranny  and  oppression,  when  the 
people  were  considered  as  having  no  rights,  and  their  lives,  lib- 
erty,   reputation   and  property,  were    at   the  disposal  of  the 


216 

will  of  a  tyrant.  It  is  for  you  to  judge,  on  which  side  is  the 
weight  of  argument,  and  on  which  side  the  scales  of  justice  pre* 
ponderate. 

In  the  defence  of  General  Dearborn,  the  testimony  of  Captain 
"Whistler  is  recited,  with  respect  to  provisions.  In  one  of  my 
numbers,  I  have  informed  you  of  the  character  and  situation  of 
this  officer.  Admitting  however,  his  testimony  to  be  true,  with 
respect  to  the  barrels  of  provisions  in  the  store,  which  he  says 
he  counted,  if  you  will  only  take  the  trouble  of  calculating  the 
number  of  rations  they  would  make,  and  the  time  when  he 
counted  them,  and  compare  it  with  the  issues  previous  to  that 
time,  which  have  been  stated  by  the  contractor,  you  will  find  it 
only  would  have  lasted  to  about  the  16th  of  August,  the  day  of 
the  capitulation.  This  statement  you  will  find,  is  correct  by 
mathematical  calculation.  This  witness  has  likewise  stated  the 
the  number  of  cannon,  small  arms,  powder  and  ball,  at  the 
fort. 

In  reply  I  will  only  observe,  that  a  part  of  these  cannon  were 
left  by  the  British,  when  the  fort  was  delivered  to   us,  by  virtue 
of  the  treaty  of  peace,  being  principally  without  carriages,  and 
were  considered  as  useless.     Others  were  left,  with  the  small 
arms  and  powder,  by  General  Wayne's  army  which  was  dis- 
banded at  Detroit,  after  the   Indian  war,  and  all  the  carriages 
were  rotten,  and  the  small  arms  ate  up  with  rust  and  not  worth 
repairing.     The  powder  remained  so  long  a  time  in  the  store 
that  it  had  lost  all  its  strength,  and   was  no  better  than  ashes. 
I  should  be  wanting  in  duty  to  myself,  did  I  not  make  some  re- 
ply to  that  part  of  the  defence  which  relates  to  the  Indians.— 
I  refer  you,  fellow  citizens,  to  the  3d  number  of  my  memoirs, 
in  which  I  recited  a  letter,  which  I  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  on  that  subject.     In  that  letter  the  character,  habits,  and 
predominant  passions  of  the  Indians  are  described.     I  informed 
the  government  that  in  the  event  of  war,  the  sachems  and  chiefs 
would  advise  the  warriours  to  take  no  part  in   it,  but  gave  it  as 
my  opinion  in    the  most  explicit  manner,  that  their  authority 
over  them  would  not  be  able  to  restrain  them.     The  policy  of 
our  government  was  not  to  employ  them.     As  soon  as  I  took 
the  command  of  the  army,  I  sent  messages  to  their  villages  and 
advised  them,  in  the  event  of  war,  to  remain  quiet  in  their  wig- 
wams, and  take  no  part  in  the  contest,  in  which  they  could 


21? 

have  no  interest.  The  old  sachem  chiefs,  called  in  councils, 
and  advised  the  warriours  to  this  policy.  Their  advice  and  au- 
thority had  no  effect,  and  as  I  was  not  authorized  to  employ 
them,  they  all  joined  the  British  standard. 

Their  conduct  was  precisely  such,  as  I  had  predicted  to  the 
government,  and  there  was  nothing,  which  could  have  made  it 
different,  but  an  invitation  to  them  to  join  our  standard,  which 
I  had  no  authority  to  give. 

Young  General  Dearborn  has  published  the  names  of  the  of- 
ficers who  composed  the  court  martial,  with  his  father  at  the 
head,  as  president.  It  required  two-thirds  only  of  the  mem- 
bers, to  pronounce  the  sentence.  It  is  very  certain,  that  it  was 
not  unanimous,  as  it  is  said  two-thirds  of  the  members  agreed 
to  it.  Had  it  been  unanimous,  it  would  have  been  so  stated. 
It  must  be  evident,  that  a  part  of  the  court  were  opposed  to  it. 
I  should  be  happy  indeed,  were  it  in  my  power,  to  designate 
the  characters,  who  were  only  influenced,  by  disinterested  and 
honourable  motives. 

I  have  stated  the  reasons  why  I  did  not  object  to  the  j« resi- 
dent or  any  of  the  members  of  this  court  martial.  I  had  been 
much  more  than  a  year,  a  prisoner  in  arrest,  was  conscious  of 
having  faithfully  done  my  duty,  and  in  my  official  communica- 
tion to  the  government,  requested  an  investigation  of  my  con- 
duct It  had  been  delayed  in  an  unprecedented  manner,  dur- 
ing this  long  time,  and  I  believed,  had  I  made  objections  to  the 
president  or  any  members  of  the  court,  it  would  have  caused 
further  delay.  Besides,  most  of  the  members  of  the  court  were 
strangers  to  me;  men,  whom  I  never  before  had  seen,  and 
whose  names  I  had  never  heard,  excepting  General  Dearborn, 
General  Bloomfield,  Colonel  Fenwick,  Colonel  House,  and 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Conner. 

By  examining  the  list,  published  by  young  General  Dearborn 
you  will  perceive,  the  other  members  belonged  to  new  raised  regi- 
ments which  did  not  exist,  during  the  campaign  of  1812.  They 
were  appointed  to  regiments  numbered  from  thirty-two  to  forty- 
two.    They  had  no  military  rank  at  that  time. 

It  is  well  known,  that  officers  were  selected  to  form  these  ad- 
ditional regiments,  from  the  most  violent  partizans  of  the  ad- 
ministration, and  this  alone  was  a  sufficient  qualification.  Of- 
ficers cf  this  description  constituted  a  majority  of  the  court 


118 

They  were  pledged  to  any  measures,  which  the  administration 
my  prosecutors,  wished.  With  respect  to  General  Dearborn* 
the  president,  the  deep  interest  which  he  had  in  the  issue  of 
the  trial,  has  been  presented  to  you. 

General  Bloomfieid  was  a  meritorious  officer  of  the  revolu- 
tion, and  served  with  credit  to  himself.  He  was  an  amiable 
and  much  respected  citizen  at  the  termination  of  the  revolution- 
ary war,  and  [  believe  retained  the  esteem  of  society  to  the 
close  of  his  life.  He  is  now  numbered  among  the  dead,  with 
many  others,  his  compatriots  in  arms — and  in  the  presence  of 
that  Judge,  who  examines  the  motives  as  well  as  the  actions  of 
men — and  before  whose  tribunal  we  must  all  appear. — May  he 
rest  in  peace  ! 

Colonel  Fenwick  and  Colonel  House,  I  have  ever  believed  were 
governed  by  the  purest  and  most  honourable  motives,  and  were 
under  no  other  influence,  than  a  sense  of  duty.  Under  this  in- 
fluence, whatever  may  have  been  their  opinions,  I  shall  ever  re- 
spect them  as  honourable  men.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Conner 
received  his  commission  about  the  time  that  General  Dearborn 
was  appointed  the  first  Major  General.  If  was  obtained  by  his 
patronage.  He  was  in  his  family,  and  one  of  his  aids  de  camp. 
JSut  a  short  time  before  the  court  martial  was  ordered  he  was 
promoted  to  the  rank  of  lieutenant  colonel  by  the  same  patron- 
age, and  selected  as  a  member  of  the  court  for  my  trial.  T# 
the  president  of  the  court  martial,  he  owed  both  his  first  ap- 
pointment, and  his  sudden  promotions. 

Any  comments  from     e,  appear  unnecessary. 

"When  you  consider,  that  the  court  martial  was  composed  of 
a  majority  of  officers  ^elected  from  the  additional  regiments, 
not  in  service  until  after  the  campaign  of  1812,  and  when  you 
reflect  on  the  conditions  on  which  officers  were  appointed  at 
that  time,  that  they  must  be  zealous  supporters  of  every  meas- 
ure of  the  administration  and  subservient  to  the  wishes  of  its 
officers  and  of  its  commanding  General,  as  an  indispensable 
qualification  to  promotion,  and  how  deeply  interested  that  ad- 
ministration, who  became  my  prosecutors,  were,  in  fixing  the 
disasters  of  the  campaign  on  me,  I  am  persuaded  you  cannot 
be  at  a  loss  to  declare  the  motives  which  prompted  the  sentence 
of  two  thirds  of  a  court  martial,  thus  selected  and  thus  oigan* 
i#ed.     When  you  iuruier  consider,  that  this  court  martial  re* 


2id 

eerved  the  opinions  of  witnesses  on  great  military  operations/ 
who  never  had  any  military  experience,  and  many  of  whom 
from  the  evidence  now  presented,  you  must  be  satisfied,  were 
deeply  interested  in  my  condemnation,  you  must  be  sensible, 
that  little  or  no  credit  ought  to  be  given  to  their  testimony. 
From  the  sentence  of  such  a  court  martial,  whose  judgment  was 
formed  on  testimony  like  this — I  have  appealed  to  the  highest 
tribunal  on  earth,  whose  decision  I  am  convinced  will  be  found- 
ed on  impartial  justice.  In  answer  to  my  animadversions  on 
the  proceedings  of  the  court  martial  and  the  evidence  I  have 
produced,  to  show  the  deep  interest  which  the  president  and 
some  of  the  members  had  in  the  issue  of  the  trial,  and  the  mo- 
tives which  must  have  influenced,  nearly  the  whole  of  them,  he 
has  extracted  from  my  defence  an  observation  which  I  then 
made,  expressive  of  my  confidence  in  that  court  martial.  As 
this  is  his  last  effort  and  seems  to  be  his  dernier  resort,  in  de^ 
fence  of  his  father,  it  becomes  necessary  to  furnish  its  true  ex- 
planation. By  an  examination  of  the  extract,  it  will  be  seen9 
that  it  is  qualified  by  this  remark,  'that  there  has  been  some 
departure  from  accustomed  forms.'  Nothing  is  more  evident, 
for  the  just  construction  of  a  sentence,  than  that  the  whole  of  it 
ought  to  be  taken  into  one  view,  with  the  circumstances  under 
which  it  is  made.  Having  stated  the  manner  in  which  I  lost 
all  my  papers  which  related  to  the  campaign,  it  is  well  known, 
that  I  had  no  documents  at  my  trial,  excepting  such  copies 
from  the  records  of  the  government  as  my  prosecutors  thought 
proper  to  furnish.  In  my  repeated  applications  to  the  govern- 
ment, I  requested  to  be  furnished  with  copies  of  all  the  docu- 
ments which  had  any  relation  to  the  campaign.  None  were  furn- 
ished, excepting  such  as  it  was  thought  would  operate  most  strong- 
ly against  me.  In  my  defence,  it  may  be  seen,  in  what  manner  I 
applied  for  particular  documents,  which  I  shewed  were  deposit- 
ed in  the  War  Office,  and  the  reasons  which  were  offered,  why 
they  were  not  furnished.  The  letters  from  the  Secretary  of 
War  to  General  Dearborn,  containing  the  orders  to  him  to  co- 
operate with  me,  his  letters  to  the  Secretary  and  all  the  letters 
relating  to  the  armistice  were  withheld,  and  I  was  consequently 
deprived  of  the  use  of  their  contents.  All  I  then  knew,  was 
that  *uch  arrangements  had  been  made,  but  on  what  principles* 
by  whose  authority,  and  for  what  reasons,  were  unknown  to  me, 


220 

as  I  could  give  no  explanation,  and  my  prosecutors  did  not 
think  proper  to  present  them  in  evidence,  it  was  impossible  for 
me  to  avail  of  testimony  so  highly  important  to  me.  The  evi- 
dence both  with  respect  to  co-operation  and  the  armistice,  being 
withheld  from  me,  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  know,  how  deep- 
ly General  Dearborn  was  interested  in  the  remit  of  my  trial. — 
It  now  seems,  however,  by  General  Dearborn's  own  statement 
to  the  Secretary  of  War,  that  he  entered  into  the  armistice, 
when  at  the  same  moment,  Adjutant  General  Baynes  had  in- 
formed him,  that  Michillimackanack  had  fallen  into  the  hands 
of  the  British,  and  consequently  when  he  must  have  known  that 
an  additional  force  of  the  enemy,  with  the  tribes  of  Indians  from, 
the  north  would  thereby  be  spared  to  act  against  me.  Being 
blindfolded  and  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  deep  designs  of  my 
prosecutors,  I  expressed  what  is  well  understood  to  be  a  gener- 
al custom  in  similar  cases — a  generous  confidence  in  a  tribunal 
of  my  peers  as  I  had  considered  them,  from  the  badges  by 
which  they  were  distinguished.  Since  that  period,  evidence 
has  been  furnished  which  unfolds  circumstances  connected  with 
the  campaign,  and  exhibits  in  colours,  which  never  can  be  ef- 
faced, the  causes  of  its  disasters  and  misfortunes.  Those  ex- 
pressions therefore,  made  under  the  state  of  things  which  then 
existed,  young  General  Dearborn  is  at  fuM  liberty  to  grasp, 
among  the  many  other  shadows  he  so  eagerly  aims  to  seize. 

It  is  our  duty  to  respect  all  the  public  institutions  of  our 
country,  and  feel  a  liberal  confidence  in  characters,  elevated  to 
the  seats  of  justice — we  ought  to  presume  they  are  unspotted, 
and  free  from  any  undue  bias  and  influence,  until  the  contrary 
appears. 

I  will  endeavour  to  illustrate  these  considerations,  by  exam- 
ples in  our  civil  courts  which  you  see  every  day  practised. 
What  is  more  common,  than  for  an  advocate  at  the  bar,  to  ex- 
press his  confidence  in  the  justice  and  integrity  of  the  court  and 
jury,  before  which  a  cause  is  tried,  either  of  a  criminal  or  civil 
nature,  involving  life,  reputation  or  properly,  to  acknowledge 
there  has  been  a  patient  trial,  and  to  express  his  gratitude  for 
the  impartiality  with  which  it  has  been  conducted  ?  But  when 
sentence  has  been  pronounced  by  the  court,  if  it  afterwards 
appears  that  the  thief  Justice,  or  other  judges,  or  the  foreman 
or  any  of  the  jurors,  hadji  deep  interest  in  the  cause,  or  had 


221 

been  improperly  tampered  with,  I  ask,  whether  On  an  appeal 
from  such  a  sentence,  or  on  a  new  trial,  before  another  tribunal, 
it  was  ever  contended,  that  the  sentence  was  just,  and  ought  not 
to  be  reversed,  because,  forsooth,  the  advocate  at  the  first  trial 
made  such  acknowledgments  and  expressed  such  gratitude,  as  is 
above  supposed.  I  will  not  insult  your  understandings,  fellow 
citizens,  by  dwelling  further  on  a  point  so  clear  and  familiar  to 
the  most  inexperienced  among  you,  but  will  leave  this  with 
many  other  such  strong  holds  of  the  young  General,  for  you  to 
make  your  own  deductions. 

The  prodigal  use  of  epithets  too  disgusting  for  repetition,, 
which  adorn  the  pages  of  young  General  Dearborn,  in  defence 
of  his  father,  carry  with  them  their  own  antidote,  and  are  en- 
titled to  no  further  notice  from  me  ;  such  language  is  the  usual 
substitute,  where  a  cause  is  deficient  of  argument  or  truth  for 
its  support ;  this  defence  of  General  Dearborn,  with  my  appeal 
to  your  candour  and  impartiality,  are  now  submitted  by  your 
fellow  citizen,  WILLIAM  HULL. 

Newton,  August  30th,  1824, 


No.  XXXVIII. 


Since  the  publication  of  my  reply  to  the  attempt  of  the  son 
of  General  Dearborn,  to  defend  the  conduct  of  his  father,  I 
have  obtained  some  new  evidence  on  the  subject  of  the  armis- 
tice, which  I  shall  present  for  your  consideration  in  this  num- 
ber. This  evidence  consists  of  the  letters  of  Sir  George  Pre- 
vost  to  General  Brock,  a  few  days  before  the  armistice  took 
place,  during  its  continuance,  and  after  its  operation  ceased.  It 
is  contained  in  a  pamphlet,  entitled,  "Some  account  of  the 
Public  Life  of  the  late  Lieutenant  General  Sir  George  Prevost, 
Bart,  particularly  of  his  services  in  Canada ;  London,  publish- 
ed by  Cadell,&c.  1823,"  and  will  be  found  in  pages  37,  38,  39, 
40,  and  41.  It  is  stated  in  the  defence  of  General  Dearborn, 
by  his  son,  that  "  no  troops,  or  military  supplies,  were  sent  to 
the  relief  of  fort  Maiden,  from  any  post  below,  during  the  tem- 
porary armistice,  and  that  General  Brock,  did  not  even  know- 


22$ 

that  one  had  been  agreed  upon,  until  he  returned  to  fort  Erie, 
on  the  Niagara,  after  the  capture  of  General  Hull  and  his  army* 
and  lhat  so  far  from  neglecting  the  situation  of  General  Hull, 
every  precaution  was  taken  by  General  Dearborn,  to  render 
the  arrangement,  not  only  not  injurious,  but  advantageous  to 
him."  To  prove  that  troops  had  been  sent,  from  Niagara  to 
Maiden  a  few  days  before  the  armistice  was  agreed  to,  and 
while  it  was  in  operation,  I  have  produced  the  letters  of  Gene- 
ral Doarborn,  to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  to  General  Van 
Rensselaer,  who  commanded  on  the  Niagara  river.  By  these 
letters,  it  appears,  that  General  Dearborn  had  a  perfect  know- 
ledge, that  re-enforcements  had  marched  against  me,  when  he 
signed  the  araaistice.  Although  on  this  point,  I  believe  the 
evidence  I  have  offered,  is  satisfactory  to  you,  yet  as  this  unau- 
thorized measure  was  so  essentially  the  cause  of  the  disasters 
of  my  army,  it  is  desirable  to  remove  every  doubt,  if  any  exists 
in  the  mind  of  a  single  individual. 

In  page  37,  of  this  pamphlet,  it  is  stated,  "that  Sir  George 
Prevost,  upon  the  receipt  of  despatches  from  Mr.  Foster,  ac- 
quainting him,  with  the  proposed  repeal  of  the  orders  in  council, 
by  the  British  government,  immediately  opened  a  communica- 
tion with  Major  General  Dearborn,  commanding  the  American 
forces,  on  the  frontiers  of  Lower  Canada,  for  the  purpose  of 
concluding  an  armistice,  until  the  Congress  should  determine 
upon  the  proposals,  transmitted  to  them  by  Mr.  Foster.  An 
armistice  of  about  three  weeks  did  accordingly  take  place." 
The  advantages  are  then  stated,  which  this  armistice  gave  to£ir 
George  Prevost ;  that  a  regiment  had  arrived  from  the  West 
Indies  ;  and  after  the  armistice  was  concluded,  and  during  the 
continuance  of  it,  considerable  re-enforcements  of  men  and  sup- 
plies, were  forwarded  to  Upper  Canada,  where  they  arrived,  be- 
fore the  resuming  of  hostilities,  and  materially  contributed,  to- 
wards defeating  the  attempts,  which  were  made  by  the  enemy 
to  invade  that  province.  It  is  then  stated,  that  intelligence 
was  sent  to  General  Brock,  which  must  have  reached  him  at 
Amherstburg,  (that  is,  Maiden,)  while  he  was  at  that  place. 
It  is  then  further  stated,  that  "Sir  George  Prevost  despatched 
a  private  letter,  to  General  Brock  of  the  2d  of  August,  1812, 
six  days  before  the  proposed  armistice  was  concluded,  and  upon 
the  subject  of  it."     In  a  letter,  addressed  to   General  Brock'. 


223 

•^fthe  30th  of  August,  1812.  he  quotes  the  opinion  of  his  majes- 
ty's government,  on  the  subject  of  the  defensive  system,  in 
these  words  : 

"The  King's  Government,  having  most  unequivocally  ex- 
pressed to  me,  their  desire  to  preserve  peace  with  the  United 
States,  that  they  might  uninterruptedly  pursue,  with  the  whole 
disposable  force  of  the  country,  the  great  interests  committed  to 
them  in  Europe,  I  have  endeavoured  to  be  instrumental  in  the 
accomplishment  of  those  views.  He  then  says  in  this  same,  let- 
ter, "  But  I  consider  it  most  fortunate,  to  have  been  enabled  to  do 
so  without  interfering  with  your  operations  on  the  Detroit,  j 
have  sent  you  men,  money ,  and  stores  of  every  kind."  Here  are 
quoted  the  identical  words  of  Sir  George  Prevost  to  General 
Brock,  on  the  subject  of  the  armistice,  and  the  operations  on 
the  Detroit  river.  Thus  fellow  citizens,  I  have  not  only  fur- 
nished you  with  the  letters  of  General  Dearborn,  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  and  to  General  Van  Rensselaer,  that  a  few  days 
before  he  agreed  to  the  armistice,  and  during  the  continuance 
of  it,  that  troops  had  been  sent  to  Maiden,  from  Niagara,  but 
have  now  established  the  same  facts,  by  the  letters  of  Sir  George 
Prevost,  who  commanded  the  British  army  in  the  Canadas^- 
and  have  likewise  established  this  most  important  fact,  that  as 
early  as  the  2d  of  August,  six  days  before  the  armistice  was 
concluded,  that  a  private  letter  was  sent  to  General  Brock,  by 
Sir  George  Prevost,  giving  him  information  on  the  subject  of 
the  armistice. — On  the  evidence  before  offered,  in  addition  to 
this,  I  ask  you  to  consider  on  what  grounds  young  General 
Dearborn  could  have  made  the  assertion  contained  in  the  de- 
fence of  his  father  ? 

The  evidence,  which  I  have  presented  in  this  and  my  former 
numbers,  must  exhibit,  in  the  most  decided  manner,  the  effects 
which  this  measure  had  on  my  operations.  It  now  becomes  a 
very  serious  inquiry,  what  were  the  motives  of  General  Dear- 
born's conduct  ? 

It  cannot  be  presumed  that  he  acted  without  motives.  His 
own  acknowledgement,  that  he  had  no  authority  to  agree  to  a 
©essation  of  arms,  is  the  best  evidence  which  can  be  adduced, 
that  he  consented  to  a  measure  which  his  duly  did  not  warrant, 
and  f >r  which  he  had  no  authority;  a  measure  not  founded  in 
policy  or  expediency ;    because  he  says  in  his  letter  to  the  Se- 


224 

viretary  of  War,  that  he  had  no  expectation   his   government 
would  consent  to  it. 

General  Dearborn  had  formed  the  plan  of  the  campaign,  and 
well  knew  the  time  and  manner  in  which  the  invasion  of  Upper 
Canada  had  been  made  by  the  troops  under  my  command.  He 
likewise  knew  the  progress  I  had  made  in  the  execution  of  his 
own  plan,  jind  the  manner  in  which  the  operations  on  the  De- 
troit river  had  been  approved  by  the  President. — Having  him- 
self neglected  to  make  preparations  at  Niagara,  and  being  hard 
pressed  by  the  President  to  order  his  troops  to  attack  the  ene- 
my's posts,  and  co-operate  with  me  ;  what  does  he  say  ?  I  ask 
you  to  look  at  his  letter  of  the  28th  of  July,  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  recited  by  the  son  in  defence  of  his  father  ?  You  will 
find,  he  appeared  to  be  in  a  state  of  amazement,  and  the  first 
sentence  of  it  is,  *'  Who  is  to  command  the  operations  in  Uppet 
Canada?"  This  was  a  critical  crisis.  By  the  positive  com- 
mands he  had  received,  he  must  have  ordered  the  troops  at  Ni- 
agara to  have  invaded  Upper  Canada,  and  co-operated  with  my 
forces,  or  made  some  arrangement,  for  an  excuse,  for  not  obey- 
ing these  positive  commands.  In  this  situation,  to  prevent  the 
possibility  of  co-operating  and  affording  me  any  assistance,  what 
did  he  do  ?  In  a  few  days  after  he  agreed  to  the  armistice,  in 
which  he  pledged  himself,  that  the  troops  he  commanded, 
should  not  make  the  invasion,  and  should  not  co-operate  with 
my  forces.  Under  these  facts,  the  motives  by  which  he  was  in- 
fluenced, I  do  think  must  be  too  plain  to  be  misunderstood  ;  es- 
pecially when  considered  in  connection  with  his  conduct  as 
president  of  the  court  martial  by  which  I  was  tried. 

It  must  be  satisfactory  evidence,  that  his  measures  were  re- 
gulated by  what  he  believed  to  be  his  own  private  interest, 
whatever  might  be  the  sacrifice,  regardless  of  the  public  good. 
By  the  arrangements  he  had  made,  and  afterwards  by  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  court  martial,  of  which  he  was  president,  he  be- 
lieved that  he  had  supported  himself  on  my  ruins  ;  that  by  this 
measure,  he  had  disqualified  himself  from  rendering  me  any 
assistance  and  had  left  all  the  forces  in  Canada  in  a  situation  to 
march  against  me. 

My  object,  you  will  perceive,  is  to  furnish  you  with  evidence 
which  will  remove  all  doubts  from  your  minds,  with  respect  to 
the  motives  of  his  conduct  in  relation  to  me;  from  the  view  I 


225 

have  already  taken  of  the  subject  I  may  bow  ask  you,  with  pro- 
priety, whether  he  did  not  consider  any  means  justifiable  which 
would  have  a  tendency  to  accomplish  the  end.  Our  actions  are 
influenced  by  our  dispositions ;  any  other  part  of  his  conduct 
therefore,  which  will  show  the  disposition  of  his  heart,  will  not 
be  considered  as  irrelevant  to  the  present  subject.  His  account 
of  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill  was  written  and  published  in  the 
year  1818.  His  object  in  writing  and  publishing  this  account, 
must  be  evident'  His  conduct  during  the  war,  in  which  he 
was  nominally  considered  as  the  first  General,  had  lowered  him 
to  a  scale  of  degradation,  which  was  mortifying  to  his  own  van- 
ity and.  pride.  The  principal  achievements  which  he  perform- 
ed during  his  command,  were  the  armistice  which  occasioned 
the  disasters  of  my  army ;  his  services  as  president  of  the  court 
martial  for  my  destruction  ;  and  his  expedition  against  York,  in 
Upper  Canada,  where  he  remained  in  his  vessel  on  the  lake  be- 
yond the  range  of  cannon  shot,  whence  he  viewed  the  gal- 
lant and  unfortunate  General  Pike,  land  his  troops,  ascend  the 
bank,  take  possession  of  the  town,  and  perish  with  many  of  his 
brave  troops,  by  the  explosion  of  a  magazine  of  powder,  pre- 
pared for  the  purpose.  After  this  explosion  he  landed  in  safe- 
ty, and  obtained  a  scalp,  which  he  preserved  as  a  trophy  of  vic- 
tory. For  these  exploits  he  was  retained  in  service,  with  his 
rank  and  emoluments,  until  peace  was  established  j  but  in  the 
degraded  situation  of  seeing  junior  Generals  appointed  to  all 
the  important  commands.  Not  having  performed  a  single  act, 
while  commanding  General,  which  entitled  him  in  your  estima- 
tion to  the  station  he  had  held,  or  to  the  least  distinction  in  so- 
ciety ;  he  remembered,  that  he  was  in  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill, 
and  that  you  were  disposed  to  give  great  credit  to  those  who 
acted  a  part  on  that  important  and  memorable  occasion. 

His  account  of  the  battle  was  forty-three  years  after  the  event 
took  place,  and  essentially  different  from  any  other  which  be- 
fore had  been  published.  He  says,  that  General  Ward,  the 
commander  in  chief  of  the  American  army,  took  no  interest  or 
part  in  the  transactions  of  the  day ;  and  that  General  Putnam, 
who  was  the  senior  officer  on  Bunker  Hill,  behaved  like  a 
"coward,"  and  was  entitled  to  no  credit  for  his  conduct ;  that 
nothing  saved  him  from  trial  and  censure  but  his  extraordinary 
popularity,  and  it  was  afterwards  thought  mysterious  why  Col- 
29 


226 

oriel  Gerrish  was  made  the  "scape  goat."  The  circumstances 
of  this  battle  are  an  important  part  of  your  history,  and  it  is  de- 
sirable, indeed,  that  the  facts  relating  to  it  should  be  handed 
down  to  posterity  as  they  existed,  in  truth,  It  is  evident  that 
his  object  in  publishing  this  account  was  to  influence  you  to  be- 
lieve that  General  Putnam  was  a  coward,  and  persuade  you  fo 
give  himself  a  great  share  in  the  glory.  Hereafter  this  subject 
will  be  more  fully  considered. 

I  will  now  return  to  the  considerations  more  immediately 
connected  with  the  subject  of  the  campaign  of  1812. 

The  letters  published  in  the  volume,  to  which  I  have  refer- 
red, from  the  British  government  to  Sir  George  Prevost,  and 
his  letters  to  General  Brock,  distinctly  show  the  views  of  that 
government,  with  respect  to  the  war,  which  Congress  had  de- 
clared. 

The  instructions  to  the  British  commander  in  Canada  were 
to  act  on  the  defensive.— -In  these  instructions  it  was  stated  that 
the  great  interests  in  Europe,  required  all  the  strength  and  re- 
sources of  the  British  nation.  Under  these  circumstances,  no 
measure  would  have  been  so  favourable  for  the  defence  of  Can- 
ada as  delay;  nothing  could  have  operated  so  effectually  to 
have  produced  delay,  as  an  armistice.  Its  advantage  to  our 
enemy  are  forcibly  pointed  out  in  the  volume  to  which  I  have 
referred. 

Our  situation  was  totally  different — to  us  it  was  a  favourable 
moment  for  active  offensive  operations.  To  both  belligerents 
it  could  not  have  been  favourable.  The  acknowledgment  by 
the  British  commander  that  it  was  most  advantageous  to  him,  is 
certainly  good  evidence  that  it  must  have  been  injurious  to  us. 
His  advantages  were  our  losses. 

In  must  be  obvious  that  delay  must  be  advantageous  to  an 
army  whose  object  is  defensive  operations;  and  injurious  to  one 
acting  on  the  contrary  system.  Had  the  armistice  been  general, 
considering  the  objects  of  the  war,  and  the  circumstances  of  the 
armies,  it  would  have  given  advantages  to  the  enemy,  and  been 
injurious  to  us. — Under  the  partial  circumstances  it  was  agreed 
to,  (a  part  of  our  army  not  being  included  in  it,)  no  measure 
could  have  been  more  fatal.  The  terms  of  it  were  such,  as  ren- 
dered all  the  British  posts  from  Quebec  to  lake  Erie  perfectly 
safe,  during  its  continuance.     It  is  perfectly  understood,  that 


227 

the  forces  t  commanded  on  the  Detroit  river  had  no  participa- 
tion in  it ;  and  it  is  now  proved  by  the  letters  of  Sir  George 
Prevost,  to  General  Brock,  that  there  were  no  provisions  con- 
tained in  it,  which  prevented  the  British  commander  from  send- 
ing troops,  warlike  stores,  and  supplies  of  every  kind,  to  re-en- 
force and  assist  the  army  operating  against  me. 

This  fact  is  so  important,  fellow  citizens,  that  I  must  ask 
you  to  permit  me  to  repeat  the  evidence  of  it  contained  in  Sir 
George  Prevost's  letter  to  General  Brock.  Speaking  of  his  in- 
structions, and  of  the  defensive  system,  he  says,  "I  have  en- 
deavoured to  be  instrumental  in  accomplishing  the  views  of  my 
government;  but  J  consider  it  most  fortunate  to  have  been  ena- 
bled to  do  so,  without  interfering  with  your  operations  on  the 
Detroit. — I  have  sent  you,  men,  money,  and  stores  of  every  kind." 
— Thus  you  have  before  you,  the  evidence,  not  only  that  Sir 
George  Prevost  considered  himself  authorized,  notwithstanding 
the  armistice,  to  send  re-enforcements  and  supplies  of  every 
kind  to  General  Brock,  but  that  he  actually  did  send  them  to  him 
at  the  time,  and  during  its  continuance. 

You  likewise  have  before  you,  fellow  citizens,  the  letter  of 
General  Dearborn  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  written  a  few  days 
before  he  made  the  armistice ;  and  his  letter  to  General  Van 
Rensselaer,  during   its   continuance,    giving  information   that 
troops  had  been  sent  from  Niagara  to  re-enforce  the  garrison  at 
Maiden ;  and  also  the  letter  of  Colonel  Cass,   to  prove,   that 
about  the  10th  of  August  four  hundred  regular  troops  had  act- 
ually arrived  at  Maiden  as   a  re-enforcement.     You  likewise 
now  have  the  additional  proof  of  Sir  George  Prevost's  letter  to 
General  Brock,  that  it  was  most  fortunate  that  his  defensive 
system  had  not  interfered  with  his  (General  Brock's)  operations 
at  Detroit,  and  stating  that  he  had  sent  him  troops,  money,  and 
supplies  of  every  kind,  during  the  continuance  of  the  armistice. 
On  the  other  hand  you  have  the  naked  round  assertion  of  the 
son  of  General  Dearborn,  that  no  troops  were  sent  at  that  time, 
as  re-enforcements  to  that  place.    If  the  letters  of  his  father 
and  the  British  commander  are  to  be  believed,  his  assertion  can- 
not be  true.     It  might  be  some  consolation  if  he  could  plead 
ignorance.    That  is  impossible,  because  in  the  same  paper  in 
which  he  made  the  assertion  that  no  troops  were  sent  from  Nia- 
gara to  re-enforce  the  army  at  Maiden,  he  published  his  father's 


228 

letters  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  General  Van  Rensselaer, 
giving  them  the  information,  and  advising  General  Van  Rensse- 
laer to  be  prepared  to  take  advantage  of  the  reduced  situation 
of  the  enemy  at  Niagara,  when  the  armistice  should  be  over. 

Thus  he  manifested  his  wishes  by  furnishing  evidence  which 
proved  his  assertions  to  be  false ;  and  something  still  worse,  by 
making  an  assertion,  which  by  the  evidence  in  his  possession 
he  knew  was  not  true — it  therefore  must  be  considered  as  a 
wilful  misrepresentation. 

I  make  use  of  no  epithets,  or  abusive  language,  to  excite  a 
prejudice  against  him ;  I  state  facts,  and  produce  the  evidence 
of  their  truth ;  I  only  ask  you  to  make  such  inferences,  as  must 
naturally  follow  from  the  facts,  and  to  give  him  such  a  charac- 
ter, and  such  a  name  as  he  deserves.  No  !  I  will  not  even  ask 
this  !  Unfortunate  man  !  My  only  request  is,  that  you  would 
pity  and  forgive  him  ! — u  Honour  your  father"  is  the  command 
of  God.  Obedience  to  this  command,  he  says,  has  been  the 
most  painful  act  of  his  life.  He  must  remember  it  was  his  own 
act,  and  however  painful,  it  was  caused  by  his  own  weakness 
and  passions.  It  is  hoped,  it  will  be  a  useful  lesson  to  him  in 
future  life,  and  teach  him  the  importance  of  regulating  his  con- 
duct, by  reason  and  truth.  Having  asked  your  forgiveness  for 
him,  I  freely  offer  him  mine,  because  I  believe  he  was  so  ex- 
cited by  passions  that  "  he  knew  not  what  he  did." 

Had  he  come  forward  in  an  honourable  manner,  and  attempt- 
ed to  have  proved,  by  evidence  and  fair  argument,  that  his 
father  had  no  interest  in  the  event  of  my  trial,  and  that  the  pro- 
ceedings against  me  were  just,  I  should  have  met  him  only  with 
the  same  weapons  of  evidence,  and  of  argument.  But  since  he 
has  adopted  a  different  course,  and  has  grounded  his  defence  on 
the  proceedings  of  a  court  martial,  over  which  his  interested 
father  presided,  and  on  those  proceedings  alone,  without  any 
other  evidence,  has  endeavoured  to  calumniate  and  continue 
your  prejudices  against  me,  I  feel  myself  justified,  and  I  have 
the  pleasure  to  believe  you  will  be  of  the  opinion,  that  I  am  jus- 
tified, in  the  few  personal  remarks,  which  I  have  here  made. 

From  the  proceedings   of  that  court   martial  I  have   now 
appealed,  to  a  fair,  independent,  and  impartial  tribunal. 

My  right  to  this  appeal,  is  founded  on  the  principles  of  our 
government.    You  are  the  fountain  of  all  power,  and  the  source 


229 

whence  all  authority  flows.  It  follows  of  course,  that  your  ju- 
risdiction is  above  all  tribunals  which  you  have  instituted.  1 
well  know  the  difficulty  which  attends  an  individual,  in  making 
his  case  known  to  so  numerous  a  body.  I  have  stated  it  in  as 
plain,  and  simple  a  manner,  as  it  was  possible,  that  it  might  be 
understood  by  all.  It  has  been  published,  with  great  disinter- 
estedness in  many,  very  many  of  our  newspapers,  and  as  far  as 
my  knowledge  extends,  has  been  read  not  only  without  preju- 
dice, but  with  great  candour,  and  a  sincere  desire  to  obtain  the 
truth. 

If  from  a  want  of  evidence  before  the  court  martial,  or  from 
any  other  cause,  you  should  now  be  satisfied  that  the  proceed- 
ings against  me,  were  unjust,  your  opinion  will  afford  happi- 
ness to  the  few  remaining  days  of  my  life,  which  no  language 
can  express.  If,  on  the  contrary,  from  the  difficulty  of  spread- 
ing the  truth  before  you,  I  ghould  not  be  able,  to  convince  you, 
that  I  acted  faithfully,  and  that  my  conduct  was  influenced. by 
a  sense  of  duty,  I  shall  still  respect  your  opinion,  and  shall 
only  have  the  same  consolation,  until  my  death,  which  has  been 
my  support  since  the  events  happened.  Ji  consciousness  of  the 
purity  of  motives,  and  a  belief  that  my  conduct,  as  circumstances 
were,  was  the  most  correct. 

I  am,  with  the  highest  respect, 

Your  injured  fellow  citizen, 

WILLIAM  HULL. 

Newton,  October  12th,  1824. 


APPENDIX* 


A  GfeNERAL  SKETCH  OF    THE  REVOLUTIONARY  SERVICES  OF  THE 
AUTHOR  OF  THE  FOREGOING  MEMOIRS. 


Fellow  Citizens, 
As  many  of  you  are  strangers  to  the  early  efforts  of  my  mili- 
tary life,  and  as  attempts  have  been  made  in  the  latter  part  of 
it,  to  represent  me  as  unworthy  of  your  confidence,  I  cannot 
but  hope,  that  a  general  outline  of  my  history  (as  a  soldier  of 
the  revolution)  will  be  received  with  the  same  candour,  that  has 
marked  your  attention  in  the  examination  of  the  foregoing  me- 
moirs. No  other  consideration,  but  the  injustice  I  have  exper- 
ienced, could  have,  induced  me  to  have  presented  it  to  you. 

In  the  year  1775,  at  the  age  of  twenty-two,  I  exchanged  the 
profession  of  law,  for  that  of  arms.  I  enlisted  a  company  of 
infantry,  which  became  attached  to  a  regiment  in  the  State  of 
Connecticut,  commanded  by  Colonel  Charles  Webb.  This 
regiment  marched  to  Cambridge,  soon  after  General  Washing- 
ton took  command  of  the  army  it  that  plaGe.  In  this  station  it 
remained,  until  March  1776,  when  the  British  army  evacuated 
Boston.  The  prinicpal  part  of  the  army  immediately  after  this 
event,  marched  from  Boston  to  New  York.  The  above  regi- 
ment was  stationed  on  Long  Island,  until  Sir  William  Howe 
landed,  and  after  the  operations  on  that  Island,  retreated  with 
the  other  forces  to  New  York. 

It  was  likewise  with  General  Washington's  army,  on  its  re- 
treat from  York  Island,  to  the  White  Plains.  The  British  Gen- 
eral crossed  the  east  river  from  Long  Island,  with  the  principal 
part  of  his  army,  and  landed  on  Frog's  Neck,  from  which  plaice 


APPENDIX.  11 

lie  marched  against  General  Washington. — The  position  the 
American  army  had  taken  was  on  the  heights,  a  small  distance 
back  of  the  White  Plains ;  and  a  division  of  this  army  was  post- 
ed on  Chatterdon's  hill,  about  a  mile  in  its  front  Colonel 
Webb's  regiment  formed  a  part  of  this  divison.  It  was  attack- 
ed by  the  whole  force  of  the  British  army,  and  was  obliged  to 
give  way,  after  sustaining  an  obstinate  and  severe  conflict,  and 
the  enemy  became  possessed  of  this  ground.  In  this  action,  I 
received  a  slight  wound  by  a  musket  ball.  The  strength  of  the 
two  armies  was  now  formed  within  a  mile  of  each  other,  and  it 
was  believed,  that  a  general  battle  the  next  day  was  only  pre- 
vented by  a  heavy  storm  of  rain.  In  the  night  after  this  storm, 
Sir  William  Howe  left  Chatterdon's  hill,  and  moved  to  York 
island,  where  he  attacked  and  carried  fort  Washington,  with  the 
loss  on  our  part  of  killed,  wounded  and  prisoners,  ;of  about 
three  thousand  men. 

After  these  events,  General  Washington  crossed  the  Hudson, 
with  a  part  of  his  army,  to  oppose  the  progress  of  the  British 
army  in  New  Jersey.  His  force  however  was  inadequate  to  the 
object,  and  he  was  compelled  to  retreat  to  the  banks  of  the  Del- 
aware, cross  that  river,  and  take  a  position  in  Pennsylvania. 

In  December,  1776,  Colonel  Webb's  regiment,  composed  a 
part  of  the  division  of  the  army,  which  was  ordered  to  march 
from  the  Hudson,  through  New  Jersey,  to  re-enforce  General 
Washington. — During  the  march,  on  the  right  flank  of  the  ene- 
my, General  Lee,  who  commanded  the  division,  was  made 
prisoner. 

A  few  days  after  the  junction  of  this  division  with  the  main 
army,  the  enterprize  against  the  enemy's  post  at  Trenton,  and 
his  other  stations  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Delaware,  was  pro- 
jected. This  division  thus  united  to  the  army,  under  General 
Washington,  aided  in  the  successful  attack  on  Trenton,  the 
night  of  the  25th  of  December,  1776,  in  which  a  complete  vic- 
tory was  obtained.  On  the  1st  day  of  January,  1777,  the  term 
of  service,  for  which  the  army  engaged,  had  expired.  General 
Washington  made  an  address  to  the  men,  in  which  he  acknow- 
ledged their  right,  to  return  to  their  homes,  and  thanked  them 
for  the  faithful  services  they  had  performed.  He  reminded 
them  of  the  victory  which  had  recently  been  obtained  by  their 
valour,  and  invited  them  to  remain  six  weeks  longer  in  service. 


tU  APPENDIX. 

During  this  time  he  expected  his  army  would  be  re-enfcrced. 
and  expressed  a  hope  to  lead  them  to  new  victories.  After 
reading  and  explaining  this  address  to  my  company,  which  con- 
sisted of  sixty  men,  every  one  engaged  to  remain  the  time, 
which  was  requested. 

The  last  day  of  December,  the  strength  of  the  British  army 
marched  against  him  at  Trenton,  and  being  greatly  superiour  to 
his  army  in  numbers,  on  the  night  of  the  1st  of  January,  1777, 
undiscovered  by  the  enemy,  and  only  separated  by  a  small 
creek,  he  abandoned  his  camp,  and  marched  to  Princetown, 
where  he  obtained  another  victory  no  less  important,  than  the 
one  at  Trenton. 

At  this  time  General  Washington  had  received  an  authority 
from  Congress,  to  re-organize  the  army,  and  make  promotions. 
I  was  a  young  Captain,  and  not  entitled  to  promotion  by  regular 
succession.  By  a  letter  from  him  to  General  Heath,  which  has 
lately  been  published,  it  will  appear  that  he  gave  me  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  Major  in  the  Massachusetts9  line,  in  consequence 
of  my  conduct,  in  these  two  battles.  After  these  events,  the 
beginning  of  January,  the  army  marched  to  Morristown,  in 
New  Jersey,  for  its  winter  quarters. 

From  this  post,  I  was  ordered,  to  join  the  regiment  to  which 
I  was  attached,  then  recruiting  in  Boston.  As  fast  as  the  men 
were  enlisted,  they  were  ordered  to  Springfield  on  Connecticut 
river,  and  when  about  three  hundred  had  rendezvoused  at  that 
place,  I  was  directed  to  take  the  command  of  them,  and  march 
them  to  Tyconderoga,  in  the  month  of  April,  1777.  Michael 
Jackson,  who  was  the  Colonel  of  the  regiment,  and  had  been 
wounded  in  an  attack  on  Montrasuer's  Island,  near  New  York, 
the  year  before,  had  not  recovered  of  his  wounds,  and  the  late 
Governour  Brooks  who  was  the  Lieutenant  Colonel,  remained 
in  Boston,  to  superintend  the  recruiting  of  the  residue  of  the 
regiment. 

General  St.  Clair  commanded  at  Ticonderoga  on  my  arrival, 
the  latter  part  of  April. — My  station,  with  the  command  of  this 
regiment,  was  at  the  old  French  lines,  which  had  been  repaired 
the  year  before.  After  the  arrival  of  General  Burgoyne's  army 
these  lines  were  several  times  attacked,  and  the  assailants  as 
often  repulsed.  In  the  retreat  of  the  army  from  this  post, 
through  the  woods  of  Vermont,  I  continued  to  command  the 


APPENDIX.  IV 

vegiment,  and  after  a  fatiguing  march,  a  junction  was  formed 
with  General  Schuyler's  army,  on  the  Hudson,  a  little  below 
fort  Edward. 

As  General  Burgoyne  advanced  from  lake  Champlain,  Gen- 
eral Schuyler  retreated,  and  crossed  to  the  west  bank  of  the 
Hudson.  The  army  in  its  retreat  halted  at  Sarratoga,  and  in 
the  evening  three  hundred  men,  under  my  command,  were  post- 
ed two  miles  above,  on  the  bank  of  the  river,  as  a  rear  guard. 
In  the  night  a  large  body  of  General  Burgoyne's  army,  with  the 
savages  attached  to  it,  crossed  to  the  west  bank  of  the  river, 
made  a  circuitous  march,  and  at  day  light  in  the  morning  ap- 
peared in  the  front,  and  on  the  left  flank  of  the  guard,  my  right 
being  extended  to  the  river.  In  this  situation,  the  enemy  com- 
menced the  attack,  both  in  my  front,  and  on  the  left  flank, 
which  was  resisted,  and  the  ground  maintained,  until  perceiv- 
ing they  were  greatly  superiour  to  me  in  numbers,  and  were 
pressing  around  my  left  flank,  and  gaining  my  rear,  I  ordered  a 
retreat,  which  was  continued  about  a  mile,  under  a  heavy  fire  of 
regulars  and  savages.  Observing  an  advantageous  height  of 
ground,  the  detachment  was  formed,  and  held  their  position, 
although  hardly  pressed,  until  a  strong  re-enforcement  arrived, 
for  my  support ;  the  whole  body  then  advanced  and  compelled 
the  assailants  to  retreat  in  their  turn.  In  this  rencounter,  our 
loss  was  forty  men  and  three  officers,  killed  and  wounded. — 
Although,  in  the  first  instance,  I  was  obliged  to  retreat,  yet  I 
received  the  full  approbation  and  thanks  of  General  Schuyler, 
in  public  orders,  for  my  conduct.  At  this  time  Lieutenant  Col- 
onel Brooks  had  arrived  at  Albany  with  the  remainder  of  the 
regiment,  and  was  marching  up  the  Mowhawk,  with  a  detach- 
ment ordered  for  the  relief  of  fort  Stanwix,  which  was  in- 
vested, by  a  detachment  of  the  British  army,  and  savages.  I 
was  ordered  to  join  him  with  the  part  of  the  regiment  I  had  com- 
manded during  the  campaign,  and  the  junction  was  made  at  the 
German  Flats,  which  was  then  the  extent  of  our  settlements. 
The  gallant  defence  of  that  fort,  with  the  circumstances  of  the 
siege,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  was  relieved,  are  fully  re- 
corded in  history.  After  the  siege  was  raised  and  the  besiegers 
compelled  to  retreat  to  Canada,  the  detachment  returned,  and 
joined  the  army  on  the  Hudson,  at  the  entrance  of  the  Mohawk, 
into  that  river. 

30 


V  APPENDIX.  y 

General  Gates  had  now  been  appointed  to  the  chief  command 
in  the  northern  department,  and  immediately  ordered  the  army 
to  advance  on  the  enemy.  He  took  a  position,  and  formed  his 
camp,  on  Bhemis'  heights,  about  eight  miles  below  Sarratoga, 
where  his  fortifications  were  erected,  with  the  right  extending 
to  the  Hudson.  General  Burgoyne,  crossed  the  river  at  fort 
Edward,  and  established  his  camp,  and  fortifications,  above, 
leaving  a  space  of  about  two  miles,  between  the  two  armies. — 
The  two  memorable  battles,  which  were  fought  on  this  ground 
by  these  two  armies,  on  the  19th  of  September,  and  the  7th  of 
October,  previously  to  the  surrender  of  General  Burgoyne,  are 
also  described  in  the  history  of  the  revolutionary  war.  The 
action  of  the  19th  of  September,  commenced  between  Colonel 
Morgan's  riflemen  and  an  advanced  corps  from  the  right  of 
General  Burgoyne's  encampment,  directed  towards  the  left  of 
General  Gate's  position.  It  was  about  one  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon. A  very  short  interval  succeeded,  when  Morgan's  corps 
was  re-enforced  by  General  Poor's  brigade  from  New  Hamp- 
shire, and  at  the  same  time,  with  a  detachment  of  three  hun- 
dred volunteers,  from  the  Massachusetts'  brigade,  to  which  I 
belonged,  and  the  command  of  which  was  assigned  to  me.  The 
action  was  obstinate,  and  severe,  and  was  only  interrupted  by 
the  dusk  of  the  evening.  General  Burgoyne  claimed  the  victo- 
ry, because  his  troops  lay  on  the  field  of  battle;  our  troops  more 
desirous  of  comfort,  than  of  etiquette,  retired,  in  the  dusk  of 
the  evening  to  their  tents,  to  prepare  for  combat  the  next  day, 
if  called  again  into  the  field.  By  the  return,  it  appeared,  that 
one  hundred  and  fifty  of  the  three  hundred  under  my  command, 
were  killed  and  wounded. 

On  the  7th  of  October,  I  likewise  commanded  another  detach- 
ment from  the  brigade,  of  about  three  hundred  men,  which  be- 
fore the  action  commenced,  was  ordered  to  the  left  of  our  posi- 
tion, to  observe  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  give  information, 
and  check  any  small  parties,  which  might  be  advancing.  It 
was  discovered  in  the  afternoon,  that  the  strength  of  the  British 
army  was  moving  to  occupy  elevated  ground  on  the  left  of  our 
encampment. 

Colonel  Morgan's  riflemen,  with  a  corps  of  light  infantry,  un- 
der the  command  of  Major  Dearborn  and  the  principal  part  of 
the  left  wing  of  the  army,  was  ordered  to  attack  them,      "When 


APPENDIX,  VI 

these  re-enforcements  arrived  on  the  ground  where  I  was  posted , 
I  joined  Colonel  Weston's  regiment  with  the  detachment  I 
commanded,  and  after  a  severe  conflict,  General  Burgoyne  was 
compelled  to  retreat  to  his  lines,  where  he  was  followed,  and 
the  day  was  closed  by  storming  his  entrenchments,  and  entire 
possession  was  gained  of  the  right  of  his  position,  and  encamp- 
ment. This  victory,  and  the  obstinate  battle  of  the  19th  of 
September,  with  our  success  at  fort  Stanwix,  and  Bennington, 
on  his  right  and  left  wing,  decided  the  fate  of  his  army.  After 
the  surrender,  the  regiment  to  which  I  belonged,  with  other  de- 
tachments from  General  Gates'  was  ordered  to  re  enforce  Gene- 
ral Washington's  army,  then  at  White  Marsh,  between  the 
Delaware  and  Schuylkill,  in  Pennsylvania, — after  this  junction 
the  British  army  marched  out  of  Philadelphia,  reconnoitred,  and 
viewed  every  part  of  General  Washington's  position,  and  it  was 
fully  expected  a  general  battle  would  have  been  fought,  between 
the  two  armies,  on  this  occasion.  Sir  William  Howe  could  have 
had  no  other  motive  in  advancing  from  Philadelphia;  and  Gen- 
eral Washington  had  taken  a  strong  position,  and  there  is  no 
doubt,  but  it  was  his  intention,  to  have  defended  it.  He  had 
now  with  him  the  strength  of  General  Gates'  success  ful  army, 
and  the  army  he  had  commanded  during  the  campaign.  The 
one  would  have  been  animated  with  a  desire  to  have  maintained 
the  character  it  had  acquired,  and  the  other  to  have  proved, 
that  it  had  deserved  equal  success.  The  fields  between  the 
two  armies,  were  suitable  for  military  operations,  and  the 
strength  of  both  was  collected  in  compact  bodies. 

The  British  commander,  declining  the  combat,  probably  pre- 
vented a  more  general  battle  than  was  fought  during  the  war  of 
the  revolution.  The  British  army  would  have  been  ambitious 
to  have  retrieved  the  misfortunes  at  the  north,  and  the  American 
army,  now  united  under  the  standard  of  its  beloved  Washing- 
ton, would  have  exerted  all  its  energies  to  have  added  to  the 
glory,  which  had  been  acquired  at  Saratoga 

After  the  retreat  of  the  British  army  to  Philadelphia,  General 
Washington  marched  his  army  to  the  west  bank  of  the  Schuyl- 
kill, about  twenty  miles  from  Philadelphia,  in  the  month  of  De- 
cember, where  huts  were  built  foe  winter  quarters,  with  mate- 
rials taken  immediately  from  the  forest,  and  constructed  by  the 
troops,    without  any  assistance  from  mechanics.     Here,  after 


Vll  APPENDIX. 

the  toils  of  the  campaign,  the  army  suffered  every  distress,  which 
the  want  of  necessary  food,  comfortable  clothing,  and  conse- 
quent disease  could  occasion.  In  this  situation  it  remained, 
until  the  British  army  evacuated  Philadelphia,  and  commenced 
its  march  through  New  Jersey  to  New  York,  by  the  way  of 
Amboy.  As  soon  as  information  was  received  of  this  move- 
ment, General  Washington  crossed  the  Schuylkill,  and  march- 
ed on  the  rear  of  the  enemy.  At  Monmouth,  the  British  army 
was  overtaken,  and  a  battle  ensued,  honourable  to  the  Ameri- 
can arms.  In  this  battle,  I  commanded  the  8th  Massachusetts' 
regiment,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Brooks  acting  on  the  staff  as  Ad- 
jutant General  to  the  advanced  corps,  under  the  command  of 
General  Lee.  After  this  battle,  the  army  retired  to  th?  Hud- 
son, and  the  following  winter,  was  stationed  at  West  Point, 
and  in  the  high  lands. 

During  the  winter,  the  command  of  the  troops,  on  the  ad- 
vanced lines  of  the  army,  near  York  Island,  was  assigned  to 
me.  The  objects  of  the  command  were,  to  observe  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy,  check  any  small  parties  advancing  into  the 
country,  and  afford  protection  to  the  inhabitants  of  that  part  of  the 
state  of  New  York,  and  the  west  part  of  the  state  of  Connecti- 
cut. The  line  of  defence  extended  from  the  north  river  to  the 
White  Plains,  and  from  thence  to  the  east  river  or  sound,  a 
distance  of  about  ten  miles. 

This  position  was  about  twenty-five  miles  from  any  ether 
part  of  the  American  army,  and  not  more  than  ten  miles  from 
the  enemy,  on  York  Island.  My  command  consisted  of  about 
four  hundred  men,  and  the  duty  was  so  severe,  that  all  the  offi- 
cers and  men,  were  relieved  every  fortnight.  I  however  re- 
mained, at  the  request  of  General  Washington,  from  November 
until  May ;  during  this  time,  many  attempts  were  made  by  the 
enemy  to  surprize  my  guards,  but  without  success.  All  my 
rest  and  sleep  were  taken  by  day,  and  my  nights  were  devoted 
to  incessant  duty.  In  this  exposed  situation,  for  live  months, 
within  three  hours'  march  of  the  whole  British  army,  no  part  of 
my  troops  was  ever  surprized,  although  many  attempts  were 
made  for  the  purpose,  and  many  successful  enterprizes  were 
made  against  the  enemy's  oui-posts. 

In  May,  1779,  when  the  British  army  advanced  up  the  north 
river,  to  take  possession  of  Stoney  and  Verplank's  points,  I  was 


APPEJJDIX.  Till 

ordered  to  retire  from  the  lines,  and  join  the  army  at  West 
Point.  This  corps,  composed  of  light  infantry,  was  continued 
under  my  command,  and  was  ordered  to  take  a  position  on  the 
highest  ground,  in  the  rear  of  the  fortifications  at  that  place 
and  which  overlooked  all  that  had  been  constructed  between  it 
and  the  river.  Here  a  new  fort  was  erected,  by  this  corps* 
General  Wayne,  at  this  time,  commanded  the  light  infantry  of 
the  army,  and  his  station  was  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Hudson, 
about  three  miles  below  West  Point,  near  fort  Montgomery. 
The  British  commander  having  erected  fortifications  on  both 
sides  of  the  Hudson,  about  fourteen  miles  below  West  Point, 
at  Stoney  Point  and  Verplank's  point,  and,  leaving  about  a 
thousand  men  at  each  of  those  posts,  returned  to  New  York 
with  the  main  body  of  his  army,  and  formed  a  predatory  expe- 
dition against  the  towns  in  Connecticut,  which  bordered  on  the 
sea  shore.  His  object  undoubtedly  was,  to  draw  General  Wash- 
ington from  his  strong  holds,  on  the  Hudson,  and  before  he 
could  return  for  their  defence,  ascend  the  Hudson,  and  possess 
himself  of  West  Point,  and  the  positions  in  the  high  lands. 
Under  these  circumstances,  it  became  necessary,  for  General 
Washington  to  adopt  some  measures,  to  check  the  desolation 
making  on  the  sea-board. 

Not  thinking  it  safe  to  march  his  army  from  the  Hudson,  he 
projected  an  enterprize  against  Stoney  and  Verplank's  Point. 
The  execution  of  the  one  against  Stoney  Point  was  committed 
to  General  Wayne ;  I  was  ordered  with  the  corps  I  command- 
ed to  leave  the  heights  I  had  fortified,  and  join  him  at  Sandy 
Beach,  near  fort  Montgomery.  Before  we  marched,  two  com- 
panies of  light  infantry,  from  North  Carolina,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Major  Murphy,  were  ordered  to  join  my  corps,  and 
being  the  senior  officer,  my  command  now  consisted  of  seven 
companies.  The  whole  body  of  light  infantry,  being  thus  or- 
ganized under  the  command  of  General  Wayne,  consisting  of 
less  than  two  thousand  men,  commenced  its  march  over  the 
mountains,  and  halted  the  beginning  of  the  evening,  about  a 
mile  and  an  half  from  Stoney  Point. 

Here  the  orders  were,  for  the  first  time,  communicated. — 
At  twelve  o'clock  at  night,  the  attack  was  made,  with  unloaded 
arms,  and  with  the  bayonet  alone.  Some  historians  of  the  rev- 
olution have  considered  that  the  British  garrison  was  surprized. 


IX  APPENDIX. 

This  is  not  the  fact ;  as  we  advanced,  the  centinels  fired  on  ug 
half  a  mile  from  the  fort,  and  when  we  forced  the  barriers,  and 
entered  the  fort,  every  British  soldier  was  in  full  uniform,  with 
his  arms  in  his  hands.  History  has  pointed  out  all  the  trans- 
actions relating  to  this  successful  enterprize. 

In  consequence  of  letters  from  General  Washington  to  Gene- 
ral Heath,  and  from  General  Washington  to  the  legislature  of 
Massachusetts,  after  the  enterprize  against  Stoney  Point,  I  was 
promoted  to  the  rank  of  Lieutenant  Colonel ; — promotions  at 
that  period,  being  made  by  the  legislatures  of  the  states. 

When  the  army  retired  to  winter  quarters,  in  1 779,  the  paper 
money,  in  which  the  officers  and  soldiers  had  been  paid,  had 
depreciated  to  such  a  degree,  that  justice  and  expediency  re- 
quired that  some  measures  should  be  adopted  for  their  relief. 
General  Washington  approved  and  consented  to  an  arrange- 
ment, of  sending  commissioners,  to  the  different  states,  to  repre- 
sent the  case  to  the  legislatures,  and  solicit  relief. — To  this  duty 
I  was  appointed,  by  the  officers  of  the  Massachusetts'  line,  and 
this  was  my  first  absence  from  military  duty,  since  I  had  joined 
the  army  in  1775. 

In  December,  1780,  and  January,  1781,  mutinies  had  been 
excited  in  the  Pennsylvania  and  Jersey  lines  of  the  army,  from 
causes,  which  here  it  is  unnecessary  to  mention,  and  it  was  feared 
the  excitement  would  extend  to  the  other  parts  of  the  army. 
General  Washington  was  desirous  of  making  some  offensive 
operations  against  the  enemy,  to  show  to  his  country,  and  the 
"British  commander,  that  his  whole  army  was  not  infected  with 
this  mutinous  spirit.  For  this  purpose  he  ordered  a  detachment 
to  march  against  the  mutineers  into  New  Jersey,  and  awother 
detachment  to  attack  the  enemy's  post  at  Morrisania.  The 
command  of  the  latter  detachment  was  assigned  to  me — Mor- 
rissania  was  so  insulated,  that  General  Washington  considered 
that  success  was  very  doubtful ;  but  under  the  circumstances 
which  existed,  as  appears  in  his  letter  on  the  subject  to  General 
Heath,  he  thought  it  expedient  to  make  the  attempt.  The  re- 
sult, however,  was  favourable  to  the  American  arms,  as  com- 
plete success  attended  the  enterprize. 

In  the  summer  of  1783,  after  preliminary  articles  of  peace 
were  settled,  and  a  cessation  of  hostilities  had  taken  place,  the 
American  army  remained  at  West  Point,  and  in  the  highlands 


APPENDIX.  X 

in  its  neighbourhood  and  a  corps  of  light  infantry  was  formed 
and  stationed  very  near  the*  British  posts  at  Kingsbridge,  the 
command  of  which  was  assigned  to  me-  Here  I  remained  until 
the  British  army  was  ready  to  evacuate  New  York.  At  that 
time  General  Washington  with  many  of  the  principal  officers 
of  the  army,  attended  likewise  by  the  Govcrnour,  and  a  number 
of  the  civil  officers  of  the  State  were  escorted  into  the  city  by 
the  corps  I  commanded ;  and  commencing  at  Kingsbridge,  as 
the  British  retired  from  their  posts  we  advanced  and  took  pos- 
session of  them. 

The  day  Geaefal  "Washington  took  his  final  farewell  of  his 
brother  office's  in  New  York,  this  corps  which  I  had  so  long 
command  yd,  had  the  honour  of  escorting  him  to  his  barge,  and 
paying  him  the  last  military  salutation  he  received  from  that 
army,  which  had  followed  his  standard  through  the  trying  scenes 
of  the  revolutionary  struggle. 

Under  the  circumstances,  which  have  since  taken  place,  and 
the  attempts  which  have  been  made,  to  destroy  my  military 
character,  I  have  considered  it  my  duty,  fellow  citizens,  to  pre- 
sent to  you,  this  general  sketch  of  my  revolutionary  services. 

In  the  enterprize  against  Morrissania,  where  I  commanded,  I 
refer  you  to  the  letter  of  General  Washington  to  General  Heath, 
which  has  been  lately  published,  to  show  his  opinion  of  the  haz- 
ard, which  attended  it,  and  to  his  public  orders  to  the  army,  ex- 
pressing his  thanks,  for  the  judicious  arrangements,  which  were 
made,  and  the  intrepid  manner,  in  which  they  were  executed. 
Likewise  to  the  resolution  of  Congress,  with  similar  expressions 
of  approbation. 

jbor  my  conduct,  in  storming  Stony  Point,  I  refer  you  to  the 
public  orders  of  General  Wayne,  General  Washington,  and  the 
resolution  of  Congress,  in  which  my  name  will  be  found  associat- 
ed, with  the  officers,  who  distinguished  themselves  on  that  oc- 
casion. 

On  all  other  occasions  where  I  was  called  into  the  field  of 
danger,  I  can  refer  to  the  letters  and  orders  of  General  Wash- 
ington, and  the  other  Generals,  under  whose  immediate  com- 
mand I  served,  for  their  approbation. 

I  am  in  the  possession  of  these  testimonials,  and  many  of 
them  are  on  the  records  of  our  country.  They  will  be  preserv- 
ed and  left  with  my  family,  to  be  made  use  of  hereafter,  in  such 
manner,  as  they  may  think  proper.        WILLIAM  HULL. 


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